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
THE
EXPOSITOR.

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THE EXPOSITOR.

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE REVISED VERSION.

THERE are certain Greek constructions which still remain mysteries and challenge solution. Nor should this create surprise; for although principles of language have repeatedly been formulated in rules of grammar ever fashioned anew, nevertheless of these rules a few only are cardinal and serviceable, while of the rest some are quite useless, others obstructive and misleading, many even more obscure than the principles they profess to formulate. To the earnest student a modern syntax looks like a pathless forest, a tangle of despair. To rearrange and simplify these rules, a gifted grammarian would just now be a great boon. A few stars in philology appeared in the beginning of this century, such as Porson and Hermann and Buttman; men so keen of insight in the laws of language as to deserve the title of legislators in scholarship. A like power of intuition must have marked some of the first translators of the New Testament, a work admirably done; at any rate they appear in their renderings of certain texts to have seen, by a shrewd instinct, what their modern successors have failed to see by trained scholarship.

As one reads the Revised Version, there grows upon the mind an impression that it exhibits in its translations more labour than genius, more learning than judgment. Too often the noble forest cannot be seen for the particular

trees ; minute precision excludes vigorous intuition, and rigid grammar displaces common sense. This absence or scantiness of fine discernment both in linguistic principles and in rhythmical rendering appears to be a constitutional defect in the new translation ; a serious blemish it is, marking many of the thousand and one alterations that have been made. This lack of strong grasp and of fine taste may be just now exemplified in two instances out of many ; one a sample of awkward and ungainly English : “ I am not *sufficient* that thou shouldst enter under my roof ”—why not *meet* for *ικανός*, if indeed *worthy* must be altered?—the other a specimen of bewildering wordiness in the sentence (Acts xxvi. 16) : “ To appoint thee a minister and a witness both of the things wherein thou hast seen me, and of the things wherein I will appear unto thee.” This last instance seems to be a very frolic of verbiage ; moreover, as to the inner meaning, it may perhaps be fairly asked—How can a *person* be said to appear or be seen in a *thing*, and that twice over ? Nevertheless, it must be owned the Greek here is difficult. But notwithstanding this characteristic feebleness, numerous texts have in the Revised Version been retranslated for the better, and some of them very well done. If, therefore, the new translation shall by competent judges be pronounced a positive improvement upon the old, it will at the same time be designated an improvement that leaves large room for further improvement. In the hope of contributing somewhat to this “ further improvement ” the following paper is written. Its main object is to draw attention to certain principles of construction in Greek, which seem to have escaped the notice of scholars in general, and of the Revisers in particular. This necessitates a critical examination of certain renderings.

Unquestionably some half-dozen constructions of prime consideration have met with what may be termed summary treatment ; such, for instance, as relate to participial tenses,

or to obstinate nouns in $\mu\alpha$, or to the elastic middle voice, or to the accommodating $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$, or to the unobtrusive $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$. Let the construction of the last-named $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ come first under review, as it is a quiet and unambitious particle, one that seems to care as little what verbal mood it ushers in as the Revision itself seems to have cared—in some prime instances at least.

It appears that Matthiæ could never “satisfy himself whether any or what difference exists between the construction of $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ with an infinitive and with an indicative.” And in fact, the cloud, which full fifty years ago enveloped these two constructions, leaving them an undistinguishable one, is even now slow to melt, slow to roll away; a certain haze still lingers about them, and many scholars do but dimly discern that the two eminences as they come to view are parted from each other by a deep depression between them. The difference is as great as the difference between $\omicron\upsilon$ and $\mu\acute{\eta}$, and much the same. It may be said that $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ with the indicative points to something *actual*, with the infinitive to something *contemplated*. This “something” is often, not always, a *result*. The first of these two may be called the *objective* use of $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$, the second the *subjective*. And yet this distinction, broad as it is, would be hardly correct, because it is evident that the particle is in itself quite indifferent, by its own confession perfectly neutral and equally flexible to either mood, ever ready to fingerpoint alike the steady indicative or the airy infinitive. The real difference, therefore, between the two constructions resides in the mood of the verb that happens to follow $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$: and if the indicative mood may be termed objective as denoting what is actual, and the infinitive mood subjective as denoting what is mental or contemplated,—in that case certainly this or that use of $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$, being determined by the nature of the mood that follows it, may be called its objective or subjective use. It is in the mood, therefore, and not in the

particle, that the idea of what is actual and of what is conceptional resides.

If the above theory is true, we cannot in propriety render ὥστε τινὰ θαυμάσαι "so that some one wondered," any more than we can render in an apodosis τινὰ θαυμάσαι "some one wondered." The Greek for "so that some one wondered" is ὥστε τὶς ἐθαύμασεν, and for the precise reason that τὶς ἐθαύμασεν by itself means "some one wondered."

On this principle let us proceed to examine a certain text, 1 Corinthians v. 1, ὥστε γυναῖκά τινα ἔχειν, where the translation in the Authorised Version "that one should have his father's wife" has been altered into "that one of you hath his father's wife." Is this new rendering grammatically possible on the principle stated above? Just as grammatically possible as to translate ἔχειν in apodosis "he hath" is grammatically possible. For it has been shewn that ὥστε has in itself no governing power, is in itself but an index, a mere fingerpost or stepping-stone conducting to some verb or other beyond it, whether to ἔχει or to ἔχειν or to ἔχοι or to ἔχοι ἄν, what cares ὥστε? The particle is supremely indifferent, probably quite unconscious, neither knowing nor caring to know whether it guides the reader to an infinitive or to an indicative or even to an optative with or without ἄν. Hence it appears that the ἔχειν in this text is not at all governed or controlled by ὥστε, but simply indicated by it. The infinitive, in fact, if an infinitive which denotes what is conceptional and not what is actual can be said to stand at all, stands by itself. That the ὥστε and the ἔχειν are in construction independent of each other, may be further shewn by the frequent absence of this particle before the infinitive, for instance κλύειν or μαθεῖν, just as in English to wit.

Possibly in this text (1 Cor. v. 1) the infinitive in its true idea would be better satisfied, if it were represented thus in the whole passage rendered thus: "Absolutely (ὁλως) it

is reported that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not among the Gentiles; namely, for a man to have his father's wife." And no doubt ὥστε likewise, as a sign pointing *forward*, would be well content to be represented by *for*. Nevertheless this suggested rendering would be no improvement upon that of the Authorised Version. Why so? Because in the latter the words *that one should have* really make the general and subjective idea of the clause just as prominent as do the words *for one to have*. For the *subjunctive* and *infinitive* are both alike moods of conception or contemplation, precisely as the indicative is the mood of action. The truth of the matter is, if we must sound this construction to the very bottom, the rendering "for one to have" is more *literal* and closer to the Greek ὥστε τινὰ ἔχειν, whereas the Authorised rendering, "that one should have," is more *idiomatic* and less close to the Greek. The proper Greek for the translation *that one should have* would be ἵνα τις ἔχη. But in a sentence of this form, with τοιαύτη in the apodosis, what is the difference between ὥστε τινὰ ἔχειν and ἵνα τις ἔχη? Just none at all. This might be shewn at length, did space permit. If then the Authorised idiomatic and the suggested literal forms of rendering are equivalents, each yielding the same sense in substance, which is to be preferred here? The idiomatic one of the Authorised Version. Why so? Because it fits in better with what goes before; because it goes along in easy continuity, running in harness and in harmony with its leader. In fact, the translation of the Authorised Version can hardly be improved. And yet it has been expunged in the Revised Version, and replaced by a new rendering that simply rends the grammar, confounds mood with mood, identifies objective with subjective: that is, of course, if the theory propounded in the outset is true. Moreover the inserted genitive *of you* in italics is a somewhat solid importation.

But supposing for a moment the new rendering were grammatically possible, would it on *ethical* grounds be probable? Far from it: quite alien to St. Paul's tender consideration for others would be such a direct personal allusion as is couched in the phrase "that one of you *hath*." It would almost cast a slur on the Apostle's characteristic courtesy and gentle method of dealing with a lapsed Christian. Whereas if we translate *that one* or *any one should have his father's wife*, or perhaps more accurately still, *should have for wife his father's*, according to this rendering St. Paul is made to put a particular case in general terms, covering the *individual* offender with the broad screen of a possible *class* of such offenders. Just as when a member of a Corporation by ill advice misleads the rest, the individual shielded by the Society escapes the scornful pointing of the public finger.

Akin to this error in 1 Corinthians v. 1, and a member of the same family, is another error, one of omission in this instance, not of commission as in the former. In 1 Corinthians i. 7, the Greek ἐβεβαιώθη ἐν ὑμῖν, ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματος is translated in both Versions "was confirmed in you: (why so big a stop as a colon here?) so that ye come behind in no gift." It may be remarked that if this English were turned into good Greek, the ὑμᾶς would be changed into ὑμεῖς, μὴ into οὐχ, ὑστερεῖσθαι not into ὑστερεῖσθε but into ὑστερεῖτε: for ὑστερεῖτε means *ye come behind*, ὑστερεῖσθε *ye feel behindhand*. In this one clause there are two mistakes made in the Authorised Version and neither of them unmade in the Revised Version. It is at once evident from the subjective form of the construction that the Apostle does not mean to declare as an objective fact that the Corinthian converts were not inferior to other Christian communities in respect of charismata or gifts bestowed: rather he appeals to their *consciousness* of equality with any other Church in all

spiritual endowments. He appeals to this consciousness of equality as a felt result and, it may be, as an internal evidence of their confirmation in the faith. This more correct view of the clause may be expressed in the following retranslation: "The testimony of Christ was confirmed in you, *causing you not to feel behindhand* in any one gift." It may be added that the subjective negative μή serves to corroborate, what needs no corroboration at all, namely the subjectivity of the infinitive ὑστερεῖσθαι, making the objectivity of the whole clause, impossible before, more impossible still.

"But," some one will say, "it may be all quite true—this distinction of yours between the two constructions of ὥστε. No doubt the theory fits in well enough with the foregoing texts, and with others besides, it may be: nevertheless, there are numerous texts in which this theory can hardly hold good, for instance St. Matthew xii. 22, 'and He healed him, *inasmuch that* the dumb man *spoke* and *saw*': where the Greek is ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτόν, ὥστε τὸν τυφλὸν λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν. Surely you must allow that the rendering of this clause in both Versions is a good one." Answer to the objection: It is true that the rendering of the ὥστε clause, common to both Versions, gives the sense well enough, and perhaps the Revisers were wise in leaving the English text undisturbed, simply on the principle of μή κίνει Καμάριναν. Nevertheless, though it may stand on moral grounds, it cannot stand at all on grammatical. For consider: if ὥστε is a facile particle, as it is, passive, ductile, ready to point at any time to any of the four moods, then λαλεῖν *to talk* or βλέπειν *to see* is no more affected by the particle than the wind is by a weathercock. In fact, the Infinitive is inexorable in its mood, and will not condescend to stand like the Indicative on the *terra firma* of objectivity (as in *he spoke and saw*), but insists on floating in the buxom air of subjectivity (as in *to talk* and *to see*).

“But,” comes again the voice of the objector, “what *does* it matter? In spite of subjectivity and objectivity and similar flashes of inventivity, surely the plain meaning is given in the plain English *insomuch that he spake and saw*. The pure gold of sound sense is here: why gild it? The lily of truth is here; why paint it? The grammar may be quite wrong, but the logic is all right.” Answer: No doubt the sense given is sound enough, although the grammar be rent in twain; but are you so sure about the *logic*? Consider: in the rendering *insomuch that* (a big word for modest ὥστε) *he spake and saw*, which of the two comes most to view, the effect or the cause? Clearly the effect. The effect of what cause? As clearly, the effect of the inward cure wrought by the Lord. Unquestionably the plain meaning, as you call it, of the clause is given in both Versions, for the simple reason that it is obvious from the context or circumstances or nature of the case, that such effect of speaking and of seeing must follow such cause, namely, a thorough cure of a man dumb and blind. For that the cure was thorough, and wrought from within before the effects were seen from without, is patent from the aorist tense of ἐθεράπευσεν. But notwithstanding the sufficiency of the received translation for the ordinary reader, it is a thing to be well noted that the structure of the clause in Greek, while it makes apparent the outward effects or visible fruits of the inward cure, at the same time makes more conspicuous the inward cure as cause of such effect. For this reason it seems that the grammar would be more correct, and the logic more perfect, and the sense more true, and the “gold” more refined, if the clause in question were rendered, “And he healed him, causing the blind man to speak and to see,” or more simply “making him talk and see.” In this suggested rendering the cure, as cause, is made more prominent; in the received one the talking and seeing as effects. It may be remarked by the way

that *θεραπεῖν* means *to cure*, *ἰᾶσθαι* *to heal*; while *λαλεῖν* often, not always, means *to talk*, and *λέγειν* *to speak* or *say*.

"But," again is heard the voice of one complaining, "there are so many other texts, sir, in which *ὥστε* occurs with the infinitive, where—but no doubt what you said just now about *ὥστε* with the indicative is all correct, for I have just glanced through all the instances of Bruder's Concordance. But what have you to say now about a text like this (Matt. xiii. 32): 'But when it is grown, it is greater than the herbs, and becometh a tree, *so that* the birds of the heaven *come* and *lodge* in the branches thereof'? What now becomes of your theory of cause and effect? Can you without affectation, sir, speak of any tree *causing* any fowl to come and lodge in its branches? Where is now your 'buxom' subjectivity, as you are pleased to call it? It melts into the air, in which you say it floats! For my part, being a plain scholar, I much prefer the downright, straightforward, manly objectivity of the Revised Version, sir! Give me the *terra firma* of plain sense level to an honest mind. To achieve this end, why should not two moods be fused and melted into one, if the solution comes out clear? Why should not infinitives on the wing (if I may pluck a plume from your own figurative style) be identified sometimes with indicatives on the tramp? Or, better still, why should not the eagle of subjectivity soaring in the air be now and then taken for the lion of objectivity roaring in the plain? What after all if your finespun subjectivity, sir, is but the homespun of your imaginativeness, sir? Excuse this bluntness of speech: I may have overshot the mark, but you will allow at least there is a difficulty here." Answer: As to my style, I find it difficult in dealing with abstractions to avoid the use of metaphor. No doubt there is, as you say, a difficulty here; yet a difficulty, I venture to think, not insurmountable. But in solving it we must, I fear, again plunge into the mazes

of subjectivity. And the clue to this labyrinth is the language again of metaphor. For the bearings of abstract principles are best elucidated by the application of familiar images. The question just now before us is, whether the clause ὥστε ἐλθεῖν τὰ πετεινά κ.τ.λ. rendered "so that the birds come and build" invalidates the theory propounded above, of the broad difference between ὥστε with the indicative and with the infinitive. In other words, can this clause be fairly and honestly so re-translated as not to shake that theory? Nothing easier: for if the severe objectivity of a clause with the indicative may be compared to a rigid stump bare of boughs, the pliant subjectivity of a clause with the infinitive may be likewise compared to a facile stem spreading into branches. This image will facilitate the solution of the seeming difficulty. Flexible subjectivity puts forth several branches, all akin to one another in substance but differing in form: and their substance is mental conception. Now two or three of these branches of the contemplative, all of them ὁμόριζοι have already appeared in clauses already discussed; for instance *that one should have his father's wife*, or (a distinction without an appreciable difference) *for one to have his father's wife*; and again *causing or inspiring you to feel behindhand in no one gift*. And what if another branch should shoot forth ὁμόριζος from the same stem of fertile subjectivity? And another after that? Are there not passages to be found in the Greek Testament similar in structure to (Ædip. Col. 969)—

ἐπεὶ διδάξον, εἴ τι θέσφατον πατρὶ
 χρησμοῖσιν ἰκνέῃθ', ὥστε πρὸς παίδων θανεῖν?

What does the ὥστε clause mean in these lines? Aught objective or actual? Or does the eagle of the air scorn to be identified with the lion of the plain? The bird contemns the beast. Certainly the subordinate ὥστε clause here

serves to specify the contents of the oracle of Apollo; and so the passage may be translated, *If there came to a father an oracle in boys* (to the effect) *that he should die by a son*. But this quotation from Sophocles merely by the way, to shew that in all clauses with ὥστε and the infinitive the real difficulty lies in determining the special line on which the mental conception moves. Starting always from the same station of subjectivity the conception takes the line sometimes of *design* or *intent*, as in ὥστε ὁρᾶν *for to see*, or of what is akin to this idea the line of *contemplated result*; sometimes again that of *definition* or explanation in detail of something general that has gone before, sometimes again of *degree* or *extent*—not actual, of course, but potential or viewed as a natural or possible consequence.

Perhaps the above classification might be simplified and reduced to fewer lines. But it is sufficiently obvious from all that has been said, that in all these instances of ὥστε with the infinitive the context, the preceding context, alone determines the precise shade of meaning, alone determines what particular direction the conception may take on leaving the station of subjectivity; in other and more accurate language, alone determines with what specific circumstantial sense the essential sense (always an invariable quantity and in these instances pure *mental conception*) may choose to clothe itself.

In the text St. Matthew xiii. 32, extent or degree or capacity is the particular result contemplated, and the passage may be rendered, "The mustard seed becomes a tree *allowing* the birds of the air to come and lodge in its branches," that is, a large tree, making it possible, or a tree big enough *for* the birds to build therein. This again may be improved and simplified into "becometh a tree *for* the birds to come and build in its branches." (No need of any punctuation after the word "tree.") One more instance may be added, involving an ambiguity which neither grammar nor con-

text can solve. From the ὥστε πλανῆσαι of St. Matthew xxiv. 24, are we to infer that the magicians of the last days will work stupendous miracles “*enough to lead astray the elect*” or “*for to lead astray the elect*”? Does the Greek clause denote a result contemplated as possible or natural by spectators from the outside, or does it point to design and purpose conceived by the magicians themselves? That seems to be a question which remains to be settled by the context of future history.

It may be added, in conclusion, that the above stated theory seems *elastic enough to suit* (ὥστε συναρμόττειν I dare not say ὥστε συναρμόττει *so elastic that it does suit*, any more than I dare translate ὥστε τινα ἔχειν *that one has*) most, if not all, of the ὥστε clauses in the Greek Testament. The theory not only insists upon a radical difference between the objective use of ὥστε with the indicative and its subjective use with the infinitive, but also maintains that, while the former is rigid and uniform, the latter is pliable and manifold, not a *platanus cælebs* or stately bachelor, but a ramifying paterfamilias. If the principle is a true one, it would have been better, more edifying even for the ordinary reader, had it been more frequently applied by the learned Revisers. It remains an open question whether it was worth while to make alterations in a large class of texts wherein the sense is sufficiently given in the Authorised Version, albeit given at the cost of much grammar and some logic. One sample of this class is 1 Thessalonians i. 7, where the proper Greek for the retained rendering *so that ye became an ensample*, would of necessity be ὥστε ὑμεῖς ἐγένεσθε τύπος. Here, however, it is possible that the principle of “let well alone” might well apply, lest what had been made by alteration grammatically and logically better, might prove, because of alteration, morally worse, in disturbing the cherished associations of time-hallowed phrase.

The construction of *participial tenses* comes next under review. In this branch of scholarship imperfects and aorists alike seem to have been treated in the Revised Version with a lack of diagnosis sometimes disastrous, in a few cases fatal to the true idea.

But its examination may furnish material for another Article. Meanwhile some light food for critical rumination is provided in the rendering of *εἴπερ* and *εἴγε*. These significant particles appear in the Revision to have met with much the same treatment as *ὥστε* with its two moods, or as the participles with their two or three tenses. They are simply undifferentiated. The rendering of both *εἴπερ* and *εἴγε* in the New Version is one and the same: it is *if so be that*. This bracketing of inequalities serves to demolish the true idea in a few texts, for instance, 2 Corinthians v. 3, where see Mr. Waite's note of explanation in the "Speaker's Commentary."

T. S. EVANS.

THE SECOND PSALM.

THE second Psalm has many and distinguished claims on our regard. No other psalm is so frequently quoted in the New Testament. It is the most dramatic, as it is also one of the most beautiful, lyrics in the whole Psalter. It is rife with Messianic indications. It is one of the earliest, heartiest, and most re-assuring proclamations of that final and complete triumph of good over evil in which Christ has taught us to hope.

On all these grounds, then, the Psalm claims and commands our attention. And yet we know, and can know, absolutely nothing whether of its date, its occasion, or its authorship. It "rings with the tramp of gathering armies and notes of lofty challenge." It seems to have been

written at a time "when Jerusalem was threatened by a confederacy" of hostile and rebellious powers, a confederacy which took advantage of the accession of a young and inexperienced monarch to fling off the bonds of subjection and tribute. David, Solomon, Ahaz, Uzziah, have each of them been regarded as the hero and theme of the poem; but in each case there is some lack of correspondence between the psalm and the history of their several reigns: either we find no trace of such a confederacy as is here assumed, or the confederates are not revolted tributaries, or the king against whom they rebel is not young and newly placed on the throne. And, indeed, there is no necessity for the assumption that the Psalmist had any actual king, or any series of historic circumstance, immediately in view. It may well be that he was brooding over the promise made to David when, because he had wished to build a house for God, God assured him that He would build up *his* house, and establish the throne of his kingdom. Speaking of the seed of David,¹ God said, "*I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son.*" As he brooded over this gracious promise, it may have occurred to the Psalmist that the Divine determination, or decree, would not run smoothly to its end; that if, for a time, the wide empire of David should be maintained, it was sure, at some time, to be dismembered and assailed; hostile powers would come up against it; tributary powers would rise up against it: but, nevertheless, the purpose of God would stand fast, his promise would be made good: the hostile and rebellious powers would but break themselves in pieces against it: nay, despite all their assaults, that kingdom would grow and spread till it reached and covered the uttermost parts of the earth.

It may be that the Psalmist had no one actual king in his eye, but *the* king, the *ideal* king, any and every son

¹ 2 Sam. vii. 14.

of David who proved himself to be also a son of God by his fidelity to his royal call and vocation. For, if that were so, it at once explains the lofty Messianic prevision of the Psalm. There is but a step between the ideal king and the Messianic king—a step, moreover, which the poets and prophets of Israel were for ever taking. When they thought of the King in the abstract, the King as he should be, they thought of the Messiah; just as when we think of the ideal Father, we think of God.

We can name neither the hero of the Psalm, nor its author; and from the very structure of the Psalm we may infer, I think, that the author did not care to be known; that he had what we are told the true artist must have—"the divine courage to eclipse himself, and disappear in his own immortal work." It is one of the most impersonal and dramatic of songs. So far from obtruding himself upon us, the Poet retires behind his own work, and is content to give us simply the reflection of what he saw and the echo of what he heard.

His psalm owes its dramatic power mainly, of course, to the fact that he leaves the persons whom he briefly introduces to speak for themselves, and reports the very words of the confederate Princes (Verse 3), of Jehovah (Verse 6), and of the King who is his Son (Verses 7 and 8); even the speech of the King being, not a monologue, but a dialogue, and therefore all the more dramatic.

The dramatic force of the Psalm is obvious to every reader; but its lyrical beauty is, for the most part, obvious only to the accomplished Hebraist. We can all see that the Psalm divides itself into four strophes, of three verses each. Those who are at all familiar with the lyrical poetry of our own land, or of ancient Greece and Rome, cannot but feel that the abrupt question with which the Psalm opens, plunging at once into the very centre and heart of its theme, is in the true lyrical style. But it is impossible

to reproduce in English the subtle vocal and rhythmical changes by which the Poet compels his words, and the very sound of his words, to express and carry his meaning. Most of us must be content to hear that his selection of epithets is so exquisite, and his "phrasing" so subtle and eloquent, as to render the poem at once the joy and the despair of the translator. Thus, for instance, one Commentator tells us that, in the Original, the exclamation of Verse 3—

Up! let us burst their bonds asunder,
And cast away their cords from us!

sounds like "the murmur of hatred and defiance" it expresses; so that you hear in it, says another "the precipitancy and rage of the speakers." And, again, in Verse 5—

Then shall he speak to them in his wrath,
And thunder at them in his hot displeasure—

another fine Hebrew scholar says, "The rhythm changes, and becomes full and sonorous, rolling like thunder"; while a commentator of still livelier imagination—for even a commentator *may* have imagination—hears "a peal of thunder" in the first line of the Verse, and sees "the lightning's destructive flash" in the second line. But, whatever allowance we may make for the imagination of scholars, who are not usually thought to be surcharged with that fine faculty, we may be sure that words which move them so deeply must be fit words and choice, words exquisitely selected and arranged.

I. The manifold beauties of the Psalm, however, will grow upon us, I hope, as we proceed to examine it strophe by strophe, and verse by verse.

The First Strophe (Verses 1-3), opens with an abrupt question, a peremptory *why*,—

Why have nations raged tumultuously,
And why do peoples meditate vanity?

in which even the change from the past tense in “Why *have*?” to the present tense in “Why *do*?” is not without force; since, while the latter indicates a present outbreak, the former points back to the motives, or the conspiracy, from which it sprang. In short, the Poet asks the double question, Why *did* they cherish this rebellious rage? and What *do*, or can, they hope to gain by it? What does it now aim at? and, What first impelled them to it? And the question expresses, by its very abruptness, both his horror and his astonishment at the wild tumultuous scene on which he gazes. It is not a cruel tyrant, not even an austere or careless and indifferent despot, against whom the nations and their princes are leagued. It is Jehovah Himself, Jehovah merciful and gracious, who is assailed in the person of the King whom He has set on the throne. What can have moved them to conspire against *Him*? or how, against Him, can they hope to succeed? They are but meditating vanity. The attempt must be as fruitless as it is groundless. The Almighty cannot be overcome. To cast off the rule of the All-good is but to sink into darkness and perdition. Hence the insanity of the attempt astonishes the Psalmist as much as its wickedness terrifies and revolts him.

The horror grows upon him. For, as we learn from Verse 2, it is not only “the ignorant populace,” it is not only “the base multitude,” which has risen, in momentary rage, to create a passing tumult; but kings of the earth have set or arrayed themselves, have assumed, that is, an attitude of fixed and deliberate hostility, and princes, born leaders of men, have conspired together.¹ It is *they* who

¹ Again mark the change of tense; the first line being in the present tense to indicate that the Poet *sees*, as it were, the array before his eyes; while the past tense of the second line points back to the conspiracy which preceded the muster and array:

Kings of the earth *array* themselves,
And princes *have* conspired together.

have prompted the people; they who have stirred up the tumult; they who lead the revolt.

The closing words of the Verse disclose at once the design they cherish, and the utter hopelessness of it. It is against Jehovah and against his Messiah, *i.e.* against One whom Jehovah has called and anointed, that they have conspired, on whom they make war: and what can they do against One round whom *God* has cast his shield and for whom He fights?

The Poet not only sees the raging and mutinous host; he also hears its menace. In Verse 3 he gives us the very words of the kings and princes who have set themselves to contend with God and his Anointed. And in this impatient exclamation a deep truth is conveyed. It is always for *freedom*, and yet *against* freedom, that men fight when they break the bonds of his law asunder. When men sin, it is not so much the wish to do wrong by which they are moved as the wish to do what they like. The Divine law seems to fetter them, to curtail their natural liberty. It is *a bond*, and they want to break it; *a cord*, and they want to cast it away. They forget, or they do not know, that to break from this bond is to fall into the most degrading and intolerable of slaveries, to become at once the slave and the victim of their own lusts. And yet it is precisely here that the utter hopelessness of their conflict and endeavour lies. The law of God does but formulate the demands of their own nature, the conditions of their own welfare. To do that which is right—right for creatures such as we are in such a world as this—is the only way of peace, freedom, blessedness. To walk at large, they *must* keep God's commandments. To violate these is to wrong their own nature; to sin against God is to sin against their own soul. To break the law is to become a slave to the very lust which prompts them to break that law. And hence the conspiracy of these kings and princes against God was also

a conspiracy against themselves ; their enterprise could only defeat itself, since the more successful it was the more ruinous it would be.

The Second Strophe (Verses 4-6). How, then, could He who sits in heaven but laugh at them ? How could He but have them in derision, when He saw them strutting to their own confusion as they marched with tumultuous banners against Him, defeating themselves in the very hour of their triumph, and binding themselves in a more cruel bondage with every blow they struck for freedom ? We may scruple, as many good men do, to ascribe irony to God ; nor are we bound to be content with the hard stern conception of God which was quite reasonable in an ancient Hebrew psalmist. But we cannot possibly doubt or deny "the irony of events ;" we cannot conceal from ourselves a very grave and pathetic irony in the position of men whose very triumph is their defeat, and who, aiming at freedom, sink into slaves by gaining the very freedom at which they aim. And if God be the great Author and Disposer of events, if it is by his will that those who fight against Him defeat themselves, and those who become rich and great in this world by violating his law ruin and impoverish themselves in all that is really worth having, why need we hesitate to ascribe irony to Him ? The events do not put the irony into themselves ; it is put into them by the great Author and Disposer of events.

So, again, when we read, in Verse 5, that, after laughing and mocking at those who set themselves against the bonds and cords of his law, only to slip from the protection of that law into its penal discipline ;—when we read that God not only laughs and mocks at them, but *speaks to them in his wrath, and thunders at them in his hot displeasure*, we may once more hesitate to receive this ancient conception of the Almighty. We may say : "God is not a man that He should be angry, and still less that He should storm and

rage in his anger like a man in whom passion is strong and judgment weak." And, no doubt, there is reason, and warrant, for what we thus feel and say. And yet what do we mean when, for example, we speak of "a cruel lot," or "a stern retribution," or even of "the storms of fate"? Do we not mean that the conditions of human life are often very hard; that the law which governs our life includes an element of inflexible and unrelenting rigour; that we have to encounter much which is hostile, or which seems to be cruelly hostile, to our present happiness; and even that we are exposed to tempests of calamity in which we are wrecked? But who appointed the conditions of human life, and gave its law, and sends the storms in which men sometimes perish, if not God? Must we not admit, then, that He does at times speak to us in wrath, and thunder at us in his displeasure? Nay, must we not admit that He always speaks thus to us when we fight against Him and his law? that He is for ever and inflexibly opposed to all that is evil in us, and quite inexorable in punishing us for the evils we do?

It surely is not possible to deny it; nay, nor even so much as to wish that it were otherwise. For what does it come to after all save this?—that God is so bent on our good that He will not pass by any evil in us; that, simply because He loves us and seeks our true abiding welfare, He is inflexible in the discipline by which He purifies and transforms us: and that He is inexorable in demanding that all which makes war on Him shall be defeated, if not destroyed, because it also makes war upon us. It is this good kind end of God which reconciles us to his anger and teaches us the mercy of judgment; for anger against evil means love of that which is good; and the judgments which purge us from evil are the truest and divinest mercy.

It is thus, then, that *we* conceive of God, and love Him

all the more because He is angry with us every day,¹ since his very anger is designed to make us more worthy of his love: for if He were content with us as we are, and while we are so discontented with ourselves, we could not love Him as we do, nor would there be any hope of our becoming better than we are. And I am by no means persuaded that our conception of God, modern as we think it, was wholly unknown to the Hebrew psalmist. For observe what it is that he represents Jehovah as saying (Verse 6) even when He speaks in wrath and thunders in hot displeasure: *But I, I have set my King upon Zion, my holy mountain.* "I" is the emphatic word of the Verse, and by its emphatic position denotes the verse to mean: "But *I* for my part, let men plot, let them strive, as they will, have found a King for them, and have fixed Him on a throne which can never be shaken."

Thus read, read in their true sense, the words do not sound very angry, as men understand anger. Nor is the fact they announce a hostile or unwelcome fact. That God has chosen the real Ruler of the world, that this Ruler is one who calls God "Father" and whom God calls "Son," and that his rule can never be endangered or overthrown, however men may fret and strive against it, or triumph in the thought that they have thrown it off,—this is not bad news for the world, but the very best news. It is not unwelcome news to us who believe in God, but most welcome,—the very Gospel in which we trust and rejoice. It is not bad news, however unwelcome as yet, even to those who rage and strive against the Divine rule; for, as we have seen, their triumph would be their defeat, their success their overthrow; while their defeat may be their triumph, and their compelled submission to the Divine law may teach them that a willing obedience is their only

¹ See Psalm vii. 11, where "*the wicked*" is a gratuitous and misleading insertion.

path to safety and freedom. For the evil they have meditated and done, they must suffer indeed; but, for evil men, to suffer for evil is often the shortest way to the love and service of goodness.

If, then, though the Psalmist thinks of God as speaking in anger, he also thinks of Him as speaking so graciously as this,—as declaring that the world shall have, and shall eventually submit to, a Divine Ruler and a Divine law, we can hardly pronounce his conception of God to be a defective one, or admit that in much it differs from our own.

The Third Strophe (Verses 7-9). And that he does think thus nobly of God is put beyond doubt in the third strophe of his Psalm. For here he allows the King whom God has anointed and enthroned to speak for Himself, or, rather, to repeat what He has heard from the mouth of Jehovah: and from this royal declaration, this Divine decree, we learn that the true King of men reigns, not by the will of men, but by the grace of God. His throne is defended, not simply by right, but by a Divine promise or decree. He is not only a *King* anointed by God; He is also God's *Son*. He has but to ask, in order to receive an universal dominion, a dominion including all nations and stretching to the very ends of the earth. All power is committed to Him, so that He shall beat down those who oppose themselves to his rule as with a sceptre of iron, and dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel.

In this noble description of the true King of men (a fuller treatment of which I reserve till we have to deal with the Messianic aspect of the Psalm) there is nothing which jars upon our ears, unless it be the images of Verse 9. All else falls in with our loftiest conceptions of what such a Lord and Ruler should be. And these images are interpreted to us, and fall into their due place, as we remember once more that to beat down evil is to release and set up good, that to destroy iniquity is to establish righteousness;

as we once more remember the inexorable penalties which wait on evil, and the grace by which those who have been broken by the penalties of the law are often recovered to its love and service. And I venture to say that no picture of the growing rule of Love and Righteousness in the earth would either be true to the facts of the case, or would commend itself to the reason and conscience of man, if it failed to find room for the misery and destruction of those who consciously and deliberately set themselves against it. We see the misery they both breed, and endure, every day. And, for ourselves, we feel that, in so far as *we* are disobedient to the law and disloyal to the rule of God, we deserve to suffer, and could neither be content to be treated as though we had done no wrong or harm, nor cherish any stedfast hope of being redeemed from our sins if we were not also punished for our sins.

The Fourth Strophe (Verses 10-12). It is as we contemplate the miseries and degradations bred by evil on every side, by which our own life is stunted and deformed and the lives of many of our neighbours are embittered and despoiled, that we enter into the force and pathos of the exhortation which the Psalmist appends to this glowing description of the Divine Ruler, and feel the utter groundlessness and fruitlessness of opposing it. Well may he who has so deeply felt the beneficence of that Rule, and has seen so far into the ends of mercy involved in its very terrors, admonish men to desist from their mad enterprise, to submit to a rule they cannot escape, to rejoice in a rule which seeks nothing but their good; and yet to "tremble" as they rejoice lest, in any measure, while seeking to serve the King, they should slip into any disobedience to his will, and so provoke Him, or the God who anointed Him, again to anger. Well may *he* beseech them to render a constant and affectionate homage to the Son and Lord whom God has set over them who knows how

easily men wander from his ways into ways of their own choosing, and how inevitably those who walk in their own way perish in that way. Well may he who has felt the blessedness of those who are reconciled to God and his rule invite us also to take refuge in Him, and to prove that we have taken refuge in Him by striving against the evil He hates and seeking to overcome evil with good.

II. Nothing in this Psalm is more admirable than the conviction which lies on its very surface; viz., the settled and immovable belief of the inspired Poet that, in the end, good must triumph over evil. So far as he could see, there was but one race of men which knew and served the only true God, the true King and Lord of men; and this elect race did not stand high nor bulk large in the estimation of the world. From the first the great military races had set themselves against it, or had absorbed the tiny province it cultivated into their wide-spread empires without any sense of effort. At the moment in which he wrote there was a deliberate conspiracy among these world-powers, or some of them, against the people whom God had chosen to be his witnesses in the earth. And yet the Psalmist contemplates the issue of the conflict without a single misgiving. His confidence in the triumph of the good cause, the cause of virtue and religion, does not waver for a moment. His faith is not for an instant sicklied o'er with the pale cast of doubt. In the strongest contrast to the craven pessimistic tribe who deem it a mournful sign of their superiority to their fellows that they hold the worst opinion of God and man, and can look up into an empty heaven and forward to a barren and dispeopled earth untouched with ruth and terror, he cherishes a cheerful confidence in the goodness of God, and in the ultimate victory of that goodness over all that is evil in man and in the conditions of human life. The world is *not* to be

swept as rubbish to the void. The race is not on its road to silence and death. The powers of evil are not to triumph and rejoice. All who set themselves against truth and goodness set themselves against God, and against his will and purpose for humanity. The greater their apparent triumph the greater and the more certain will be their real defeat. They *must* be conquered, and that in the noblest way, by being drawn into the very kingdom against which they have conspired and made war.

And when we remember that the Psalmist rose to this conviction by the inspiration of God, we may well find in it at once a grave rebuke of our own misgivings and doubts, and a warrant for the largest and most confident hopes for the future of the world and of man.

This hopeful and assured conviction of the ultimate triumph of good over evil took, as was natural and inevitable, a peculiar form in the prophetic soul of a Hebrew psalmist. For the Hebrew mind was impatient of the abstractions in which the philosophic Greek mind expatiated with ease and delight. It was poetic rather than philosophic, and clothed its largest and most abstract thoughts in concrete forms. And hence, to the Hebrew, the triumph of goodness shaped itself as the triumph of good men, or of a good race of men, or of the sovereign Lord and Ruler of men; while the defeat of evil shaped itself as the defeat of bad men, or bad kings, or bad angels, who had conspired together against the Lord and against his Anointed. It is to this habit of thought that many of the Psalms owe, at least in part, their Messianic character. We need not imagine, we shall only be led astray if we do imagine, that the inspired Hebrew prophet, dreaming of things to come, was raised to a height from which he could look down through the centuries and see the very figure of the Son of Man as He passed through the streets of Jerusalem and across the plains and hills of Galilee, and was thus enabled

not so much to predict as to describe many of the features of his lot, many even of the minuter details of his life. *That*, so far as we can learn, was not the manner in which the Spirit moved and wrought in the Hebrew seers; but rather this:—Just as many of the great thinkers of Greece, disappointed by the defects and failures of the turbulent democracies by which they were surrounded, dreamed of *an ideal republic*, and forecast the conditions of human life under such a republic as that of which they dreamed; so the Hebrew prophets, as the several kings of their race disappointed the fond hopes they had cherished, fell to dreaming of *an ideal king* under whose rule their hopes would be fulfilled, and endeavoured to forecast what the conditions of his kingdom must inevitably be if a true reign of God were to be set up in the earth, and if all the subjects of that kingdom were to be made righteous and holy and free: if, in short, the evil that is in men, and in the social and political conditions of men, was to be really overcome of good. An inspired *speculation*, an inspired forecast, of this kind, if at least God be the real Lord and Governor of human life, could not fail in many respects to be a true prediction. There *must* be a sacred reality answering to, and even excelling, their loftiest conceptions,—a King and a Kingdom corresponding to their thoughts, fulfilling and outrunning their hopes. And if, as we believe, they were moved by no one less than God Himself to brood over this ideal King and Kingdom, if his Spirit moulded and guided their thoughts, how could they fail to rise to a true prævision of the things which afterwards came to pass, and for the full development of which we still wait? No doubt, as they brooded over it, their ideal would rise and grow, so that the later prophet would see more than the earlier, the greater prophet more than the lesser. No doubt it would vary according to the structure, bent and capacity of their several natures, so that the more spiritual

man would frame the clearer and larger conception of it, and the less spiritual the more secular and imperfect conception of it. No doubt even that the ideal conception would take some tinge of mortal infirmity from even the noblest and greatest minds through which it passed; so that the King, when He came, would be other, better, diviner than they had prepared the world to expect. But, nevertheless, if we believe in God, if we believe that one day his kingdom is to come and his will be done on earth as it is done in heaven, and if we believe that holy men of old were moved by God to conceive and to tell men what this kingdom would be like, we may well believe also that, though they never saw the historic Christ, their provisions of the ideal King would be true though inadequate predictions of Him; that the conceptions quickened in them by the Divine Spirit would correspond to the sacred reality and purpose in the Divine Mind: in fine, that their psalms would be true Messianic psalms.

Now if any psalm in the whole Psalter has a Messianic element and character, it must be admitted that this Second Psalm has it. Not only is it more frequently quoted in the New Testament Scriptures than any other psalm; it also anticipates two of the leading New Testament names for the Saviour of Mankind. In Verse 2 it calls the true King of men "*the Messiah of God*," i.e., the *Christ*; while in Verse 7 it describes Him as "*the Son of God*." Nay, more; the New Testament distinctly applies the declaration of Verse 7—"Thou art my Son; *this day have I begotten thee*"—to Jesus, the Prophet of Nazareth, and so applies it to Him as to interpret its meaning and bring out its full force. For the curious and difficult phrase, "*This day have I begotten thee*," really means, "*This day have I called thee to a new existence, to a new career, to a new life.*" And when we ask, "What was the day on which the Son of God and the King of men was raised to a new life and a

new career?" St. Paul replies (Acts xiii. 33 ; Romans i. 14), that that day was the day in which God raised Jesus from the dead, and thus declared Him to be "the Son of God with power." According to the New Testament, the day of Christ's resurrection was the day on which He was crowned and enthroned, the day on which He was called to enter on a new existence, a new career, to take unto Himself the great power over men He had acquired by his redeeming death, and to reign over those whom He had thus delivered from their bondage to the Prince of the powers of this world ; and hence the Church still calls that day *dies regalis*.

There can be no doubt, then, that our Psalm is declared on the highest authority to be a true Messianic psalm ; a psalm in which the true King of men is so nobly conceived and portrayed that we are to see in it a prophetic anticipation of Jesus the Christ. And how worthy it is to be ranked in this royal order of Psalms we shall still further see as we consider the conception of man's true Lord and King which it places before us.

1. And, first of all, it is to be observed that, according to this Psalm, the true King of men must be of God's choosing and not of man's ; He must be "the *Lord's* Anointed" : He must even be the Lord's "*Son*,"—so one with God as ever to do his will and to rule by his law. We are not to be left to choose our King for ourselves, in the darkness of our own ignorance, lest we choose a king like ourselves, a king with many shining qualities perhaps, but at bottom as unwise, unjust, and imperfect as his fellows ; unable, therefore, to guide us in our deepest perplexities, or to defend us from the perils we most fear. He must be chosen for us by a *Divine* wisdom ; He must be clothed with a *Divine* power ; He must be animated by a *Divine* goodness ; He must reign by a *Divine* right ; He must rule us by a *Divine* law. Under whatever human and subordinate governments we may be, and however

we may suffer from their injustice, their unwisdom, their impotence, we must feel that, through and above all earthly rule, we are ruled from Heaven and ruled by One who will defend us in straits beyond the reach of mortal arm; who will so correct all that is wrong, and so compensate us for all that is unjust or injurious, in the incidence of earthly laws, as that even the mistakes of man and the wrongs of time shall contribute at last to our true wealth and dignity and peace.

The ideal King must be one of whom God Himself can say, "I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to Me a son," in order that He may rule us, not by the imperfect codes of earth, but by the pure and perfect law of God: since no other law could possibly content us, no other law could possibly secure and establish our well-being. For if God, our Maker and Father, be good, He can only will our welfare. His law is but the expression of his will. His law, therefore, can only formulate the conditions of our welfare. So that only as we are ruled by that law can our true, our highest and enduring, welfare be secured.

It is as we enter into this most true and sustaining conception of the law of God, as we believe it to be nothing more nor less than a law which declares and enforces the conditions on which our well-being depends, that we come to understand the inexorableness of that law, and can rejoice that no deviation from it is permitted, that no escape from it is possible. But if we once rise to this conception, even the most extreme expressions of the irrevocableness of Divine law no longer shock or surprise us. Even when the Psalmist represents God as laughing and mocking (Verse 4) at the men who set themselves against Him, or as thundering at them in his hot displeasure (Verse 5); even when he represents the Son of God as breaking them with an iron sceptre and dashing them in pieces like a potter's vessel

(Verse 9), we are not shocked or surprised; for we see that men who oppose themselves to the Divine law and rule oppose themselves against their own welfare and the welfare of the world. We cannot so much as wish that it were otherwise. For we say: Men who break the very conditions of their own welfare *must* suffer; to sin against God's law is to violate these conditions; to reject the King and Saviour of men is to adjudge themselves unworthy and to render themselves incapable of their own true life and blessedness, which can only be attained by submission to his rule and obedience to his will. Their punishment is inevitable; it is self-inflicted; and it is as merciful as it is inevitable. They *must* be unmade and remade, born anew and born from above, before they can enter on their true life and rise toward their true blessedness; and before they can be remade they must be broken in pieces. Even for ourselves we do not desire, if at least we are wise, to escape from punishment, until we are freed from sin, or to be freed from the sufferings which make men perfect until we have become perfect. Our prayer is, "Thy will be done in and by us; and, till we can do that will freely and perfectly, continue to chasten and discipline our wills and to make them one with thine."

Nor can we too seriously lay it to heart that heaven and hell are not *future* states simply, but also *present* states. However little we may be conscious of the fact at the time, we plunge into hell the very moment we break that Divine law obedience to which is essential to our welfare; and so long as we cleave to our sin, and refuse to submit to that law, we remain in the hell into which we have plunged. Its fires must kindle upon us; its thunders must peal against us; we must be crushed and broken by the law we have attempted to break. Our only hope of rising into a heaven of peace and rest hangs on our apprehending where our true welfare lies, and in a willing adoption of the

law which secures our welfare. Until we "kiss the Son," until, *i.e.*, we are reconciled to the true King of men and render Him a cheerful and unforced homage, we can only "perish in our way" (Verse 12); for, consciously or unconsciously, we are walking in the very way of perdition, a way which leads us straight against the inexorable law by which the world is really ruled, sustained, and defended.

2. We have to observe, once more, that the true King of any one race of men must be the King of all men; or, to put the thought in another form, if any one race is to be secure and happy in its obedience to Him, all races must become his willing and obedient subjects.

Nothing is more surprising in our Psalmist than "the long mind" and "the large heart" which enabled him to rise so far above the prejudices of his time and race as to see that God was the God of all men, and that God's Anointed must be, not the King of the Jews only, but also the King of all nations to the very ends of the earth. Some nations, indeed, with their kings and princes, were in rebellion against Jehovah and against his Messiah; but their rebellion is foredoomed to defeat, and the Christ has only to ask in order to receive "the nations for his inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession." And when we remember that the Jews were the haughtiest and most exclusive of races, that they held themselves to be the elect and sacred strain of humanity, and looked down with contempt rather than pity on the "sinners of the Gentiles," it is simply wonderful that the writer of this Psalm, whatever his date, should have embraced a conception so large and humane as that which finds expression in Strophes III and IV. It seems as if he must have anticipated thoughts which are comparatively rare with us, and have seen that the true King of the Jews must also be the King of the Philistines, the Edomites, the Egyp-

tians, the Assyrians, and of all nations, even the most distant, who came into commercial, political, or military connection with them; that the welfare and happiness of his own people could only be established on solid and lasting foundations in proportion as all other nations were brought under the Divine sceptre and law.

But whatever his conception may have been, and however he may have reached it, the words in which he depicts the true King of Men cover and suggest an ideal which more and more commends itself to the wisest modern thought, though even yet it has hardly penetrated and coloured the common thought of the day. A King who should govern men by a law written on their minds and hearts, the only law which can secure their wellbeing and happiness, is the ideal King of modern science as well as of ancient prophecy; and such a King, administering such a law and permitting no deviation from it, we have seen God's Anointed to be. But, even for *our own* welfare, our larger modern experience has taught us that it is not enough that the ideal King should reign over one race and enforce his law in one realm. We have learned as men could not learn until the means of communication with all parts of the world had become rapid, easy, instantaneous, that absolutely nothing human is alien to us. It is not only that, to be secure, we need to be defended against the aggressions of great military empires which lie near to us, and from any arrest of the main streams of commerce by which we are fed and enriched. It is also that no strife can break out, no public crime be committed on sea or land, no loss, disaster, or calamity, befall any race, however savage or remote, but that it jars on some sensitive chord, touches and distresses some of our interests, and more or less directly affects our welfare and our peace. If only to secure *us* from harm, loss, misery, our King must be King in all the earth, and the law which governs our life must govern all lives.

Nor is it only our commercial and political interests which are involved; it is also our humanity, our piety, our concern for the good of man and the advance of that Kingdom which makes it our chief aim to raise the fallen, to comfort the sorrowful, to reclaim the lost, to deliver the oppressed, to civilize the rude. Time was, indeed, when even in this Christian nation men assumed that mere conquest was glory, that we became strong by weakening others and enriched ourselves by impoverishing them; and no doubt there still linger among us certain belated politicians who cleave to these antiquated and exploded maxims, and think to make England great and wealthy by inflicting loss and misery on other races, by taking advantage of their weakness or their misfortunes. Happily, however, most of us have learned—some by the teaching of a wiser political economy, but more by imbibing more of the spirit of Christ—that one nation becomes great as it helps to make other nations great and free; and that then only can we become wealthy and secure as all races rise into happier and more prosperous conditions, and are safe from strife and alarms.

Even from the purely commercial and political point of view, we long and pray for the time when all nations will dwell together in amity and peace, when the law of God shall become the law of all realms, and Christ the King shall rule in all hearts. And as Christian men, as men touched and moved by Christian charity, how much more must we long for the time when all nations shall be given Him for an inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession! For we cannot bear the yoke of the Divine law lightly and happily while many of our neighbours both refuse to bear it and are for ever tempting us, by the whole strain and spirit of their lives, to throw it off or to let it slip from our necks. If the mind that was and is in Christ be in us, we cannot be free from pangs of grief and pity while

any race, or any man, sets himself against his own welfare and the welfare of the world, by setting himself against the Divine law. So many suffer by one man's sin as well as the man himself. The whole world is the poorer and the worse so long as any race remains outside the pale of the kingdom of our God and his Christ. How, then, can we be at peace, or rest from our labours, while men and races thus plunge themselves into an inevitable and growing misery? How can we but beseech them to "kiss the Son" lest they perish in their way? how can we but cry to the true King of men, and beseech Him to take unto Himself his great power and reign in all the earth?

I take leave to doubt whether this view of Christ, as the true King of Men, as ruling them by a law inscribed on their very nature, and permitting no violation of it to go unpunished, simply because obedience to its statutes is the imperative and indispensable condition of human well-being; as destined, therefore, in proportion as men come to know themselves, their needs, and the sole condition on which their needs can be satisfied and their welfare secured, to rule over all nations; and as, meantime, electing one race, or the Church, to his service only that in and through them, He may teach, raise, and bless all the families of the earth: I doubt, I say, whether this view of Christ as the one true, universal, and eternal King of Men, ancient though it be, has been set forth with the force, the fervour, the emphasis which its importance demands. For, surely, had it been duly impressed on the minds of men, it would have forestalled many of the objections to the Christian Faith with which modern thought is rife. With this view before him, no man could imagine that Religion deals with the future to the neglect of the present life; or that the Divine Law to which it invites men to submit is an arbitrary prescription, ill adapted to the constitution of man; or that the Gospel which it proclaims is intended for the

advantage of an elect few, and brings only tidings of the stroke of doom to the great mass of mankind ; or that it applies itself only to one aspect of human existence, in place of covering and blessing it through all its aspects, relations, and pursuits. And hence we have much still to learn from this noble Hebrew psalm, and may well find a very "*present truth*" in its antique but not outworn forms of thought.

S. Cox.

STUDIES IN THE MINOR PROPHETS.

I. JONAH.

THE prophet Jonah is the earliest star in that great movement of illumination which glorified the reigns of Jeroboam II., Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah ; he is the dawn of which Isaiah is the noontide. His rising is the boundary-line between two worlds—the age of sense and the age of faith ; and therefore the Book which bears his name is a strange blending of the historian and the preacher. Perhaps of all the Jewish prophets, Daniel excepted, it is the Book whose contents are most widely and popularly known ; it points a moral even to the child in the nursery. The narrative form in which it is cast has made its sayings household words. Joel, Amos, Hosea, Habakkuk, even Isaiah, are in their personal aspect little more than names ; but the incidents of the life of Jonah are familiar to our earliest years. We have received an indelible picture of the man, with his faults and his misfortunes. The call to a Divine mission ; the attempt to avoid that call by flight ; the great storm on the deep, pointing to an act of transgression ; the casting out of the Prophet into the waves ; his miraculous preservation ; his subsequent struggles to fulfil his office, and his final lament over his withered gourd : all these are familiar even to our earliest years.

And yet, as we have said, the Book of Jonah has a spiritual as well as a historical side. Its interest is not limited to the popular mind; it has a problem for the Biblical student. Its problem for him hinges on a totally different point from that which arrests the attention of the general reader. To the general reader the central object of interest is the punishment of Jonah's disobedience; to the student the main point of interest is the disobedience itself. What he wishes to have explained is not so much the miracle of Chapter ii. as the confession of Chapter iv. The miraculous feature of the Book is rather its seeming violation of moral order than its professed violation of physical law. Here is a man receiving a Divine call to the prophetic office, and compassing sea and land to escape that call. In seeking to escape it, he is not actuated by a low and mistaken sense of the character of God; on the contrary the Being whom he recognizes as an object of worship is One who is gracious, merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness. Yet not only does the perception of these qualities fail to attract Jonah into the Divine service; but he expressly declares that it is by his perception of them he is repelled from that service. It is just because the God whom he recognizes *is* merciful, gracious, and forgiving, that he refuses to obey his voice. Is there not something very peculiar here, very different from the ordinary modes of human thought and action? That a man should be offered what in our days would be called "promotion"; that he should be summoned to take a prominent part in the service of the national religion, and promised a special gift for the performance of his task; that he should recognize in the call the voice of a Being who was gracious and merciful, longsuffering and forgiving; that, so far from being attracted by the qualities of such a Master, he should see in these qualities the greatest possible barrier to his service; and that, to avoid becoming his servant, he

should flee from his native country and seek refuge on a foreign shore, is, at first sight, an inexplicable anomaly.

Yet a deeper reflection will convince us that there is here no anomaly at all. For, if we consider the matter more carefully, we shall see that, from the worldly point of view, the misgivings of Jonah were those of a shrewd and calculating mind; and that the conception of a God who was gracious, merciful, and forgiving, was in one sense a deterring element to the mind of any prophet. The conception of such a God was in fact fitted above all other things to shake the prophet's confidence in the fulfilment of his own predictions. In the older days of the Jewish commonwealth the prophets had been bold. They had gone forth to confront the offending man, or the offending nation, and had proclaimed in tongues of fire the advent of impending calamities; but what had been the ground of their boldness? It was their belief that the God whom they served was a Being whose sentences were inexorable, and from whose judgments there could be no appeal. When the prophet was commanded to go out into the Ninevehs and the Babylons of this world, to lift up his voice against their iniquity, to declare that God was about to execute judgment on their transgressions, he had no hesitation in obeying the mandate. And why? Simply because he had no doubt that the mandate would be executed. He believed the God from whom he had received it to be One who never went back from his word, and therefore he was under no apprehension lest his prediction of judgment should be unfulfilled. But when men began to think of God as a Father rather than a Judge, when the thought of Divine mercy began to blend with the conception of Divine law, it was evident that the mind of the prophet must be greatly affected by the change. The threatened judgment upon a guilty city when uttered by an inexorable God was one thing; when uttered by a

heavenly Father it was a very different thing. The inexorable God would surely bring it to pass; the heavenly Father would bring it to pass only if its threatening should produce no repentance. "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown," were words which could be uttered with confidence only by one who believed in a Divine law analogous to the laws of the Medes and Persians. To a prophet who had seen the vision of a God of mercy the call to proclaim such a message might, from a purely selfish point of view, be contemplated only with dismay. What if the very utterance of the prediction should induce Nineveh to repent? What if the impending cloud of Divine wrath should impel the guilty city to seek emancipation from her guilt, and to supplicate a return to the favour of Heaven? A prophet who had seen God in the new light would feel that such a supplication could not be refused. What would then become of his prediction, and what would become of himself as the predictor of that which had not come to pass? Where would be his credit in the eyes of his countrymen? where his reputation in the judgment of posterity? Would not men look upon him with contempt as one who had pretended to a revelation which the facts of life had demonstrated to be untrue? Would not the world say that he had been either a deceiver or a dupe? Was such an office to be coveted? was a sphere fraught with such dangers to be an object of desire? We can hardly wonder that a man so circumstanced should have answered, No; nor can we marvel that the immediate impulse of his frail humanity should have been to shun the Presence which suggested to him his arduous call.

Now, in the days of Jonah, the land of Palestine seems to have been passing through some such period of transition in its conception of the character of God. The lineaments of the Divine face and form were becoming transfigured to its gaze, and the vision of a heavenly mercy was softening

the image of inexorable law. The change had not originated in the days of Jonah; if we are not greatly mistaken, it had been handed down to Jonah from the closing years of Elijah. To institute any comparison between these two men must seem, at first sight, the wildest of paradoxes; they are to all outward appearance moral contrasts. The bold uncompromising prophet of fire whose word was law, and whose purpose was inflexible, seems to have little in common with the shrinking, doubting, almost cowardly spirit of him who fled from the presence of the Lord. And yet, if we mistake not, the last years of Elijah contain the germ of the life of Jonah. Who can study those years and fail to see that the theological change was already in the air?

The prophet of fire, as he stood in the cave of Horeb, experienced the very sense of disappointment felt by Jonah in the averted destruction of Nineveh. He had witnessed the thunder, and the earthquake, and the fire of the Divine wrath on Carmel; and he had read in these the promise of God's instant judgment upon transgressors. That promise, to outward appearance, had not been kept. Ahab had regained his strength, Jezebel had regained her power, and the authority of the Prophet had suddenly lost its influence over the minds of men. In that hour of humiliation Elijah anticipated the despairing cry of Jonah. *His* Nineveh had remained undestroyed, notwithstanding the prophecy of its destruction. The promised thunder and earthquake and fire had passed away, and had been succeeded by a great silence. To Elijah, that silence was a new experience. He must have remembered how in the days of old the prophet spake and it was done. He could not have forgotten how even the forgiveness of David's sin had not procured him exemption from outward chastisement; and he must have felt with some bitterness that he had been called to an office whose visible glory had

departed. It is significant that Elijah under the juniper tree of Horeb, and Jonah under the gourd of Nineveh, should both have uttered the same prayer, that their prophetic ministry might be closed in death (1 Kings xix. 4, and Jonah iv. 3).

But what was the answer to this plaint of Elijah? for in that answer we shall find the key to the moral purpose of the Book of Jonah. The prophet of fire complained that the fire had suddenly vanished from his life, that the earthquake had ceased to follow his word, that the thunder no longer rolled at his command. The answer to his complaint was "the still small voice"; it told him that his power lay in the very silence which, to his mind, constituted his weakness. The symbol of the still small voice had many different meanings to the world; but to Elijah, as a prophet, it had one distinct and peculiar meaning. It said to him that prophecy was about to enter on a new stage of its development, that its external glitter was about to be exchanged for an inward glory. It revealed to him that the office of a prophet was henceforth more and more to become the office of a preacher. Its power was no longer to consist in its ability to bring down fire from heaven, but in its capacity to kindle fire in the silent recesses of the soul. Its glory was not henceforth to be the earthquake which shattered a city, but the strength of moral conviction that could shake the impenitent heart. The still small voice was itself to constitute the thunder of prophetic power. Hitherto the prophet had measured his success by the exactness with which his predictions had been fulfilled; he was now to measure it by the moral effect they had produced on the minds of his audience. He was to go into the wicked Ninevehs and Babylons of the earth, and tell them that their wickedness would bring destruction upon them; but he was to remember that there were two

distinct ways in which the destruction might come. It might come in the death of the city, or it might come in the death of the city's iniquity; it might be either the product of a physical or the result of a moral revolution. And the prophet of the new age was told to long more for the moral than for the physical change. He was told to see the highest success of his preaching, not in the fire or the earthquake, but in the still small voice which revealed the awakened conscience of his auditors. He was told that the law against transgression would have received its noblest vindication in the hour when it should have destroyed the transgression itself. To waste a guilty city by fire and sword was no real victory to the arm of Jehovah; but to burn up the impurity of the city by the fire of penitence was the very triumph of Divine truth. As the messenger of that Divine truth the prophet was above all other things to seek this triumph. He was to realize the fact that, when God spares Nineveh, He disarms it for evermore; that the keenest fire of destruction is that Love which consumes the base alloy, and that the most powerful agent in kindling it is the proclamation of a Heavenly Mercy.

Now it cannot surprise us that this new revelation of the Divine Nature should have fallen on the ancient spirit of prophecy with a somewhat depressing effect. We cannot wonder that such men as Elijah and Jonah should have seen in this Gospel of Mercy an obstacle to all their prophetic aims. They were not unmerciful men. The prophet of fire had given ample evidence in his life that he had been touched with the feeling of human infirmities; the prophet Jonah had too little fire in his nature to render him implacable towards the enemies of God. Yet these men had been accustomed to think it the special function of the prophet to proclaim an unalterable message. That the still small voice of repentance should avert the thunder, and the earth-

quake, and the fire ; that the destruction of the sin should be substituted for the destruction of the sinner, was, to them and to their age, the revelation of a new experience, and an experience which, because it was new, was not wholly free from pain. It was the first breath of a Christian atmosphere which had been wafted into the Jewish theocracy ; and to those who had held the glory of the Theocracy to be its fixed and immutable government, the breath of the Christian atmosphere brought a sense of disturbance and innovation.

It was essential, then, first of all, that the mind of the prophet himself should be impressed with the necessity for the change. Before he could proclaim the new Gospel of Mercy he must be taught that he himself had need of that Mercy, that the conception of an immutable Divine law was not sufficient to support his soul in passing through the waters of tribulation. In order to be taught that fact the prophet had to pass through the waters. There are some things which a man may learn from the testimony of others, but the sense of need is not one of them ; he can only learn that by the experience of his own life. Accordingly, before the great roll of the new prophetic age was opened, the need for such an age had to be impressed on the heart of the prophet ; and an individual life was selected to be the recipient of that experience. That life was Jonah's. He came into the world to be the first of that noble band who may be called distinctively the prophets of the Divine Mercy ; and his special mission, as their forerunner, was to learn by experience that he himself needed the mercy he was to teach. A hundred morals have been pointed from his life ; but the deepest and the most unnoticed is that which lies on the very surface of the history—the soul's necessity for an intervening help of God. Here is a man starting on the path of existence with a set of preconceived opinions derived

from his ancestors, believing above all things in the creed of Elijah with its laws of inexorable retribution, its thunder, its earthquake, and its fire. God meets him on the way, —as He meets us all—in those experiences which we call the dispensations of Divine Providence. The life of Jonah has to pass through two forms of affliction to which every life is more or less exposed; he has to learn the nature of great calamities, and he has to learn the vexation of trivial circumstances. He first meets with affliction on a grand scale. He is placed in the midst of the storm, and his life is in jeopardy. All human resources prove powerless to avert the impending stroke, and the Prophet is only saved by the interposition of an influence over which he has no control. In that hour he awakens to the sense of his nothingness and his need. He finds himself to be frail and impotent in the presence of the mighty forces of Nature, and he sends through the vast expanse a cry for succour. Then the curtain falls, to rise again upon a new scene. The storm subsides into a calm, and the man, who recently had been tossing on the waves, is seen resting quietly under a green and leafy shade. Suddenly, the black care which had been expelled from the ocean rises out of the garden, and Jonah is confronted by sorrow, no longer in the form of a tempest, but in the withering of a gourd. One feels almost disposed to smile at the seeming anti-climax, and would do so but for the remembrance that the picture is true to life. Men are as powerfully affected by the withered gourds of life as by its tempests; not infrequently they are more deeply moved. One half of our miseries arises from disappointment in trifles. Sometimes the withering of the gourd is a purely subjective process. It is not necessary that a man's possessions should be lost or diminished in order that his gourd may wither; he has only to lose the freshness of his first joy in it. The transition from happiness

to discontent is in most cases made from within. A man's wealth may be the same this year as it was last, and yet the gourd of his wealth may be withered; he may have learned by bitter experience that wealth is inadequate to the wants of his soul. Such moments are harder to bear than the positive storms of existence. The storm is at least a definite calamity, and reveals the source of the trouble; but the withering of the inward gourd is a sense of calamity everywhere, incapable of being defined, and therefore more inaccessible to cure. The withered gourd, even more than the storm, reveals to the human heart its need of mercy. The sense of dissatisfaction is ever a sense of solitude. It drives the spirit back within itself by the revelation of the fact that the outer streams are dry; and by awakening within it the experience of its own loneliness, it impels it to seek for supernatural succour.

Such, then, was the mission of Jonah. He was sent into the world to be educated into a new experience—the need of a God who could modify his penalties. He was to be the first prophet of the Divine Mercy; and he was to learn by the tempest and the withered gourd the necessity for that mercy. He was to be what his name signifies—the dove. He was to come forth from the flood of waters a witness, in his own experience, of man's need of redeeming Love, and a herald, in his own testimony, of the approaching advent of that Love. In him the old spirit of prophecy was to go down into the waves to be baptized anew, and to come forth from its baptism purified and ennobled, having exchanged the frown of vengeance for the smile of reconciliation and the glance of forgiveness. For, let us remember, how wide was this message of mercy which Jonah was to proclaim. It was a proclamation of pardon to Nineveh, the capital of that great Assyrian empire whose power and whose religion were so dangerous to the peace of Judea. But that is the smallest part of the wonder; the marvel lies

in the ground of the forgiveness. As we read the closing words of the book of Jonah, we are surprised beyond measure at the breadth and liberality evinced by the Jewish nation of that age. We find there the mind of a prophet taken captive against its will by a Divine impulse of forgiveness, impelled to utter words of pardon to a guilty and a hostile city; and impelled to utter these words on the broad ground of a common humanity. The sparing of Nineveh is not based on any Jewish or local consideration. It is not founded on the intercession of a prophet of the God of Israel; it is offered in spite of his opposition. It is grounded, purely and exclusively, on the pity of a Divine Father's heart. It is based upon the vastness and the ignorance of a heathen population, whose numbers and whose darkness have stirred into tenderness the depths of the fatherhood of God. Nay, the sense of Divine Pity has a more universal basis still. It listens not merely to the cry of a helpless humanity; it extends to the wants of the inferior creation: "Should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand; *and also much cattle?*" The transition from the world of men to the world of cattle seems an anti-climax, but it is an anti-climax which reveals the majesty of God. The Divine Light shines the more brightly in its downward flight of condescension, and its highest glory appears when it has enfolded the lowest grades of being. Judaism never had a grander vision of God than it saw in that moment. It was no longer the mere Father of the nation it beheld, no longer simply the theocratic Ruler of the Jewish commonwealth. It looked in that hour upon the God of the whole earth, in the whole breadth of his earthly sympathy. It saw Him as the Father not only of Jews but of Assyrians, not only of men but of cattle. It beheld his care stretched outward to embrace the heathen, bent

downward to enfold the beast of the field. For once at least in its history, it had a glimpse of unconditioned Divine Mercy, of sympathy free from local boundaries, of pity unqualified by conditions of race or clime. In the utterance of the earliest of its prophets, it struck the very key-note of Gospel liberty.

And let us remember the circumstances in which Judaism struck this key-note. It was not the utterance of its despair; it was not the cry of its captivity; it was the voice of its days of triumph. We are apt to think of the Jewish nation as having been broadened into catholic sentiments only by those repeated strokes of adversity which impaired its national strength. We are not surprised to find that the nation, in emerging from captivity, began to think more kindly of those heathen lands wherein it had sojourned and with whose customs companionship had made it familiar; it seems only natural that in circumstances such as these the barrier of exclusiveness should give way. But the matter is altogether different when we see the barrier surmounted in the days of Jonah. The days of Jonah were not days of national depression; they were full of promise and rich with fulfilment. The national dreams of the past had almost realized themselves; the expectations of the future had become yet more aspiring. The people of Israel seemed about to retrieve the lost glories of the age of Solomon. The brilliant reign of Jeroboam II. had revealed the latent resources of the theocratic kingdom, and had opened up the prospect of an universal dominion. There was success abroad; there was prosperity at home; and on every side there were materials to foster the pride of the Jewish commonwealth. Yet it was precisely at this period that the theocratic kingdom began to display the sentiment of national brotherhood. It was from its age of prosperity that it first cast upon the surrounding nations a glance of genuine interest and kindness. The prophecy of Jonah

suggests more than it expresses. When we read between the lines, we see in this Book the utterance of a Protestant tendency which had long been hovering in the air. We see that the Jewish commonwealth was becoming weary of its own narrowness, and was eager to find some point of contact with the culture of neighbouring lands. We are impressed, in short, with the fact that the heart of Judaism had become for a moment the heart of humanity, had forgotten its individual distinctions, had remembered only its interests in common with the race of man. The pulse of all creation was beating within it; the object of its worship was the God of the whole earth, who cared not only for the wants of the heathen but for the wants of the cattle; and in the worship of Him the heart of Judaism felt that its sympathies were linked to every living thing. Nor need we be surprised that, in this age of prosperity, the nation should have exhibited a generosity so remarkable and unwonted. We must remember that its earliest days had been days of national unselfishness. The Jews had once been Hebrews, and the spirit of Hebraism had never been exclusive. The prophets of Israel were not the sudden growth of a new spirit; they were rather the revival of a great past. The spirit of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob was reproduced in them. The cosmopolitan feeling which had enabled the patriarchs, even while preserving their nationality, to sojourn in all lands, and to accommodate themselves to all customs, lived again in the hearts of the prophets. They felt that, like the father of the faithful, they had not yet found their country; and they were willing to view all lands as steps on the journey towards it. They must have remembered, too, that the old tradition of the rainbow (Genesis ix. 12) had associated their nation with God in a cosmopolitan covenant. That rainbow was to be a token not only between God and man, but between God and beast; the cattle of the field had been

made parties to the sacred covenant. It was no unfitting sequel to such a promise that, when the flood of waters was gathering around a heathen city, the Prophet should see the vision of a rainbow of Mercy, which embraced and transfigured the whole creation of God.

Jonah, then, was the precursor in the Jewish Church of that great movement towards liberty which never paused until it culminated in the universal priesthood of Pauline Christianity. Between Jonah and St. Paul—the first and the last of the Jewish Protestant leaders—there are not wanting points of strong analogy. We see, originally, in both, a struggle between the old and the new, an attachment to the prepossessions of childhood warring against the influx of modern culture. In both, it seemed, at one time, as if the prepossessions of childhood would prevail, as if the influence of Jewish prejudice would conquer the tendency to recognize the brotherhood of humanity. Jonah goes to Nineveh, not to bless, but to curse; Paul goes to Damascus, not to save, but to destroy. Yet, in both cases, the prophet is conquered by the influence of that foreign culture against which he has come to inveigh. Jonah is compelled, against his will, to strike the first note in the message of universal fatherhood; Paul is constrained, in opposition to his birth and education, to preach that faith of which he had long made havoc. The battle of Jewish Protestantism was often doubtful, but never lost. It had to contend not only against the weapons of its enemies, but against the half-heartedness of its own supporters; Jonah and Paul were driven into the fight by an influence which they struggled to repel. Yet the very fact proves that, behind the individual man, there was a national spirit. In some lands the spirit of freedom has been awakened by the life of a great soul; in Judea souls naturally humble were made great by the impulse of the spirit of freedom. The national life worked out its own emancipation. It called Abraham out of his natural home

in Ur of the Chaldees; it summoned Jonah from his dreams of Jewish patriotism in the court of the second Jeroboam: and it awakened Saul of Tarsus from the sleep of Pharisaism into the glorious liberty of the sons of God.

GEORGE MATHESON.

ON THE SECOND EPISTLE OF ST. PETER.

I. HAD THE AUTHOR READ JOSEPHUS?

It is well known that the genuineness of the Second Epistle of St. Peter is open to considerable doubt. In attempting to ascertain the character of the Apostle's teaching, Bishop Lightfoot (*Epistle to the Galatians*, p. 355), writes as follows: "If the deficiency of external evidence forbids the use of the Second Epistle in controversy, the First labours under no such disabilities." The "if" appears to be not hypothetical, but equivalent to "although": at all events in the following pages (*Ibid.*, pp. 356-8) the Bishop confines himself strictly to the First Epistle, and makes no use whatever of the Second. Canon Westcott states with great force the deficiency of external evidence. To obtain a complete idea of the judgment of the Church upon the Canon, we must combine (Westcott, *Canon*, p. 264) the two Canons of the East and West; by doing this "we obtain, *with one exception*, a perfect New Testament without the admixture of any foreign element." That "exception" is the so-called Second Epistle of St. Peter, which is excluded by the consent both of the Eastern and Western Canon. Up to the time of Clement of Alexandria "no trace has been found" of its existence (*Ibid.*, p. 349); and it is rejected both by Origen and by Eusebius. The circumstances in which the Epistle was written (supposing it to be genuine) make the

absence of external evidence all the more serious; for it must have been addressed by the foremost of the Apostles, shortly before his death, to readers of whom Alford writes (*Prolegomena*, p. 142) that "by Chap. iii. 1 it would appear that they are identical with at all events a portion of those to whom the first Epistle was addressed," *i.e.*, to "the elect who are sojourners of the Dispersion in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia." It is difficult to conceive how the last utterance of the Apostle St. Peter, addressed shortly before his martyrdom to so large an audience (or even to a considerable part of it), could have fallen into such complete neglect that up to the time of Clement of Alexandria there is no trace of its existence.

Logically, this absence of external testimony would seem to throw the *onus probandi* on those who maintain the genuineness of the Epistle. But, in practice, it is otherwise; even those who may feel that the Second Epistle occupies a moral and spiritual level far below that of the First, will nevertheless hardly be brought by mere negative arguments, derived from want of evidence, to deny the Apostolic origin of the former. The Epistle is at all events in possession of a place in the Canon, and it is perhaps but natural that possession should count for its "nine points." We are therefore driven to internal evidence, in which the principal arguments usually urged for a late date are the mention of St. Paul's letters (iii. 16) as being, by implication, "scriptures;" the reference to the "Holy Mount" (i. 18) of the Transfiguration, of which Canon Westcott (*Gospels*, p. 175) justly says, that "the comparative elaborateness of the description seems to offer an instructive contrast to the simplicity of the earlier Gospel;" and the apparent interweaving of phrases and sentences borrowed from St. Jude's Epistle in a manner alien (as we should suppose) from Apostolic simplicity, and especially from the character of such an Apostle as St. Peter. Cumulatively this evidence is

of great force, and especially that part which is derived from the use of St. Jude's Epistle. But as the date of that Epistle is unknown, even the demonstrated use of it cannot determine the date of which we are in quest. We may be convinced that the author of the Second Epistle of St. Peter borrowed from the Epistle of St. Jude, and still remain in doubt concerning the date of the latter, and therefore of the former. But if it could be shewn that the Author had borrowed from some work of which the date is known to be late, *e.g.* the Antiquities of Josephus, published in 93 A.D., the date of the Epistle would then be determined to be after 93 A.D., and the author of the Epistle would be known to be not St. Peter. The writer of this article, in the course of a critical study of the Second Epistle, found what appeared to him evidence that the author of it had read the Antiquities of Josephus: and a summary of it was circulated among six or seven of the most eminent of our theological scholars. One expressed a doubt whether the method was safe; another urged that even though the present Second Epistle were proved to be indebted to Josephus, it might be a translation from the Aramaic, so that no more would be proved than that the translator (not the author) borrowed from the Antiquities; a third regarded it as "decisively proved that either the author had borrowed from Josephus, or Josephus from the author," but suggested the possibility of the latter alternative: while all appeared to concur in regarding the evidence, even in the very condensed form in which it was presented to them, as novel, striking, and deserving of discussion. This evidence, therefore, in a popularised form, is now laid before the readers of the *Expositor*. A good deal of it will be omitted as too technical; nor will the writer enter into the question whether it is more probable that Josephus borrowed from the Second Epistle, or the Epistle from Josephus; nor will there be leisure to consider whether it is highly probable that a letter from

St. Peter, addressed to readers familiar with the Greek Epistles of St. Paul (iii. 16), should have been written in Aramaic and left untranslated for more than a quarter of a century. These points, if they appear to require discussion, may be discussed hereafter: for the present the writer, assuming that Josephus did not borrow from the Epistle, and that the Epistle was written in Greek, will attempt to prove that the author of the Epistle had read the Antiquities of Josephus.

Before proceeding to details we must lay down the axiom on which the proof rests. It is as follows:—

The evidence of *a group of words* is far stronger than that of a multitude of single words, to shew that one author has read another.

A single illustration will explain and enforce this. In an unpublished note-book of Francis Bacon, containing a number of quotations, formularies of courtesy, proverbs, and some original aphorisms, there are found (in a group of phrases relating to sleep and awakening), the two following entries close together: “up-rouse,” “golden sleep.” Now if these entries had been at a great interval, nothing could have been inferred from them; but, occurring almost consecutively, they lead the reader almost irresistibly to infer that Bacon had read or heard the following passage in “Romeo and Juliet:”

“But where unbruised youth with unstuffed brain
Doth couch his limbs, there *golden sleep* doth reign:
Therefore thy earliness doth me assure
Thou art *uproused* by some distemp’rature.”

Romeo and Juliet, ii. 3, 40.

Few will find it easy to resist this evidence; no one, I think, would deny that if there had been a third entry in the note book, “unbruised,” for example, or “unstuffed,” the evidence derived from the group of three words would have been absolutely irresistible.

But it may be urged that the strength of the evidence here greatly depends upon the peculiarity of the Baconian entries. If the expression "uproused from golden sleep" occurred in one of Bacon's "Devices," or in the "Wisdom of the Ancients" we should not feel anything like the same certainty that Bacon was borrowing from Shakespeare. It is our knowledge that Bacon in his note-book is stringing together other people's sayings, which makes us feel from the first disposed to believe that he is borrowing; and the passage from Shakespeare comes in only secondarily to prove that the borrowing is from *Romeo and Juliet*. The force of this argument must be admitted: but it can be met, first, by shewing that the author of the *Second Epistle* borrows not only words but, to some extent, thoughts from Josephus; secondly, by bringing forward a group not of two, nor of three, but of four, five, or six words, whose cumulative force will be found extremely strong; thirdly, by shewing that the Author borrowed in the same way from Philo, not to speak of the borrowing from St. Jude, so that, his character as a borrower in two cases being established, we ought to feel the less difficulty in believing that he borrowed in a third case.

Only one other remark need detain us, and that refers to the kind of words which will furnish the most convincing evidence. Obviously, uncommon words are far more weighty than common. But this is not all. The Author, who was familiar with the *Epistles of St. Paul*, must have necessarily been familiar also with the oral or written language of the Gospels and, still more, with the language of the *Septuagint*. If we find in *Robinson Crusoe* an isolated expression that strikes us as Shakespearian, but further search reveals it, or something like it, in the *English Bible*, clearly the probability is that Defoe borrowed from the Bible and not from Shakespeare; and similarly in the *Second Epistle*, should isolated words be found used both

by Josephus and the LXX., the probability is that, if there has been any imitation at all, the LXX. and not Josephus has been imitated. On the other hand, if the Epistle contains words found in Josephus but not found in the whole of the LXX. and the New Testament, then these words, though they may be common enough in the Greek language, assume the importance of uncommon words. For example, take such a word as *τοιόσδε* "such," "the following." Though it abounds in Thucydides and the classical writers, it is not found once in the LXX., nor anywhere in the New Testament except in a single passage of our Epistle (i. 17). The question therefore arises, what influence induced the author thus to step out of the linguistic sphere of his contemporaries into the sphere of classical Greek? And if it be found that this is one of a group of five or six words in a passage of Josephus, all of which reappear in the Epistle, then *τοιόσδε*, although absolutely a common Greek word, will assume the importance of a word relatively most uncommon, and it will add great weight to the cumulative evidence of the group.

Before proceeding however to Josephus, we will apply our method to an attempt to shew that our Author imitated Philo. In a comment on Genesis xv. 12 ("But about sunset a trance fell on Abraham"), Philo (*Quis Rer. Divin. Her.*, p. 52) declares that this describes the experience of one who is (a) inspired, or *borne on by God* (*θεοφορήτου*); for a prophet uttereth nothing that is his own, or (b) *private* (*ἴδιον*), but is merely a lyre in the hand of God. Human reason must be dormant when the Divine Spirit inspires. Now the reason is to the mind what the sun is to the universe, for both the reason and the sun are (c) *light-bearers* (*φωσφορεῖ*); therefore when "the sun sets," that is, when the human reason is dormant, then, and not till then, the Divine light (d) *rises* (*ἀνατέλλει*).

Compare with this page of Philo three verses of our

Second Epistle (i. 19-21), exhorting the readers to give heed to prophecy until (a) the *Light-bearer* (φωσφόρος) (d) rise (ἀνατεῖλε) in their hearts; knowing this, that no prophecy of Scripture is of (b) *private* (ιδίᾱς) interpretation; for prophecy came not by the will of man, but men spake from God, being (a) inspired or *borne on* (φερόμενοι) by the Holy Spirit.¹

It is hardly possible for a critic to resist the conclusion that, in spite of the different adaptation of the words in the two passages, our Author had in his mind the passage of Philo. Indeed, Philo serves as a key to unlock the meaning of the Epistle; for our Author, in borrowing from Philo, as in borrowing from St. Jude, has somewhat obscured the meaning of a part of his own words, "No prophecy is of *private* interpretation." Does this mean, No prophecy can be *privately* or specially interpreted by *private* or special persons, or of special events? Or does it mean, No prophecy can be adequately interpreted as the *private* utterance of the prophet himself, intelligible only to him? Both interpretations have been maintained; but the latter is confirmed by Philo, who tells us that the prophet, like the lyre, gives forth no sound of his own or *private* origination. This thought our Author has amplified, by adding that the prophet not only does not originate, but does not even fully interpret, the words he utters. Again, does the word φωσφόρος, *light-bearer*, mean the "morning star" or "sun"? The word is not used in the LXX. (where

¹ Justin (*Ad Græcos*, viii.), says that the prophets "did not teach us from *their own fancy* . . . for neither by nature nor by man's conception could men discover such divine truths, but by the gift which then came down from above upon the *holy men*." Here, some one may say, is a reminiscence of the Second Epistle of St. Peter. But the next line or two make it much more probable that he has Philo in his mind, for he goes on to speak of the Holy Spirit as the *plectrum* (i.e. lyre striker), which uses *just men* as its instrument, like a harp or lyre; and Philo similarly says the prophet is the sounding *instrument* struck invisibly by God, and that all whom Moses introduces as *just persons* are also represented as prophets.

ἑωσφόρος is found seven times), nor in the N. T. In classical Greek it appears to have been used (Hesychius) both for *light-giver* generally, and for *bright star* in particular; and the latter is the more common meaning. But the context (i. 19) seems to demand the "sun" ("until the day shall have dawned, and the Light-bearer shall have risen"), because the rising of the Morning Star more naturally precedes or accompanies the dawn of day, than follows it; and, after the mention of the dawn, one naturally expects the mention of sunrise; and this interpretation is supported by Philo, who says of the sun, *it is a light-bearer* (φωσφορεῖ). It must be added that the Author's use of φερόμενος, *borne on*, as applied to men, is unexampled in the LXX. and N. T.; and it is contended that this coincidence of a group of words in a page of Philo, with a group of words in two or three verses of our Epistle, regard being had also to the partial similarity of the thought, and to the complete absence of two words of the group (as here used) from the books of the New Testament and Septuagint, cannot reasonably be supposed accidental, but probably proceeds from an imitation of Philo by the Author of the Epistle.

We pass now to the consideration of Josephus. Assuming that the Author of the Epistle had read parts of the Antiquities of Josephus, our readers will readily admit that he had probably read the short Introduction which describes the motives and objects of the work; and that, if the Epistle contains any traces of an imitation of the Antiquities, the Introduction will be a likely place to search for them.

Now the Introduction (Par. 3) declares (*a*) that the moral derived from the Jewish records is, that those who follow God's will find success and happiness, whereas those who disobey find everything against them, and are involved in irremediable calamities (a thought repeated also in Par. 4);

(*b*) Moses considered that the basis of all law was (Par. 4) insight into the *nature of God* (Θεοῦ φύσιν); (*c*) he exhibited (Par. 4) God in the possession of his *virtue* (ἀρετήν), undefiled by degrading anthropomorphism; (*d*) he considered (Par. 4) that it was the duty of man to partake in this Divine virtue; (*e*) the laws of Moses (Par. 4) contain nothing out of harmony with the *greatness* (μεγαλειότητος) of God; (*f*) he kept free from all unseemly myths and legends, though he might have easily cheated men (Par. 3) with *feigned* stories (πλασμάτων); (*g*) he always assigned fitting actions (Par. 3) to God's *power*; (*h*) nor did he do as other law-givers (Par. 4) who have *followed after fables* (μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες).

The Epistle declares (*a*) that the moral of the stories of the fallen angels, of Noah, and of Lot, is (ii. 9) that the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to keep the unrighteous unto punishment unto the day of judgment; (*g*) his Divine *power* (i. 3) hath granted us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him that called us (*d*) by his own glory and *virtue* (i. 3); that we may become (*d*) sharers in (*b*) the Divine *nature*; false teachers shall arise to make merchandise (ii. 3) of men with (*f*) *feigned* words (πλαστοῖς λόγοις); but we (*e*) were eye-witnesses (i. 16) of the *greatness* (μεγαλειότητος) of Christ; and (*h*) in declaring it we did (i. 16) not *follow after* cunningly devised *fables* (μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες).

The two most important points here are (*h*) the coincidence of phrase, *having followed after fables* (μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες), and (*b*) the mention of the *nature* of God. As to the first, it must be borne in mind that the word *follow after*, though found in the LXX., does not occur in the N. T.; and the word *fable*, though found four times in the Pastoral Epistles, does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament, nor (except in the sense of *tale*, Sirach

xx. 19) in the whole of the LXX. The probability, therefore, that the Author borrowed from Josephus this protest that the Christians, as well as the Jews, did not *follow after fables*, is increased by the fact that neither the LXX. nor the N. T. contains *both* of the words which are here combined in the same order by the Author of the Epistle and Josephus. It may be suggested that the resemblance is less striking because the Author adds the words "cunningly devised" (σεσοφισμένοις). But it is the manner of borrowers to add something of their own, and it is a confirmation of the borrowing hypothesis that this added word is used but once in the N. T. (2 Tim. iii. 15, "*make thee wise* unto salvation"), and there in a sense opposite to the meaning here; whereas in the sense of "cunningly devise," "deceive," it is found at least twice in Josephus (*B. J.*, iii. 7, 20, and iv. 2, 3). Next, as to the expression *nature* of God, or Divine *nature*, it must be remembered that this is not only absent from the LXX. and N. T., but alien to New Testament thought. The Greeks and Romans spoke about "the *nature* of the gods," but St. Paul contrasts "nature" with "spirit," and no New Testament writer, although he might speak of God as the Creator of things in nature, could speak of "the *nature* of God." Although the phrase of Josephus, "nature (Θεοῦ) of God," differs slightly from that of the Epistle, "divine (θείας) nature," yet the latter phrase is used by him elsewhere in his Treatise against Apion, and the word θεῖος (rare in the N. T.) is extremely common in Josephus. Of the other phrases it is sufficient to say that πλαστός is not found in the N. T. or LXX.; that *virtue* (ἀρετή, in the sing.) applied to God is only found once in the LXX., where the meaning is "glory" (Hab. iii. 2); and that the word here used for *greatness*, found only twice in the LXX. and twice in N. T., is only in one passage (Luke ix. 43) used, as here, of the greatness of a Divine Person. Some of the points

of similarity enumerated above (e.g. the *power* of God) are slight in themselves; but it is contended that the combination of coincidences, the mention of the *power*, the *virtue*, and the *nature* of God, the *greatness* of God (or Christ), the similar description of the moral derivable from the History of the Old Testament, the mention of the human sharing or partaking in the divine nature or virtue, the protest against the charge of using *feigned* words and *following after fables*, form an amount of cumulative evidence, important in itself, and more than sufficient to prepare the reader to give his attention to another instance of similar proof.

If the Author was attracted by the comparison (implied above) between Moses the truthful law-giver of the Jews, and the truthful teachers of the Christians, it is natural that in writing the last utterance of St. Peter he should turn his attention to the last utterance of Moses (*Antiquities*, iv. 8, 2), of which it will be well to set down a summary. Moses is said to have spoken (a) as follows (τοιιάδε): "Fellow soldiers and (b) *sharers* of our long hardship (μακρᾶς κοινωνοὶ ταλαιπωρίας, where note the transposition), since I (c) am not *destined* (οὐ μέλλω) to be your helper on earth, (d) I *thought it right* (δίκαιον ἡγησάμην) still to regard happiness for you and (e) *memory* (μνήμην) for myself. Do not set anything above (f) your *present* customs (νομίμων τῶν παροντῶν), (g) *despising* (καταφρονήσαντες) the (h) *reverence* (εὐσεβείας) which ye now feel for God; (i) thus will ye be never able to be taken (εὐάλωτοι) by your enemies. God will be with you (j) *as long as* (ἐφ' ὅσον) you will have Him for your leader. Listen then to your leaders, (k) *knowing that* (γιννώσκοντες ὅτι) men learn to command by obeying. These things I say (l) at my *departure* from life (ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ τοῦ ζῆν), (m) not *recalling* them (εἰς ἀνάμνησιν φέρων) by way of reproach, but for your good, that ye may not, (n) through *folly*, degenerate."

With these compare (a) τοιαῦδε (i. 17, here alone in N. T. and LXX.); (b) θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως (i. 4, where note the transposition similar to μακρὰς κοινωνοὶ ταλαιπωρίας above); (c) μελλήσω, i. 12 (v. r. οὐκ ἀμελήσω, (?) οὐ μελλήσω, reading and meaning doubtful, *valeat tantum*); (d) *I think it right* (δίκαιον ἡγοῦμαι) i. 13 (here only in N. T. and LXX.); (e) μνήμην, i. 15 (sense different from that of Josephus, but here alone in N. T.); (f) “the *present* truth,” i. 12 (παρούση); (g) καταφρονούντες (ii. 10, in different context); (h) εὐσέβεια (four times in this Epistle, eight times in the Pastoral Epistles, only once in the rest of the N. T.); (i) *made for taking*, ii. 12 (εἰς ἄλωσιν, in different context, but the word is only here used in N. T., and twice in LXX.); (j) *as long as*, i. 13 (ἐφ’ ὅσον) is only here used in N. T. and LXX. in this sense (in the only other passage in which it occurs, Rom. xi. 13, it has a different sense); (k) *knowing that* (γινώσκοντες ὅτι) is twice used in this Epistle (i. 20; iii. 3) to introduce a new clause, and only twice elsewhere in the N. T.; (l) *my departure*, ἔξοδος (i. 15) only once used elsewhere in LXX. and N. T. (*viz.* Luke ix. 31) in this sense; note also in Josephus the juxtaposition of ἔξοδος and ἀνάμνησιν, and in 2 Pet. ἔξοδος and ὑπομνήσει; (m) the word ἀμαθία, *folly, inability to learn*, is not in the N. T. nor LXX., but the kindred adjective, *foolish* (ἀμαθής), though not in this context, is found in this Epistle (iii. 16) and nowhere else in the N. T. or LXX.

Here the evidence rests on the similarity of words rather than of thought; yet even in thought there is considerable similarity. Both Moses and St. Peter look forward anxiously to the time after their *departure*; and both *think it right* to provide for the interests of the faithful by solemn warnings to abide by the *present* truth (or customs). But, apart from the thought, the coincidence in the use of words is striking. Even if the words quoted

above were common in the N. T. we should think such a coincidence remarkable; but, when we remember that *μνήμην*, *ἐφ' ὅσον*, *δίκαιον δὲ ἡγοῦμαι* are never used, and *ἐξοδος* only once, in the whole of the N. T., then finding all these expressions in two or three verses describing the last words of St. Peter, and in a page of Josephus describing the last words of Moses, and adding to this the weight of the other less striking similarities, we shall probably find the cumulative evidence quite as powerful as that deducible from the Introduction; and the two together may perhaps be thought to amount to a demonstration that the Author of the Epistle had read Josephus.

It is not to be expected that more than one or two passages of the Antiquities should shew such striking groups of similarities as those above mentioned. Yet, were there no fear of overloading the pages with matter uninteresting to the general reader, it would be easy to point out thirteen or fourteen remarkable words or phrases in the Epistle, not found in the N.T. or LXX., which are found in different parts of the works of Josephus; but the evidence of single words and isolated phrases is of little importance as compared with that of groups, and therefore we will only ask the reader to compare 2 Peter ii. 10, *κυριότητος καταφρονοῦντας· τολμηταί*, with *B. J.*, iii. 9, 3, *τολμηταὶ καὶ θανάτου καταφρονοῦντες*, and lastly 2 Pet. i. 19, *ὃ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες*, *to which ye do well to give heed*, with *Ant.*, xi. 6, 12, *οἷς καλῶς ποιήσετε μὴ προσέχοντες*, *to which ye will do well not to give heed*.

In two other passages, where the language is wholly unlike, our Author agrees with Josephus in supplementing the Bible narrative. (i.) He tells us (ii. 5) that Noah was a "herald of righteousness." Nothing of this kind is found in Genesis ix., which merely tells us that Noah was "perfect"; but Josephus relates how Noah (*Antiquities*, i. 3, 1), "being ill pleased at their deeds and pained at

their counsels, tried to persuade them to amend their minds and actions." This expression reminds us a little of our Author's description of Lot, "worn out by the wanton life of the lawless, torturing his soul from day to day at their unlawful deeds" (ii. 8); but in any case it justifies the Epistle in describing Noah as a "herald" or "preacher" of righteousness. (ii.) Again, commenting on the reference to Balaam in the Epistle (ii. 16), which certainly *implies* (though it is not absolutely necessary to interpret it so) that the prophet was not only "hindered" but "rebuked" by the ass, Alford writes as follows: "A discrepancy has been discovered between this and the Mosaic account, seeing that it was the angel, and not the ass, from whom the rebuke came, the ass having merely deprecated ill treatment at Balaam's hands." Whether in any case the difference amounts to a "discrepancy," may be well questioned; but at all events the ass appears to "rebuke" the prophet in Josephus (*Antiquities*, iv. 6, 3), where we read that "the ass, having received a human voice, blamed Balaam as unjust, *having no cause to find fault with him for its previous services, yet now he inflicts blows on it, not understanding that now, in accordance with the purpose of God, he was being hindered,*" etc.

Taken as a whole, the evidence in favour of the theory that the Author of the Second Epistle imitated Josephus, can hardly fail to appear striking, if not convincing. For it exhibits: 1st, a very large number of similar words and phrases in the two authors (and I may here add, that the same method applied to the First Epistle of St. Peter exhibits an almost total absence of such similarities); 2nd, all the phrases and words on which stress has been laid above are words and phrases rare or non-existent in the N. T. and LXX., and therefore completely out of the Author's natural sphere; 3rd, the groups of similarities between the Epistle and the *Antiquities* are found in just

those portions of the latter which our Author would be likely to have studied: 4th, besides some parallelism of thought in the two passages selected above to exhibit the parallelism of language, we find two others in which our Author agrees with Josephus in diverging from, or at all events adding to, the Bible narrative. This evidence would be still further strengthened could it be shewn that it is the character of the Epistle to borrow; that it contains no thoughts which may not be traced to St. Paul, St. Jude, Philo, Clement, and the books of the Old Testament; and that the style, in its use of some words almost unknown to Greek literature, in its misuse of other words and idioms, in its fondness for grandiloquent novelties and strained sonorousness, and in its weak reduplication of florid phrases, presents a perfect similarity to the English written by a Bengalee affecting the "fine style," and an utter dissimilarity from anything that could be expected in the last utterance of an Apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ. These, or some of these, propositions the writer will attempt to substantiate in a future article.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

CHRIST AND THE ANGELS.

HEBREWS ii. 11-17.

VERSES 11-13: "For both the sanctifier and the sanctified are all of one [that is, have one father, even God; for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying, 'I will declare thy name unto my brethren, in the midst of the congregation I will sing praise unto Thee:'] and, again: 'I will put my trust in Him;' and, again, 'Behold, I and the children which God hath given me.'"

In Verse 11 the present participles "sanctifier" and "sanctified" are sometimes taken to denote that the sanctification of believers is still going on (Riehm). It seems, however, safer to understand the form as used in a timeless substantive sense. The meaning of the verse is plain. One of the points of Verse 10 is that the saved are themselves sons of God, according to our Lord's own teaching and the universal Christian prayer, "Our Father."¹ This fact is the starting-point for the doctrine of Christ's identification with his people in suffering. For, says the Apostle, if we are sons, we are sprung from the same father with Christ; we possess that oneness with Him which belongs to brethren: and that we are indeed his brethren He Himself acknowledges in more than one passage of Scripture. This thought is so clear that it is hard to conceive how Bleek and others have come to invert the argument, and say that Verses 11-13 are designed to justify the name of sons, by shewing that we are admittedly brethren of Christ. Can we suppose that any Christians ignored the sonship which they daily expressed in the Lord's prayer? But they might very well fail to draw from this sonship a proper inference as to the nature of our brotherhood with Christ.

The Old Testament citations need not long delay us. The first is from Psalm xxii. 22; and that Jesus might be viewed as the speaker was, of course, sufficiently proved by the fact that He used words from this Psalm upon the cross. The other citations are from Isaiah viii. 17, 18. Since our Author splits this into two citations, the first has been often sought in a different part of the Old Testament—in 2 Sam. xxii. 3, or Isa. xii. 2. But it seems unreasonable to seek two passages where one is enough; and the words "I will put my trust in Him," are hardly, when taken by themselves, an independent proof of what the Apostle aims at. On the other hand, the citation being one, it was worth

¹ See *Art. Christ and the Angels*, Vol. ii. pp. 418 *et seq.*

while to divide it, in order to shew that it contains two distinct points. In the second part Christ—for it is assumed that the Messiah speaks, and this view was facilitated by the Septuagint insertion of *καὶ ἐπεὶ* at the beginning of Verse 17—associates Himself with the children given Him by God, *i.e.*, according to the context here, with God's children his brethren; and further, according to the first part of the citation, He associates Himself with them in an act of faith. Now faith, which according to our Epistle (xi. 1), involves hope of a goal not yet attained, and the apprehension of things as yet invisible, is a virtue which Jesus exercised only in the days of his flesh, when, for the joy set before Him, He endured the cross, despising shame. It is in this sense that Jesus, in Chapter xii. Verse 2, is said to be the author and perfecter of faith, *i.e.*, since faith is an activity, the first to begin and carry through to completeness that life of faith which is our example in the struggle set before us (xii. 1, 2). In this connection the expression found in Isaiah viii. has a real value for the Author's argument. "Unless He were man," says Calvin, "and liable to human necessities, He would have no need for such trust. Since, then, He depends on the aid of God, his condition has community with ours."

We have still to ask why, in Verse 11, the Apostle introduces, for Jesus and his saved ones, the new relative terms *sanctifier* and *sanctified*. That the usual dogmatic definition of sanctification, as the change in a man from the vileness of sin to the purity of the divine image, does not coincide with the thought in our passage, is plain. Sanctification is a notion which the New Testament borrows and develops from the Old. In the Old Testament the idea of holiness belongs properly to the sphere of worship, and *hiqdîsh* or *qiddeh* is to separate from profane uses and consecrate to God in a religious ceremony, or for a religious liturgical service. It is as worshippers of God, not as moral

agents, that the Old Testament people are holy. The notion of holiness is æsthetic, not ethical; and thus it is that, while righteousness in the Old Testament as in the New is entirely free from anything ceremonial, holiness, as an æsthetic notion, calling for a visible manifestation, is expressed in a whole system of ceremonial ordinances. In the New Testament the predicate "holy," ἅγιος, is transferred from the fleshly Israel to the New Testament Church. But Christians are called ἅγιοι, not in acknowledgment of their moral purity, but because they take the place of the Old Testament people as the worshipping people of God, called and consecrated to do religious service to Him. Thus the term ἅγιοι, "saints," is strictly co-ordinate with the word ἐκκλησία, "church," corresponding to *qahal*, which is the technical Old Testament term for the congregation of Israel summoned before God for the exercise of a religious function. The development of the notion of holiness in the New Testament, and the elimination from it of all ceremonial elements, depend simply on the spiritualization of the notion of worship and religious service before God. Acts of worship are no longer limited in time and place, and are no longer carried out in the presentation before God of representative material offerings. The holy persons, or priests, of the New Testament are themselves, at the same time, a living sacrifice, acceptable to God (Rom. xii. 1; xv. 16); and their whole life is brought under the notion of worship, inasmuch as they have continual access to God in the Spirit (Eph. ii. 18), an access realized in the constant exercise of prayer and thanksgiving (1 Thess. v. 17, 18; Phil. iv. 6), so that every action receives a direct reference to God, and therefore falls to be done as a holy action.

It will be found that these general remarks on the New Testament idea of holiness are fully borne out in our Epistle. The most instructive passage is Chapter ix. Verses 13, 14, where, in an argument from the less to the greater,

we read: "If the blood of goats and bullocks, *etc.* sanctify in point of purity of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ who, through the eternal spirit, offered Himself without blemish unto God, cleanse your conscience from dead works, to serve (as worshippers, λατρεύειν) the living God."

Here we are not to treat *sanctify* and *cleanse* on the one hand, and the prepositional clauses on the other, as parallel elements in the comparison; for the clause with πρὸς ("in point of purity of the flesh") is not *telic* like the clause with εἰς ("to serve the living God"). Accordingly, ἁγιάζειν answers not simply to καθαρίζειν, but to καθαρίζειν εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν, κ.τ.λ. Sanctification is the purification of the worshipper for his religious service (λάτρεία, compare x. 2) and the sanctification of the New Testament is the cleansing of the conscience from dead works by the blood of Christ, which gives us confident access to the heavenly sanctuary (x. 19-22). The same thought, viz., that by the sacrifice, or through the blood, of Christ we are sanctified, appears in Chapters x. 10, 14, 29; xiii. 12, and still in a connection which shews that the sanctified are thought of as worshippers (compare x. 10 sq. with x. 2 and xiii. 12 with xiii. 10, 15).

As yet, however, we have gained only a formal conception of sanctification. We are sanctified by the sacrifice of Christ when we are brought to stand acceptably before God, not as justified sinners before a judge but as worshippers. The material side of the notion of holiness must depend on the nature of the worship which the sanctified perform with acceptance. The most general utterance on this point is in Chapter xii. Verse 23, where the Apostle exhorts his readers to exercise thankfulness (χάριω ἔχειν as Luke xvii. 9, etc.) through which we may worship God acceptably, with godly fear and awe. This determines the attitude of the worshipper; the substance of

his service is given in Chapter xiii. Verses 15, 16. It is, according to Old Testament analogy, a sacrifice offered through a high priest. Further, the sacrifices with which God is well pleased are the continual sacrifice of praise, that is, the fruit of lips confessing his name, together with good deeds (*εὐποία*) and exercises of charity (*κοινωνία*). The latter appear at Chapter vi. Verse 10 as the display of love to God. It is, then, in the continual exercise of thanksgiving and of loving obedience—especially in good deeds done to our neighbour in the spirit of love to God, that the practical exercise of the Christian's sanctification appears. Now when it is said that, in one sacrifice, Jesus Christ has perfected in perpetuity them that are sanctified (x. 14), it is certainly to be understood that the Christian's prayer and obedience are ever acceptable to God in virtue of the one sacrifice. But it is none the less true that our Christian service, as above described, is a moral service, the Godward aspect in fact of our whole moral vocation. From this point of view, the holiness, which is in fact our habitual nearness to God in such services, appears as a task, and as a growing holiness. Moral nearness to God is likeness to God or participation in his holiness (xii. 10) which is wrought in the Christian by God's fatherly discipline and chastisement. Or again, in Chapter xii. Verse 14, sanctification is a thing to be pursued, without which none can see the Lord; that is the Lord Jesus, when, at his second coming, He shall appear to them that wait for Him unto salvation (ix. 28). And the way of this sanctification lies in the pursuit of peace with all men—that is, in accordance with the Biblical sense of the word peace, in the maintenance, in their full integrity, of the moral relations towards those around us which are given to us in our several vocations.

When we remember that the sanctification, thus connected with the pursuit of peace, is accomplished in that

participation in God's own holiness which is the end of his fatherly training, we cannot fail to see in the conceptions of our Author the development of the beatitude in which our Lord attaches the name of sons of God to those who work peace (peacemakers in the sense of James iii. 18). By this combination the Apostle's doctrine of sanctification is completely filled up and rounded off. For we now see that the life of every Christian has a manward side—the pursuit of peace with all men, and a Godward side—the pursuit of holiness. These two pursuits are not two parts of the Christian life, but two sides of the same work. They are so in virtue of the work of Christ, by which we are sanctified. In that work his people receive such access to God at the throne of grace as secures them his mercy and seasonable help in every time of need (iv. 16); so that the whole life of the Christian assumes a direct and assured relation to God, whereby it becomes an acceptable religious service, full of thanksgiving, and guided by pious fear and reverence. The relation to God thus constituted is one of sonship, in which all chastening dispensations are seen to have as their end the full realization, in actual participation in the divine holiness, of that consecration to God which is accomplished in the sacrifice of Christ.

When, therefore, in Chapter ii. Verse 11, the Apostle introduces into his argument that relation of believers to Christ which is expressed by the words sanctifier and sanctified, he does so in order to indicate the direct Godward aspect of that work which had previously been described more vaguely as salvation and bringing to glory.

Verses 14, 15: "Since then the children have blood and flesh in common [or more exactly 'have received a common share of blood and flesh'] he also in like manner *παρὰ πλησίως* does not necessarily mean in an identical

manner, but from Verse 17 that appears to be the meaning here; partook of the same [*i.e.* during the days of his flesh, Chapter v. Verse 7] that through death he might bring to nought [literally render *ἀεργος*, deprive of his power and sphere of action] him that held the empire of death, that is the devil, and set those free, as many as through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to [held under] bondage."

I. Here we have to consider, in the first place, Jesus's share in blood and flesh. In spite of the inversion this can be nothing else than the usual "flesh and blood" which, in the received text, has displaced the true reading. The inversion may be explained from the fact that oneness of blood is the common expression for the natural unity of mankind. Flesh and blood is not an Old Testament expression, but occurs in Ecclesiasticus xiv. 8; xvii. 26 [31], in a connection where the Old Testament writers are accustomed to use "flesh" by itself, to denote the frail and perishing physical nature of man. In the Rabbinical writers, "flesh and blood" is a standing phrase for human nature in contrast to God. So in Matthew xvi. 17, Galatians i. 16, the expression simply means "man." In Ephesians vi. 12 a wrestling with flesh and blood (in the *Palæstra*) is contrasted with the Christian's conflict with spiritual powers; and, finally, in 1 Corinthians xv. 50, it is said that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor doth corruption inherit incorruption. Flesh and blood, then, are what make a man less than a purely spiritual being—that in him which is corruptible and liable to death. Accordingly the expression, though a metonymy, like flesh in the Old Testament, never becomes a metaphor like the Pauline *σάρξ*; the physical flesh and blood are always the basis of the conception. Christ had to assume flesh and blood, that He might undergo death. But, in his glorified state, He no longer partakes of these, as the aorist *μέτεσχεν* shews. The days of his flesh (v. 7) are

the period of his earthly struggles and suffering; and in his sacrifice his blood is shed and his flesh rent (ix. 12; x. 20). Plainly, then, our Author shares the opinion of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians xv., that flesh and blood have no place in the resurrection state, that the resurrection body is spiritual. This doctrine St. Paul uses to separate the Christian faith in a full personal immortality—which implies a bodily organism—from all idle questions or speculations as to the continuity of our present physical life with the life to come. That corruption cannot inherit incorruption means that the doctrine of the resurrection does not interfere with any physical law of decay, and so cannot be subverted by any physical argument, while at the same time the resurrection life is freed from all physical weakness.¹

II. Verse 15, with the second half of Verse 14, presents a very difficult chain of thought, which has been interpreted in the most various ways. The difficulty is mainly due to the fact that the argument, which is very briefly set forth in the words before us, is not taken up again, at least not in anything like the same form, in subsequent parts of the Epistle. The very notions which the argument links together are mentioned here for the first and last time. There is no other allusion in the book to *διάβολος*, *φόβος θανάτου*, *τὸ κράτος τοῦ θανάτου*, *δουλεία* or *ἀπαλλαγή*. The Writer either throws out in this verse an entirely inde-

¹ A different usage of the word *σᾶρξ*, in the phrase "flesh and bones," is found in most MSS. of Luke xxiv. 39. But the reading *σάρκας καὶ ὀστέα* preferred by Tischendorf (Ed. VIII.), means "fleshy and bony mass," which, of course, is consistent with the elimination of all corruptible and mutable elements. In Acts ii. 31, Luke gives to Peter's no doubt Aramaic speech a form dependent on the LXX. rendering of Psalm xvi.; and, apart from this, it is plain that the homiletic use of an Old Testament passage ought not to guide our way of speaking of the resurrection, when we have St. Paul's carefully framed *usus* on the other side. Even in Acts ii. 30 there is no *κατὰ σαρὰ* in the true text. So, too, we know that in many early forms of the creed "the resurrection of the dead" stands in place of "the resurrection of the flesh." Caspari, however, seems to have proved that in the creed the one form is as old as the other.

pendent view of the work of Christ; or, what is more probable, presents the elements which elsewhere make up his view of the Atonement in a peculiar form to which he does not recur.

Let us begin by inquiring into the place here assigned to the devil. He holds the empire of death. Some commentators seek the explanation of this sovereignty in the Jewish doctrine that identifies Satan with Sammaël the angel of death. It was Sammaël, say the later Jews, who tempted Eve, and he is represented as the accuser who in the day of expiation seeks but cannot find any sin in Israel; for if he then found sin in them, they would be delivered into his hand, like all other nations. In this mythological conception, which is further paganised by the precept to offer bribes to Sammaël on the day of expiation to "blind his eyes," there is not much to help us here. For, apart from the fact that the whole conception belongs to the lowest manifestations of Jewish thought, it is Michael, not Sammaël, who is the angel of death to the Israelites. But, further, according to the *usus loquendi*, τὸ κράτος τοῦ θανάτου does not mean power to inflict death, but a sovereignty of which death is the realm, just as κράτος τῆς θαλάσσης means naval supremacy and the like. Thus the expression is strictly parallel with Romans v. 21, "Sin reigned in death," which means that the sovereignty of sin extended throughout the whole province covered by death. And this sovereignty of sin may also be viewed as a sovereignty of the devil, because sin and death entered the world by him at the Fall. It is true that the Old Testament nowhere identifies the Satan with the serpent in Eden. But the identification is given in the Apocryphal book of Wisdom ii. 24, and is adopted in Revelation xii. 9, where the old serpent is a name of the devil.

The thought, then, that whatever authority the devil possesses is an empire in the province of death has clear

enough Biblical analogies. Still this line of illustration does not fully explain our passage. Of what nature is the empire here spoken of, and what are the limits of its exercise? It is not the mere existence of physical death¹ that is an exertion of the might of the devil. There is not a particle of Biblical support for the view that the devil inflicts death. Nor does the bringing to nought of the devil do away with death as such. After Christ's work, as much as before it, "it is appointed unto men once to die" (ix. 27). The destruction of the empire of the devil delivers men, not from death, but from a bondage due to the fear of death. The empire of Satan in the realm of death displays itself in the existence of a fear of death, and in the lack of freedom which this fear brings with it. Now what is the fear of death? What is meant is, of course, not the mere natural shrinking which Jesus Himself experienced, but that fear of death which is a factor in man's spiritual state—that fear of death which is so fully explained in the Old Testament. In the Old Testament death—physical death—is identified with separation from God and his grace. The identification is not absolute: even in the Old Testament death is sometimes conceived as coming under circumstances which render it only the natural and inevitable close of a life that has been fully crowned by God's blessing. But, in general, the fear of death which runs through the whole life of the Old Testament believer is the fear that God will reject his person, and visit upon him his sins. This fear was not always present to the minds of the Old Testament people; but it was never vanquished and wholly laid aside. At any moment a series of providential dispensations, such as fell on Job, might awake it in all its keenness, as we see it in the utterances of Hezekiah and of many Psalmists.

¹ *θάνατος* in our Epistle is simply physical death, and here no one can propose to give it a further sense, as Jesus Himself underwent it.

Now the lack which is felt by the whole Old Testament of any objective and sure pledge that God will not in any special case *remember sins* against an individual, has an objective expression in the doctrine of the Satan, that is, of the malicious adversary, who, in Job and Zechariah iii., appears in God's court as the public accuser, whose business it is to call the sins of God's people to mind—for the Old Testament looks only in the future for a state of things in which God will no more remember his people's sins (Jer. xxxi. 34). It is in this sense that the devil appears here. Within the limits of mortality the accuser exercises sway, and prevents even God's people from enjoying liberty so long as the fear of death, as a sign of the lack of full acceptance before God, continues to press on their minds. Jesus abolishes this fear, and reduces the office of the accuser to nullity, inasmuch as his saving death inaugurates the new dispensation in which God remembers his people's sins no more. (Compare Chap. viii. 12 sq.) How strongly this argument would appeal to the Hebrew readers of the Epistle is clear from the Rabbinical theology, which often speaks of the fear of death and the accuser as a constant companion of man's life. In every dangerous crisis of life, on a lonely journey, or on the high seas, the Jew seemed to see the accuser pleading for his death. "In this life," says the *Midrash Tanchuma*, "death never suffers man to be glad."¹

We have not yet, however, fully developed the argument of the verse. To bring out the whole meaning, let us state it once more. As the Author never again mentions the devil, it is plain that the relation of the atonement to the devil is quite a secondary point in his theory. In fact, as we have just seen, the key to our verse lies not in the notion of a Satanic empire, but in the Old Testament fear of death. It is not said that Satan has any legitimate

¹ See citations in detail in Weber's *Altsynagogale Theologie*, p. 321.

authority over man, which has to be bought up, as the Patristic theory of the Atonement suggests. But the want of freedom, involved in the fact that fear of death, as of something implying rejection by God, runs through the whole life of the Old Testament dispensation, may be represented as a bondage to the accusing power that brings sins into remembrance before God. As far as the religious fear of death extends, this accusing power extends its dreaded sway.¹

To break this sway, Jesus takes upon Himself that mortal flesh and blood to whose infirmities the fear of death under the Old Testament attaches. But, while He passes through all the weakness of fleshly life, and, finally through death itself, He, unlike all others, proves Himself not only exempt from the fear of death, but victorious over the accuser. To Him who in his sinlessness experienced every weakness of mortality, without diminution of his unbroken strength of fellowship with God, death is not the dreaded sign of separation from God's grace (comp. v. 7) but a step in his divinely appointed career; not something inflicted on Him against his will, but a means whereby (*διὰ* with genitive) He consciously and designedly accomplishes his vocation as Saviour. For this victory of Jesus over the devil, or, which is the same thing, the fear of death, must be taken, like every other part of his work, in connection with the idea of his vocation as Head and Leader of his people. It is no mere private or personal victory. It is the abolition of the fear of death, the negation of the accusing power of the devil, for his brethren as well as for

¹ According to the unusual but very precise phrase *τούτους ὅσοι*, the deliverance wrought by Jesus is as wide as the previous bondage. All who laboured under the fear of death are set free by Christ's work. But that fear is not the physical shrinking common to all men, but the fear felt by those who have a sense of sin, *i.e.*, by God's people under the old dispensation. The question of the extent of the Atonement as discussed in modern theology thus lies quite outside of the Apostle's argument. In fact, as the next verse shews, the whole reasoning applies only to the seed of Abraham.

Himself; for it was only for their sakes, in their interest, and to carry them with Him, that He assumed flesh and blood and passed through death. His victorious death did not simply prove that death is not necessarily a thing of dread. Nay, it actually and in fact deprived death of its terror, giving it an altogether new significance in the organism of the moral world. If the devil stands as our accuser, Jesus appears before God as our representative; and the fear of death which rises up in our hearts whenever we connect death and the subsequent judgment (ix. 27) with an accusing rehearsal of our sin before God, is rendered impossible when we remember that, even in death, we are only following Him who shared our life and shared our death in order that, with and in Him, we might appear acceptably before God. To those who are Christ's, death means what it meant to Him, and nothing more. It is the gate of glory, not the mark of God's wrath. For, as St. Paul puts it, in death and life alike we are the Lord's (Romans xiv. 7, 8).

The connection of this argument with Verses 17 and 18 requires to be determined with some care. Let us begin by reading these verses.

Verses 16, 17; "For, as you know (*δήπου* introduces propositions which neither speaker nor hearer will think of questioning), it is not angels that he takes hold of (*i.e.*, succours), but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham. Wherefore it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things looking to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people."

Now let us look at the connection of these sentences with Verse 15. It is usually stated in a way involving a degree of logical looseness not at all probable. The Apostle, we are told, argues: "Those who are to be helped are not pure spirits, but men; and so, to help them, Jesus must become

man." Now, in the first place, this would be a mere resumption of what has been said in Verses 14, 15. And it would be a resumption in unclear form of what was there said very precisely. For, instead of saying that the saved are men, the Apostle says here that they are descendants of Abraham; and instead of giving to his inference the definite shape, that Christ also behoved to become man, he gives the vaguer thesis, "It behoved him to become like his brethren." It is worth while, before accepting so limping a view, to ask whether the looseness of logic and expression lies with the Apostle or with the commentators.

In the argument of Verse 15 the Writer has ascribed to Jesus a function which bears a close analogy to a familiar Old Testament office. If Jesus delivers his people from the fear of death, by destroying the accusing power of sin, and so enables them to appear with Him before God in an acceptable way, He clearly does the work of a high priest. It is not to be forgotten that, under the Old Testament, the fear of death was specially connected with the approach of an impure worshipper before God, and that, according to Numbers xviii. 5, it was the special charge of the priesthood so to discharge the service of the tabernacle that there might be no outbreak of Divine wrath on the children of Israel. The fear of death expressed by the people after the judgment on Korah (Num. xvii. 13), "Every one that draweth near to the tabernacle of Jehovah shall die," was, in fact, met and removed by the ordinance of the earthly priesthood; although the deeper fear of death, which runs through the whole life of the Old Testament, remained untaken away. He, then, who removes that fear finds his Old Testament type, or, as our Apostle would say, his anti-type, in the priesthood which accomplished, in external ceremonial matters, that which He does for his people in a spiritual sense. And even the idea that Jesus encounters and defeats the accuser, Satan, has its parallel in what is

said of the high priest Joshua in Zechariah iii. The filthy garments of Joshua are there to be understood in contrast with the pure high-priestly robes that he receives on his acquittal. As the latter symbolize a representative, not a personal, holiness of the priest, so the former must symbolize not the private shortcomings of Joshua merely, but also the sins of the people in whose name he approaches God. So we find that the highest privilege consequent on his acquittal is free access to God as priest; that is, access to God in the people's name, (Zech. iii. 7): "I will give thee free passage among these who stand (before me)." Joshua, indeed, is no saviour. It is not he that defeats the accuser, but divine grace that accepts him and puts Satan to shame. Yet, with this difference, the parallel is obvious.

In order, then, to complete the thought of Verse 15, and to pass at once to the notion of the high priesthood of Christ in such a way as to offer a new confirmation of the accuracy of the whole line of his argument, it is only necessary for the Apostle to point to the fact, that the society which receives the benefit of Christ's death is in fact the same society which, under the Old Testament, looked to the high priest for access to God. Hence, in Verse 16, he continues: This is undoubtedly a just view of the Saviour's work. For, as you know, it is not angels who receive his help, but the seed of Abraham, that is, the church of God under its Old Testament name (Ps. cv. 6; Isa. xli. 8). Now the kind of help which the Church needs in things looking to God is well known from the ordinances of the old dispensation. He who stands for them before God, relieving them of the fear of death in their approach to God, must be a high priest; and, in order to be a merciful and faithful high priest, Jesus, like all high priests, required to be a brother Israelite, like in all things to his brethren whom He represents before God.

This, I think, is the true view of the connection; and,

according to it, Verses 14, 15, and Verses 16, 17, offer two parallel and mutually illustrative, but not identical arguments. Each states a fact as to those who were to benefit by the work of the Saviour, with an object (introduced by *iva*) which it was his aim to realize; and from these two points taken together draws an inference as to the necessity of the incarnation and the passion of Jesus.

VERSES 14, 15.

The children are mortal flesh and blood: and the object is to deliver them from the fear of death. To do this, Jesus shared their mortal nature, and victoriously underwent death.

VERSES 16, 17.

Those who are to be helped are the Church elect in Abraham. The object is to provide for the Church an adequate priesthood. To become a high priest Jesus must become like his brethren, the seed of Abraham, and must undergo human sufferings and temptations.

So far the general structure of the argument. The details of Verse 17 with Verse 18 will occupy another paper.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

BRIEF NOTICES.

LECTURES IN DEFENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, *by Professor F. Godet*. Translated by Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttelton, M.A. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark). The cream of this valuable little work appeared in the first series of the EXPOSITOR, in the five articles entitled the Resurrection and the Holiness of Jesus Christ, although, by some oversight, Canon Lyttelton has omitted to mention that fact in his Preface. Our readers will know, therefore, what to expect from it; and doubtless many of them will be glad to possess the work in a separate and complete form. For Dr. Godet has something to say on the Miracles wrought by Christ as well as

on his Resurrection, on his Divinity as well as on his Holiness. And though these Lectures in some measure take their form from a local controversy in which he was suddenly engaged, they are nevertheless full of fine thoughts and cogent arguments which have much more than a local application. Many a stripling will here find an armour which he can wear, and weapons which he can wield, in the conflict with scepticism and unbelief; and, above all, may learn from this accomplished veteran the generous and catholic spirit in which alone that conflict should be waged.

ARKITE WORSHIP, *by Rev. R. Balgarnie.* (London: Nisbet & Co.) And here is another book substantially drawn from the pages of this Magazine—Mr. Balgarnie *not* having forgotten, however, to acknowledge his debt. Many of our readers will remember two striking articles, entitled “As Old as Methusaleh,” which bore his name. These he now reprints with some valuable additions. And whatever may be thought of his main thesis, or of some of the arguments with which he sustains it—and some of these seem open to grave question—it will be admitted, I think, that he gives us a welcome insight into the nature of that great primitive Tradition, if it should not rather be called that great primitive Revelation, of which we find many traces not only in the Old Testament, but also in the sacred books of every ancient race.

THE KEYNOTE OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

CONCERNING the leading characteristics of the Epistle to the Hebrews, there is general agreement among critics. The Paulinism of its doctrine is unmistakeable. The writer is either Paul himself, or else one who has sat at the feet of Paul; who not only agrees with him in teaching those truths which every preacher of Christianity must have published, but has also imbibed from him all that we regard as characteristic in the Pauline method of presenting Gospel truths. Nor is it only in the substance of its doctrine that this Epistle is Pauline; the language also is so in a high degree. There are many coincidences of expression with Paul's acknowledged letters, which either prove common authorship or, if they do not, at least shew that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews was well acquainted with some of Paul's epistles, in particular that to the Romans. On the other hand, one cannot but be impressed by the fact, of which Origen took notice, that the Greek of the Epistle to the Hebrews is of a rhetorical character, unlike that of Paul's writings; so that even if we believe that the Apostle commissioned the writing of the Epistle and adopted it when written, still it would be reasonable to think that he had employed in the composition the hand of some other person.

But it seems to me that even this suggestion of the Alexandrian critics fails to take account of what I regard as indications of a date a little later than that of the circle of Pauline writings. The question of the final perseverance of

the saints—in other words, the question whether it is possible that one who is really a child of God can totally and finally fall away, is one that has been warmly debated among Protestant theologians. Those who on this subject speak in the language of most confident assurance have always found passages in Paul's writings most apposite for quotation, such as, "being confident of this very thing, that He who hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ." But I do not know whether it has been sufficiently remarked that, if one had to derive a system of doctrine from the Epistle to the Hebrews alone, controversy on the subject of which I speak could scarcely arise; for it would be determined in quite the opposite way. The danger of his disciples falling away seems to be weighing heavily on the writer's mind. He recurs to the subject again and again, multiplying his exhortations and his warnings.

In the piecemeal way of reading the Bible common among us, it is easy for us to miss the drift of a long passage. In Church or in family reading a chapter is usually read at a time; in their private study of Scripture many look out not even a chapter but a text, seeking to find, it may be in some incidental words, a proof by which to establish a doctrine, and scarcely troubling themselves to enquire how their interpretation fits in with what goes before and after. In this way it happens that the vast majority of those who from time to time read a chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews never trouble themselves to enquire what the whole Epistle is about; what the special object with which it was written; what the then immediate dangers of the Church which the author desired to counteract. Of those who do so enquire a great many give what I account a wrong answer. For example, a common answer might be that the design of the writer is to shew the superiority of Christianity to Judaism, or else that his design is to exhibit

the high dignity of our blessed Lord. Yet I do not think that there is reason to believe that the readers of the Epistle were either ignorant on these topics, or that they had begun to doubt on them, and needed to have their ignorance enlightened or their doubts removed. It is true that the topics of our Saviour's dignity, and of the superiority of the dispensation which He founded to any which had preceded it, do occupy a large part of the Epistle, but these topics are not the conclusions which the argument is to establish, but the acknowledged truths which serve as premisses. The writer's object is not so much dogmatic as practical; not so much to prove the fundamental doctrines of our faith as to draw out the practical duties which the recognition of these doctrines imposes. Thus the Epistle opens by contrasting the former dispensations in which God spake to the fathers by the prophets, with the new dispensation of which his blessed Son was the Mediator; but it is in order to draw the practical conclusion, that the dignity of the Messenger throws a greater responsibility on those to whom the message has been sent, makes the duty of adherence to it the greater and the danger of falling from it more terrible. No sooner has the writer, in the first chapter, asserted the superangelic character of the Son of God than he hastens to draw the conclusion, how much more dangerous the rejection of the word spoken by the Son than of that dispensation which had been given by the instrumentality of angels: "*Therefore* we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things we have heard, lest at any time we should let them slip,"—or, as the Revised Version has it, "lest haply we drift away from them;"—"for if the word spoken through angels proved steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?"

The keynote here struck is sustained throughout the entire Epistle. The danger of his disciples falling away,

the terrible penalties which apostasy would entail ; these are topics which the writer has always in view and from which he never wanders far. My readers must forgive me if I draw out the proof at length ; for I know how deceitful is the expectation that readers told to “see” such and such a passage will actually look out for it, even when the book referred to is so easy of access as the Bible ; and therefore that no impression can be conveyed of the frequency with which a topic recurs without making the quotations at full length. The writer, then, of the Epistle to the Hebrews, having spoken of our Lord’s superiority to angels, proceeds to compare Him with the legislator of the Jewish dispensation, and goes on : “Moses indeed was faithful in all his house as a servant, but Christ as a son over his house ; whose house are we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end.” Then, having warned his disciples by the example of the Jews to whom Moses spoke and who, as we read in Psalm xcv. provoked God to swear in his wrath that they should not enter into his rest, he proceeds : “Take heed, brethren, lest haply there be in any one of you an evil heart of unbelief, in falling away from the living God ; but exhort one another day by day, so long as it is called To-day, lest any of you be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin ; for we are become partakers of Christ, *if* we hold fast the beginning of our confidence firm unto the end.” Then, having reminded them of the fate of those who had been rebellious and disobedient and whose carcases fell in the wilderness, he exhorts again : “Let us fear, therefore, lest haply, a promise being left of entering into rest, any one of you should seem to have come short of it ;” “For indeed we have had good tidings preached to us, even as they had ; but the word of hearing did not profit them :” “Having then a great high priest, who hath passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast our confession.” Then,

having spoken somewhat on the high priesthood of Christ, he comes back to his warnings in words the sternness of which has made them hard to be received: "As touching those who were once enlightened, and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, and then fell away, it is impossible to renew them again to repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh and put Him to an open shame:" "But beloved we are persuaded better things of you; and we desire that each one of you may shew diligence unto the fulness of hope, even to the end, that ye be not sluggish, but imitators of them who through faith and patience inherit the promises." The writer then sets forth at length the superiority of Christ's atonement to the Mosaic sacrifices, and returns to his constant topic of exhortation: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope that it waver not, for He is faithful that promised; and let us consider one another to provoke unto love and good works, not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together as the custom of some is, but exhorting one another, and so much the more as ye see the day drawing nigh. For if we sin wilfully, after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more a sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful expectation of judgment, and a fierceness of fire which shall devour the adversaries. A man that hath set at nought Moses' law dieth without compassion on the word of two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment think ye shall he be judged worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the spirit of grace? for we know Him that said, Vengeance is Mine, I will recompense; and again, The Lord shall judge His people. It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

The writer then reminds his disciples of the proofs of the sincerity of their faith which they had already given, and exhorts: "Cast not away therefore your boldness which hath great recompense of reward. For ye have need of patience that, having done the will of God, ye may receive the promise. For yet a very little while, He that cometh shall come and shall not tarry. But my righteous one shall live by faith; and, if he shrink back, my soul hath no pleasure in Him. But we are not of them that shrink back unto perdition, but of them that have faith unto the saving of the soul."

In the passage just cited occurs nearly the only instance in which a charge of bias can, with any appearance of justice, be brought against the translators of the Authorized Version. For, without any authority from the original, they interpolate the words "any man": "The just shall live by faith; but if *any man* draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him," an interpretation apparently recommended by dislike to the doctrinal inference suggested by the literal translation, "The just shall live by faith; but, if he draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him."

After this the writer, having in his noble 11th Chapter sung the praises of faith, returns to exhort his disciples to patience under the temporal sufferings they were undergoing. He reminds them of the example of Christ in enduring the contradiction of sinners, "that they wax not weary, fainting in their souls." He tells them of the purposes for which their Father saw it good that they should receive chastening, and he proceeds: "Follow after peace with all men, and the sanctification without which no man shall see the Lord; looking carefully lest there be any man that falleth short of the grace of God," or, as it is in the margin of the Revised Version, "that falleth back from the grace of God:" "lest any root of bitterness springing up trouble you, and thereby the many be defiled; lest there

be any fornicator or profane person, as Esau, who, for one mess of meat, sold his own birthright; for you know that, even when he afterwards desired to inherit the blessing, he was rejected; for he found no place of repentance, though he sought it diligently with tears." I have made quotations from the Epistle at great, I only hope not wearisome, length; but without very full quotation it would not have been possible to exhibit how the whole letter is pervaded by the thought that the faith of its readers was being subjected to severe trials, tempting them sorely to apostasy; that they had need of patience and endurance to hold fast the good confession they had made; and must be reminded of the rewards of perseverance, as well as admonished by Old Testament examples, of the irretrievable ruin which would follow falling away.

Now I hope it will not be imagined that I wish to make out that there is a difference of doctrine between the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews and St. Paul; that I am arguing that this Epistle could not have been written by St. Paul because, to state the matter coarsely, St. Paul was a Calvinist and the writer of this Epistle an Arminian. Such an idea could only be suggested to any one by our unhistorical method of reading the New Testament, our habit of searching it only in order to find out a text which may furnish a ruling on some point of modern controversy, regardless what were the circumstances of the Sacred Writer, what the thoughts of which his mind was full, and whether it was of that controversy it was his object to speak. I have no desire to disparage the importance of the subjects on which in modern times controversy has arisen, what are the beginnings of the spiritual life, what the signs by which it manifests itself, whether the subject of it can recognize these signs by infallible indications, and what confidence he can build on them for the future. But it may easily be that if our thoughts are full of these ques-

tions, we may fail to throw ourselves into the circumstances of the Sacred Writer, and to perceive what were the thoughts and feelings of which his mind was full. In the present case, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has not in his thoughts the case of the secret decadence of the spiritual life in the soul of one whose heart had at one time burned with zeal for the Gospel cause, but whose love had grown cold, and concerning whose restoration doubts might well be entertained. He has to deal with a patent fact; the case of a Church learning, by bitter experience, to know the truth of our Lord's warning, that there are those in whom the word of life is sown who, "when they have heard the word, immediately receive it with gladness, but have no root in themselves, and so endure but for a time; and afterwards, when tribulation or persecution ariseth for the word's sake, immediately they are offended." In the Church here addressed there had been some who, under the pressure of persecution, withdrew themselves from the Christian meetings, and forsook the assembling of themselves together: nay, the apostasy had carried off some who had enjoyed the highest consideration in the Christian community, and had given the strongest evidence of their fitness to advance its interests. Men who had not only been admitted into the Church by baptism, but who had even been partakers of the supernatural gifts of the New Dispensation, who had been enlightened, and had tasted of the heavenly gift, and had been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and had tasted of the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, had fallen away. What marvel, when the demon of unbelief had struck down his victims in such high places, if the one predominating thought of the Preacher to the little band who still remained faithful was, Will ye also go away?

When we thus read the Epistle, with an eye less to its dogmatic than to its historic interest, we find ourselves,

I think, in a period a little later than that represented in Paul's epistles. There was no time in the Church's history when some apostasies did not occur. Even in our Lord's lifetime there were those who "went back and walked no more with Him"; yet this sin was not the pressing danger at the time when the Church had not yet lost her first love, and when persecution against her had not been organized. Even in the first days, as we learn from the Acts of the Apostles, the preaching of the Gospel was a work of danger. The missionaries were liable to be set upon by tumults of mobs, or dragged before tribunals. Yet there they had protection, as in the case of Gallio, in the contemptuous toleration of the Roman magistrates for a silly superstition condemned by no law. Accordingly, the diseases of the Church were such as beset a state of worldly prosperity, and Paul, about to visit Corinth, dreaded that God would humble him among them, and that he must be forced to bewail "many who had sinned already, and had not repented of the uncleanness and lasciviousness and fornication which they had committed." It was later that persecution assumed a systematic form, and that Christianity became an unlawful profession; so that, as we learn from the Epistle of St. Peter, "Christian" became a title of accusation, and "to suffer as a Christian" was an intelligible phrase. The celebrated letter of Pliny shews clearly that, though trials of Christians had not formed part of that magistrate's previous experience, the thing itself was no novelty. And he conceived himself to be taking a humane view when he decided that, whatever the Christian profession might be, the refusal to apostatize from it was a piece of obstinacy which might be properly punished with death. In the time of the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, the rigour of persecution had not proceeded so far against the Church addressed. Imprisonments and loss of property were the extreme punishment inflicted. Of these they had had their

share; they had been "made a gazingstock by reproaches and afflictions." Some of their society were in bonds, towards whom the rest fraternally exhibited compassion. The spoiling of their goods was inflicted on them, and they took it joyfully. But, elsewhere, the malice of their enemies had gone further; and those to whom the Epistle was addressed could not say, as these others, "that they had resisted unto blood, striving against sin." I am disposed to think that "they of Italy," from whom in the Epistle a salutation is sent, could even then tell of that Neronian persecution which was probably a time of trial, though less severe, for Christians all over the empire.¹ However this may be, it seems to me that this Epistle exhibits a greater strain on Christians from external persecution, greater consequent temptation to apostasy, than the Pauline epistles, and that therefore it may probably be referred to a somewhat later date.

Though I have been discussing the Epistle to the Hebrews historically, without reference to any modern controversy, it may not be out of place to add a few words about that doctrine of what is called the final perseverance of the saints, to which several passages in this epistle wear a hostile aspect. And perhaps I shall seem to be uttering a paradox if I say that the doctrine in question, even if theoretically false, is practically true. Yet there are many cases where it is practically more important to enunciate a general proposition than to attend to the exceptions and limitations which must be taken into account if we want to bring it into accordance with strict theoretical truth. We make practical use with great advantage of the theorems of theoretical mechanics, though there are no mathematical lines or circles

¹ This view of the date of the Epistle is that of Renan, who places it before the destruction of Jerusalem, but after that Neronian persecution in which Paul is commonly believed to have suffered martyrdom. But for the reason mentioned in the preceding sentence I cannot agree with Renan, that Rome was the Church addressed.

to be found in nature, no systems of forces so simple as those which our theory contemplates. Or, to take an illustration which more fairly represents what I have in my mind, we are obliged for practical purposes to lean on our own understanding, to adopt the conclusions which, after weighing the arguments as best we can, appear to us most reasonable. Yet it might be objected that we are not infallible, and therefore not entitled to rely on the decisions of our own intellect. It may easily be that we make a mistake; that what seems to us absurd or incredible may be really true, what seems practical wisdom may be downright foolishness. We cannot deny it. If we were to formulate into an abstract proposition any assertion of our immunity from error, we should, no doubt, be stating a falsehood. Yet, in practice, we not only habitually forget our fallibility, but we do so wisely; for all our powers of action would be paralysed if we allowed any doubts suggested in the region of theory to descend into that of practice and prevent us from taking with energy the course which, after the best prudential calculation we could make, appeared to us the best. And so, in many other cases, it is practically wise to banish from our minds contingencies for the occurrence of which we must even make provision. We do not know whether we shall be alive to-morrow, and a prudent man must make provision for the possibility that he may not; yet he would do ill in brooding over the thought of his mortality, and he is bound in prudence to make his plans for the morrow as carefully as if he were absolutely sure of being alive to carry them out.

If even yet I have not made my meaning clear, let me by a different illustration come a little closer to the matter in hand. Imagine that we had to preach a wedding sermon, and that some one recommended us to address the newly married couple as follows:—"You have promised to love each other to your life's end, and you think it certain that

you will do so ; but in real truth you can have no certainty whatever that your feelings will not change. Many marriages have begun as fairly as yours, and love has been succeeded by indifference, nay, by dislike and unfaithfulness." Could we reject the suggested topics solely on the ground that they stated what was not true? Can we deny that such changes of feeling as have been described do from time to time occur? Why, the most trusting bride will allow her friends to provide by settlements for the possibility that her husband may prove unworthy of the trust she places in him. Well, then, can we say that, if estrangement takes place after marriage, it proves that the love originally professed had not been sincere ; and that therefore, conversely, one who was assured of his own sincerity might also be assured against the possibility of change in the future? I do not know that this can be said either ; but it is certain that, even if there were theoretical truth in such an address as I have imagined, it would be practically false ; and that it would be mischievous if one was cruel enough to deliver it, and the parties foolish enough to give heed to it. For why is it that true affection resents as an insult the suggestion of the possibility of its discontinuance? Is it not because there cannot be love without trust, and trust is incompatible with doubt, the entertainment of which would very speedily bring its own justification and fulfil its own prophecies by undermining the affection it assailed? Well, whatever reason we have for trusting in the affection of a fellow creature, we have infinitely more for trusting in the love of Christ. We may discover that we have been mistaken in our opinion of a fellow creature, and that one on whom we had bestowed our affection was really unworthy of our love. It can never happen to us to find that we have thought too highly of Him. It may happen that one on whom we had bestowed our love withdraws affection from us, and that we find it hard to go on loving without return. That dis-

appointment can never befall our love to Christ. Men may prove inconstant, but He abideth faithful; He cannot deny Himself. What remains, then, to doubt, but the frailty of our own hearts? Well, if experience of human inconstancy does not deter two human beings from exchanging pledges of lifelong affection with each other, and if in thousands of cases we find by a better experience that their vows, made in God's sight and blessed by his Church, do receive, in answer to faithful prayer, grace and strength which exalt human affection into sacred duty, which preserve it unshaken through the trials and changes of life, so that sorrow or adversity borne together only draws it closer; labour endured for the other is no toil; unkindness, even injuries, received from the other find ready indulgence and forgiveness; still more may we be sure that faithful prayer will bring grace and strength to preserve unshaken that union with Christ on which our spiritual life depends.

I do not know how to assert final perseverance as a theory. I can say nothing to encourage a backslider to trust in the memory of a dead past, and rely that his recollections of the love of former days in themselves contain a pledge of future restoration. But to those who hold fast by a present faith in the Son of God I can confidently say, Doubt not, but earnestly believe in the faithfulness of Him in whom you trust. "He will perfect that which concerneth you; He will not forsake the work of His own hands."

GEORGE SALMON.

THE THIRD PSALM.

THIS is the morning hymn of the Psalter; and it shews us a new dawn of hope rising on the darkness of a burdened heart.

Happily all critics, even the most advanced and sceptical, agree both in ascribing the Psalm to David and in finding in it a memorial of his flight from Absalom; for we are thus spared that preliminary critical discussion which renders the approach to many psalms so tedious, and are enabled to apply an historical key to the interpretation of the Psalm without hesitation or doubt. The familiar story of David's flight has left so many traces on this brief lyric that, if we would apprehend its significance, we must call to mind some of the chief incidents of that story.

In the very year, then, in which, by the justice of his rule and the valour of his arms, David had achieved his most splendid conquests and touched the top of happy fortune, by his adultery with Bathsheba and the murder of Uriah he plunged into the deepest abyss of misery. Despite his profound penitence, the deep-drawn sobs of which we may still hear in Psalm li., that great sin darkened his whole future course. The prophet Nathan had warned him¹ that, because of his sin, God would "raise up evil against him *out of his own house*," and bring on him the very shame which he had brought on Uriah. And from the moment of that warning the memory of his sin and the apprehension of its punishment seem to have wellnigh unmanned and unkinged him. He fell more and more under the sinister influence of Joab and Bathsheba, and more and more neglected the plain duties of his royal office. He no longer led his armies in the field, or sat in the gate administering justice indifferently to all comers;

nor did he restrain and punish the sins of his sons, or compose their strifes, or even resent and crush the first motions of treason. He appears to have sunk into "a devout apathy" alien to his nature, and from which he was only aroused as the revolt of Absalom threatened to overwhelm him. For four years Absalom had been stealing away from him the hearts of the people of Israel, sitting, undeputed, in the gate of justice, gathering round him a royal bodyguard, and thus putting forward pretensions to the throne which no Oriental monarch could misunderstand; and yet through all these years David sat still and made no sign. Even when the revolt, which he must have foreseen, broke out, his first thought was of flight, not of resistance. He felt, apparently, that this was the predicted punishment of his sin—a punishment against which it would be vain, and might be wrong, to strive. And so, attended by but a few hundred devoted servants and soldiers, he left his palace, stole through the streets of Jerusalem, and stood by "the Far House,"¹—i.e., the last house on the extreme verge of the city, while his train defiled before him and crossed the brook Kidron. When they had crossed the brook and were on the way over Mount Olivet, he bade the priests carry back the ark, which they had brought thus far after him, to the tabernacle in Zion; for David had outgrown the superstition which regarded the ark as a talisman or palladium, and which led the Israelites of the previous generation to carry it with them into battle. He is sure that God's presence is not confined to symbol or place; he shrinks even from seeming to claim the providence of God as his ally, for he feels that he may have deserved God's anger rather than his favour. And hence he utters the well-known pathetic words: "Carry back the ark of God into the city. If I shall find favour in the eyes of the Lord, He will bring me back again, and shew me

¹ 2 Samuel xv. 17 (Hebrew).

both it and his habitation. But if He should say, I have no delight in thee, behold, here am I, let Him do to me as seemeth good to Him.”¹

Bereft of the ark, David continued his ascent of Olivet, “and wept as he went up, and had his head covered, and he went barefoot; and all the people with him covered every man his head, and they went up, weeping as they went.” It was at this moment, when shaken by the fear lest he might be forsaken of God, he learned that, beyond all doubt, he was forsaken by the man whom he most trusted as a friend and most feared as a foe. He is told that the venerable Ahithophel, “whose counsel was as if a man had consulted the oracle of God,” had conspired with Absalom against him. Nor was even the loss of a counsellor so wise the heaviest part of the blow to David. What made it pain him to the very heart was that it brought up again the memory of his old sin, and deepened his conviction that God was entering into judgment with him. For Ahithophel was the grandfather of Bathsheba, the head of the house which had been put to shame by David’s transgressions. In all probability it was, at least in part, to revenge this shame that he had so readily conspired against his master and king, and had counselled Absalom to enter his father’s harem “in the sight of all Israel.”²

Even yet, however, the calamities of the day were not complete. For, as David and his little band struck down from the mountain into the road which led to the fords of the Jordan, they passed along one side of a narrow ravine in the territory of Benjamin. And, here, the foul-tongued Shimei,³ of the house of Saul, sprang out over against them on the opposite ridge, and hurled curses and stones at them, crying: “Get out, get out, thou man of blood, and thou man of Belial,” *i.e.*, thou murderer and

¹ 2 Samuel xv. 25, 26.

² 2 Samuel xvi. 20-22.

³ *Ibid.* 5-14.

scoundrel: "*the Lord* hath delivered thy kingdom into the hands of Absalom, and hath trapped thee in thine own wickedness!" Hard and cruel words for the fugitive monarch to hear; and all the harder because, in part, they were true: harder still because he feared they might be altogether true. Had not he shewn himself "a man of blood" in his dealing with Uriah, and "a man of Belial" in his dealing with Bathsheba? Might it not be true that the Lord had taken his kingdom from him and given it to another? Hence he will not suffer Shimei to be slain. The Lord, he says, may have moved him to utter the curse. At least he can but hope that "the Lord will look on his tears, and requite him good" for the evil that has been spoken of him. And so, spent and weary, David and his servants camp by the fords of the Jordan, unable, until at least they have rested and slept, to put that deep and rapid stream between themselves and their foes. They have no defence but in God; and even He may be against them, and not for them.

Meantime their fate is being determined in Jerusalem. Ahithophel has besought Absalom to let him pursue the fugitives that very night, that he may come upon them while they are weary and weak-handed, and throw them into a confusion from which they would be unable to recover. David once slain, as in the confusion he easily might be, all the people, even those most attached to him, would turn to Absalom "as a bride turneth to her husband."¹ The counsel was "good," and, had it been taken, the conspiracy would, in all likelihood, have succeeded. But God had listened to David's prayer, and "turned the wisdom of Ahithophel into foolishness" in the foolish ear

¹ 2 Samuel xvii. 3. This verse, which in the Authorized Version makes no sense at all, should probably be read thus: "And I will (by smiting the king) make all the people turn to thee, as a bride turneth to her husband. Thou seekest but the life of one; and all the people shall remain in peace."

into which it was poured. At the prompting of Hushai, Absalom decided to wait for daylight, nay, till all the host of Israel could be 'summoned to his banner; and his decision cost him the kingdom. For very early in the morning, apparently before dawn,¹ David and all the people who were with him, crossed the river; and ere long hundreds and thousands of his bravest soldiers found their way to the standard of their old captain, and proved, in the issue, too strong for the hasty, though far more numerous, levies which Absalom led against them.

Now it is on the morning after this critical and momentous night that we meet David in our psalm. Rising, as was his wont, before the break of day—and possibly roused even earlier than was his wont by the tidings sent him from Jerusalem—he reviews his position, and finds it, in his more cheerful morning mood, take a very different shape and hue to that which it had assumed in the weariness and dejection of the previous night. Not that he attempts to lessen or disguise the imminent and deadly peril in which he stands. The whole nation has, apparently, risen up against him. The revolt is headed by his son, and guided by the ablest and craftiest of his statesmen. As yet hardly any have declared themselves for him except his foreign guards. The odds, therefore, are overwhelmingly against him, and he is fully sensible of his danger. “How *many*,” he cries, “are my adversaries!” And, again: “*Many* rise up against me!” And, again: “*Many* say of my soul, No help for him in God!” And, again: “*Ten thousands* have set themselves against me!” (Verses 1, 2, 6).

But though the odds are overwhelmingly against him, he refuses to be overwhelmed by them. Only yesterday, perturbed by the sudden shock of change, he could think only of his sin, and doubted whether God Himself had not changed, as men had changed, and turned to be his

¹ 2 Samuel xvii. 22.

foe. When Shimei had cursed him, cried out that there was no help for him in God, and affirmed that God Himself was fighting against him, his heart misgave him; he feared that God might have inspired the curse. But he has had time to reflect and to collect his soul—time to remember his penitence as well as his sin, time to remember that God had promised to pardon his sin as well as to punish it. And as he thinks of all that God had done for him and promised to do, he feels what God is to him and to all who put their trust in Him. He still lies open to peril indeed on every side; but God is his “shield,” as He had been that of father Abraham. A disrowned fugitive, he is plunged in shame; but God is his “glory.” With bent and shrouded head, and fallen countenance stained with tears, he had fled from palace and throne; but God is “the lifter up of his head” (Verse 3).

The ark is no longer with him. He had not felt worthy to keep it with him. That ancient symbol of the Divine Presence and Favour was once more safe within its curtains at Jerusalem. Yet, none the less, though he is separated from the holy mountain, not by distance alone, but also by the foes who have driven him from the sacred precinct, he is sure that, wheresoever and whencesoever he cries unto the Lord with his voice, his prayer penetrates to the Divine Presence, is heard and answered from the holy mountain (Verse 4): nothing can separate him from God, the God who “dwells between the cherubim” of the ark.

So utter a revulsion of feeling, a change of mood so radical, startles us, and sets us on asking what can have produced it. And the answer given to that question in Verse 5 is, at first, as surprising as the change of mood for which it is to account. David has passed a quiet night; no alarm has been sounded; no fierce pursuing foes have disturbed his rest. “*I laid me down,*” he says, with a growing accent of wonder; “*I fell asleep: I woke up*

again! That can only be because the Lord was with me, because He sustained and has determined to sustain me. Even *I*, hunted and cursed by men; even I who distrusted God and feared that He too had abandoned me; even I have tasted of his goodness this very night!" And from this near small mercy he argues up to the large continuous mercy of God. He takes his stand upon it, and looks back with grateful retrospect, forward with courage and hope, and puts away all fear let the peril be what it may (Verse 6): "I will not be afraid of the ten thousands who have set themselves against me."

If that seem too large and bold an inference to draw from a fact so common and small, the fact itself may perhaps grow larger as we consider it. For David knew, as well as Ahithophel, that the night on which, through the mercy of God, he had slept in peace and safety was the turning-point of the whole enterprise; that, had he have been attacked *then*, he must have been overcome. And if one of these old and experienced statesmen knew that night to be of such critical moment that, when he saw that "his counsel was not followed, he saddled his ass, and arose, and gat home to his house, in his own city, and put his household in order, and hanged himself, and died,"¹ why should not the other also see in it the point on which his fate revolved, and infer that he had now solid ground for confidence and hope; that he need no longer torment himself with fear of the ill-guided ten thousands who were arrayed against him? That he had been suffered to lie down in peace, that, on such a night, he had been able to sleep at all, that on this bright morning he had woke up in health and safety,—all this was of the best omen: God's protection through these most perilous hours was a pledge and prophecy of a Care and a Love that would never fail him.

Yet, though he has this strong inward assurance of the

¹ 2 Samuel xvii. 23.

Divine protection and help, he does not fail to *ask* God's protection and help; the implicit promise of the night only whets the edge and inflames the fervour of his morning prayer (Verse 7). He calls on God to *arise*, as he himself had just arisen from his couch; for God is said to "arise" when He visibly intervenes, when He takes a decisive part, in human affairs. He prays to God for *help*, as if to silence and rebuke those who had said, "There is no help, for him, in God." And, strong in the faith which the peace of the night has bred in his soul, he sees the answer to his prayer coming to him "from the holy mountain." Moved by the memory of earlier happier days, the answer to his prayer takes a peculiar form in his thoughts. He conceives of his enemies as infuriated wild beasts rushing on their prey; and he foresees that as of old he himself had smitten the lion and the bear so God will "smite in the jawbone" of his pursuers, and "break the teeth" with which they would fain rend him.

The final verse of the Psalm is by far the finest in thought, though not in form. Shimei and "many" more had affirmed, "There is no help for him in God." And, now, David replies: "To Jehovah belongeth *the help*,"—the only full, complete, and efficient help; help for body and soul, help in life and in death; the help which really saves a man from himself and his sins as well as from his adversaries and fears. But if David thinks *first* of himself and his own salvation, he cannot, as a true king, think of himself before God without also thinking of his subjects, and praying that they too may be saved. The ejaculation which closes the Psalm also crowns it. For "*Thy blessing on thy people*" means, "Thy blessing on *all* thy people; on the ten thousands who have set themselves against me, as well as on the scanty hundreds who are ~~with me~~ and for me. Thy blessing on them all, though they have rebelled against me, and whatever the issue of ~~this strife~~ with

them may be: even though I should suffer defeat and death, God bless his kingdom, the people whom He has called to be his witnesses, and his praise, in the earth."

And so the Psalm mounts to its climax, and David, in the very spirit of David's Son and Lord, requites evil with good, a blessing for a curse. Well may Ewald say when he reaches this heartfelt ejaculation: "This one short word throws a bright lustre upon David's noble soul"; and Perowne: "What a glimpse it gives us into the goodness and generosity of that noble heart!"

The third Psalm, then, is as fine a specimen of the historic psalm as the second is of the dramatic or Messianic psalm.¹ Its verses are absolutely crowded with historical allusions which illustrate its meaning. It is fairly saturated with the story of the hour which gave it birth; so that those who here read it in its connexion with that story for the first time cannot fail to gain a new and wider insight into its significance.

And because it sprang straight from the heart of a man of like passions and like conditions with ourselves, it finds an echo in our hearts; it is rife with instruction even for us. For we too know what it is to sin, and to be punished for our sins. Though we should have repented of our transgression, nay, even though our transgression has been blotted out by the Divine forgiveness, the stream of consequence which our transgression set in motion may long flow on unchecked; and that punishment of our sin which God means for our good may be mistaken for a sign of his anger. As the punitive results of our transgression overtake us, and compass us about, leaving no clear way of escape, men may say of us, or we may say of ourselves, as many said of David, "No help for him in God." Who that has lived to mature years has not been, at times, thus

¹ See pp. 13, *et seq.*

seized upon and compassed about by the sins and errors of his youth till the past has seemed all dark with guilt, and the future with despair? Which of us has not had at least to suffer from the sins of others, from the unruly and untamed passions of those whom we have loved as he loved Absalom, or from the defection of friends whom we have trusted as he trusted Ahithophel? And which of us has not permitted these mists of earth to obscure the very light of heaven?

What we need, therefore, what we need most of all, is that ingrained trust in the Mercy and Care of God which could never be long suppressed in the heart of David; which taught him in his utmost peril to make God his "shield," and in his deepest shame to look to God as his "glory" and the "lifter-up of his head." For if we are sincerely penitent for our sins, we too may be sure that God has forgiven our sins, even though He should still punish us for them; and sure that this very punishment is intended for our welfare. And it may help us to this most helpful confidence in God if we observe how it was that David rose out of his temporary despair into his habitual mood of courage and hope. We may find, indeed, a deep practical wisdom in the fact that a single night's undisturbed repose sufficed to restore his wavering faith; that, simply because he had lain down, and slept, and woke again, he could infer, "Jehovah sustaineth me," and resolve, "I will not be afraid though all things and all men should still seem to be against me." For if a small near good, a blessing so common as a few hours sleep, should thus reassure us, by convincing us that God is still with us, that He has neither forgotten nor forsaken us, *when* need we be without that most consolatory and sustaining conviction? In our worst shame, in our deepest sorrow, in our most impoverishing loss, something is still left to us. And if, instead of wilfully turning away from the

comforts and blessings which remain to us, or even weakly resenting that the sun should still shine and human life go on as of old when we have lost so much or are plunged in so dark a grief, we were thankfully to reckon up the mercies still lavished upon us, and from the least of them all to argue up to the large unfailing mercy of God, we too should gratefully acknowledge, "the Lord still sustains us and will sustain," and feel that we were not un comforted in our grief, nor wholly impoverished by our loss. To my mind there is nothing in this psalm more charming or more valuable than the homely wisdom with which it teaches us to make the best of what is left to us, to find in small and common gifts the pledge of an infinite bounty, and to see even in a few hours sleep not only some compensation for the loss of a throne, but also a clear prediction that the throne is *not* lost after all.

Yet the Psalm has kindred lessons for us of no slight value; as, for example, this: that our knowledge of what God's will is, so far from rendering prayer unnecessary or unmeet, should prompt us to pray that his will may be done. Because God has kept him through the night, David is sure that God will keep and help him in his struggle with his foes,—God's help in little things being a pledge of his help in the greatest; but his confidence does not close his mouth; it only lends urgency to his cry, "Arise, O Lord; help me, O my God!" That is to say, though he does not know in what way God is about to help him, he heartily consents to that way whatever it may be, and is even sure that God's way must be best.

Now if, in like manner, when we are oppressed with shame and grief, with care and fear, we should argue from a small present help to the larger help we need, and so become confident that God's will is our welfare, it would be no small comfort to us were we to turn this springing and germinant assurance into prayer, both because we know

God's will and know it not. We know his will to be our welfare; and therefore we can ask without fear or hesitation that his will may be done: for in asking his help when we know that He means to help us, we are in no danger of asking what He cannot bestow. But we do not know *how* He means to secure our welfare, in what form his help is to come; and therefore, with David,¹ we should ask Him to do as seemeth Him best, to help us in any way He will, and thus both bring our wills into a happy concert with his, and assure Him that we are of one will with Him. "Happy the soul in such a posture found!" for what grief can be all grief, or what loss all loss, if in the heart of it all there be the conviction that God is bent on our well-being—is promoting it even by the very loss or grief He calls us to endure—and that we are willing to accept well-being in whatever form he may send it?

There is still another lesson for us in the closing words of the Psalm. David could not seek his own welfare and salvation only. He is willing even to be saved in a way that shall seem a loss and shame to men, so that *they* are saved and blessed. His very foes must be saved before he can regard his salvation as complete. And hence he prays for a blessing on the people who had risen up against him. Nor is there anything which will so enlarge our straitened hearts, or bring such comfort to our grief, or so teach us to find in loss itself a gain to match, as this tender gracious consideration for the needs and the griefs of our neighbours. To seek the welfare of others is to secure our own. And if we can rise to the heroic height of David, and honestly forgive those who have trespassed against us, because God has forgiven our trespass against Him, we shall find that by one such act of forgiveness, even of the little wrongs which are done us in daily life, we have drawn nearer to God, and have brought Him nearer to us, than by a thousand prayers.

This Psalm then, will be a true morning hymn to us if it teach us to draw auguries of large future good from the common and apparently trivial gifts of the passing hour; if it teach us to turn our confidence in the infinite and inalienable goodness of God into prayers that his good will may be done, in and by and for us, in his own way, *i.e.*, in the best way; and if it also teach us to ask for and to seek the welfare of all men, even of those who have most wronged us, as we seek our own: for to have learned these lessons will be in very deed to turn the night of life into a new and happy day.

S. Cox.

MAN'S POWER TO FORGIVE SINS.

ST. MARK ii. 10.

It seems not unreasonable to suggest a doubt whether the somewhat trite interpretation of this passage which passes current among commentators can be fairly maintained, or yield a result which quite satisfies the notable peculiarity of our Lord's words. Does the ordinary acceptance of this clause fairly and fully represent its logical connexion with the circumstances? And as, in the slightly varied narratives of the Synoptical writers, this saying of our Lord alone is repeated with literal accuracy, is it not probable that some special significance may be latent in its exceptional form,—a significance which the ordinary interpretation fails to recognize? It is the purpose of the following pages to attempt an answer to these enquiries.

The reasoning of the Scribes, "among themselves," or "in their hearts," which our Lord perceived and rebuked, had been to the effect that the word of forgiveness uttered by Christ implied a blasphemous claim, on his part, to

exercise a power which belonged exclusively to God. There were two ways of replying to such a charge as this. One was for our Lord to admit the principle assumed, and to assert his own claim to be divine. The other was to allege that the power of Forgiveness was in some sort committed to men, and to justify his own claim, as man, to exercise it. Which of these two answers does He make ?

It is commonly understood that, in the words before us,—“the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins,”—He asserts his own divine nature, and so claims, as God, to exercise the power of forgiveness; and that, by way of proving that, being divine, He had the power in question,—“that ye may know,” etc.,—He referred the Scribes to the miracle which He immediately performed. With a view to this interpretation, it is taken for granted that the title “*Son of man*,” as applied to Himself, would necessarily convey to the Scribes his claim to be divine; this, says Dean Alford, being “an expression regarded by the Jews as equivalent to ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, v. Matt. xxvi. 63.”¹

But it is not observed (1) that, if the Scribes had been prepared to understand the phrase “*Son of man*,” thus applied, as a divine title, their rejection of such a claim by Him as blasphemous would in all probability have been far more eager and violent than their offence at his claim to forgive sins. And, (2) that, if they had actually so understood the title, it would have been altogether superfluous to perform a miracle, in order to prove to them the very fact which their objection had asserted,—namely, that *God* could forgive sins !

If, then, it could hardly be gathered from the passage, that the Scribes understood the expression “*Son of man*” as a divine title, or that they received it as implying our Lord’s claim to be God, there seems good reason to doubt

¹ Alford’s “Gr. Test.,” on Matthew ix. 6.

if our Lord could have meant them so to understand it ; while, if He did not, it creates a hopeless confusion in the narrative for us so to interpret his words.

Neither can it fail to occur to the thoughtful reader, that, if our Lord's object in this saying had been to assert his divinity as the ground of his claim to forgive sins, it would have seemed more likely that He should attain it, by saying "the *Son of God* hath power" to forgive sins, *because He is God*. But in that case, as has been above remarked, there could have been no occasion to offer any proof of that which his hearers already knew.

It is not for a moment lost sight of that the title "Son of man," as adopted by our Lord, did actually bear a divine application. But the Jews, although they knew it as a title of the Messiah, not only did not attach to it any divine significance, but subsequently charged Jesus with blasphemy for doing so ; in that He identified the Son of man, the Messiah, with the Son of God (Matt. xxvi. 65, 66).¹ How far the Jews were from regarding it as a divine title may perhaps be gathered from their disrespectful question, "Who is this Son of man?" in John xii. 34. Nor can it be questioned that our Lord had a special reason for using this expression in this place, as also for using it in a general form in the third person, rather than of Himself in the first. But, if it were allowed to suggest this reason, it would certainly not be in order that He might covertly assert that which none of his hearers denied ; but that He might emphasize and bring to the front the *humanity* to which He was related, and claim for *that* specifically the possession of the power of forgiveness. And it seems as if He had thus insisted upon the human side of his nature, notwithstanding that He knew He would be understood to affirm that the power attached to humanity *per se*, and not as being in association with Deity. And using this expres-

¹ See art. "Son of man," in Smith's "Dict. of the Bible."

sion here, with the certainty of its being so understood, it is a reasonable inference that He meant it to be so understood.

The difficulty attending the common interpretation is not lessened by reference to the qualifying or limiting clause,—“*on earth*.” It cannot be necessary to point out that, if the Scribes had recognized a divine power as being exercised by our Lord at all, they would have found no difficulty in admitting its exercise *on earth*, as well as *in heaven*. The meaning of this qualification cannot well be divined in reference to the ordinary application of the words. And its apparent want of significance is as evident whether the ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς belong, as Grotius regards it, to ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας, or, as later critics, to ἐξουσίαν ἔχει; although the former association seems in itself the more natural, and is indeed rendered more probable by an alternate reading of no little authority in this Gospel, of ἀφιέναι ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἁμαρτίας.¹ To state the matter plainly, there could be no purpose in announcing to the Jews that the Messiah, if they recognized Him *as God*, had power to forgive sins *upon earth*, or that He had power on earth to forgive sins. They would not dispute it. And, in addition, it is to be noted carefully how the attention of the hearers is represented by the Evangelist as being fixed by the words before us, not on any claim therein supposed to be alleged by the Miracle-Worker to be divine, as if *therein* were the answer to the objection of the Scribes; but upon the fact, supposed to be asserted, that *to men* belongs a power to forgive sins. This is more evident in Matthew's Gospel where we read (ix. 8) that, “when the multitude saw it (the miracle), they marvelled and glorified God who had given such power *unto men*!” It can hardly be a satisfactory explanation of this, to adopt Bengel's ingenious construction of the words τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, as a “*dativus commodi*,” and to read “*hominibus, tam diu*

¹ Dean Alford adopts this reading in the text.

cum peccato conflictatis.”¹ Nor, as Meyer remarks, can ἀνθρώποις be taken as “the plural of category, so that only Jesus is meant (Kuinoel), but *men* generally, the human race. In one individual member of the human family they saw this power actually displayed; and they regarded it as a rare gift of God to *humanity*, for which they gave God praise.”²

No stress is here laid upon a matter that has been much insisted on, and much disputed, that the power to perform a miracle implies the power to forgive sins. On the question whether the possession of the latter power is in this case supposed to be evidenced by the exercise of the former, something will have to be said in the sequel.

What has already been advanced is intended to shew reasons for doubting if the words in question can be rightly construed as only an assertion that Christ, the Son of man, being God as well as man, had the power on earth to forgive sins. Of course the writer has no design to question the truth of this assertion in itself. His object has been to shew that the particular words before us do not make, and were not intended to make, this assertion.

And if not this, does it not seem as if the whole logic of the case required the words to be interpreted as conveying the alternative reply above suggested to the question of the Scribes, “Who can forgive sins but God alone?” After rebuking them for their readiness to impute to Him the evil of blasphemy, our Lord repudiates the blasphemy by saying, as it were, “God does *not* absolutely reserve to Himself alone the prerogative to forgive sin, for the *Son of man* has power to forgive sins on earth. And, that you may know that He has this power, I, whom, claiming as I do to be the Son of man, you only know as a member of the human family; I, whose distinctly human relation

¹ Bengel's Gnomon in Matthew ix. 8.

² Eng. transl. of Meyer's Commentary on Matthew ix. 8. T. & T. Clark.

is by this title specially, if not exclusively, displayed before you, thus exercise the power of forgiveness by performing this miracle of healing." There can be no doubt that this was the way in which this saying and its attendant miracle were understood, and received by the hearers; and therefore it was that they "glorified God who had given such power *unto men*."¹

It is noticeable that our Lord does not speak of the power of forgiveness as being a matter of special delegation to the Son of man, nor as being newly acquired; but as being *possessed* by Him: "The Son of man *hath* (ἔχει) power." And although, in the current interpretation, this may be represented as implying that the power of forgiveness as exercised by our Lord was no delegated power, but essential to his divine nature,² yet it scarcely seems as if an exclusively *divine* power would be thus asserted as essentially inherent in Christ, as *the Son of man*. And, in the interpretation now suggested, such a mode of statement is consistent with the hypothesis, that a power of forgiveness of sin is *inborn* in man; that it is a natural endowment of humanity, to which, neglected or misunderstood hitherto, He, the Son of Man, the Representative of the race, being, whatever else He was, *essentially human*, now called the attention of the brotherhood of humanity, by shewing how it was to be exercised.

And from this, too, an obvious advance may be made to the remark that the power, here assumed to be asserted for humanity, has nothing to do with the special priestly or official remission authorized by divine enactment under the Jewish dispensation, and alleged in modern times to have equal authority among ourselves. It does not seem to have been much noted that the Scribes in the narrative before us, to whom the powers of the Levitical priesthood to absolve and to retain sins, must have been a matter of

¹ Matthew ix. 8.

² Alford, on Matthew ix. 6.

familiar recognition, plainly shew by their question, "Who can forgive sins but God alone?" how very decided was the limit within which those priestly powers could alone be wielded. In their minds it is plain that there is no difficulty in adjusting what they regarded as God's sole prerogative of forgiveness to their entire acceptance of the ecclesiastical remission of sins by the Levitical priest. Possibly from this consideration an instructive light might be thrown upon the question of modern priestly claims of this sort. But, in respect of the subject before us, it is only necessary to gather from it that the words of our Lord certainly do not refer to any special official or ecclesiastical powers; but that, if they do not, as it is assumed they do not, refer to Himself exclusively, they are asserted of humanity at large, and announce the power of forgiveness as a natural endowment which humanity, as such, possesses, and is called upon, after the example of its Representative, to exercise.

The general bearing of the words before us to which, in accordance with what has preceded, we seem to be exegetically constrained, may be stated as follows: "Although, in a large and divine sense, it is undoubtedly true that God alone can absolutely forgive sins, yet there is a forgiveness on earth which man can exercise, and which, therefore, I, as the Son of man, the Representative of humanity, and especially as the leader and example of all those who desire to tread in my steps, now exercise in my human nature. And, that you may know that such a power really belongs to me, in the only character in which you know me, I, in that character, as the Son of man, grant to this poor sufferer that earthly forgiveness of sins which consists in the removal from him of the bodily suffering which is the earthly consequence and penalty of sins; a release, of the reality and completeness of which you yourselves are perfectly competent to judge.

And, in doing this as the representative Man, I announce to you the principle which as yet men have never recognized, that, so far as you yourselves relieve the suffering and sorrow which sin has caused to your brethren, you are in fact granting to them an earthly forgiveness of sins. The exercise of this power is a privilege with which every man in his degree is endowed, as inherent in his social nature, but which may be so enlarged and extended in its application as to approach nearer and nearer to the miraculous exercise of this endowment, of which this cure is an example, until it is manifested as a power of doing on earth the work which, in its spiritual sphere, is the special prerogative of my Father in heaven."

Now it is submitted that here was the enunciation of a principle eminently characteristic of the Gospel, and in full harmony with its teachings—not only sufficiently important, but also (at that period at least) sufficiently novel, to justify the peculiar emphasis of its announcement, and fully capable of satisfying the remarkable form of its expression.

A brief examination of the circumstances and words which are narrated as having led up to this saying will shew that they are certainly not less consistent with the proposed, than with the ordinary, interpretation.

There is no reason for doubting that our Lord's first utterance to this paralytic was the announcement of a *plenary divine pardon* of his sins. And, to the murmured question of the Scribes, whether any but God Himself could bestow such a pardon, our Lord vouchsafes no direct reply, because his hearers were not able to receive it. He simply rebukes their readiness to think evil of Him. But He, as it were, continues: "You think it is very easy to give utterance to such words, of whose effect, from the nature of the case, it is impossible that you should have any direct evidence. But is it equally easy to utter words of healing, and, as I do this, to make their effect manifest to you in

the cure of this paralytic? I leave aside the question of God's exclusive prerogative in the forgiveness which I have just declared. *This* you are not able to apprehend. But, that you may know that *man* (in Me) has power to bestow an *earthly* forgiveness of sins,—a forgiveness which is no usurpation of the divine prerogative, but its normal adumbration and pledge, I hereby bestow an earthly forgiveness upon this man; and, that you may have no doubt of the reality of the gift, behold it in the form of a visible relief of his suffering." Here, therefore, is no need to raise a question of the connexion of the power of spiritual forgiveness with that of miracle-working; since the work of healing which our Lord performed was *itself* the forgiveness on earth of the sins which had caused the paralytic's suffering, seeing that it remitted for him their earthly penalty.

Lest it should be thought that by this interpretation (necessary as it seems) our Lord is represented as asserting for human nature too high a claim, the following considerations are briefly suggested.

Acknowledging, as we do, the general principle that in sorrow, and suffering, pain, disease, and death, we see the earthly consequence and penalty of sin, and, in multitudes of cases, even specifically, the earthly consequences and penalties of sins, we cannot but recognize that any relief from those consequences and penalties, or any of them, is, to that extent, a relief from the evil effects of the sin which has caused them. The most absolute forgiveness of sin does not imply the annihilation or extinction of the fact of sin, but simply the cancelling of all its consequences, whether moral or physical, spiritual or temporal, both in this life and in the life to come. And, of course, that which cancels any of these consequences, if it be the expression of the good will of an intelligent being or agent, is *to that extent* forgiveness. If it be limited only to the temporal or earthly consequences of sin, or, so far as it does so ex-

tend, it is rightly characterized as a forgiveness *on earth*, or an *earthly* forgiveness, as distinguished from a *divine* or *heavenly* forgiveness. As far as it goes, however, if it be effected by the ministry of a moral agent, it is a real forgiveness.

It is true that such reliefs from the consequences of sin may be and often are both received and conferred by those who have no regard for the moral nature of the agency. In such cases, it is of course an abuse of language to insist on their relation to forgiveness. But, in proportion as the moral conditions involved in the reception and bestowal of such benefits are considered, the idea that in them the effect of some previous wrong is being neutralized, by a voluntary and personal, not a necessary and mechanical, agency is brought to the surface; Love is vindicated as capable of superseding Law; and the simple act of instinctive benevolence or of mutual helpfulness is lifted into a spiritual atmosphere, and becomes an earthly human expression of the divine forgiveness of sins.

Briefly to illustrate this. A man is cured by a physician of a painful disease; and the common-place relations of life may no doubt be satisfied in such a case by the grateful acknowledgment of kindly medical skill and care in the usual way, and there an end. But if both the physician and the patient should be thoughtful Christian men, striving to see their experience of life and the events of every day on their spiritual side, and to realize for themselves the attitude in which Christ would have stood to them, they might, as it is contended on the teaching of this passage, regard themselves, the one, as having received from God through his servant an earthly forgiveness of some special sin, in himself or others, which had caused his suffering; and the other as having used a power of earthly forgiveness, with which God had endowed him, in the way in which Christ had used it; in order to commend to the sinner the

great love of God in forgiveness, an earthly reflection of which He had thus been enabled to bestow.

To develop the moral and spiritual uses to which the passage thus interpreted may be applied, belongs rather to the office of the preacher than to that of the exegete. Still it may be allowed to the writer very briefly to point out how much is gained, by such an interpretation of our Lord's words as he has advocated, in power to raise the common charities and benevolences of life on to a definitely spiritual ground, and to link the daily ministries of Christian love to the great work which our Lord came to earth to accomplish. A clue is here given whereby can be discerned the great plea of the forgiveness of sins twined into every thread of the entire texture of the Gospel life and teaching, and the love which Christ enjoined to his followers is set forth as a manifestation not only in word but in deed, not only in form but in fact, of the love wherewith God has loved us; so that the exercise of the earthly forgiveness of sins, by us, on behalf of God, may not only enhance the attractions of his kingdom, but render ourselves daily more and more the "children of our Father in heaven."

ROBT. E. WALLIS.

THE TWO ACCOUNTS OF OUR LORD'S INFANCY.

THE difference between the two accounts of our Lord's birth and infancy, given in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, must strike even the most careless reader of the New Testament with surprise; and it is no wonder that to many it has proved a serious stumbling block, so serious as to lead them to reject one or other of the accounts as legendary or mythical, or to set down both narratives as the various traditions current in different parts of the Church, each

perhaps containing a certain amount of truth, but shewing by their discrepancies and variations that it is impossible to accept either of them as a veracious record of the events related therein.

If we set the narratives side by side the full amount of variation will be seen at once:—

ST. MATTHEW'S ACCOUNT.

ST. LUKE'S ACCOUNT.

(1) Mary is suddenly found to be with child, and Joseph proposes to put her away secretly.

(1) Annunciation by the angel Gabriel at Nazareth to the Virgin, of her approaching conception, and charge to her to name the child Jesus.

(2) Appearance of an angel in a dream to Joseph, announcing that that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost, and charge to him to name the child Jesus.

(2) Mary's visit to Elizabeth in the hill country of Judea; and the Magnificat.

(3) Birth of Jesus at Bethlehem in the days of Herod the king.

(3) The "enrolment" brings Mary and Joseph to Bethlehem, where the child is born and laid in manger.

(4) Visit of the Magi.

(4) Visit of the Shepherds.

(5) Joseph is warned in a dream to flee into Egypt, and obeys the command.

(5) The Circumcision and naming of the child.

(6) The massacre of the Innocents.

(6) The Purification and Presentation in the Temple.

(7) After Herod's death Joseph is bidden by an angel in a dream to return to Palestine.

(7) They return to Nazareth and dwell there.

(8) Warned of God in a dream, he turns aside to Nazareth and dwells there.

Thus it will be seen that, with the exception of the miraculous birth at Bethlehem, the name given to the Holy Child, and the return to Nazareth, there is hardly a single fact related by both Evangelists. This, of course, shews that the narratives are *incomplete*. It forbids our appealing to either of them as if it gave a full account of all the cir-

cumstances. But can it do more than this? Does it shew that they are unreliable for what they do relate? Does it forbid our appealing to them as credible witnesses for the facts contained in them? That it does so is the contention of the negative critics: but it is a contention which requires proof, and needs something more than mere assertion to support it. Facts, it should be remembered, may easily be looked at from different points of view; and in any case where we have two independent narratives of the same event, we may be sure that we shall not only have the facts presented to us in different lights, but that the details preserved will vary more or less, according as the position of the narrators varied. Each of our informants will describe what fell under his personal observation, if he be an eyewitness; or if he is handing on the narrative of another, will single out those details which specially struck him, and which fitted in with the peculiar character and bent of his own mind. One fact has an attraction for one class of mind which, to another, is uninteresting. Details are significant to some men, which are meaningless to others. That which one man thinks of the highest importance is summarily dismissed by another as trivial and of no consequence. And so we may feel sure that two independent narratives of the same event will vary considerably from one another; and a skilful critic, recognizing this, will not hastily set down either of them as false because they are different, nor even because they seem to contradict each other on some points (for he will remember how different an appearance many things present when approached from opposite sides); but, knowing that both his accounts are incomplete, he will endeavour to weave them together, and out of them both to form a fuller narrative, and take a more comprehensive survey of the whole event. Thus, with the two accounts before us, we must start by fully and frankly recognizing the fact that they are only *partial* accounts; and, it may

be added, that neither of them professes to be complete. Recognizing this, we shall hesitate in rejecting them because they are not identical, and be slow to accuse them of contradicting each other because they move in different circles, and present to our view different series of events. Dean Alford's words will commend themselves to us as sound and sober:—"Being persuaded of the historic reality of these narratives of Matthew and Luke, we shall find no difficulty in also believing that *were we acquainted with all the events as they happened, their reconciliation would be an easy matter*; whereas now, the two independent accounts, from not being aware of, seem to exclude one another. This will often be the case in ordinary life; *e.g.*, in the giving of evidence. And nothing can more satisfactorily shew the veracity and independence of the narrators, where their testimony to the main facts, as in the present case, is consistent."

But must we rest content with this confession of difference between the two narratives? Can we not go at least one step further, and, allowing that we are not acquainted with all the events as they happened, and that therefore difficulties occur in harmonizing the two accounts—can we not shew *why the two writers have presented the facts from such different points of view*? Can we not discern some adequate reason why the one Gospel has preserved certain details, and the other others? If we can thus, in some measure, discover the points of view of the narrators, we are at least a step nearer to harmonizing the narratives and establishing their credibility. Let us, then, examine the records themselves and see whether we can find in the position of the narrators anything that will serve to account for the special facts and details selected by them for narration. The central point round which the histories are grouped is the birth of the Saviour at Bethlehem; everything else is subordinate to this, and leads up to or flows from it. Now

there was one person present then living, and one only, who would be in possession of full and complete knowledge of all the surrounding circumstances, namely, the Virgin Mother herself. But there was one other whose knowledge would be very great, and who would stand next to her in intimate acquaintance with the facts and their bearings—her husband, Joseph, the reputed father of the child. From either of these, and from these only, could the details have come in the first instance. And yet we may be sure that their accounts would have been in many points different from each other. Even in the account of the birth and infancy of an ordinary child, how differently would the father and mother relate the events; how would the mother linger over details and love to dwell on thoughts and sayings which she had treasured up, and of which the father knew nothing, or which to him had not the same importance and significance? What a much more *external* account his would be? Each would relate the events from his or her point of view, and the result would be widely differing narratives, both of them perfectly true so far as they went. Bearing this in mind, let us turn to the Gospel of St. Matthew and see whether the details there preserved shew from which point of view, from Mary's or from Joseph's, the narrative is written. A very slight examination will convince us that we have here what we may fairly call an *external* account, such an one as would have been handed down by Joseph rather than by Mary. We are told just those things of which the husband would have known most, which he would have been likely to remark, and which would have had an especial interest for him, as he was the principal figure in them. Thus we are told of the discovery of his espoused wife's pregnancy, and of the way in which *Joseph* planned the secret divorce; we read how the angel appeared to *Joseph* in a dream; how *Joseph* did as the angel commanded him; how, after the departure

of the Magi, an angel again appeared to *Joseph* and bade him take the young child and his mother and flee into Egypt, and how he obeyed the heavenly voice. Again, after Herod's death, it is to *Joseph* that the angel appears once more, bidding him return to Palestine; and it is *Joseph* who is warned of God to turn aside to Galilee. Can anything be clearer than the fact that the whole narrative is written from *Joseph's* point of view; and that, however many hands it may have passed through before it reached St. Matthew, *Joseph* was at any rate the narrator in the first instance?

Let us advance a step further, and shew how probable it was that *Joseph's* narrative should be preserved in St. Matthew's Gospel rather than in any of the others. Internal and external evidence both agree in pointing steadily to the fact, that the first Gospel was written for the Hebrew Christians of Palestine. Indeed Papias (A.D. 120-140) tells us that it was written *in Hebrew*; and Eusebius is simply representing the consistent testimony of antiquity when he writes that "Matthew, having first proclaimed the Gospel to the Hebrews, when on the point of going to other nations, committed it to writing in his native tongue, and thus supplied the want of his presence to them by his writings" (*H. E.*, III., xxiv.). Can we, then, trace any special connexion between *Joseph* and the Church of Palestine, which might account for the presence of his narrative of our Lord's infancy in the Gospel that was written primarily for this Church? The answer seems to be that we can. We know, from the Acts of the Apostles and St. Paul's Epistles, that the most prominent person in the Church of Jerusalem—president or bishop, or whatever we call him—was "James the brother of the Lord" (Acts xii. 17, xv. 13, 19, xxi. 18 *sq.*; Gal. ii. 9, 12). What may be the precise relationship thus described is of course a *vexata quæstio* in New Testament criticism; but Bishop Lightfoot,

in his masterly and exhaustive Dissertation on "the Brethren of the Lord," in his Commentary on Galatians, has shewn the view that the "brethren" were sons of Joseph by a former wife "to have the highest claims to the sanction of tradition," and that "this solution seems especially to represent the Palestinian view." If this view be correct, James the *son of Joseph* was the first bishop of the Church of Jerusalem. This, of itself, establishes a connexion between that Church and the family of Joseph: does the connexion end here? Hegesippus (A.D. 160), himself a Hebrew Christian of Palestine, tells us that "after the martyrdom of James the Just on the same charge as the Lord, *his paternal uncle's child*, Symeon the son of Clopas, is next made bishop, who was put forward by all as the second in succession, being cousin of the Lord" (Hegesippus ap. Euseb. *H. E.*, IV., xxii.). And Eusebius himself elsewhere (III., xi.) says, that "Hegesippus relates that Clopas was the brother of Joseph." Thus the *nephew of Joseph* was the second bishop of the Church. And it would seem that others of the same family were also living there towards the close of the first century; for the same Hegesippus has preserved a touching story of the way in which "the grandsons of Jude, called the brother of the Lord according to the flesh," were brought before the Emperor Domitian, and accused of being of the family of David. The story is well known, and there is no need to repeat it here, only let us mark its conclusion: "Thus delivered, they ruled the Churches, both as witnesses, and relatives of the Lord" (Euseb., *H. E.*, III., xx.). These facts, taken together, seem quite sufficient to establish the close connexion of the family of Joseph with the Church of Jerusalem. Our Lord's "brethren" and kinsmen clearly took a prominent position there. Is it not natural, then, that, in the Gospel which was written primarily for the use of this Church, the account of our Lord's infancy should be

written (as we have seen that it is) from Joseph's point of view? Joseph probably died even before our Lord's ministry began. But he must often have told the wondrous story to his children and nephews; and it is only what we might reasonably expect, that the narrative, which came in the first instance from his lips, should have been preserved in the Church presided over by his descendants, and so have been committed to writing by that Evangelist who wrote for the Hebrew Christians of Palestine.

If we now turn to the Gospel of St. Luke, a very slight inspection will be sufficient to convince us that the story of the birth and infancy of Jesus is written *from Mary's point of view*. It is in this Gospel alone that the appearance of the angel Gabriel to *Mary* is recorded. Here only we read of *Mary's* visit to her cousin Elizabeth, and of *Mary's* Song, the Magnificat; in this Gospel alone are the details of the birth of the Child preserved.

But a closer examination of the narrative will go far to shew that it is not merely written from Mary's point of view, but that *it was actually taken down from her lips, or came from her pen*. The two narratives stand on a somewhat different footing in this respect. There is no sort of reason for supposing that the first two chapters of St. Matthew come from a different documentary source from the rest of the Gospel. They simply represent the tradition which had come in the first instance from Joseph, and which may have passed through many hands before it was finally committed to writing by the Evangelist. But with the first two chapters of St. Luke the case is different. To pass from the preface (Chap. i. 1-4) to the account of the Infancy (Chaps. i. 5-ii. 52) is like going from one country to another: it is to pass from Greece to Palestine, from the cultivated speech of a classical author to the simple style of the ancient Hebrew Scriptures, which we find nowhere else in St. Luke's writings. To give but one example: by

a Hebrew the days were reckoned from evening to morning; and he therefore spoke of "night and day." A Greek would use the order more familiar to us, and speak of "day and night." St. Luke, who was a Gentile, naturally uses this last expression in his narrative (Luke xviii. 7; Acts ix. 24), but in Acts xx. 31, xxvi. 7, in speeches of St. Paul (who always uses the Jewish order in his Epistles), and in Chapter ii. 37 of the Gospel we find "night and day." In this last mentioned passage it occurs not in a speech but in the simple narrative; and the natural inference is that the narrator is not St. Luke himself, but that he is faithfully incorporating in his own work the recital or the manuscript of another, and that other a Hebrew Christian. He tells us in his Preface that he has "traced out all things accurately from the first;" and it is not unnatural to suppose that in the course of his researches he became possessed of some document containing an account of the Nativity which he perhaps translated, and thus preserved for us in his Gospel.

That the Virgin Mother herself was the author of this account is the point that I would now try to establish. There is no need to repeat what has been already said, as to the story being written from her point of view; but attention must be drawn to the fact that many of the details can only have come from her in the first instance. She alone was in a position to relate the account of the Annunciation, as she alone was then present, and heard the salutation of the angel; and who but she could tell of that hasty visit into the hill country to her cousin Elizabeth, and of that wondrous salutation, "Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. And whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come unto me? For behold, when the voice of thy salutation came into mine ears, the babe leaped in my womb for joy." She would naturally know, as few others

would, all the circumstances connected with the birth of her cousin's child, the Baptist, the account of which is found in this Gospel only : and who but she would linger so fondly over the details of the birth of her own child, and describe how "the days were accomplished that she should be delivered," and how "she brought forth her firstborn son, and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger because there was no room for them in the inn" ?

Even when others than herself were present, there is more than one indication that the details of the story sank into the heart of Mary as into no others ; and that it is to her that St. Luke owes his account of them,—*e.g.*, Chapter ii. 18, 19 : "And all they that heard it wondered at those things which were told them by the shepherds ; *but Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart ;*" Chapter ii. 51 : "And he went down with them, and came to Nazareth, and was subject unto them ; *but his mother kept all these sayings in her heart.*" The words of M. Godet on the former of these passages are striking, and worth quoting in this connexion : "The oftener we read the 19th verse (Chap. ii.), the more we feel assured that Mary was the first and real author of this whole narrative. This fine, simple, and private history was composed by her, and preserved for a certain time in an oral form, until some one committed it to writing, whose work fell into the hands of Luke, and was reproduced by him in Greek."

There is another fact which, so far as I am aware, has not hitherto been noticed as an argument in favour of the view that these chapters are the work of the Virgin Mary. It is the remarkable similarity between them and the narrative in 1 Samuel i. and ii., a similarity sometimes extending to the very words used : *e.g.*, the statement of Luke ii. 40, with regard to the infant Jesus, that "the

child grew . . . and the grace of God was upon him," reminds us of the description in 1 Samuel iii. 19, "And Samuel grew, and the Lord was with him;" while Luke ii. 52, "And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and men," is really a direct reference to 1 Samuel ii. 26, "And the child Samuel grew on, and was in favour both with the Lord and also with men," and accordingly it is rightly printed in uncial type by Professors Westcott and Hort in their edition of the Greek Testament. Thus it is clear both from the general similarity of the compositions and also from these special verbal coincidences, that the author of St. Luke's first two chapters was so thoroughly familiar with the early history of Samuel that it moulded the language and shaped the phraseology in which the new record was cast. And—not to lay stress on the fact that Mary, whose circumstances were so similar to Hannah's, would naturally love to dwell on her story, and read it again and again till she knew it almost by heart,—it must not be forgotten that the Magnificat supplies us with direct and positive evidence of her complete familiarity with this part of the ancient Scriptures. Everybody knows that the one hymn is really framed on the model of the other; it may, however, be worth while to set some passages from them side by side, to make the comparison easier.

1 Samuel ii. 1. And Hannah
prayed and said:

"My heart rejoiceth in the Lord,
Mine horn is exalted in the Lord,

My mouth is enlarged over mine
enemies,

Because I rejoice in thy salvation.
There is none holy as the Lord,

The bows of the mighty men are
broken,

Luke i. 46. And Mary said:

"My soul doth magnify the Lord,
And my spirit hath rejoiced in
God my Saviour.

For He that is mighty hath mag-
nified me,

And holy is his name.

He hath shewed strength with
His arm,

He hath scattered the proud in
the imagination of their hearts.

And they that stumbled are girded with strength.	He hath put down the mighty from their seats,
They that were full have hired themselves out for bread.	And hath exalted them of low degree.
And they that were hungry ceased.	He hath filled the hungry with good things,
	And the rich He hath sent empty away."
The Lord maketh poor and maketh rich,	
He bringeth low and lifteth up,	
He raiseth up the poor out of the dust,	
And lifteth the beggar from the dunghill."	

Nor are the coincidences entirely confined to the *song* of Hannah. The words of the Magnificat, "For He hath regarded the lowliness of his handmaiden," *ὅτι ἐπέβλεψεν ἐπὶ τὴν ταπείνωσιν τῆς δούλης αὐτοῦ*), which, it will be seen, have nothing corresponding to them in the song, are really a quotation from Hannah's *prayer*. "If thou wilt indeed look upon the affliction of thine handmaid" (LXX. *ἐὰν ἐπιβλέπων ἐπιβλέψῃς ἐπὶ τὴν ταπείνωσιν τῆς δούλης σου*).

The case, then, stands thus: (1) The author of Luke i. and ii. was so thoroughly familiar with 1 Samuel i.-iii. that its language and style is reflected in his (or her) own work; (2) The Magnificat shews that the Virgin Mary was so thoroughly familiar with these Chapters that her own hymn was based and modelled upon them: and (3) the inference to be drawn is that very possibly the author of the Magnificat was also the author of the remainder of these chapters of St. Luke's Gospel. The coincidence is at any rate a remarkable one; and although, if it stood alone, it would perhaps be too slight to build upon, yet, when taken in connexion with other facts which point in the same direction, it seems to be of real weight, and to have considerable value as a subsidiary argument: and this is all that is here claimed for it.

Lastly, it is perhaps worth while, just to allude to the tradition that St. Luke was a painter, and especially distinguished for his portraits of the Virgin Mary. It cannot be said that the tradition is an early one, or that it is worthy of the faintest credence; but it may perhaps have been shaped in accordance with an earlier tradition, and at least it embodies a belief in a connexion of some kind between St. Luke and the Virgin, which we have seen, from internal evidence, to be extremely probable.

And now to sum up. I have tried in this paper, *not* to harmonize the two accounts of our Lord's Nativity (to do that completely and satisfactorily is perhaps now impossible), but *to discover the points of view of the narrators*. If this has been done satisfactorily, if we are once clear on this head, and convinced that the story is really given to us from two different sides, it will lead us to expect variety, or at least to be patient of it; and it will help us to understand how the two accounts, strikingly different as they are, may nevertheless both be true, and both be the work of men who were inspired by that Spirit "who divideth to each one severally as He will."

EDGAR C. S. GIBSON.

CHRIST AND THE ANGELS.

HEBREWS ii. Ver. 17, 18.

THE general structure of the argument of Verse 17 has been explained in a former paper; we come now to the details, and here we note (1) the function of the high priest, "to make propitiation for the sins of the people." The construction of *ἱλάσκεσθαι* with the accusative *ἁμαρτίας* is unusual, but does not present any difficulty, being in fact equivalent to *ἐξιλάσκεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν* which,

though not used in the LXX. of the Canonical books is common in post-canonical Greek, and frequent in Ecclesiastical. In Theodotion's version of Daniel ix. 24, ἐξιλάσασθαι ἁδικίας answers to the Hebrew *kipper 'awôn*; and here, no doubt, it is the high-priestly propitiation, *kappirah*, on the great day of atonement, that is in the mind of the Apostle. The sins expiated are those of the λαός, that is, of Israel, the people of God (Chap. iv. 9).

The general function of atoning acts in the Old Testament is not disputed. The course of those benefits which Israel receives from the covenant God is liable to interruption from the sins of the people. That these sins are not imputed as a disturbing element in the covenant standing of the people, is expressed in the services of the day of atonement; in which the people approach the sanctuary in the guise of penitents, but through the high-priestly atonement obtain that access to God within the veil which shews that their persons are accepted, and that their sins have not broken the flow of covenant blessings. This atoning ordinance is not final. It is repeated from year to year; not to wipe out the sins of each new season, but because each act falls short of the requirements of a true atonement, and does not remove from the worshippers the consciousness of sin (Chap. x. 2). Strictly speaking, it is only the shadow of an atonement to come; but at least it serves to shew what the Church needs, namely, a way of access to God in which the people can find all help and grace from on high without the intervening consciousness of sin.

(2) Now the Apostle takes it for granted that, to be a high priest and secure the access of a weak and sinful people to God, Jesus must Himself be in all things like his brethren. This really needs no proof; for, as appears in Chapter v. Verse 1, it is the very definition of a priest that he is taken *from* men, to stand *for* men in things regarding

God. His position is that of a representative ; and no one can be a fit representative of others save in virtue of what he has in common with them. It is to be observed, however, that the Apostle lays stress on certain qualifications for office, which Jesus has in virtue of his earthly experience but which cannot be said to be prominent in what we read of the Old Testament priesthood. By being made in all things like to his brethren, Jesus is a high priest *ἐλεήμων*, merciful, and *πιστός*, trustworthy and loyal in the discharge of his duty. How far are these Old Testament ideas? We read in 1 Samuel ii. 35, that God having destroyed Eli's house will raise up *a faithful priest* (*ἱερέα πιστόν*) who will do all that is in God's mind. On the other hand, the predicate *אִישׁ חַסֵּד, חַסִּיד*, which would correspond to *ἐλεήμων*, is nowhere used of the priests,¹ and from the time of Hophni and Phinehas downward the great fault of the priests was their frequent lack of sympathy with the people. They were eager exactors of their own rights, but rather delighted in the sins of the people, which proved to them a source of revenue (Hosea iv.). In the later period of Jewish history, under the degenerate Hasmoneans and in New Testament times, the priestly aristocracy of the Sadducees was notoriously unfeeling and cruel. The Sadducees, says Josephus (*Arch.*, xx., 9, § 1), are savage in judgment beyond all the Jews.² Thus the idea of a merciful and faithful high priest, though little prominent in the Old Testament, was one which could not fail to attract the sympathy of the Hebrew readers of the Epistle, who had full reason to know that in these qualities the Aaronic priesthood had failed.

Not the less on that account is it plain that our Author here touches on features the demand for which, as an essen-

¹ Deuteronomy xxxiii. 8 is not to be cited in this connection.

² Compare at a somewhat earlier date the character given to the priestly aristocracy in the *Psalter of Solomon*.

tial part of a priest's character, transcends the Old Testament sphere. What was required in theory of the Old Testament priest was ceremonial precision in his duties; and when the prophets rebuke the moral failings of the priesthood, they do so mainly in connection with their functions as judges and teachers, which were less important in the later part of the Jewish dispensation and are not mentioned by the Apostle. The point indicated by our Author in Chapter v. Verse 2, that the Aaronic priests were able to shew indulgence to the ignorant and erring, is not one which has any importance under the Old Dispensation. It is because Christ's priesthood is not *ceremonial* but *ethical*, because He helps us in the inner needs of our spiritual life, that these qualities of mercy and fidelity are necessary parts of his equipment for the priesthood. If we are to seek an Old Testament basis for the introduction of these ideas in connection with the purging away of sin, this must be found not in anything relating to the priesthood, but in Proverbs xvi. 6: "By mercy and truth iniquity is purged."

(3) The ethical point of view from which the predicates *ἐλεήμων καὶ πιστός* appear so indispensable to the true high priest is expressed in Verse 18.

Of this Verse there are two possible translations. The easiest is:—"For inasmuch as He hath suffered, having Himself been tempted, He is able to succour those that are tempted." But it is also grammatically possible to read the words thus:—"For having Himself been tempted in what He suffered He is able, etc."

On the first rendering, the sufferings of Christ are such sufferings as are felt by men under temptation. It is not the physical agony of his passion, but the pain of temptation, which forms the bond of sympathy between us and Jesus. On the other rendering, the temptation is not set forth as being itself a cause of suffering, but as arising

out of suffering. On the one interpretation, temptation is viewed as a painful experience; on the other, the pains of human life are presented as occasions of temptation. The first of these two views not only agrees better with the syntactical structure of the verse, but appears more natural and comprehensive. For certainly not every temptation arises out of the painful experiences of life; yet we know that Jesus was *in all points* tempted like as we are, yet without sin (Chap. iv. 15).

The sufferings of Jesus, therefore, which He endured when He assumed flesh and blood, and for our sakes passed under death, are to be viewed as the accompaniments of temptation; and, of course, of temptation resisted. For example, the crowning suffering of death, which is mainly in our Author's mind when he speaks of the suffering Christ, has religious value, not in respect of the physical agony on the cross, but because in it was experienced the sharpest temptation that fell upon Jesus. And, in like manner, the weaknesses experienced by us, with which He has fellow-feeling (Chap. iv. 15), are nothing else than our want of strength under temptation, which requires that we should be upheld by seasonable help from heavenly grace.

(4) At this point we must seek to get a clearer idea of what is meant by temptation; and, in particular, by the temptation of Christ. "Temptation" says Ritschl,¹ "is a source of possible sin, proceeding from an impulse which at first sight it appears to be legitimate to gratify. The motions of any appetite or impulse which from the first appears to be illegitimate, and therefore to be wicked, are not a source of temptation, but a manifestation of sinful concupiscence. Christ was exposed to temptation only because temptation always attaches to some disposition, which looked at *à priori*, is legitimate or per-

¹ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, vol. iii. p. 507.

missible. It was the impulse to natural self preservation, which in itself is justifiable, that produced the wish of Christ to be spared the suffering of death. Hereupon a temptation to sin arose, since the wish came into collision with the special duty of his vocation; but Christ resisted the temptation, renouncing self preservation and accepting the death appointed for Him by God as a consequence of his vocation." It will be remembered that we found the idea of "perfecting" (τελειώσις) to be applicable to Jesus only in connection with his moral vocation as Author of our salvation. Ritschl's remarks help us to see that the temptation of Christ must be viewed in the same connection: otherwise we shall not be able to understand it in a sense consistent with the absence of all sinful concupiscence. We saw that Christ passed through a process of *τελειώσις*, inasmuch as He had to take his place in the moral universe, with the moral relations it involves, by actually and practically working Himself into that place, in a course of prayerful and believing submission to the will of God (Chap. v. 7-9). The will of God marked out for Him a course of self-renunciation. He was called not to do his own will, but the will of the Father; to subordinate the personal, and in itself legitimate, end of self-conservation to the accomplishment of his task as our Saviour. To a certain extent this is the call of duty to all of us. No member of the ethical fellowship of the kingdom of heaven is permitted to take the development of his own personality, and the gratification of his own legitimate aspirations as the supreme ruling object of life. In general, however, the formula of self-denial, as it is required of us, is expressed by Philippians ii. 4: "Looking not every man to his own things, but every man *also* to the things of others." That is, while each man's life must fall under the rule that he has to live not for himself alone but for the kingdom of God, the religious and moral growth

and culture of our own personal life is to all of us a considerable direct part of the work which God appoints to us. But this was not the case with Jesus. His vocation was that of Head over the whole moral fellowship of the saved. It was a representative vocation, every act of which had a universal bearing, being done in the direct interest not of his own personal life, but of the life of God's people as a whole. Therefore He is much more than an example of self-communication. His whole life is one self-renunciation, so that at every point in it we can say that here Christ sacrificed his own will for us, sacrificed it to the will of God for our salvation. Thus all possible temptation, every possible antagonism between the personal aim of self-conservation and self-development on the one hand, and the interests of God's will and kingdom on the other, is embraced in the life of Christ. Now, the steady and unbroken practice of self-denying obedience to God under such circumstances is necessarily a suffering—not the suffering of internal distraction between a resolve to do right and a desire to do wrong, but the painful and laborious toil of doing God's will against obstacles, and at a sacrifice of interests which are in themselves innocent and laudable. The ideal of righteous happiness is a course of life in which at each moment the action conducive to the realization of the final aims of God's kingdom, is also the action which at the moment is felt to give full, free, unfettered scope for the play of the legitimate activities of the individual. It is not, therefore, merely because of the risk of yielding to the tempter that we are taught to pray "Lead us not into temptation." Temptation, even when withstood, is not in itself a good thing; for it implies a condition of constraint and pressure which belongs only to a state of discipline. And no man is to pray for discipline, though he must accept it cheerfully when it comes (James i. 2). Our prayers always

contemplate the final goal, a state where God's will is done in perfect freedom and without pain. Thus even Jesus in his prayers combined with the expression of perfect submission to God's will the petition that the cup of his passion might pass from Him.¹

These considerations make it plain that the temptation and suffering of Christ are co-extensive; and that both are inseparable from the whole course of his life of obedience. The active and passive obedience of Christ cannot be dissociated: his doing and suffering alike belong to the whole discharge of his vocation as the Author of our salvation; and it is this constant union of doing and suffering which marks his course as one of constant exposure to and victory over temptation. But the moral attitude corresponding to such a life is not one of mental conflict, which we generally associate with the idea of temptation, but, as Ritschl has well observed, an attitude of *patience*. And so, in the latter part of the Epistle, we hear no more of the temptation of Christ, but only (Chap. xii. 2, 3) of the patience with which, for the joy set before Him, He endured (*ὑπέμεινε*) the cross, despising shame, or endured so great contradiction of sinners against Himself.

(5) What, now, is the value for our religious needs of this doctrine of the temptation of Christ, and how does the doctrine belong to the discussion of the qualification of Jesus as our high priest? The answer to the first question is given in Verse 18; while the second question has to do with the connection between Verses 17 and 18. As the idea of Verse 18 is perfectly simple and self-contained, it is better to begin with the question that belongs

¹ From the shorter form of the Lord's prayer as given in Luke, it appears that "deliver us ἀπὸ τοῦ πονήρου" is a gloss on the original petition, "Lead us not into temptation." But if πονήρου is personal, "the evil one," the gloss falls far short of the true scope of the petition, which indeed is not fully expressed even in the form "deliver us from evil."

to it. It is because Christ has Himself been tempted and suffered, that He is able to succour those who are under temptation. Along with this answer we must take Chapter iv. Verse 15, where the fact that He was tempted in all things like as we are, yet without sin, is used to prove that He is not one who is unable to have sympathy with our weakness. Plainly, the Apostle holds that the only efficient help which can be given to men under temptation is the help of sympathy, based on experience of the same kind of trial.

This, I think, is assumed, and correctly assumed, as a proposition evident on general grounds. For what does help in temptation mean? It may mean one of two things. In the first place, a person wiser than myself may explain to me that path of duty which the temptation threatens to obscure. He may say to me with authority, this is what you have to do, and so may reduce my decision against the temptation to a simple exercise of obedience to his instructions. It is, however, plain that this kind of help is not what Christ gives to believers. God permits us to be tempted as a moral exercise not merely in obedience, but in spiritual insight. And, therefore, while He clearly reveals to us all that is required to guide us in the path of duty, his revelation is never put in a shape which calls for nothing but mechanical obedience. It is still necessary for us, prayerfully and thoughtfully, to ponder the path of duty under temptation, and to conquer by a personal decision.

The help given to the people of God under temptation is, therefore, not the kind of help which relieves us of half the battle; it can only be such help as enables us to conquer temptation for ourselves. Now every one knows what that help is which, instead of doing a thing for us, enables us to do it ourselves: it is the help of moral sympathy, the help of one who takes us by the hand and

walks with us step by step in the path that we are called to tread.

The Apostle, therefore, is justified in assuming on general grounds, and apart from all question as to the way in which Christ imparts his aid to us, that the kind of help He gives is dependent on his ability to enter into our weaknesses from personal experience of a like temptation. We know, from other Scriptures, that the way in which Christ helps us is by imparting to us his Spirit. But the action of the Spirit is not magical: it breaks no law of our moral nature; it supplies only the bond of union in which we can realize a personal fellowship with Christ. And so the help which the Spirit ministers can come to us only if, according to the precept which follows in the next verse, we look to Jesus. Or, as the thing is put in Chapter xii. Verses 1, 2, the race set before us must be run with our eyes fixed on Jesus in his quality as the beginner and perfecter of faith, and in his patient endurance of pain, shame, and opposition, for the sake of the joy set before Him. In this contemplation of the course in which for our sakes He conquered temptation in all its sharpness, we realize his sympathy, and are able to feel his hand spiritually sustaining us when we are ready to faint.

(6) And now we come to the last point in this long discussion. How does this effective sympathy of Christ stand related to his high-priestly function of atoning for the sins of the people? Our Author evidently views the two things as strictly parallel. The help which Christ gives to the seed of Abraham (Verse 16) is doubly expressed, as the expiation of the sins of the people by a merciful and faithful high priest, and as the succouring of the tempted by one who has himself been tempted.

To understand the parallelism between these two definitions of the help we receive from Christ, we must remember that, even under the Old Testament, the practical outcome

of the priestly propitiation was the uninterrupted continuance of the flow of Covenant blessings to the people from God. To the acts of worship accepted in the atoning service, God returned the answer symbolically expressed in the benediction pronounced by the priests over the people, which in the Pentateuch (Numbers vi. 22-27) is accompanied by a promise of effective Divine blessing. So, in like manner, the continual ministration to the Church of the specific blessings of the New Testament covenant must be the practical outcome of Christ's propitiation. But these blessings are no longer earthly, but spiritual. The promise of the New Covenant is that given by Jeremiah in the passage quoted by our Author in Chapter x. Verses 16, 17: "I will put my laws in their hearts, and in their minds will I write them; and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more." The fulfilment of this promise in the experience of the Church, and of every believer, is the fruit of Christ's high-priestly work.

Now the latter half of the promise is realized whenever the believer confidently approaches the throne of grace through Christ. But both halves of the promise must be fulfilled together; and so we can come before God with confidence of forgiveness only when we come to Him to ask that our hearts may be transformed according to his law. The believer cannot appropriate the promise of forgiveness except in the submission of his heart and will to God's law; and he cannot submit his heart to the Divine will except in battle with and victory over temptation. It is, therefore, only in the perception of Divine grace succouring us in temptation that we can realize the fulfilment of the promise of the New Covenant, and the efficacious atonement of Christ (comp. Chap. iv. 16). The propitiation of Christ would not be adequate unless it contained in itself the security of grace to conquer temptation, as well as the pledge of free access to God. In passing to the right hand

of God, where He sits as our intercessor, Christ gives us the assurance of free access to the Father; but it is in his own victory over temptation in all its fulness that He gives to us the not less needful pledge of effectual succour in all temptation.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

ON THE SECOND EPISTLE OF ST. PETER.

II. HAD THE AUTHOR READ ST. JUDE?

IN a previous article we attempted to prove that the Author of the Second Epistle had read the Antiquities of Josephus; we will now endeavour to shew that he copied the Epistle of St. Jude.¹

The close connection between this Epistle and that of St. Jude will be most readily perceived if we set down and italicize (in the order of St. Jude) the words and parts of words common to both, inserting merely so much of St. Jude's context as may enable the reader to catch their tenour: "*The servant of Jesus Christ to . . . mercy and love be multiplied.*"² *With all zeal I beg you to contend for the faith delivered to the holy brethren* (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 21, the *holy* commandment *delivered* to them). *For some have come in secretly, long ago ordained to this judgment, denying the Master.* But I wish to *put you in*

¹ It may be well to remind the reader that there are abundant instances of patch-work composition in apocryphal literature both before and after the Christian era. The First Book of Esdras, for example, contains an original story in a frame-work made up of extracts more or less exact from the Second Book of Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah: and the Gospel of Nicodemus has for its basis the Gospel of St. John, but includes many extracts from the other Gospels.

² The salutation of 2 Pet. i. 1, though similar to that of Jude, is more similar to that in 1 Pet. i. 2.

mind, though you know, that . . . and the angels he hath reserved for the judgment of the great day in chains under darkness. As Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities round about, having gone after strange flesh, are a sample to all (2 Pet. ii. 6, ὑπόδειγμα, ensample; Jude 7, δειγμα, sample). Even so these defile the flesh, despise dignity, and blaspheme glories (i.e. authorities). Yet the archangel (2 Pet. ii. 11, angels) dared not bring against them a judgment of evil speaking. But these blaspheme what they know not; and what they understand naturally, like irrational beasts, in these things they are destroyed (or 'corrupt themselves'). In the way of Cain they went, and in the error of Balaam, for pay. These are spots (σπιλάδες, the meaning is uncertain; 2 Pet. ii. 13, σπιλοι) . . . revelling with you, clouds waterless, for whom the gloom of darkness hath been reserved for ever. These walk after their lusts, they speak pompous things; but, beloved, remember the sayings that have been before spoken by the apostles of the Lord, how that in the last part of the time there shall be mockers walking after their own lusts. To God our Saviour be glory both now and for all the ages."

None who can appreciate documentary evidence will deny that there has been copying here; but the question arises may not *both* writers have copied from some common original, some Book of Enoch, for example, describing the fall of the angels and that which was to come to pass in the later days? The improbability of that hypothesis can be inferred from the fact that some of the similarities, being personal to the writer, could hardly have been extracted from any such original. How could the ancient Enoch be introduced as with *all zeal putting his readers in mind, though they know already?* Or as calling on them to remember *the sayings previously uttered by the Apostles (or Prophets) of the Lord?* But be this as it may, a detailed examination of two or three of the similar passages will

shew that, in any case, St. Jude's Epistle represents the original, whereas the Second Epistle is an unintelligent copy, taken, either from St. Jude, or from the original which St. Jude had copied intelligently.

Take first the following (2 Pet. ii. 9-11): "The Lord knoweth how to reserve under punishment for the day of judgment the unjust, and especially those who *go after the flesh* in the lust for pollution, and despise authority. Audacious, self-willed, they tremble not when railing against glories, whereas angels, in strength and power superior, do not bring against them, in the sight of the Lord, a railing judgment." This passage is an admirable instance of the manner in which the Author, by omitting necessary words from his original, and by inserting unnecessary words, produces an obscure, yet verbose result. He has been speaking above of the fallen angels and of the rescue of Lot from Sodom; and he deduces from it the moral that the Lord punishes especially those who "*go after the flesh.*" In his comment on this expression, Alford says that it means "all following after unlawful carnal lusts:" but the context requires something much stronger than this;¹ and accordingly Jude (7) has "like Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities round about them, which in the same way as these (*i.e.* the angels mentioned above) committed fornication and went after *strange* flesh." That this is the original meaning is confirmed by a passage in the Book of Enoch (Dillmann, p. 82), which uses the word *ὀπίσω* in the same signification, of the fallen angels going astray *after* the daughters of men (*καὶ ἐπεθύμησαν αὐτὰς καὶ ἀπεπλανήθησαν ὀπίσω αὐτῶν*). It is doubtful

¹ It is much to be regretted that the Revised Version translates by the same words ("walk *after* the flesh") two totally different expressions (1) *περιπατοῦσιν κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom. viii. 4) which means merely "walk *according to* the flesh," *i.e.* lead a fleshly or sensual life; and (2) *ὀπίσω σαρκὸς πορευομένους* (2 Pet. ii. 10) which means to "go *astray following* the dictates of the flesh," like "*following after Satan*" (1 Tim. v. 15).

whether the expression "to follow after the flesh" could be used at all (with a personification of the Flesh) to denote obeying the instincts of the flesh; for such a metaphor—possibly because of the verbal inconsistency implied in our "following" the flesh which encloses us—is unknown to the New Testament; but in any case the context of the Second Epistle, the text and context of Jude, and the fragment of Enoch, all tend to prove that the meaning ought to be, not, as Alford would have it, "*all* following after unlawful carnal lusts," but the special sin imputed to the angels, and to the men of the two doomed cities, a lusting after "*strange* flesh," *i.e.* unnatural vice.

Still more decisive is the remainder of the passage quoted above (2 Pet. ii. 10, 11), "they tremble not when railing against glories; whereas angels do not bring against *them* a railing judgment." Who could possibly understand this passage as it stands, with this ambiguous "*them*," without the aid of St. Jude? The meaning of "glories" seems to be spiritual "thrones and principalities:" and it is stated that these false teachers do not hesitate to rail against the highest spiritual powers. Against good powers or bad? Clearly, against the good. But the next clause contrasts the presumption of these false teachers with the modesty of the good angels: "whereas angels do not bring against *them* a railing judgment." Against whom? Against the false teachers? The context certainly at first sight would seem to demand this interpretation; but it conveys no sense, and Alford's note mentions no commentator who has suggested it. It must be then against the "glories," *i.e.* the spiritual powers of *goodness* just mentioned, which have been railed at by the false teachers? But it seems absurd to praise the *good* angels for not railing at the spiritual powers of *goodness*. The sense therefore demands that "*them*" should mean "the spiritual powers of *evil*:" and the sentence ought to run thus: "These

heretics do not hesitate to rail against the powers of goodness; yet even the angels shrink from railing against the powers of evil." Again, even if the sentence were thus clearly expressed, we should still be forced to ask, what authority had the writer for thus praising the moderation of the angels? What was the special tradition which he must have had in view?

All these questions are answered, and all these obscurities cleared up, by reference to the following simple passage of Jude: "But in the same way these men . . . defile the flesh, despise authority, and rail against glories. Yet Michael the archangel, when he, while disputing with the devil, spoke with him concerning the body of Moses, dared not to bring *against him* a judgment of railing, but said, The Lord rebuke thee." This makes all clear. The Author of the Second Epistle had this passage before him. But, writing for Gentile readers, he did not wish to introduce the story of Michael, Moses, and the devil: omitting it therefore, he would have these words before him in Jude: "They despise authority, and rail against glories; Yet the archangel did not dare to bring *against him* a judgment of railing, but said, The Lord rebuke thee." Clearly "him" must be altered, now that "devil" is omitted. It is therefore hastily altered into "them," to refer to the "glories" above, thereby making nonsense. Also, the "archangel" looks too much like allusion to a definite story, and is therefore altered into "angels superior in might and power;" lastly, the rebuke of Michael to Satan must be omitted, but still this appeal to the presence of the Lord can be partly expressed by a kind of side-stroke, and for this purpose the Author adds "in the sight of (*lit.* by the side of) the Lord." At the same time he adds some unnecessary but classical verbiage, to the effect that these teachers "*do not tremble* when railing," and that they are "audacious, self-willed," the final result being: "Audacious, self-willed, they do not

tremble when railing against glories; whereas angels superior in strength and power do not bring against them in the sight of the Lord a railing judgment."

In the following passages our Author, in altering Jude, has endeavoured to improve the sense; and although he has not made nonsense, it can be clearly shewn that the text of St. Jude was, or represents, the original from which the Second Epistle was derived. Jude (12) says of the false teachers, "These are they who are *stains* (σπιλάδες) in your *feasts of charity* (ἀγάπαις) feasting with you." The word translated *stains* presents a difficulty; for it always means "rocks" except here and in an Orphic poem (Lightfoot, *On a Fresh Revision*, p. 137) of the fourth century after Christ. yet all the early Versions understood the word in the sense of "*stain*" (Lightfoot, *ib.*), and the cognate word σπιλοι more commonly used in the sense "*stains*," also (Rutherford's *New Phrynichus*, p. 17) appears to have passed from the meaning "rock" to the later meaning "*stain*." It is therefore very probable that our Old Version is here correct, and that St. Jude meant, not as our New Version has it, "rocks," but "spots" or "stains." But whatever may have been Jude's meaning, it was certainly obscured by the use of the word σπιλάδες; for if the word meant "rocks," then the metaphor, although conceivable, is harsh and far-fetched; and if it meant "stains," then the use of the word, in this rare sense, is objectionable. Naturally therefore the Author of the Second Epistle would alter σπιλάδες into σπιλοι, a word used in St. Paul's Epistles and therefore familiar to him; but that Jude should have altered the intelligible σπιλοι into his own unintelligible σπιλάδες is inconceivable. Again, it would seem that Jude's word "*feasts of charity*" (in uncial characters ΑΓΑΠΑΙC) was corrupted, in our Author's copy, into the very similar ΑΠΑΤΑΙC, "*deceits*." But this change, having been made, necessitated the further change of "your"

into "their." Yet a further change is required; for to say "stains and blemishes in their deceits feasting with you" makes absolutely no sense: therefore our Author inserts a word implying a metaphorical feast, a "revelling" in wickedness.¹ But he still retains the reference to the literal feasting although it now makes no sense; and consequently the simple and literal statement of Jude that these heretics were blemishes on the *agapai* or "love-feasts" whenever they feasted with the faithful, is converted into the following chaos: "spots and blemishes, revelling in their deceits, feasting with you." The absurdity of this sentence has induced the scribes of some MSS. to alter the reading "deceits" back to "love-feasts:" but Westcott and Hort retain the reading "deceits" in their text, while inserting "love-feasts" in the margin.

Jude continues (12) by describing the false teachers as "clouds without water, carried past by winds . . . wandering stars for whom the blackness of darkness hath been reserved for ever." The first metaphor is not so readily intelligible to Western as to Eastern readers, who could more keenly realize, in time of drought, the disappointment caused by clouds which, instead of descending in welcome rain, are "wafted past" the expectant husbandman and prove, indeed, "waterless." So unintelligible were these "waterless clouds" to the readers for whom our Author wrote, that he alters "waterless clouds" into the much more common-place "waterless springs;" but still he desires to retain some mention of "clouds." Not however understanding Jude's point of view, he fixes, not on the "waterlessness" of the disappointing cloud, but on the unsteadiness and fickleness of it, as representing

¹ The word occurs, similarly used, in Isaiah vii. 4: and it is perhaps noteworthy that the passage Isaiah lvi. 7—lvii. 5, contains a group of expressions found in this Epistle: *ἐντροφᾶν ἐν* (found here), "my *Holy Mount*" (2 Pet. i. 18); "they are utterly blinded," (*ib.* i. 19); "dog" (*ib.* ii. 22); "the just one" (ii. 8); "children of destruction," comp. "children of curse" (*ib.* ii. 14).

teachers blown about by every wind of doctrine; and then (having in his mind possibly two passages in the LXX. Wisdom ii. 4 and 5), he describes them as “mists driven by a blast.” At this point he omits, besides other imagery of Jude, the metaphor “wandering stars,” probably because he has already anticipated this notion of “unsteadiness” in his description of the clouds. Yet, whether Jude means teachers pretending to give light like the planets, or whether he is thinking of comets—which may be literally said to pass into darkness never to return—in either case the words “wandering stars for whom the blackness of darkness hath been reserved for ever,” are most appropriate to express the evanescent light of superficial teachers. But, with even more than his wonted carelessness, our Author retains these last words about “darkness,” even though he omits all mention of the “wandering stars” which are reserved for darkness: “These are springs without water, and mists driven by a blast; for whom the blackness of darkness hath been reserved.” It is true that the pronoun “whom” refers not to “mists” but to “these”; yet the abruptness caused by the juxta-position of the “mists” and the “blackness of darkness” in reserve, requires explanation; and this explanation is afforded by the supposition that our Author has omitted the “wandering stars” which in Jude’s context make the “darkness” appropriate and expressive.

But since in all these passages the text of Jude is superior to that of the Second Epistle in clearness and force, it may be asked why may we not suppose that Jude improved on the Second Epistle rather than that the Author of the latter spoiled Jude? The briefest reference to the several passages will shew that this is impossible. It is not credible that Jude altered “waterless springs” into “waterless clouds,” or “driven by the blast” into “wafted past”; but the converse is both credible and natural. It is not credible that Jude took a pointless

metaphor like "revelling in deceits," and by the alteration of a letter or two substituted a pointed and practical meaning, "feasting at your love-feasts"; or that he found in an Epistle of Peter an ill-placed expression, "for whom the blackness of darkness is reserved," and gave it an exact meaning by inserting the words "wandering stars." The same holds true of the alteration of *σπιλάδες*; it is credible and natural that our Author altered *σπιλάδες* into *σπίλοι*; it is inconceivable that Jude altered the easy and intelligible *σπίλοι* into the harsh or unintelligible *σπιλάδες*. Lastly, whereas the Second Epistle speaks of the evil teachers as "railing against glories whereas angels do not bring against *them* a railing judgment," it is not credible that Jude penetrated into the confused meaning of the Author, and detecting the recondite allusion in his mind, made darkness light by inserting the legend which the Author had in his mind but accidentally omitted.

One more instance may be given of the confusion caused by our Author's alterations of his original. Jude writes about the evil teachers as follows (10): "These blasphemous on the one hand what things they know not; and on the other hand in such things as they understand naturally like the irrational beasts, in these they are destroyed (or, destroy themselves)," *i.e.* "these men have no sense of things spiritual, which they revile; and as for the world of sense of which they have some instinctive knowledge, as beasts have, even this they turn to their own destruction by their excesses." The antithesis is clear, and there is nothing objectionable in the statement. But this antithesis is too subtle for our Author. Utilising it only so far as it will enable him to enforce his favourite topic of "destruction" (*ἀπωλεία*)—a word that occurs six times in this Epistle and only fourteen times in all the rest of the N.T.—he emphasizes the word "destroyed" by adding "with destruction;" he changes the present into the future, because he

wishes to be regarded as *predicting future, not describing present*, teachers; and thus produces the following sentence: "But these—like irrational animals that are born natural(ly) for capture and destruction—blaspheming the things wherein they are ignorant, in their destruction shall verily be destroyed." How inferior in point and spiritual truth is this statement to that of Jude! Jude says that these blaspheming teachers are *worse* than the beasts, because they abuse nature and are destroyed by nature's retribution; our Author says simply that they shall be destroyed *like* beasts made for destruction. Yet, although the sense of Jude is so superior to that of our Author, it is inconceivable that Jude should have produced his text by amending our Author's. It is infinitely more difficult to convert a chaotic and immoral sentence into one with point and shape and moral, than to turn shape to chaos by hasty and blundering imitation. Let any one put aside the two sentences, and after giving himself time to forget the text of Jude, let him sit down, pen in hand, and try, with the text of the Second Epistle before him, to alter it and improve it into Jude's sense, and he will realize the difficulty of conceiving that Jude was the copyist.

Let us now pass to the passages in the two Epistles which describe the uprising of the false teachers. A difference will be at once apparent. Jude speaks of false teachers who *have* arisen, our Author of teachers who *shall* arise. Thus Jude has (4): "for certain men *have* crept in privily, they who have been of old appointed to this condemnation;" our Author (ii. 1): "there *shall be* false teachers, who *shall* privily bring in heresies of destruction . . . whose condemnation now of old lingereth not." Again Jude has (17) "But ye, beloved, remember ye the words which *have been spoken before* by the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ; how that *they said* to you, In the last time there shall be mockers;" but our Author (iii. 2, 3) bids

his hearers remember, not the predictions of the *Apostles*, but "the words which *were spoken before* by the holy prophets." Afterwards he makes mention of the Apostles, but not as "predicting," but as "commanding:" "and the *commandment* of the Lord and Saviour *through your Apostles*." He then proceeds to quote the prophecy assigned by Jude to the Apostles, but instead of referring to it as past, he appropriates it as *his own prophecy*, "Knowing this first, that in the last days mockers shall come." If we ask the reason for these changes of tenses, the answer is obvious. The Author, assuming an Apostolic character, must place himself in the position of an Apostle, and instead of referring (as Jude does) to the Apostolic predictions as past, must himself utter them concerning the future.

Should it be suggested that Jude may have, on the contrary, altered our Author's Future Tenses into Past Tenses, we have an answer, not only in the generally imitative nature of the Second Epistle, but also in the manifest proofs afforded by it that the Author wrote *after* the false teachers had come.¹ For he does not consistently sustain his character of one predicting the future, but proceeds to state what these future mockers are *now in the habit of thinking* (iii. 5): "For this they willingly *forget*"—not "they *will forget*"—"that there were heavens from of old, etc." A short but significant phrase (ii. 4) points to the same inconsistency: "Whose condemnation now of old lingereth not and their destruction slumbereth not." This means, as Alford rightly explains it, that their condemna-

¹ Further, let us suppose that Jude is here not copied, but copying. He has before him the words 2 Pet. iii. 3 "*mockers* (*ἐμπαῖκται*) shall come." This word "mockers" is nowhere else used in the N. T., and its occurrence in these two passages is a confirmation of the supposition that one author borrowed from the other. But on the supposition that Jude borrowed, why did he not quote by name the great Apostle whose last utterance he is repeating? How much more weight would have been attached to a definite prophecy thus definitely quoted, than to the vague generality conveyed the words uttered before by the Apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ!"

tion "is working itself out, is living and in action," and that their destruction "is awake and ready to seize them." Now, although it is very natural for Jude to write of false teachers who *have appeared*, that they were "appointed beforehand of old to this condemnation," yet it is harsh in the extreme to say of heretics who have not yet appeared, and will not appear until the generation of Apostles has passed away, that "their condemnation *is working itself out, is living and in action.*" But the fact is that, although the Author keeps his character of an Apostolic prophet when he predicts the advent of these evil teachers, he relapses into his own true character of a contemporary when he descants on their punishment; and hence he speaks of them as actually alive, and of their punishment as now impending. The different nature of the "mockers" in Jude and in the Second Epistle is also significant. The "mockers" in Jude (12) are those who "make separations," and mock the faith; in the Second Epistle they are those who are weary of awaiting the Lord's coming, "Where," say they (iii. 4), "is the promise of his coming? For, from the day that the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." This suits a post-apostolic date, a time when the earlier belief in the speedy coming of Christ had been succeeded by a belief among the faithful that his coming might be long deferred, and among the faithless that He might not come at all; and that this impatient feeling had already set in is proved by the protestation of our Author himself, in the present tense (iii. 9), "The Lord *is* not slow as regards his promise. . . but He *is* long suffering."

It would be beyond the limits of this paper to go through the whole of the Epistle and, pointing out the sources whence a number of other words and phrases are derived, to shew that there is probably not one original thought, and scarcely one natural expression, in the whole of it. One

or two specimens must suffice. It contains only two or three expressions borrowed from St. Peter's First Epistle (for the list of words given by Dr. Plumptre as "comparatively unfamiliar in other books and common to the two Epistles," will be greatly thinned upon a careful inspection), such as the salutation (i. 1), the use of "precious" (τίμιος) (i. 1) and the phrase (iii. 14) "without spot and blameless" (comp. 1 Pet. i. 19). But the first two verses shew more than one trace that the Author set out with the intention of imitating St. Peter, and yet of not copying the First Epistle too exactly. For although the words "grace and peace be multiplied" are exactly reproduced, he chooses—if the reading "Simeon" be correct,—a peculiar form of Simon, not found elsewhere in the N.T. except in the single passage (Acts xv. 14) where James, in his position as President of the Council at Jerusalem, formally recognises Peter by that name as the opener of the Church to the Gentiles. Again (i. 1) in first addressing his readers—although from iii. 1 ("second epistle") we infer that he intends to have it supposed that they are the same as those who in the First Epistle (1 Pet. i. 1) are addressed as "the sojourners of the Dispersion in Pontus, Galatia, etc."—he does not repeat the address of the First Epistle, but resorts to a different one, yet not original. Reading the account in the Acts of the Apostles (xi. 17) in which Peter defended the offer of baptism to the Gentiles against the attacks of the Judaizing party, he found the Apostle describing the Gentiles as those to whom "God gave the *like* (ἴσῃν) gift as he did also to us, having had faith (πιστεύσασιν) in the Lord Jesus Christ." Instead of ἴσῃν he uses the word (unknown in N.T. but found in Josephus) ἰσότιμον, "equally honoured," and then describes his hearers by the same periphrasis, "them that have obtained an equally honoured faith with us." It is also probable that the expression μίσθον ἀδικίας, wages of iniquity, twice repeated

in 2 Pet. ii. 13, and ii. 15, and found nowhere in the N.T., except in the speech of St. Peter, Acts i. 18, has been borrowed from the latter passage.

We will conclude the list of our Author's imitations by mentioning two passages for the consideration of the learned, where he appears likely to be indebted to Clement of Rome. In i. 17 he speaks of a voice having been carried to Christ on the Mount of Transfiguration "by the *excellent glory*" (ὕπὸ τῆς μεγαλοπρεπῆς δόξης). Now the word here rendered "excellent" is rare in the LXX. and not found in the N.T.; but the exact phrase is found in Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthians, Chap. ix., "those that ministered to his *excellent glory*" (τῇ μεγαλοπρέπει δόξη αὐτοῦ); and Clement elsewhere (viii.) speaks of "the *excellent* and glorious will of God." Again (iii. 5-7) our Author speaks of the old heavens and earth as being "*compacted*. . . . *by the Word of God*," and of the new heavens and earth as being "treasured up by the *same Word* (so Westcott and Hort; Alford, 'by his word'), being reserved for fire." This passage occurs in a context that treats of God's promises (ἐπαγγελίας). In a similar passage Clement (xxvii.) bids us attach ourselves to Him who is faithful in his promises (ἐπαγγελίαι), remembering that all things are easy for Him: "In the *Word* of his power He *compacted* all things and in the *Word* He is able to destroy them." Of course it may be suggested that Clement may have borrowed these expressions from our Author; but, if we believe that our Author had read the Antiquities of Josephus, published in 93 A.D., and that he wrote a few years after that date (so as to allow a sufficient time for the Antiquities to come into general circulation) it will appear more probable that our Author borrowed from Clement (who wrote about 95 A.D.) than that Clement borrowed from an Epistle which could only just have come into circulation and which *is not distinctly quoted by any*

Christian writer till the third century. Two other similarities between Clement and the Second Epistle (less striking verbally, but of some importance when combined with those given above) are given by Kirchhofer (p. 277).

Taken by themselves these passages might leave it doubtful whether our Author had borrowed or lent them; but if we find him proved to have borrowed from Jude, Philo, Josephus, the First Epistle of St. Peter, and the Acts of the Apostles, his established character for borrowing ought fairly to turn the scale against him when internal evidence makes it probable that either he or Clement borrowed, but is insufficient to prove which was the borrower. This conclusion will be still further confirmed if we can shew that the style of the Author throughout is that of a copyist and "fine writer," ignorant of ordinary Greek idiom, yet constantly straining after grandiloquent Greek, an affected and artificial style wholly unlike that of the First Epistle of St. Peter, a style so made up of shreds and patches of other men's writings, and so interspersed with obsolete, sonorous, and meaningless words that it really has no claim to be called a style at all, and resembles nothing so much as the patchwork English of a half-educated Hindoo aping the language of Lord Macaulay and Dr. Johnson with an occasional flavour of Shakespeare. But this aspect of the Epistle will demand separate treatment.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

“THE BROTHER WHOSE PRAISE IS IN THE
GOSPEL.”

2 CORINTHIANS viii. 18.

IT might seem useless, if not presumptuous, to add another to the many conjectures which have been made as to the identity of the person so named by St. Paul, were it not that every such conjecture, even if it does not commend itself to others, may lead to an independent examination and study of Scripture, which cannot fail to be of use. I, therefore, venture to put forward an hypothesis which I have not met with anywhere, not as likely to command universal assent, but as worthy of discussion and consideration. It will be well, first, to state shortly the data which we have to go upon, and the chief conjectures which have found favour hitherto. (1) “The brother” is mentioned as being sent by Paul with Titus and another “brother” to Corinth. (2) He is ὁ ἀδελφὸς οὗ ὁ ἔπαινος ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ διὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν. (3) He was chosen by the Churches to travel, with St. Paul, with the money collected for the Church in Judæa, in order that there might be no suspicion of malversation of the funds.

The conjectures as to his identity have been many and various, as may be seen in Alford’s note. Heumann and Rückert suppose him to have been a brother of Titus; others (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Luther, Calvin), St. Barnabas; Baronius and Estius, Silas; Lightfoot and Stier, Mark; De Wette and Wieseler, Trophimus. But perhaps the most favoured theory was that which identified him with St. Luke, and explained the words, “whose praise is in the Gospel,” as referring to the written Gospel of St. Luke (so Origen, Jerome, Ambrose, *al.*, and so Wordsworth,

Gk. Test.) : and, though later writers have pointed out the fact (which Wordsworth appears to admit) that St. Luke's Gospel was not yet written, this need not invalidate the hypothesis, as St. Luke no doubt may have greatly assisted St. Paul in preaching the Gospel, and, moreover, he undoubtedly was one of those who accompanied St. Paul on the journey to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 6), and so would answer more or less to the description of one "chosen by the churches to travel, with us, with this grace which is administered by us." These words, indeed, have been held (as by Wordsworth (Gk. Test., *in loc.*) to exclude any excepting those mentioned (Acts xx. 4-6) as accompanying St. Paul to Jerusalem; and, if this be so, then the words will most probably apply to St. Luke. But it does not seem necessary to conclude that the "brother" mentioned in 2 Corinthians viii. 18 actually accompanied St. Paul to Jerusalem. His presence was intended to prevent any suspicion of unfairness in the administration of the fund; but this was amply provided for by the presence of the other delegates of the various Churches: so that, if need were, he might be relieved from the necessity of accompanying St. Paul to Jerusalem.

If, then, we are free to look outside the list given in Acts xx. 4-6, it seems to me that there is at any rate a possibility that the person meant was the Ἐπαίνετος, or Epānetus, mentioned in Romans xvi. 5. This would at once give a natural explanation of the expression οὗ ὁ ἔπαινος ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, which would be a playful allusion to the name of the person of whom the Apostle was speaking. Such a quip or play on the meaning of a name—*Praiseworthy*, whose *praise* is in all the Churches—was quite in St. Paul's manner, as we learn from his beautiful letter, or note rather, to Philemon, where (Verse 11) he speaks of a slave *Profitable* (Onesimus) who had once been *useless* to his master, but who would henceforth be *useful* to him, and

repeats the allusion in a slightly different form in Verse 20; nor would such a play of fancy or humour seem in the least forced to an age, and in one of a race, which was very apt to find an omen in names.¹

The difficulties of this view are (1) that Epænetus was in Rome when St. Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans, which cannot have been long after the date when the second Epistle to the Corinthians was written. But we have a parallel to this in the case of Aquila and Priscilla, who were with St. Paul when 1 Corinthians was written (1 Cor. xvi. 19), but when the Epistle to the Romans was written had gone to Rome (Rom. xvi. 3). And, besides, the interval between the date of 2 Corinthians and that of Romans must have been at least three months (cf. 2 Cor. ii. 13 with Acts xx. 3), and probably a good deal more, which would allow ample time for Epænetus to reach Rome.

A second difficulty is that which has been already alluded to, viz., that Epænetus is not mentioned amongst those who accompanied St. Paul on his journey to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 4); and, if it is necessary to suppose that the "brother whose praise is in the Gospel" accompanied St. Paul to Jerusalem, Epænetus clearly cannot be the person meant. But it is not certain that this was so; and, if Epænetus was "the brother," we can see a reason why it would not be necessary for him to go to Jerusalem; for he was the "first fruits of Asia unto Christ" (*Ἀσίας* is the true reading in Rom. xvi. 5, A B C D F **N**, etc. adapted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg.), and therefore probably a delegate of the Churches of Asia; but as there were two other delegates from Asia, Tychicus and Trophimus, one of whom at any rate (Acts xxi. 29), and probably both, did

¹ We may compare, for the Jewish practice, the play on the name of Hezekiah's wife, Hephzibah (2 Kings xxi. 1.; Isa. lxii. 4), and for St. Paul's practice of thus playing on words Phil. iii. 2, 3; Rom. xii. 3.

accompany St. Paul to Jerusalem, the presence of Epænetus would not be necessary to give a security to the Churches of Asia of St. Paul's good faith.

There seems, then, to be no insuperable objection to supposing that St. Paul, in the expression we are considering, was making an allusion to the name of Epænetus which would at once be understood by those to whom he was writing. And, if so, possibly the other "brother" may have been St. Luke; though against this it may be urged that, according to the narrative in the Acts, St. Luke seems to have stopped in Philippi on the second missionary journey (Acts xvi.-xvii. 1), and to have stayed there till St. Paul returned at the end of the third missionary journey (Acts xx. 6). Whatever the value of the view here advocated may be, it would at any rate supply a reasonable explanation of the expression used by St. Paul, and is not perhaps attended with more difficulties than any of the other theories which have found favour.

JAMES E. DENISON.

CRITICAL NOTE ON 1 JOHN v. 16.

"There is a sin unto death; *not concerning this do I say that he should make request.*" So the Revisers have translated the latter clause of this Verse; with the assent of most commentators. Thus Meyer paraphrases: "My exhortation does not mean that intercession should be made in connection with sins unto death." Haupt expounds: "Prayer must be offered only in case there is no sin unto death involved. When I have the impulse to pray for an erring brother, this constitutes the assurance that his sin is not unto death. When this strong confidence of petition is wanting to the Christian, οὐ λέγω ἵνα αἰτήσῃ"; where it will be observed that the passage is misquoted. The actual words are "οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ." Now this current rendering of the passage has to face three difficulties. (1) It makes ἵνα a mere connective, without any purposive force. (2) It gives to ἐρωτᾶν a meaning which it has nowhere else in the New Testament; as will be shewn in due course. (3) It does not at all obviously fit in with the context, particularly with the following Verse. Let these points be considered in order:—

(1) ἵνα is translated as merely introducing the noun sentence, the object of λέγω: "I do not say *that* he should make request." It can hardly be denied, though Meyer does deny it, that ἵνα has this use in certain passages in the New Testament; but its prevailing meaning is that which it possesses in Classical Greek, viz.: "in order that;" and it should always receive that meaning where it is possible to give it. In the three Epistles of St. John there are twenty-five occurrences of ἵνα; in sixteen of these it has its purposive meaning beyond a doubt; in six it follows the demonstrative pronoun and introduces a clause in apposition thereto: as, e.g. 1 John iii. 11, "This is the message . . . *that* we should love one another;" an idiomatic use peculiar to this Writer. In Chap. ii. 27, it somewhat similarly follows a noun (χρεῖαν); and in Chap. i. 9, the purposive meaning may very well be maintained. There remains only our own passage, where there would seem to be no difficulty in giving it its proper force: "I do not speak about this *in order that,*" etc. It rests upon those who defend the current rendering to shew why the ordinary usage of the Writer should in this case be departed from. It is true that the change leaves λέγω

without an object: but this is no difficulty, as we have four instances of its absolute use in the Gospel of St. John, viz.: ii. 21; xi. 13; xiii. 18, 22: in each of which it is, as here, followed by *περί*; for the change of rendering suggested includes the taking of *περὶ ἐκείνης* with *λέγει*, not with *ἐρωτήσῃ*—which accords much better with the order of the words.

(2) The meaning of *ἐρωτᾷν*. The current rendering gives it the meaning of prayer, or request from man to God; practically the same as that of *αἰτεῖν* in the earlier part of the Verse. Surely the Apostle did not change the word without some purpose. Meyer remarks: "It is noteworthy that John uses not *αἰτήσῃ*, but *ἐρωτήσῃ*: *ἐρωτᾷν* is a weaker word; when the Apostle warns us against *ἐρωτᾷν*, he naturally does so still more against the stronger *αἰτεῖν*"—not a very satisfactory explanation. Of course it cannot for a moment be maintained that *ἐρωτᾷν* always has in the New Testament, its classical meaning of "to question;" it certainly does often signify "to request." But it must be remembered that it is *never* (this passage being reserved) used of prayer addressed by man to God. It is used of requests from the disciples to Christ, but not requests which were in any sense prayers; but rather incidents of conversation: e.g. St. John iv. 31, "The disciples *requested* him, saying, Master, eat." It is used of requests addressed by the Greeks to Philip; by the Jews to Pilate; by Christ Himself to Peter; by the king's invited guests to the servants; by one king to another; and so on. It is a word not of prayer between man and God, but of conversation between man and man; where it is used with reference to Christ, it is not, so to speak, in his Divine capacity. The one exception is most significant; it is used of prayer, in six cases, by St. John; but all these are in one prayer, the prayer of the God-man Himself; a prayer from God to God; a prayer where the offerer was the Peer of the Object (John xvii.). A careful analysis shews that the word is never used of prayer from man to God. In the face of this fact, strong reason should be shewn before giving it such a force in this passage.

(3) There is no need to do so; its ordinary meaning gives as good a sense, and fits in better with the context: "I do not speak about that (viz. sin unto death) in order that he *may ask questions*;" may begin to ask about this and that sinner, "Has he committed the sin unto death? May I pray for him or not?" "No," says the Apostle: "all unrighteousness is sin;" sin you can discover

easily enough, and know it when you see it; "and there is a sin not unto death;" let that be your warrant for the hope that your prayer will not be in vain: but do not waste time in unprofitable discussions and questions as to what the sin unto death may be, as to who has and who has not committed it. Such would appear to be the natural connection of the two Verses; whilst the usual translation gives no obvious explanation of Verse 17. It is true that there is no other New Testament example of the absolute use of *ἔρωτᾶν* in this sense; but an exactly parallel and indubitable instance will be found in the LXX rendering of Deuteronomy xiii. 15: *καὶ ἐτάσεις καὶ ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἐξερευνήσεις σφόδρα, κ. τ. λ.*

The rendering here suggested may not be the right one; but it has at any rate the merit of obviating some of the difficulties both of the translation and exposition of the passage; and it therefore deserves at least a passing notice from the commentator on the Epistle.

EDWARD H. SUGDEN.

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE REVISED VERSION.

If the reader of the first Article on this subject has appreciated the distinction made in the Revised Version between ὥστε with the Infinitive and ὥστε with the Indicative or between εἰπερ and εἴγε, he will be better prepared to set its true value upon the diagnosis exhibited in the treatment of *participial tenses*. In considering this important branch of Greek scholarship, it may be well in the outset to state briefly a certain law of language, apparently not yet formulated into a rule of grammar. After verbs of perception, whether of hearing or seeing or of mental apprehension, three participial tenses are used, and used with very marked differences, the Aorist and the Perfect and the Imperfect. This last tense is generally termed the Present; but it would be more correct and much more convenient to call it the Imperfect. Why so? Because the *action*, expressed by the participle, is regarded as imperfect or unfinished. But, it may be asked, what has the action to do with the tense? Answer, everything: for *tense* means *time*, and an action can no more take place without time to move in than a horse can gallop without ground to go upon. If therefore an action is unfinished, the time, which is inseparable from its process, is unfinished too; for the time of an action is of necessity commensurate with the action itself. But *unfinished time*, or what now appears to be much the same thing “unfinished action,” is in grammar designated the *Imperfect Tense*. Wherefore in the sentence “I saw the man running a race” (εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα διαθέοντα), let the

participial tense be called *Imperfect*, because the man had not finished the race when my eyes fell upon him as he ran. When I first saw him, he was beginning to run or was in the full swing of running, but had not yet done running. Certainly, in whatever stage of the race he happened to catch my sight, the action of the runner was still proceeding and not yet completed. This imperfection of the action is expressed in the imperfection of the tense in διαθέοντα. The sentence must therefore be rendered "I saw the man *running* a race:" not "*run* a race." Wherefore quite correct is the new translation of Revelation xiii. 1, "And I saw a beast *coming up* (ἀναβαῖνον) out of the sea, having ten horns and seven heads:" where the imperfect tense of the participle expresses the gradual emersion of the beast from the sea, and serves to make more vivid the appearance first of the horns and after them of the heads.

But what is the Greek for "I saw the man *run* the race"? Clearly εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα δραμόντα τὸν ἀγῶνα: here in the participle the Aorist supplants the Imperfect. Why so? Because the writer or speaker wishes to bring to view the man beginning to run, continuing to run, and ceasing to run. He employs the Aorist to denote the process of the race from first to last, so that the time or action of seeing may be coincident with the time or action of running. The race may have lasted five minutes or five hours, but the Aorist does not at all trouble itself about that: it is profoundly indifferent to duration of time, and measures a long or a short space with a corresponsive elasticity. It contracts or expands according to outward pressure. Hence it appears that the so-called "momentary or transitory use of the Aorist" (*Jelf*, Gr. Gr., § 401, and sometimes *Stallbaum*) is a conception neither logical nor accurate. The nature of the case or the circumstances alone determine the character of an action, whether it be long or short, quick or slow. The Aorist simply discharges its proper function

when it defines an action from first to last and circumscribes it within the assigned limits. If the action is long, the time also is long; if short, short: for instance ἐβασίλευσεν means *he reigned*: what does the Aorist care whether μίαν ὥραν or πεντήκοντα ἔτη be appended thereunto? Not a whit: the Tense of Definition is purely unaffected by the duration of any reign. Or does it swerve from its line of duty, if it allows ἐβασίλευσεν to be rendered *he became king*? Not a hair's breadth: to its own function of circumscription it is faithful as ever; the Aorist is Aorist still. To be sure there appear to be sundry modifications to the above rule, when, for instance, in certain combinations the completion of an action is made more illustrious than its commencement, as in ἐπειδὴ ἐβασίλευσεν.

Having thus determined the distinct participial uses of the Imperfect and of the Aorist, we now proceed to the equally distinct use of the Perfect. What is the Greek for "I saw him *when he had run the race*?" Clearly εἶδον διαδεδραμηκότα. Whether I saw him immediately after the race or some time or how long after, let the context decide. There is no difficulty about the participial Perfect.

But in order to deepen the impression of the broad difference between the three tenses in their uses, one more illustration may be serviceable. Take the sentence, "I beheld a woman *putting on* the sun," εἶδον γυναῖκα ἐνδυομένην τὸν ἥλιον. What is the true idea? This: my eye lighted upon a woman as she was engaged in the process of solar investiture; whether she was in the first, or second, or third stage of the process, the Imperfect Tense does not decide, the circumstances of the case decide. Again the sentence, "I saw a woman *put on* the sun," εἶδον γυναῖκα ἐνδυσαμένην τὸν ἥλιον, implies that I beheld the process of solar investiture from first to last. And of course "I saw a woman *clothed with* the sun," would be expressed in Greek by ἐνδεδυμένην or περιβεβλημένην, the participial

Perfect denoting the complete state of solar equipment. How long time the woman had put on the sun, when I beheld her clothed with it, is a question lying outside the Perfect, one in which the tense itself is neither interested nor concerned.

From the above positions, being true, it follows that the Greek for "I saw a star falling," is *εἶδον ἀστέρα πίπτοντα*, meaning that I gazed upon it during some part or other of its descent; and for "I saw a star *fall*," *εἶδον πεσόντα*, my eye following it in its lapse from sky to earth; and for "I saw a star *fallen*," *εἶδον πεπτωκότα*; but *how long* fallen after its lighting upon the earth, depends upon circumstances.

Upon what principle therefore were the learned Revisers led to alter the A. V. rendering of Luke x. 18, and retranslate it, "I beheld Satan *fallen* as lightning from heaven," *ὡς ἀστραπὴν πεσόντα*? Did they hazily confound *πεσόντα* with *πεπτωκότα*? the *process* with the *state* resulting therefrom? And that too when the faultless rendering of the A. V. lay before them? a rendering not only faultless but vivid in its order of the words, "I beheld Satan as lightning *fall* from heaven." But what makes more conspicuous still this alteration for the worse of a rendering absolutely perfect is that it flatly contradicts the Revisers' alteration for the better of Revelation ix. 1, *εἶδον ἀστέρα πεπτωκότα*, which they have properly retranslated, "I saw a star *fallen*." This latter correction is a silent correction of the former, and a standing protest against it. But even supposing that in the text Luke x. 18, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven," the substitution of *fallen* for *fall* could be desperately defended by some crooked parallel or other, could be crazily buttressed by some weird structure of a passage in which not the whole of the action denoted by the participial Aorist came to view, but only the last stage or fag end thereof, it might still be asked,

what *sense* does the new rendering yield? None whatsoever. The proposition, "I beheld Satan *fallen as lightning* from heaven," is an absurdity. The altered translation is as logically untenable, as it is grammatically indefensible. This will appear from a brief consideration. For there is a simile in this text; a comparison between Satan and lightning. In a comparison there is always a congruity between the thing compared and that to which it is compared. What we may predicate of the one, we may predicate of the other. If it is correct to say "I saw Satan fall like lightning," it must also be correct to say "I saw lightning fall." By parity of reasoning, if it is correct to say, "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning," it must also be correct to say, "I saw lightning fallen." But it is not correct to say so, for we cannot see lightning fallen; we can see it fall, shoot, dart from point to point, from sky to earth; but fallen we cannot behold it; when it has fallen, we may only discern its effects, say, in a blasted oak or a calcined ox.

It is remarkable that the Revisers seem to have rendered correctly enough the participial tenses in the Book of Revelation. Why were they less discreet elsewhere? Why did they fail to render aright *εἶδον περιλάμψαν με φῶς* in Acts of the Apostles xxvi. 13? Just as *εἶδον αὐτὸν ἐνδυσάμενον, δραμόντα, πεσόντα* must be rendered, "I saw him *put on, run, fall,*" so precisely *εἶδον περιλάμψαν με φῶς* must be rendered, "I saw a light *shine* round about me." Grammar demands this rendering, and logic appends its seal to the postulate of grammar. For what is the drift of the sacred record? This: at the hour of noon St. Paul was approaching Damascus. As he journeyed, what he saw *shining* around him was the light of the midday sun. Then in a moment another and unearthly light "above the brightness of the sun" *shone* round about him. He saw the strange light *shine*, and outshine the shining sun, for it

came upon his eyes sudden, intense, dazzling, even blinding. This bewildering *surprise* and overmastering *afflux* of supersolar splendour, radiating from the glorified Presence of the audible Saviour, is declared, as far as it can be declared, by the participial Aorist περιλάμψαν. If the Apostle had employed the Imperfect περιλάμπων, he would have described the unearthly light either as *shining* around him already, before his eye was arrested and dazzled by it, or else as *proceeding to shine* round about him. But that idea was not in his mind: quite the reverse: he therefore employed the participial Aorist. To make this correct view of the text more certain still, we find the same sudden blaze of a divine light, shaming the sunshine, indicated by the Infinitive Aorist περιεστράψαι in Acts xxii. 6. In Jelf's Grammar this would be called probably the *instantaneous* or even *subitaneous use* of the Aorist; but that would not be strictly correct, as the Aorist shakes its definitive head at all such foreign titles and alien appellations, content to rule within its own proper domain of determining actions and leaving their times of duration to circumstances lying beyond its own control.

But now that we are become more familiar with these three tenses in their several and distinct uses, what shall we say to the translation of πῶς εἶδε τὸν ἄγγελον ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ σταθέντα καὶ εἰπόντα, "how he had seen the angel *standing* in his house and *saying*" (Acts xi. 13)? Just as if the angel were standing in the house already, and waiting to catch the eye of Cornelius! The facts narrated in this text are *alia omnia*, precisely the reverse. Cornelius being in his house saw the angel, who was gliding swift towards him, *stand and say*; that is, saw him stop in his advance (σταθέντα) and heard him say his say—from first to last (εἰπόντα). Clearly the order of the words is "he saw the angel in his house"—saw him then and there do what? *stand and say*: these two verbs should not be put asunder,

but allowed to run together in quick sequence. Ponderous exceedingly is the received translation "*standing in the house and saying*": for, not to mention that ἐστῶτα ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ καὶ λέγοντα would be the Greek purely necessary to express this idea, surely the light approach to earth of a herald from heaven, speeding through the air and checking his flight till he came to a halt in the presence of a Peter or a Cornelius and straightway delivered his message, might have been truly pictured by the learned Revisers in this text, if only the transitional Aorist (σταθέντα) had received honour due and not been heavily identified with the sluggish and ponded Perfect—a tense denoting not a change but a state. An angel's visit was a bright *surprise*, an *apparition* with a radiation; at any rate such an angel's visit as we find recorded in Acts xii. 7, a text in which the correct and even graphic or sprightly rendering in the A. V. "an angel of the Lord *came upon* him" has been altered in the R. V. to the crass and massive and misleading *stood by him*. Where is the Greek for *by* in ἐπέστη? *Stood before him* might have been better, or even *visited him*: but no doubt the true idea is that of the A. V., *came upon* or *surprised him*.

But—πῆμα πῆματος πλέον—more ponderous than ever, even elephantine in its tardiness of tread is the drowsy diction which, again putting a slight on the mercurial Aorist and delighting to honour the phlegmatic Imperfect, is employed to describe an angel's quick approach and brief address, or rather nuncupation uttered once and no more. We read according to the R. V. in Acts x. 3 that Cornelius "saw an angel of God *coming in* unto him and *saying* to him, Cornelius." Here *coming in* and *saying* profess to represent not εἰσερχόμενον and λέγοντα, but εἰσελθόντα and εἰπόντα. Equal in accuracy and alacrity would be the rendering of the line

εἶδον ὁϊστεύσαντα καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖο τυχόντα,

“I saw him *letting fly* an arrow and *hitting* the bull’s eye.” The very phrase “saying, Cornelius,” amounts to a contradiction in terms: for the whole speech of the angel in this text consists of a single word, and is itself as circumscribed and constricted as the Greek tense is circumscriptive and constringent. A speech of one word, which *Cornelius* is, excludes the very idea of unfinished utterance, repudiates therefore a participial usher in the dull uniform of an imperfect tense *saying*, and demands to be announced by the bright and brisk Aorist *say*; to which it is exactly fitted, even as a sword to its scabbard: for εἰπόντα or *say* is the sheath that utters the blade *Cornelius*. We must not however conclude that an Aorist cannot announce a speech of many words: we have had an instance of this already in Acts xi. 13: but in these instances the many-worded speech must be regarded as one whole or a single message.

But enough and more than enough of these Participial Tenses: already the reader exclaims ἄλις λέλεκται τῶν ὀριστικῶν χρόνων. Nevertheless, even after a surfeit of Aorists overlooked or extinguished in Participles, one may be tempted to examine the rare curiosity of an Aorist actually buried alive in a Perfect. In the verb ἔσχηκα (formed from ἔσχον, not from ἔχω) two tenses are in co-partnership: theirs is a *divisum imperium*; of these two joint rulers, the Aorist and the Perfect, one has been hurled from his throne by the learned Revisers, the other exalted to reign alone. The banished partner is the ill-starred Aorist. The Tense of circumscription has fled before the Tense of uncircumscription. The Perfect has been allowed to triumph over the contemned Aorist, as in πεσόντα rendered *fallen*, so in ἐσχήκαμεν rendered *we have had*: just as the Imperfect has been permitted to usurp supreme dominion in σταθέντα rendered *standing*, in εἰπόντα rendered *saying*, in εἰσελθόντα rendered *coming in*: and in every instance with results disastrous to the true idea.

In the important text Romans v. 2. the new reading ἐσχήκαμεν for ἔχομεν has been followed by the new rendering "through whom also we *have had* our access by faith into this grace wherein we stand." Is *we have had* right grammatically? How can it be, when the Aorist ἔσχον = *I got* or *I found* has been forcibly expelled from ἐσχήκαμεν? If, however, we render afresh *we have got*, then the Aorist *got* is reinstated in its proper position by the side of the Perfect *have*. Again is the new rendering *we have had* right logically also? How can it be, when the phrase *we have had* so often implies that *we have no more*—the very contrary of what the Apostle here means to declare; certainly what we have no more, that we have had. With good reason therefore St. Paul employs the Aorist-Perfect of ἔχω and not the other, and with equally good reason he placed τῇ πίστει immediately after ἐσχήκαμεν and not after προσαγωγήν or *access*, as some readers might infer that he did from the order of words in the Revised Version translation.

Perhaps both grammar and logic will run in perfect harmony together, if we render, "through whom we have by faith got or obtained our access into this grace wherein we stand." This rendering will bring to view two causes of getting the access or obtaining the introduction into the state of grace; one cause objective, Christ: the other subjective, faith; Christ the door, faith the hand that moves the door to open and to admit.

The last passage for discussion under this head of Participial Tenses is one of much moment and interest. The text 2 Corinthians v. 2, 3. ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες, εἵ γε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθυσόμεθα is rendered in the Revised Version as follows, "*longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked.*" The English of this rendering is rather obscure, and not true to the

Greek; for if *to be clothed upon* is intended to denote a swift process, the Greek for that would be ἐπενδυθῆναι, and if *being clothed* is intended to denote a lasting state, the Greek for that would be ἐνδεδυμένοι. But if in this rendering Tense is not confounded with Tense, Voice is with Voice; and that with results disastrous to the true idea. For here the Passive is boldly substituted for the Middle, the objective for the subjective. This winnowing away of the dynamic Voice scatters to the winds the free will of the agent, the correlation between part and counterpart, between divine power and human capacity, between God's gift to men of the habitation from heaven and man's moral meetness for the same. For surely the Middle Voice implies *consciousness* in him who superindues the spiritual tenement: and this consciousness might have been easily expressed in English by rendering ἐπενδύσασθαι simply and correctly *to put on over, i.e., to put on over it, the material body, the immaterial.*

But meanwhile what of our client, the participle ἐνδύσασθαι and its tense and its voice? Can the rendering *being clothed* stand at all? Not at all; for if the ambiguous English of this phrase was designed by the learned Revisers to denote a permanent state reached, ἐνδεδυμένοι would be required for that, and if it is intended to represent a process continuing and unfinished, ἐνδυνύμενοι would be required for that. But ἐνδυσάμενοι, the Aorist, insists upon its circumscriptive rights. How then *salvo jure* is it to be translated? Clearly the consciousness and volition of the Voice must be preserved; the subjective Middle expressive of action from within must not be ousted and replaced by the objective Passive expressive of action from without. That will never do. Suppose then we render ἐνδυσάμενοι here *in putting on, or when we put on, or (to bring out the force of the καὶ) when we do put on.* Certainly of a construction nearly parallel (Acts x. 33) καλῶς ἐποίησας παραγενόμενος

the rendering in the Revised Version *thou hast done well in that thou hast come*, though somewhat wordy, is correct enough: for by the *in* therein is indicated the coincidence in time between the moral *doing well* and the material *coming*. Nevertheless this text, like the half line of Euripides, εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολών, might be rendered with equal propriety and more tersely *thou didst well in coming*. For *coming* in this new rendering is just as much a participial Aorist, as *thou didst well* is a verbal. "But," some one will say, "surely *coming* is a participial Imperfect!" Answer: it may be so elsewhere, but not here; here the context *thou didst well* commands it to be Aorist. The truth is, the meagre staff of participial forms in English makes it necessary that such words as *coming*, *entering*, *putting on* should do duty sometimes as Aorist, sometimes as Imperfect, according to the colour of surrounding circumstances. Instances of this double use abound in "Tales of my Grandfather." But in Greek it is otherwise; the English *entering* is pressed to translate alike εἰσελθὼν and εἰσερχόμενος; for instance, of the sentence εἰσελθὼν ἔμαρψέ με τῆς χειρός, the translation, "*entering* the room he grasped me by the hand," is more graphic and less ponderous than, if *having entered* or *he entered and grasped* were used; it is also more correct. Yet the same word *entering*, and no other, suits the Greek Imperfect in εἶδον εἰσερχόμενον, just as *enter* and nothing but *enter* or *come in* suits the Greek Aorist in εἶδεν εἰσελθόντα, Acts x. 3.

"But," some one will object, "what is the Greek for *In putting on* his cloak he slipped?" Answer; ἐνδύμενος τὴν χλαῖναν ὥλισθε: the participial Imperfect here, because it is obvious from the circumstances of the case that the man had not completed the process of cloaking when he stumbled. But, it may be asked in reply, what is the Greek for *Putting on* his cloak he left the house? Clearly ἐνδυσάμενος ἐξῆει; because the circumstances are changed,

and therefore *putting on* from an Imperfect becomes an Aorist in English, defining the process of cloaking from first to last, from commencement to completion.

“But, sir,” again says the objector, “this process of *putting on*, mentioned by St. Paul, will be an instantaneous act, quick as lightning: you can hardly call it a process beginning and continuing till it is ended.” Answer: why not? Surely an instantaneous act may be also an instantaneous process with a first and a middle and a last. Not that this is a sample of the momentary or subitaneous use of the Aorist, but rather we gather from the extraordinary nature of the case as revealed elsewhere (1 Corinthians xv.) that the transfiguration of the saints will be an instantaneous process, swift as a flash. It is true that in ordinary human apparelling the process has stages and takes time: but this superinvestment will be superhuman and all but timeless, for we read that therein “we shall be changed (*ἀλλαγησόμεθα*, Aorist Future) in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.” Wherefore it appears that a process which measures the twinkling of an eye, will be so instantaneous, that the first of it will be the last of it, the commencement the completion. But in this mighty transformation there will be a process still, just as there is a process in a flash of lightning that lasts a second. And the whole of this process is denoted in our text by the Participial Aorist, which in itself is profoundly indifferent whether the process it denotes last a second or a minute. This explanation seems to remove the objections made so far to the rendering “if *in putting on*” or “*when we do put on* we shall be found not naked.”

“But,” some one not yet satisfied asks, “how must the time of *ἐνδυσάμενοι* be fitted to the time of *εὑρεθηςόμεθα*? Here is the difficulty: it seems to me, sir, that the Revised Version takes a very sensible view of this passage when it renders, If so be that *being clothed* we shall not be found naked: which I for my part make to signify, *when we are*

completely clothed (or as you, sir, would render it *when we have put on*), we shall then not be found naked. Why, of course we shall not be: this is an evident truth well drawn out in the rendering of the Revised Version. For this use of the English Perfect *being clothed* let me quote from Shakespear—

My story *being done*,
She gave me for my pains a world of sighs :

where Desdemona heaves her world of sighs when Othello has finished his story." Answer: even supposing the received translation *being clothed* to be correct (which is most improbable, if not quite impossible) and your own interpretation of it to be correct also (which is quite possible and very probable), what *sense* does it make? What you call "an evident truth" I should term a self-evident truism, a proposition indeed so evident that to state it is unnecessary, even superfluous. But to this proposition, self-evident as it is from one point of view, there is from another aspect a fatal objection, which is that *γυμνοὶ* here means stript or unclad not of the heavenly but of the earthly body. This is clear from all the antecedent context. And now to answer your first question about the two times, how they must be fitted to each other. Consider: there are not two times nor two moments, but one moment and two actions or two sides of the same event or process. These two sides or halves or tallies or, if you please, part and counterpart, are described as coincident in the same second of time. They are as consentaneous as they are instantaneous. The instantaneous process of *putting on completely* is an act simultaneous with the state of *being found not naked*: for so, perhaps, it should be translated and not as in the Revised Version, inasmuch as the *οὐ* is restricted to *γυμνοί*, not extending to *εὔρεθησόμεθα*. This more correct rendering, which limits the negative to *naked*, brings *ἐνδυσάμενοι*

face to face with *ἐύρεθησόμεθα οὐ γυμνοί*, positive with positive, Aorist with Aorist, each tense with its own distinct action filling the same all but spaceless space of timeless time; while again the Middle confronts the Passive, the subjective Voice the objective, both of them complementary each to each and tallying with a mutual correspondency. For it is obvious that *ἐύρεθησόμεθα*, now disencumbered of the negative, being Passive points to objective *agents* in this mystery, who shall find the saints of the last time *not-naked*. It is likewise all but certain that these *not-naked* or still body-clad saints, who shall *superindue*, were intended by St. Paul here to be in silent contrast with others who being *naked* or disembodied shall only *indue* or *put on*, not *put on over*. For the naked induce, the not-naked superindue. But when the not-naked *do put on over*, in that same moment they will be found not naked *by whom?* Who are these visitors that shall find them still clad? If they are the good angels, who day and night minister unto God for the heirs of salvation, *this* will be on earth their last office of love to the saints. *What* will be? The *finding* them? Both the finding which comes of seeking and the clothing which comes of finding. If this be true, the ministering angels, commissioned by God, shall just then prove *ἐνδύσαντες*, just when the expectant saints, meet for the embracing gift, shall prove *ἐνδυσάμενοι* to themselves. As the angelic agents rehabilitate the human recipients, these also shall rehabilitate themselves, with the new tenement furnished from heaven. Or to make the idea still clearer, after the final transfiguration of all the saints, one of them, looking back upon the stupendous event, looking back upon the instantaneous process of two sides or acts, one subjective on man's part, the other objective from the angelic side—such a one might thus fairly describe it in Greek οἱ μὲν ἄγγελοι ἐπιστάντες ἐνέδυσαν, οἱ δὲ ἄγιοι ἐνδύθεντες καὶ ἐνεδύσαντο.

Quæ cum ita sint or rather *si ita sunt*, suppose we render *longing to put on over, that is if in the moment of putting on we shall be found not naked*. Has the critic any objection to this, grammatical or logical? Voice of critic: "Well, I now begin to realize the idea of simultaneousness in the *putting on* and in the *being found clad*. No doubt, the Greek will allow two Aorists, one participial, the other verbal, to connote the same action from its two sides, as in *εὖ ἐποίησας μολών*, where, as you say, sir, the moral is coincident with the physical, the *doing well* with the *coming*. And certainly, now I think of it, one could hardly render *κτείνωμεν σφάζαντες* (Eur., *Orest.*, 1105) 'let us kill her, *when we have cut her throat*' but rather 'let us kill her—*cutting her throat*' or *by cutting*. In fact we find it thus in English, for I saw to-day in the *Newcastle Journal*, 'The Dean took the oath *kissing* the book,' which, probably you, sir, would render *καταφιλήσας τὸ βιβλίον*. And for my part I should do the same, for I cannot suppose that the Dean is described as kissing the book *before* he took the oath. In fact, the sealing kiss followed so close upon the *so help me God*, that the two acts were all but simultaneous. So that my difficulty is grammatical, no more; but is there not a logical difficulty here? According to your explanation should not St. Paul have written *ἐπενδυσάμενοι*='in the moment of putting on over?' " Answer: That is precisely what the Apostle would not have written; for, consider, he is here describing two states, one alternative to the other, namely the state of being found in the body, and that of being found stript of the body. He therefore *prefers* *ἑνδυσάμενοι* as being a term common to both these states, for whoso *puts on over* also *puts on*. Have you any more objections? One other objection is heard: "Well, sir, yet somehow after all I cannot but think that notwithstanding the flashing speed of the timeless time, as you unmathematically call it, one might have rather expected *ἐνδύομενοι*

than ἐνδυσάμενοι, to suit your view. For will not the being found in the embodied state take place a moment before or at least in the first moment of the superinvestment?" Answer: Better say at once in the first half of the moment which is to measure the whole time of the superinvestment. This quick process, however, is a mystery simply beyond our comprehension. But even supposing that the being surprised in the body would possibly precede the superinducement by half a second or by the tenth of a tick, how could the Apostle, whose whole soul was penetrated with the instantaneousness of that mighty transfiguration, who wrote in future Aorists, We shall not all *sleep* but we shall all be *changed in a moment*, have here employed the tardy Imperfect instead of the vivid Aorist? Impossible: the act and the fact occupy side by side one and the same flash of time. Nay, so incalculably swift may be the absorption of the corruptible into the incorruptible, that the being caught in the mortal body may be realized only in the first moment of immortality.

Has my critic any other objection? Voice of critic: "Yes, I have, sir, and a grave one; a missing link, sir, a missing link! Notwithstanding all these brainspun fineries about voices subjective and objective, about participial imperfects (I was taught at school to say the Present Participle and shall continue to do so), and notwithstanding all these wire-drawn distinctions between *saying* and *say*, *shining* and *shine*, *standing* and *stand*, *falling* and *fall*, *hitting* the bull's eye and *hit* it; after all these brilliant meteors and delicate gossamers of superfine scholarship, you have ignored, sir, in this passage, the existence of the particle γε! I see that εἰ γε in the Revised Version is rendered *if so be that*. To this I hope you object. I do. I was always taught to translate εἰ γε *if indeed* or *if in fact*: and now my sole doubt is whether γε means *indeed* or *in fact*. Pray, sir, can γε in any combination be rendered *so be that*? Can it in ἐργωγε?

or in *κατά γε τοῦτο*? or in *καπιθούξω γε πρὸς*? What is to become of this and of other like texts, if so be that *γε* nowhere signifies *so be that*! Answer: the particle *γε* here signifies neither *so be that*, as you rightly remark, nor *indeed*, as you wrongly assume. It means *at least* or *of course*; and being a volatile and flickering particle, it is sometimes not easy to see what word or words it influences. Here it has nothing to do with the *εἰ* which precedes it, and little to do with any word that follows it. It exerts no direct influence upon its own clause, in whole or in part. “You amaze me: what use then does it serve?” It serves or tends to reflect a strong light upon the apodosis taken in strict connexion with the protasis. “You astonish me: how in particular?” Its particular mission here is to intensify one word in the major clause, which is in affinity with another word in the minor. “You bewilder me: what next?” Its peculiar function in this passage is to illuminate the fingerpost *ἐπενδύσασθαι*, while this index points forward to its correlate *ἐνδυσάμενοι*. Is this lucid? The construction is *ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες—ἐπενδύσασθαι γε—εἰ καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι κ.τ.λ.* The conditional clause contains a necessary limitation to the idea of putting on *over*. The particle *γε* intensifies and makes brilliant *ἐπενδύσασθαι* as restricted by the conditioning clause. Clearly the meaning is Longing to put on *over*—to put on *over, of course, if*, when we do put on, we shall be found not naked: for otherwise, if in the instant of that induement, we shall be found divested of the terrestrial body, how shall we be able to *superindue* the celestial body *over* the terrestrial? It matters not whether we render *of course if* or *if, of course*: or *at least if* or *if, at least*: for *at least* and *of course* are no more fixtures in a sentence, with one place always assigned them, than is the volatile particle *γε*.

T. S. EVANS.

THE FOURTH PSALM.

THIS is the evening psalm of the Psalter ; and it breathes the very spirit of the evening hour, the spirit of tranquillity and trust, of charity and peace.

It was composed, as our ablest critics are agreed, on the evening of the day, or to express and commemorate the emotions of the evening of the day, at the dawn of which David sang the morning hymn which we studied last month.¹ It was prompted, therefore, by the same or nearly the same set of outward conditions which have left so many traces on Psalm iii. The great change of the day was that David and his little train had safely crossed the fords of the Jordan, and were now encamped at the eastern side of the river, on their way to the city of Mahanaim. All else remained unchanged. They were still few in number as opposed to the “many” who had set themselves against them, still weak as compared with the “ten thousands” who were preparing to pursue them ; the curses of Shimei, the treachery of Ahithophel, the treason of Absalom, were still present to David’s mind, and must have fretted it into an intolerable agony of anger and despair had he not learned to cast his burden on the Lord.

But, though this Psalm was prompted by much the same incidents, we must not expect to find in it so many traces of them as we found in Psalm iii. For that was a morning, and this is an evening hymn ; and therefore it naturally and inevitably takes a more inward and spiritual tone. In the morning, we look forward to the events—the duties, difficulties, dangers—of the coming day, consider how we shall meet them, and ask grace to meet them aright ; but, in the evening, we retire within ourselves, ask how we have met them, what effects they have wrought on our

¹ See pp. 94 *et seq.*

moral life, and seek, before we sink into unconsciousness, to become at peace with the world, ourselves, and God.

Moreover, through the hours of this day of peril and suspense, and the incessant claims which it made on his care and forethought, the conviction had been growing in David's mind that God, so far from having abandoned him, was with him and for him, that He who can save by many or by few was on his side. Strong in this conviction, he had been able to meet the fears and apprehensions of his little band with a cheerful confidence which gave them new courage, and to still the clamorous discontent of those among them who, holding an abundance of corn and wine to be the chief good of life, fretted over their scanty rations and failing stores. And now, ere he sinks to repose, he gives thanks "for all the blessings of the light," and especially for the glad conviction that God is his gracious good Master and Friend again, places himself under "the Almighty wings," forgives his worst enemies even as God has forgiven him, and so is at peace with all the world as well as with himself and with his Friend and Judge in heaven. In short, so appropriate are his themes and his treatment of them to the evening hour that there is a marked correspondence between the hymn which David sang before "sweet sleep his eyelids closed" and the evening hymn which most Englishmen learn to lisp in their infant years, although it is very evident that good bishop Ken did not make the former his model or draw his inspiration from a Hebrew fountain.

Yet the one is hardly more distinctively Christian than the other. If any of my readers should have thought—as I chance to know that some of them did think—that I gave too large, too modern and liberal, a scope to the closing ejaculation of David's morning prayer, when I made "Thy blessing on thy people," mean, "Thy blessing on *all* thy people, on those who have betrayed and cursed me

and are compassing my death, as well as on those who have been faithful among the faithless," they will now be undeceived; for they will now hear David praying for his enemies expressly and by name, although he is more sure than ever that, in setting themselves against him, they have set themselves against God; they will now hear him praying for *them* even before and even more emphatically than he prays for himself or for the loyal spirits who were encamped around him, the whole burden of his prayer being that they may be brought to a better mind. To conquer them by force or dexterous strategy is not enough for his generous and gracious heart; they must also be conquered in the noblest way, restored to *his* friendship and service by being converted into the friends and servants of righteousness.

The Psalm opens with an appeal to God. David had said in his morning hymn (Psalm iii. 4), "Whenever I cry unto the Lord, He heareth me;" and now he turns that strong inward conviction into the prayer (Psalm iv. 1), "When I cry, answer thou me;" for what are our prayers, what can they be, but the translation of our strongest religious convictions into the language of petition and desire? and how could we ask God to hear us if we did not know Him to be a hearer and answerer of prayer?

But *this* is much more than a prayer. It is also an appeal. For when David cries to God as "the God of *my* righteousness," he means not only that the righteousness he has come to him from God, and that the righteousness he longs for must come to him from God; he also means that God will maintain his righteousness and the righteousness of his cause against those who have risen up against him. It is an appeal to the Searcher of all hearts as to the sincerity of his own heart and the justice of his cause; and it is an expression of his growing conviction that, because his cause is just, God will uphold and vindicate it.

For, observe, on what he bases his confidence. Many a time he has been in a "strait place," in a "tight" place, a place too narrow and confined, and God has enlarged it, or has brought him out of it into a large place. Only on the night just past he had been in one of the straitest places he had ever passed through, when, weary and weak-handed, he had feared to be surprised by many foes and strong. Yet even this strait place had been made spacious enough for him; he had struggled through it unhurt; and now that Absalom had decided to summon all Israel to his banner "from Dan to Beersheba," weeks must elapse before the assault can be delivered against him, weeks which will at least give him time to turn round and to take the best advantage of this unexpected and auspicious delay. Just delivered from this strait place, from conditions so narrow and perilous, and with many similar deliverances lying in the background of his memory, he is confident that the God of his righteousness will deliver him once more, and vindicate the justice of his cause.

With this brief exordium, David turns his thoughts at once upon his foes. For if his righteousness is God's righteousness, then his honour is God's honour, and in slandering him the partisans of Absalom are talking, are lifting up their mouths, against God. To these partisans, and especially to the magnates, the captains and statesmen among them—for the Hebrew phrase, "O ye sons of men!" in Verse 2 denotes the leaders of the conspiracy rather than their followers—he now addresses himself. He is thinking of Absalom, Ahithophel, Shimei, and their peers, when he cries: "How long will ye turn my glory into shame?" God was his glory (Psalm iii. 3); to slander and assail him was therefore to "turn his glory into shame;" it was to deny that his cause was just and that it was the cause of God. Why, then, do they do it? Simply because they "love vanity" and therefore "seek after lies." Simply

because they take the shows of life for its realities, its empty shows and vain shadows for its sacred and abiding realities. Simply because they put their trust in numbers, wealth, popularity, instead of in the truth and righteousness of a cause ; and, having once adopted an unrighteous cause, snatch eagerly at any lying pretext which seems to justify it or any momentary and partial success which seems to indicate that it has the sanction of heaven. *They* have chosen Absalom for king ; the great bulk of the people have ratified their choice ; and hence they too readily infer that *God* has chosen him. *They* have deposed David from the throne ; the ten thousands of Israel have assented to his deposition ; and hence they too hastily conclude that *the Lord* has taken the kingdom from him and has given it to another.

God's judgment, however, as David solemnly reminds them in Verse 3, turns on quite other criteria. He chooses not the wise, or the strong, or the opulent, but the *good man*, or the godly man *for Himself*, and, sooner or later *marks* that man *out* as his choice. And, with all his faults and sins, David is conscious that he loves God and is devoted to his service. He is sure, therefore, that God *hears*, and will hear, his *cry*, and come to his help, and prove the cause of his enemies to be based on vanity and lies—to have no pith in it, no power to endure. And I suppose that not only do we admit, but that his very enemies would have admitted in their calmer moods, that David was much more like a good or godly man than Absalom his son, of whom, whatever his other virtues or charms, godliness was hardly a characteristic. They were lying, therefore, when they cast up David's sins against him. Not that he had not sinned—sinned heinously and grievously, but that it was not his sins which really weighed with them, any more than it was Absalom's freedom from sin which drew them to him. Had they wished to choose

for their king the man who loved God most and served Him best, they would have chosen David, and not Absalom. Again, therefore, it is against *God*, and against his anointed, that they conspire and fight, let them pretend as they will that it is God who has taken the kingdom from David and given it to his son.

But to fight against God and his anointed is of all enterprises the most futile and perilous. Hence David bids them (Verses 4 and 5) *tremble* at the certain and horrible defeat which awaits all who oppose themselves to the Divine will. He beseeches them that they *sin not*, that they cease from their sin: he beseeches them to *commune with their own heart on their bed*, *i.e.*, to meditate in the night-watches on the true nature of the enterprise they have so lightly and wantonly taken in hand; to *be still*, *i.e.*, to silence the voices of passion, revenge, and ambition, that the cause they have adopted may reveal itself to them in its true and native colours: and he assumes that if they do thus quietly and sincerely consider their ways, they will see the choice they have made to be a wrong choice, will renounce their sin, as he prays them to do; and that they will *offer the due sacrifices* for their sin, and return to their *trust in the Lord*. It is impossible to read these verses without perceiving how strong the conviction had grown to be with David that his cause was just and would be maintained by the God of justice; or without feeling how noble and generous was the spirit which no mere conquest could satisfy, which could be satisfied with nothing short of the conversion of his enemies into the friends and ministers of God.

In Verses 6 and 7 David's thoughts come back from his distant enemies to the friendly circle immediately around him, and we learn that in his own camp there prevailed a spirit too similar to that which ruled in the camp of his enemies; for here too were many who put their trust in

the outward and temporal elements of life rather than in the inward and spiritual. His camp, as was inevitable, was ill supplied. Even Ziba's two hundred loaves of bread and his bunches of raisins and of summer fruits for the young men to eat, and his skin of wine for such as were faint in the wilderness, were an unexpected and most welcome boon.¹ But what were these among so many? The relief, the pleasure with which the gifts of the pastoral chieftains of the wilderness were received when David reached Mahanaim—a pleasure which still lingers round the emphatic catalogue of the wheat and barley flour, the parched pulse and beans and lentiles, the honey and butter and sheep and cheese they brought with them,² shews how much David and his followers had suffered on their way thither, how hungry and thirsty and weary they were as they passed through the intervening strip of desert. And this lack of corn and wine would be sure to breed fear and apprehension, doubts of the success, if not of the righteousness, of the cause in which they were engaged. “The heavens themselves do frown on us,” would be the thought of many hearts. We need not wonder to hear, therefore, that among the followers of David there were those who scanned the horizon with anxious eyes, looking for a succour that did not arrive, and asking almost hopelessly, *Who will shew us any good?* meaning, Where are we to look for corn and wine? What chance have we, who lack the very necessities of life, of making a brave stand in our own defence? and how can we hope to overcome the ten thousands arrayed against us?

To these distressed and discontented spirits—always a commander's chief burden and anxiety—David sets himself to teach the lesson which he himself has learned, and which fills him with courage and hope. The conviction has been growing upon him all day that God is with them

¹ 2 Samuel xvi. 1-4.

² *Ibid.* xvii. 27-29.

and for them, and in the light of God's favour he finds a *gladness* which renders him indifferent, superior, to the trials of the passing hour, a joy beyond the joy of harvest. Thus, indeed, he proves himself to be the good man whom God has marked out for his own; and he would fain instil this sustaining preference of inward over outward, of spiritual over temporal, good into the hearts of his dejected followers. Let them lift up their eyes from the low horizon which they have "haunted with the inquest of their beseeching looks," to the lofty hills from whence their help will really come; let them turn from man to God, and they too will get a deeper gladness into their hearts than any abundance of corn and wine could give.

In the last Verse the evening hymn itself sinks to rest. "The iambs with which it closes," says Delitzsch, "are like the last strain of a lullaby, and die away softly as if themselves falling asleep." And, even should these Hebrew iambs be Hebrew to us, we can all feel the tranquil composure with which David here commits himself to the care of One who never slumbers nor sleeps. His thoughts, which at first flew away to his distant enemies, and then came back to his own camp, now close their wings within his own tent. Last night, to his infinite surprise (Psalm iii. 5), he had lain down in peace and slept undisturbed. And, now, he argues from the past to the present, and is sure that his head will no sooner touch his pillow than he shall *forthwith fall asleep*. The God of whose support and favour he is convinced, and who alone can *make him to dwell in safety*, will be with him and guard him through the watches of the night: why then should he fret himself with care or be perturbed by fear?

As we study this Psalm we cannot but admire the "soft invincibility" of David's spirit, the tranquil courage with which, confronted by malice, hatred, revenge, and sur-

rounded by discontent and apprehension, he commits himself and his cause to the Divine Protection, and calmly falls asleep. We cannot but wish that, amid our trials and perils, our cares and fears, we could shew a spirit and a courage like his. Yet the secret of this calm and sustaining temper of the soul is patent enough. That secret is told in two words,—kindness and unworldliness; the charity which enables us to love even those who hate us, and that detachment from the world which enables us to rise above its low ideals and aims. What is most peculiar and noteworthy in the Psalm is that David cherishes no revenge against his enemies, cruel and implacable as they were; and that he does not resent the clamorous discontent of his friends, much as they distress him by demands he cannot satisfy. Could his voice reach the leaders of the revolt as they were about to lie down on their beds that night, they would hear nothing harsher from him than a prayer that they would give themselves to self-scrutiny and self-inspection, and so be led to repent of their sin and renounce it. If his pining and fainthearted followers could but overhear him, they would receive no other rebuke of their discontent than the prayer that, with him, they may learn to find “the chief good and market of their time,” not in an abundance of corn and wine, but in the favour of God, which is life, and in his loving-kindness which is better than life. And when our chief care is to bring those who have wronged us to a better mind, and to teach those who love us a more excellent way than as yet they know, we too shall have risen into that pure and undefiled service of God which alone can bring a steadfast and growing peace into our hearts.

The great lesson of the Psalm is, therefore, a lesson in the right ordering of our affections and aims. The enemies of David and the friends of David fell into a common mistake; they found their chief good in the visible and temporal elements of human life, rather than in its spiritual

and invisible elements; in abundance, in enjoyment, in worldly power and success; and hence they were agitated and perturbed by every shock of change and loss: while David himself made God—that is to say, David made truth, righteousness, charity—his chief aim and good; and hence he can lie down and sleep in peace when change and loss have wrought their worst upon him. A surer hold on God, a more confident persuasion of his favour, the conviction that by the very punishment of his sins he is being made a better man and drawn into a closer fellowship with Him,—only this can make him truly and deeply glad; while all they want for gladness is plenty of corn and plenty of wine.

Now it is between these two aims and ideals that we all have to choose; and on our choice our peace depends. When we ask “Who will shew us any good?” is it a bettered character, or is it only bettered conditions, easier and more affluent circumstances, for which we long? is it “corn and wine,” or is it “the light of God’s countenance”? Reason itself teaches us that we cannot be at rest while we, who are to endure for ever, possess and seek only the good things which will comfort us for but a few brief years, which may make to themselves wings and use their wings even before we die, and for which we may have lost all relish long before they leave us. The very constitution of our nature, its very capacity of aiming at and enjoying that which is eternal, forbids us to be at peace until we have set our hearts on a good as lasting as ourselves, a good of which no shock of change can deprive us, a good which will continue to unfold new satisfactions and new charms as our powers are enlarged and refined and our life rises through stage after stage of its unending progress. No increase of corn and wine, no abundance of those happy accidents of fortune of which corn and wine are types, can possibly satisfy an immortal spirit. Nothing can satisfy

it short of a continual growth in wisdom, righteousness, and love under the genial and fruitful light of God's uplifted countenance.

This is the clear dictate of Reason as it is also the great lesson of our Psalm. And, in this Psalm, it comes to us with all and more than all the force of a logical demonstration. For it is not in the hour of his prosperity, but in an hour of the utmost adversity, that David thanks God for a gladness with which no abundance of corn and wine could have inspired him, and a peace not to be shaken by any sense of loss or any fear of peril. Had he urged this lesson upon us when he was a happy father strong in the love of brave and stalwart sons, or a happy king strong in the loyalty of devoted subjects and splendid in the lustre of victorious arms, we might have put it from us with some show of reason; we might have said, "It is all very well for *him*, possessed of all that makes life rich and honourable, to say that he has a gladness and a peace wholly independent of these happy outward conditions, and far deeper than any they could inspire: let him be put to the proof, let him lose the blessings of which he speaks so lightly, and then we shall see what his peace and gladness are worth." We cannot say that, and so, with some show of reason, put away his lesson from us. For when he utters it, he has lost all that he had. He is dethroned, dishonoured, impoverished; a man whose adversity is embittered by years of previous luxury; a father whose very life is sought by his son; a king whose glory has been turned to shame; a fugitive whose existence is in peril, and whose cause is upheld only by a few well-nigh hopeless followers. It is from the very depths of loss and shame that we hear David's tuneful voice assuring us that the joy of the Lord is our true strength, that to be at peace with Him is better than to have full barns and presses running over with new wine, better than royal authority and power, better even than

the love of children and the loyalty of subjects ; better, in short, than any or all the happy accidents of joyful fortune. Can we refuse to listen to *him* ? Can we doubt that the grace which sustained him will also sustain us ? Must we not admit that he had found the true and chief good of human life ? Shall we not join in his prayer : " Lift up the light of thy countenance upon us, O Lord, and so give us a peace and a gladness which the world, and the changes of time, and the accidents of fortune, can neither give nor take away."

There is still another point of view from which this Psalm gains force and pathos. It is, as we have seen, an evening hymn, a hymn which David sang and intended others to sing, as the hours of rest drew nigh. And every reflective man must have felt that there is something strangely calm and impressive in these evening hours, and that, as he has communed with his own heart upon his bed and been still, all things are apt to wear a new aspect and take other proportions. As the fever of the day cools out of nerve and brain, and we sink toward the repose which so closely resembles that of death, we are often conscious that the pursuits and aims of life assume a different and more solemn aspect. Just as the moon sheds over the landscape a light more calm and spiritual than that of day, so our thoughts in the watches of the night are more spiritual, more serious, more sensitive to the touch and impact of conscience, than those which occupied our waking thoughts ; and hence many of the objects which we then eagerly pursued and found full of charm lose much of their lustre and value ; while aspirations, desires, fears, which were then dormant, kindle into a strange, and often an unwelcome activity. In sleep we seem to stand as near to death as life ; and the solemn shadows of death project themselves across the aims and pursuits of life ; and, ah, how mean and trivial, how sordid and

evanescent and worthless, many of them now seem to be! Unless they have some touch of immortality in them, how vain and empty, how flat and unprofitable seem all the uses of this world! Unless we have cherished thoughts and pursued aims which extend beyond this present life, what is our life worth to us? Unless we have served God and our neighbour in the toils and duties of the day, and enjoyed Him in its gratifications and pleasures; unless all changes of outward condition have helped to build up in us a character which He can approve, what are we the better for all our labours and gains? Can we be content, is peace possible to us, so long as we feel that, should the slumber of repose pass into the deeper slumber of the grave, we should leave all we have behind us, and enter into a world into which we can carry none of the aims we have hitherto pursued, none of the treasures we have amassed? At such moments of reflection as these, what are "corn and wine" worth as compared with the love and favour of that God who rules in all worlds, and those priceless inward possessions which time cannot corrupt nor death filch from us?

S. Cox.

STUDIES IN THE MINOR PROPHETS.

II. JOEL.

JOEL may be ranked as the second, in order of time, of that higher school of Jewish prophets whose special mission it was to reveal the nature of the kingdom of God. The school had its beginning in Jonah, in whom we see the struggle between the old and the new, and whose prophecy is almost forced from his lips against his will. In Joel the sense of struggle has subsided, and the new regime has become regnant. The wavering prophet of Galilee, who had been so loth to proclaim the advent of the higher spiritual kingdom, is succeeded by a man who lives and moves and has his being in that realm, and who may be called distinctively the prophet of the Divine Spirit. The step from Jonah to Joel is indeed a stride.

Of the man Joel himself we know absolutely nothing. Probably at no time was there very much to know. The outward lives of gifted souls are not commonly eventful lives; their history lies beneath the surface, and consists of experiences which are foreign to the ordinary annalist. We know *what* Joel was, but we can scarcely tell *who* he was; we have a vivid impression of his personality, but we have no mould of his figure. The very age in which he lived is uncertain; it is unmarked by dates, unindicated by contemporary references. It is chiefly, indeed, from the absence of these references that we are able, conjecturally, to assign him an epoch. It is natural to conclude that, had Joel lived in the latter days of Isaiah, his writings would have given evidence of the imminence of the Assyrian domination such as the writings of Isaiah give. The fact that in his prophecy there is no such indication seems to warrant the inference that he belonged to an earlier day. He is not afraid to dwell on horrors; he rises to his highest

power in depicting the miseries of his nation ; yet, in the catalogue of these miseries, he does not place the Assyrian invasion. It is probable, therefore, that Assyria had not yet revealed herself in her threatening aspect towards Judea, probable also that the national sufferings depicted by Joel were the sufferings of an age of peace and prosperity. Such a period of peace and prosperity will be found in that epoch which immediately followed the days of Jonah. The long reign of Uzziah was a lull between two storms, a deceitful calm intervening between the disintegration of the Jewish empire in the past and her approaching captivities in the future. We know, from other sources, that it was an age of corruption and decay ; but the corruption and the decay were not on the surface, and therefore were not seen. Nothing was seen but glitter and glory. The empire had extended its conquests far and wide, and its enemies had bowed before it. The Nineveh which Jonah had denounced, and which in the past age had threatened to rival the Jewish commonwealth, if not to conquer it, seemed to have sunk again into obscurity. The prospect was unclouded ; foreign aggression was repelled ; foreign competition was distanced ; and Judea lifted up her head amongst the nations as the kingdom favoured of Heaven.

Yet it was just at this period and no other that the voice of prophecy assumed its most pessimistic tone. Joel lived in an age of prosperity, but his utterances are gloomy and foreboding ; there is not a note of joy in all his musings on his day and generation. It is only when he turns his eyes to other days and generations that we catch some tones of gladness. He has no sympathy with the present ; his life is divided between the future and the past. Everything in the passing hour pains him ; he finds refuge partly in the hope of a brighter dawn, and partly in the memory of a glorious sun which has set. It is not often

that in a single mind these progressive and conservative tendencies are so blended. There are poets who dwell in the future, and there are poets who have their Utopia in the past : but the one poetic impulse is apt to exclude the other. In Joel the two are one. We are not surprised to find him dwelling with delight on the advent of a coming age of glory ; in *that* he was the mouthpiece of his nation, whose eye was ever straining into the future. But, in addition to this truly Jewish tendency, Joel displays another, and in some sense an opposite one ; he not only looks forward, but he looks back. Rarely does Judaism manifest the desire to regain the garden of Eden by retracing her steps ; her goal, for the most part, is the future kingdom of God. But, in Joel, we find a strange exception to the rule. It is not difficult to read between the lines in the words, "The land is as the garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness" ; they shew clearly that his thoughts were resting upon the contrast which the life of his own day presented to the pristine life of humanity. The very recognition of the fact that beyond Eden all was desert (Joel ii. 3), reveals the tendency of a mind impelled on one side at least by conservative influences. Nay, in the 25th Verse of the same Chapter, we see that even his hope for the future had in it a conservative element : "I will restore to you the years that the locust hath eaten." The words are the utterances of a man who, even in his strainings into futurity, cannot consent to let the past go. He longs for a better day, but not for such a day as the world has never seen. He looks for a bright future, but not for a future which shall be wholly revolutionary. He craves a restoration of the paradise lost ; he seeks a heavenly country in which the fruits and flowers of the garden of Eden shall revive. He cries to the future to give him back the past, to restore the years, to revivify the freshness of early days, to let

him feel once again the experience of joy in pursuits and pleasures which have long lost their charm.

All this, as we have said, indicates a pessimistic view of the present; and it is worth while to ask what was the ground of this pessimism. The cause of Joel's despair is indicated under the figure of a plague of locusts, producing and accompanied by famine and drought. The locusts are described under the image of a hostile army; but there is so little indication of any national idiosyncrasy that we can hardly view the image as pointing to any outward foe. It rather seems to us that the locusts are figurative of two inward experiences—gnawing care, and unsatisfied desire. We are confirmed in this persuasion by the language of a prophet nearly contemporaneous with Joel. In Amos viii. 11, we read: "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land; not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, *but of hearing the words of the Lord.*" It is evident from this utterance that the Judea of the days of Joel was beginning to discover that there were other calamities in the world than those of fire and sword; that the human mind and heart might themselves be the seat of invisible battles, and that the direst of all famines might be felt in a land and in an age in which the corn and wine of outward luxury abounded. Indeed, there are not wanting in this prophecy of Joel traces that the work of the locusts was intended by him to represent the gnawing care of prosperity and the unsatisfied desire left by a life of luxury. So far from being eager, like his successor Isaiah, to be delivered from the invasion of outward foes, he is anxious above all things to be freed from the locusts of peace—the corruptions of luxurious ease. Isaiah pointed with gladness to the time when men should beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; Joel in express terms longed for the day when they should beat their ploughshares

into swords and their pruning-hooks into spears. They had a different goal of national glory, because they were living amidst opposite circumstances. Isaiah lived in a time when political clouds were beginning to gather over the Jewish horizon, when Assyria was becoming oppressive and Babylon assumed a threatening aspect; he foresaw for his country an unsuccessful military struggle, culminating in her captivity and dismemberment; and he naturally thirsted above all things for the peaceful life of the agriculturalist and the affluence of unimpeded industry. But in the days of Joel the political clouds had not yet appeared; the sky was clear, the promise unclouded. Assyria had not yet become formidable, nor had Babylon lifted its head above the nations. The soil of Judea was yielding its rich produce, and there was no foreign foe to divide the spoil. Men tasted of the vineyards and were glad, so glad that they forgot the Giver in the gift. They became corrupted by the abundance of the things they possessed. They grew effeminate, luxurious, debauched. They lost the masculine vigour of the national character; they parted with the energy which had made them great. In the days of old they had been impressed with their individual helplessness, and had leaned upon the arm of Jehovah; this had been the secret of their strength; their power had grown out of the fact that they had felt themselves to be Divine instruments. But now all was changed. Men had grown rich and self-conscious. The presence of Jehovah had ceased to be recognized as a necessity; they felt they could do without it. They could dispense with the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night, for they had now learned their own importance. They were no longer a nation of children, fighting at tremendous odds with Amalekites and Philistines. They had become themselves Philistines. They had studied how to use the means and appliances of existence, and

had mastered the art of turning all circumstances to their advantage. They could cultivate their own lands, sail in their own ships, make their own merchandise, frame their own laws. Accordingly, they had become self-dependent and self-reliant, and with their self-reliance there had come a loss of individual and national aspiration. They reposed under their vine and fig tree, and forgot their responsibility and their destiny. They were Epicureans before the days of Epicurus. They sated themselves with luxury until their very satisfaction lost its charm. They became a prey to that heaviest of all cares—the sense of having nothing to care for; they became victims of that most parching of all thirsts—the desire of having something left to desire. The locusts which devoured their substance were the offspring of their own abundance.

This, then, was the world upon which Joel looked—a world perishing in its own abundance, dying of luxurious peace. Hence Joel had a message for that world which was just the opposite of the subsequent message of Isaiah. He felt that, in the circumstances of his age, the only cure for his countrymen was war. He saw that peace was killing them, that luxury was destroying them, that plenty was starving them; and he cried out in accents of genuine alarm, “Beat your ploughshares into swords and your pruning-hooks into spears.” He perceived that what they wanted was action. Repose had been their bane, they needed to be roused from the lethargy of false content, from the misery of having nothing left to work for, to hope for, to pray for. And so Joel’s call to his countrymen was a call to action, to the sword and the spear. He felt that their true strength would only be found in conflict with the opposing forces of life. His cry to his own century was the cry of Thomas Carlyle to ours—“work.” He preached the gospel of force, and he desired for every man the necessity of exerting force. He told them that

a life of ease was inimical to their education, inimical even to their true rest; and his best wish for them was the advent of such circumstances as would break their long repose and reveal the front of battle.

And yet we must look deeper, for this does not exhaust the Gospel of Joel, nor does it constitute his essential mission. His essential mission was to proclaim the advent of the Spirit. Let us observe very carefully the connexion between Joel's view of the national misery and his mode of seeking for the national cure. He finds his countrymen oppressed with the cares of prosperity, victims to the gnawing anxiety which ever follows an exaggerated self-consciousness, and victims to that undefined thirst which our modern life calls ennui. It is quite clear to Joel that the calamity is an inward one; the gnawing care and the unsatisfied thirst have not their source in anything external. They are not caused by outward scarcity, by physical privation, by straitened circumstances; they exist in spite of outward abundance and in defiance of physical prosperity. As, therefore, they do not come from without, Joel feels that they cannot be removed from without; they have their source within the mind, and they must therefore have their remedy within the mind. Men whose hearts are burdened by care in the very midst of their prosperity must conclude that the care lies *in* their hearts, and must look for the cure in the renovation of their hearts. Accordingly it is highly significant that the hope which Joel sees for the nation is a spiritual hope, a renewal of the mind itself. He calls his countrymen to the sword and the spear, but he knows well that neither the sword nor the spear, nor any outward change of circumstances, will suffice to give them peace without the Spirit. He knows that the thing which makes them weary is not the world outside, but the unrest of their own souls; and he sees that their only hope of deliverance is in the impartation of a new life which

shall make them inwardly strong. His prophecy of comfort, therefore, is not one of changed circumstances, of valleys exalted and mountains brought low; it is the prophecy of a spiritual revelation. "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophecy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions: and also upon the servants and upon the handmaids in those days will I pour out my Spirit."¹

We all feel that the prophetic voice is true to experience. We are made conscious every day and hour that what we want most of all is vision. We need not so much "a changed cross" as a changed view of it, and we can only get that by fresh light. The prayer of the psalmist, "O send out thy light and thy truth," is no less wise than devout. He uttered it when he was passing through a season of calamity, when he went mourning because of the oppression of the enemy. Yet he did not ask for changed conditions, did not even pray that his enemy might be destroyed; he simply asked for light. He realized the experience of the prophet Joel that what man really wants in calamity is the advent of a new spirit, bearing into his bosom a sense of strength and repose. He felt, as the Prophet felt, that the true help must come from within; and, therefore, his prayer was for a vision of the Divine Countenance: "Send out thy light and thy truth; let them lead me."

But let us now look more closely at Joel's prophecy of the Spirit. The first thing which strikes us in it is its almost Pauline universality. Every word of the message breathes liberality. The Spirit is to be *poured* out; the metaphor suggests the plenteousness with which the rains of heaven are showered upon the thirsty earth. It is to be

¹ Joel ii. 28, 29.

poured out upon *all flesh* ; not simply on the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, but upon the life of universal humanity. It is to be poured out in a variety of forms in proportion as it is to touch a variety of souls ; it is to come to the old men in dreams, to the young men in visions, to the servants and the handmaidens in the power of prophecy. And when we turn to the third chapter of Joel we see how strongly the prophetic spirit of his day had become pervaded with this breadth of sympathy. In the book of Jonah we find that a message of pardon is sent to heathen Nineveh, but it is only sent as the supplement to a stern command. The voice of Jehovah to Nineveh had been the voice of an autocratic Ruler, demanding immediate submission ; and it had only become the voice of pardon when that demand had been met. But, in the third chapter of Joel, we are struck by a development in the prophecy of Divine favour to the heathen. Jehovah there speaks to the Gentile nations, no longer as an Autocrat but almost as a Father. He who had sent Jonah to proclaim, " Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown," now actually condescends to plead with the gathered nations in the Valley of Decision. The transition from commanding to pleading is a transition towards the spirit of Pauline universality. It is the germ of the true kingdom of God, which was to be rooted and grounded in the love of universal man. We catch dimly and through a mist it may be, yet in colours that cannot be mistaken, the approaching rays of that Gospel sun which already, behind the clouds of human error, was unconsciously lighting every man. It was shining as yet in darkness, but the darkness ever more and more was coming to comprehend it. The Divine message which, on the lips of Jonah, had been only the proclamation of pardon to a humbled heathen city, assumed, in the prophecy of Joel, the voice of a tender Father reassuring and pleading with his children in the valley of their own humiliation, and

exchanging the command to obey for the prayer to be reconciled.

But in this prophecy of Joel there is a second very important element premonitory of a new dispensation. Jehovah goes down to meet the nations in the *valley* (Joel iii. 2). The idea is manifestly that of Divine condescension; it marks the advent of a time when God was to bend to the necessities of his people, and when the leading principle of the theocratic kingdom was to be the establishment of empire on a basis of ministration. Now it is in strict consistency with this coming of God into the valley that the revelation of the Spirit in Joel ii. 28 is made through the humblest social instruments. No one can read that prophecy and fail to be struck with the fact, that Joel labours to exalt those whose position would naturally be considered subordinate. The Spirit is to be poured out upon all flesh; but its largest measure is to be given to the weak things of the world. The members of the human family who are to be selected for its highest manifestation are not the heads of the household, but the sons and the daughters. The dreams which, commonly and naturally, are assigned to the ardour of youth, are to be vouchsafed to the old; the visions—those ordered intellectual fabrics in which men express an insight into the true realities of human life and its chief end—which are most frequently possessed by the mature experience of age, are to be given to the young. The spirit of prophecy itself is to be vested, not so much in the kings and priests of the world as in its bondsmen and handmaidens. The whole picture suggests the exaltation of the valleys, the lifting up of things that are lowly, the glorifying of the broken and contrite heart.

We must remember that this picture belongs to the palmiest days of the Jewish empire, to the days when the land of Palestine was basking in its brightest outward sunshine. It is at such times that a nation is most apt

to learn the insufficiency of self-preservation to constitute a basis of happiness. It is when men have been allowed without stint or measure to drink of the cup of prosperity that they awaken to the knowledge of its inadequacy. As long as it is above their reach, it is believed to be the main ingredient of happiness; the moment it is brought down and tasted, it is found to be unsatisfying. That the age of Uzziah should be the first to awaken to the aspiration after a ministrant life, the first which sought to equalize in some measure the different ranks of society, is not wholly inconsistent with the laws of human nature. The most powerful of all influences for the production of human brotherhood is the conviction that a man's life "consisteth not in the abundance of the things he possesseth." To reach that conviction, we must first have the abundance; for it is personal experience alone which can prove it to be true. The age of Uzziah had enabled the Jewish nation to realize the fulness of possession. Not equal to the age of Solomon in political splendour, it surpassed it in personal luxury. Men had grown rich by commercial enterprise, and they had spent their riches on themselves. In spending their riches on themselves they had found, to their astonishment, that their life did not lie there. We do not say that such a discovery was a revelation to the Jewish people of where their life *did* lie. Dissatisfaction is at best but a negative experience, and men who find themselves unfilled by selfish pleasures are not thereby of necessity impelled to seek for unselfish joys. Yet the dissatisfaction with self, negative though it be, is the first step to the creation of a new and a higher consciousness. The second step may not at once be taken by a collective nation, but it will assuredly be taken by individual souls in that nation. Every age has men who overleap it and transcend it, and who, in the very act of transcending it, are the prophets of its future self. The reign of Uzziah was such an age, and

Joel such a man. His experience was partly in sympathy with the present, and partly in anticipation of the future. He felt in his own person the national dissatisfaction with the pleasures of selfishness, and to that extent he was the man of his time; but he felt also the cure for the dissatisfaction, and so became the man of the coming time. If the disease was self-exaltation, the cure must be found in self-abasement. A new ideal of human life must be sought and pursued. The servants and the handmaidens must become exalted in the thoughts of humanity. Ministration, service, work for others, the voluntary subjection of the individual will to goodness, must become man's path of life, if his life was to be a path of happiness; and as such new gifts demanded a new spirit, their advent must be preceded by the outflow of a fresh flood of spiritual influence. Such is Joel's prophecy of the Spirit's advent, and such are the human wants which in his view its advent is required to remedy. Let us mark the development which the doctrine of the Spirit's influence has undergone between the days of Joel and the days of Genesis. In the book of Genesis there is recognized a relation between the Spirit of God and man's spirit, but it is a relation of strife: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." There is felt to be a want of harmony between the movements of the Divine Life and the movements of the human soul, a middle wall of partition which prevents the healing waters from mingling with the earthly fountain. But, in the prophecy of Joel, humanity seems to have taken a bound. We no longer read of the Spirit's striving, but of the Spirit's outpouring. The middle wall of partition is broken down, and the waters which are under the heavens have ceased to be divided from the waters that are above them. The spirit of man has begun to look upon the Spirit of God not as an antagonistic element, but as the complement of his own nature and the fulfilment of his own ideal. The Divine

Life is seen to be the help of *his* life, the source of his revelations and the secret of his prophetic insight. We do not say that, even yet, the union between man's spirit and God's Spirit has been fully recognized. Even Joel has not got beyond the outpouring upon the flesh, or external nature of man; and there is something higher than that. The power of prophecy, the gift of divination, the experience of visions and of dreams, are indeed marks of the Divine favour; but they do not reach the innermost life of man. The innermost life of man is the heart, and the crowning work of the Spirit is the regeneration of the heart; the divine nature in the human soul only reaches its full development when it manifests itself in moral purity. But if the intellectual life of the Spirit is not its full development, it is assuredly a stage of that development. The intellect is the road to the heart, and lofty thought the prelude to noble action. In predicting the advent of a spiritual vision, of spiritual dreams and of spiritual prophecies, Joel beheld the outer court of the tabernacle which was to lead into the holy of holies. He saw the approach of a new ideal of humanity, which itself implied a higher thought of God. He perceived voluntarily what Jonah had been forced to see, that prophecy was about to enter on a new stage of its existence, in which the gift of the soothsayer would be exchanged for the power to trace the spiritual laws of the universe; and if in that vision he did not yet behold the ultimate heights of the life divine, he beheld at least the slopes of that mountain whose inevitable culmination was the kingdom of God.

GEO. MATHESON.

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF ST. PETER.

III. WAS THE AUTHOR ST. PETER?

HAVING attempted to prove that the Author of the Second Epistle of St. Peter had read and used the works of Philo and Josephus, the Epistle of St. Jude and the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians—and we have his own avowal that he had read “all epistles” (iii. 16) known by him to have proceeded from St. Paul—we proceed to examine his style when he writes in his own person.

Its most noticeable feature is tautology; by which, however, we do not mean the mere repetition of the same word or phrase to express the same thing. Euclid is not tautological, although he repeats “straight lines,” “angles,” and “triangles,” a dozen times in a page; but a writer who should twice on the same page describe the dead as “swept into the interminable azure of the past,” would be decidedly tautological. For a thought of this impassioned kind ought not to occur twice to a speaker or writer in precisely the same way, unless he is extremely insusceptible of those slight variations of emotion which furnish a natural variety to passionate speech. To repeat a phrase like “the interminable azure of the past” would be in as bad taste as to repeat an epigram or witticism. Tautology, in this sense, is a common fault in barren writers, and still more in barren speakers, of their native tongue, who feel obliged to go on writing or speaking though they have nothing more to say, and who consequently fall back upon the repetition of what they have already said; but it is also characteristic of a “fine writer,” composing in a language not his own, who, owing to the paucity of his vocabulary, is glad to make the most of the handsome phrases which he has accumulated, and having found a new bright patch must needs insert it twice or thrice

before he can bring himself to let it go. Of this "true tautology" few better specimens will be found than the following product from the pen of a native of India, assaying the "fine style" in English composition. The passage will be found in a number of the *Madras Mail*, dated shortly after Lord Hobart's death, and it is entitled "A native estimate of Lord Hobart." :—

"The not uncommon (*a*, 1) *hand of death* has distilled with febrile wings from amongst a *débris* of bereaved relatives, friends, and submissive subjects into (*b*, 1) *the interminable azure of the past*, an unexceptionably finished politician and philanthropist of the highest specific gravity, who, only a few days ago, represented our Most Gracious Majesty the Queen in this Presidency.

"The (*a*, 2) *hand of destiny* has willed that he should be carried into the infinite (*b*, 2) *azure of the past*, when the (*c*, 1) *incipient buds* and (*d*, 1) *symptoms* of his fostered love and hope for the (*e*, 1) *Oriental* element were observed to be gradually blossoming. The (*e*, 2) *Oriental mind* was just in the (*c*, 2) *incipient* stage of appreciating his noble mental and moral qualities, and consequently can only confine itself to a prediction of what his indefatigable zeal would have achieved for it, had he remained within the category of the 'survival of the fittest.'

"Under the auspices of his (*f*, 1) *limited reign*, the (*e*, 3) *Oriental mind* has been relieved of the traditional incubi, to wit, the entire concentration and bestowal of favour upon the favoured race in the struggle for life. The picture of his elaborate peroration at the Presidency College prior to his (*g*, 1) *demise*, shewed the due development of his undeniable partiality, and his broad and liberal views regarding the education of the subordinate races. The (*h*, 1) *native mind* is perfectly satisfied that had he lived, he would have reduced these theoretical sentiments to practice; but, as ill luck would have it, we will have to look to his future successor for the due execution of the same.

"It is futile for the (*h*, 2) *native mind* to ventilate anything relative to Lord Hobart's refined culture and unobtrusive character, as a versatile *littérateur* in public, and his amiable and self-denying philanthropy in private life, which will leave their (*i*, 1) *indelible* traces behind. Suffice to say that his (*f*, 2) *limited reign* and spasmodic (*g*, 2) *demise* has completely clouded the promising sun-

shine of (*e*, 4) *Oriental* bliss. His sudden loss is sincerely bemoaned by the native community in general, and the Mahommedans in particular, who can humbly offer the exclusive consolation to his bereaved lady by asserting that the (*d*, 2) *symptoms* of (*e*, 5) *Oriental* love he kept in the back-ground and incidentally ejaculated in their favour, will for ever leave an (*i*, 2) *indelible* mark of respect for his loved name, and which will remain a home word, saturating the dwellings of the (*h*, 3) *native* community, from the lowest hearth to the highly organized home!

In order to appreciate the resemblance between this Indian-English and the style of the Second Epistle, we must bear in mind that some of the words employed by the Author of the latter, are very rare in Greek literature; and others, though good classical Greek in themselves, are rare or non-existent in the New Testament. Although, therefore, these words are capable of being rendered into very simple English, yet their use, and still more their repetition, in this epistle would induce a Greek reader to form about it the same judgment that we naturally form about the "Native Estimate"; there is no style, no naturalness in either, nothing but a barbarous medley of words. For example, in the following extract, the word *δελεάζειν* to 'set baits to catch, is only once elsewhere used in the New Testament, the phrase *μίσθον ἀδικίας*, wages of iniquity is also but once used, namely, in the Acts (i. 18), in a speech of St. Peter, whence it has been probably borrowed by our Author; moreover the words *ἀστήρικτοι*, unconfirmed; *ἑξακολουθεῖν*, follow after; *ἡττᾶσθαι*, to be defeated; *φθέγγομαι*, I utter a sound; *ἐλεγξις*, a refutation; *ἀποφεύγειν*, to flee away from; and *παρανομία*, law-breaking, are not used at all in the New Testament; and the word *παραφρονία* (of which Wahl produces no other instance in Greek literature) is probably bad Greek for *παραφροσύνη*, as bad as the Indian-English quoted below, "sickishness" for "sickness." Keeping these considerations in

mind we shall perceive in the following extract from the Epistle (2 Peter ii. 14-20), the same artificial repetition of fine words which met us in the "Native Estimate," although the difficulty of representing the grandiloquence and verbosity of the Greek in an English translation somewhat diminishes the effect of the iteration:—

"(a, 1) *Setting baits to catch souls* (b, 1) *unconfirmed*" (rep. iii. 16). "having a heart practised of" (a rare and pedantic use of the gen.), "greediness, and children of curse, having left the straight way, they went astray *having followed after*" (used twice above, i. 16, ii. 2, not in New Testament) "the way of Balaam the son of Bosor who loved *the wages of iniquity*" (rep. from ii. 13) "but had the *refutation* of his own¹ *law-breaking*; a dumb beast of burden with the voice of a man (c, 1) *uttering a sound*, hindered the *maddishness* of the prophet. . . . For (c, 2) *uttering sounds* of swelling things² of vanity, in the lusts of the flesh by wanton acts they (a, 2) *set baits to catch* those who are in the least³ (d, 1) *fleeing away from* those who are spending their life in error; promising them freedom, being themselves slaves of corruption—for one is enslaved by that by which one is defeated. For if (d, 2) *having fled away from* the pollutions of the world by the *recognition*" (rep. above i. 2, 3, 8, but the word is common in St. Paul's Epistles) "of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, but afterwards having been entangled in these things they are (e, 2) *defeated*, their last state is worse than the first."

The whole Epistle abounds with iteration of this kind, mostly repeating words unknown or rare in the New Testament, such as *δωροῦμαι*, *θεῖος*, *ταχινός*, etc.; but one more specimen must suffice (iii. 10-12):—

¹ The word *ἴδιος*, *private*, ought not to be used where there is no antithesis between what is one's own and another's; but the author is so fond of the abuse of this word that even in quoting Proverbs xxvi. 11 he substitutes *ἰδίαν* for the LXX. *ἑαυτοῦ* (ii. 22; comp. iii. 3, 16, 17).

² The use of *ὑπέρογκα*, without the article, yet followed by a genitive, is bad Greek; and the bad English is intended to point to that defect.

³ The word *ὀλίγως* is rare, and mostly used in the phrase *οὐκ ὀλίγως*, *in no slight degree*, like our "not in the least." It probably means here "to some small extent."

"But the day of the Lord shall come as a thief wherein the heavens *with a whirr*¹ shall pass away and (a, 1) *elements*² (b, 1) *in fever heat* (c, 1) *shall be dissolved*, and earth and things wrought thereon shall be burned up. These things being thus (c, 2) *to be dissolved*, what manner of men should we be in holy *livings*³ and *pieties*,³ *having expectation of*" (rep. twice iii. 13, 14) "*and accelerating*³ the presence of the *day of God*" (not elsewhere in New Testament), "*whereby heavens*² *being inflamed* (c, 3) *shall be dissolved* and (a, 3) *elements*² (b, 2) *in fever heat* are to be melted."

In this last passage the Greek is bad ; but the thought is obviously more to blame than the Greek. A writer of any simplicity and force, after describing the "day of the Lord," and the impending destruction of the elements, would naturally pass to his conclusion : "These things being thus to be dissolved, what manner of men ought we to be expecting and accelerating that Day?" But the Author cannot resist the temptation of repeating, almost verbatim, his description of the Day, the "dissolution" of the heavens, and the "fever heat" of the elements. This is a perfect specimen of that inane repetition into which a shallow writer sometimes falls when he feels that he has not said what he should have said, and writes on without knowing what more he wants to say.

We pass next to another peculiarity of our Author—his love of words uncommon and, in some cases, not known to exist in Greek literature. It may seem at first sight that this predilection stamps him as a native Greek ; for who but a native would venture to coin words of his own, or even to use such rare words as might expose the writer to the charge of being unintelligible? But

¹ This rare word is explained by Hesychius as *σφόδρα ἡχητικόν* "extremely noisy."

² The omission of the article before *στοιχεῖα* and before the *Nominative* of *οὐρανοί* is unique in New Testament ; even if the second *οὐρανοί* is intended to be a quotation of the first, the omission of the article is extremely harsh.

³ The plural of these words is not found elsewhere in the New Testament ; nor is *σπεύδew* found elsewhere in the sense "accelerate."

this is not so. A foreigner writing in the "fine style" is quite capable of the crime of pedantry in the highest degree; and although it may be rare for a European to coin words in a language which he has picked up orally, the following extract from a Bengalee author will shew that innovations of this sort are very natural for one who has acquired a language in great measure by reading, and who is fond of airing the varied treasures of his vocabulary. The extract, taken from a life of Mr. Justice Onocool Chunder Mookerjee, will be found in the *Indian Observer*, 27th Dec. 1873:—

"He had one and uniform way of speaking. He made no *gairish* of words. He was an eloquent speaker, but he made no raree show of it. Never he counterchanged strong words with the pleaders of the other party. His temper was never *incandescent* or hazy. He well understood the interest of his client and never ceased to tussle for it till he was flushed with success.

"Having first expounded before the Court the anatomy of his case, he then launched out in the relative position of his client with that of the other, pointing out the *quiproquo*, or bolstering up the decision of the Lower Court with his sapience and legal acumen, and *cognoscence*, waiting with quietude to see which side the Court takes in favourable consideration, knuckling to the arguments of the Court, and then *inducing* it gradually to his favour. Justice Mookerjee very well understood the *boot*¹ of his client, for which he would carry a logomachy, as if his wheel of fortune depended upon it, and even more than that. He was seen sometimes to argue a case continually for many a day, which more than amply repaid the remuneration given to him. For this reason he was the only wished-for pleader, or magnet, for the last five years of his stay in the native Bar of the High Court. On *multitudinous*² occasions, when the hope and affiance of the clients of Justice Mookerjee *toto celo suspended* on his pleading, and he was absent from court on

¹ The writer probably borrowed this word from Shakespeare, where it is used for "profit"; but no Elizabethan author would use the word thus in the present context.

² Compare for this word (but not for the spelling) *Macbeth*, II. ii. 62.

account of some *sickishness*, he even on such a day came and pleaded their causes, when they importuned him to do so."

Exactly parallel to "gairish," "cognoscence" and "sickishness" are (as we shall now attempt to shew) the words *κυλισμόν* (ii. 22), *ἐξέραμα* (ib.), *παραφρονία* (ii. 16), *ταρταρώσας* (ii. 2), *καυσούμενα* (iii. 10). Moreover the idiomatic blunders, "induce to his favour," and "their hope suspended *toto cælo* on his pleading," may be fairly matched with the corresponding blunders, *μνήμην ποιῆσθαι* (i. 15), *σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες* (i. 5), the omission of the article (ii. 8, so Westcott and Hort; iii. 10 and 12), and the use of *ὁγδοος* (ii. 5). As for the misuse of *βλέμμα* (ii. 8), it can be matched with none of the errors in the above extract, and to do it justice we must go to another passage of the Bengalee writer in which he describes Mr. Justice Mookerjee as "remaining *sotto voce* till half-past four in the evening."

The difficulty which always attends the attempt to prove a negative is even greater than usual when the negation denies the existence of a word. But the labours of multitudes of scholars who have ransacked the literature of Greece to illustrate the vocabulary of the New Testament will go far to help us; and if it should be urged that one or two words, supposed to be non-existent in Greek, may hereafter be proved to exist in some hitherto undiscovered author, or may be found passed over in some neglected corner of an author already known, the reply will be scarcely less forcible than before, that an author who, in a letter scarcely longer than those we are in the habit of sending by the penny post, inserts even two or three words so rare that they have not yet been met with in Greek literature, is very little less guilty of pedantry than if the words had been actually non-existent. Let it be added here that all these pedantical words

quoted above are in passages where the Author deviates from Jude, and appears to be writing in his own character. While he is imitating Jude, or Philo, or Josephus, or Clemens Romanus, or the Acts of the Apostles, he is comparatively simple; but in the brief intervals where he is imitating no one, he reveals his true nature and shines forth, not as one of the Apostles of Christ who had received from their Master the precept, "Be not anxious beforehand what ye shall speak," but as a collector and stitcher of antiquarian word-scrap.

One passage of the Epistle more especially enables us to discern the Author's fondness for out-of-the-way words, because it exhibits him in the act of substituting (in a quotation) an uncommon for a common expression. We shewed above that he alters Jude's "clouds" into the rarer "mists," and Jude's "winds" into "blast." But these changes are not so significant as his improvement on Proverbs xxvi. 11, "as the dog when it approaches to its own vomit." For the word "vomit," he substitutes the word ἐξέραμα ("hardly to be found elsewhere," Alford, but found by Wahl in *Dioscorid.*, vi. 19), a technical term of medicine derived from ἐξερᾶω "to evacuate by purge or vomit," so that the passage may be rendered "The dog having returned to its own evacuation." Further he supplements this quotation by a reference to a sow returning to its wallowing; and here he introduces a word (κυλισμόν) which is not recognized by Liddell and Scott, and the rarity of which was such a stumbling block to the scribes that some MSS. alter it into κύλισμα¹; but κυλισμόν is retained by the best MSS. and by Westcott and Hort. It may be rendered "wallowance." He also uses about the sow a word generally restricted to human beings, "having

¹ Wahl gives no other instance of κυλισμός; but it occurs in the version of Proverbs ii. 18 by Theodotion, which, having been written in the earlier part of the second century after Christ, may very well have been known to the Author

washed herself or bathed." The whole passage will then run thus:—"The dog having returned to his own *evacuation*, and the sow, *having bathed*, to her wallowance."

Wahl gives no other instance of *παραφρονία* (ii. 16), which may be rendered "maddishness" (like "sickishness" in the Bengalee extract); and for the word *κανσούμενα* (iii. 10) "in fever-heat," no authority is quoted earlier than Dioscorides, who flourished about 60 A.D., and whose works would not probably have been well known for some years after that date.¹ Another word, not known to occur elsewhere in Greek literature, is *ταρταρώσας* (ii. 4). Even in its noun form, the heathen term "Tartarus" is not found in the Old or New Testament, and is as alien to both as the expression "divine nature" (i. 4); but the verb formed from this noun is not only stamped with heathen associations, but is also almost as uncouth as it would be in English to speak of "helling" some one, instead of "sending him to hell." In the same context occurs the curious word *σειροῖς*. Both Varro and Curtius recognize the word (see Alberti's *Hesychius*, sub. v. *σειροῖς*) as meaning "corn pits," in which sense it is employed by Euripides and Demosthenes (*Curtius*, vii. 4, "*siros* vocabant barbari quos ita sollerter abscondunt ut nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint. In iis conditæ fruges erant"; and Varro says they were in use in Thrace and Cappadocia); and though Hesychius himself (sub. v. *σιροῖς*) recognizes a secondary meaning, "prison," and tells us that the Laconians had a word *σιπλά* which meant "safe-keeping," yet it would seem that the word would (to a well-educated Greek) convey rather the meaning of "store-pit." Consequently we are led to the following rendering of ii. 4: "If God spared

¹ It is remarkable that two words so rare as *κανσούμενα* and *ἐξέπραμα* should occur in this Epistle and in no other author (so far as has been ascertained) earlier than Dioscorides, and that a third word, *κυλισμόν*, should not be found earlier than the second century after Christ.

not angels when they sinned, but, having *helled* them, delivered them to *store-pits* of darkness."

Again, our Author uses the word βλέμμα (ii. 8) for "the sense of sight." But in ordinary Greek, both in Demosthenes and Aristotle, and even in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs (p. 132, ed. Sinker) the word means "glance," "look," "expression of the eyes." Also in the same passage the article (which, we have seen, was irregularly omitted before στοιχεία and οὐράνοι, in ii. 7) is omitted before δίκαιος. The omission naturally caused a difficulty to the scribes, some of whom have inserted it; but it is rejected by Westcott and Hort. Yet the word "just" is obviously intended here for a pronominal epithet; nor has any one (as far as I know) attempted to justify the Author's grammar by rendering it adverbially "dwelling justly." We are therefore driven to the conclusion that it is an error, "just one" being written for "the just one." Lastly, in ii. 5, the author has placed "eighth *before* instead of *after* Noah, in a manner for which no authority has been alleged from Greek writers, and it is probably as irregular as to say in English "eighth Noah" for "Noah, the eighth," or for "Noah with seven others." Collecting the errors of this passage, we have, "He preserved *eighth Noah* . . . and delivered just Lot; for *just one*, dwelling among them, *by the expression of his eyes* and by hearing, vexed his just soul." This cluster of solecisms is surely not much less striking, even to an English ear, than the errors of the Bengalee fine writer quoted above.

Next, as regards idioms, the Author uses (i. 15) μνήμην ποιῆσθαι for "entertain recollection"; but it is used to mean "make mention," and it is not known ever to be used in the Author's sense (*Thuc.* ii. 54 is ambiguous). Still more objectionable is (i. 5) σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες. Josephus, it is true, and Diodorus Siculus, use σπουδὴν

εἰσφέρειν, and rightly enough, for “contribute zeal”; but the sonorous extra syllable added by our Author makes nonsense of the phrase, by converting it into “contribute all zeal in an indirect manner”; or, “as a secondary or subsequent consideration.” Why should our Author here go so perversely and superfluously astray? Was it because the longer word was the more grandiose? Partly; but there was another reason. In the parallel passage of St. Jude, close to the words “all zeal,” comes a compound verb with *this same combination of prepositions*, παρεισ-εδύησαν; and it is the sound of this verb which probably induced our copyist to insert a παρεισ—where it has no meaning. Lastly, in i. 12, the author uses μελλήσω (supposing that the reading of Westcott and Hort is correct) for “I shall be sure.” Now with the second person this meaning is possible (as in Matt. xxiv. 6, “You will be sure to hear of wars”); but in the first person it is probably unknown, in this sense. Add as a specimen of bathos (i. 9): “he is blind, *short-sighted*.”¹

Summing up, and endeavouring to represent in English the errors mentioned in this paragraph we have the following:—“Take care to *introduce as an appendage* all zeal. . . . He that lacketh these things is *blind* (and in fact) *short-sighted*. Wherefore I *shall be destined* to put you in remembrance of these things that ye may be able to *make the recollection* of them.”

Let it be clearly understood that we do not ground our objections to the genuineness of the Epistle on its bad Greek. The Apocalypse violates Greek syntax more glaringly; the Gospels contain more copious Hebraisms; but verbal and grammatical errors are not inconsistent with

¹ The attempt to shew that μνωπάξω means “wilfully to shut one’s eyes,” is not justified by Hesychius, and it is contrary to the express definition of μνωπάξω by Aristotle. Even were it proved that some obscure author had thus misused the word, that would only shew that our Author had a companion in his ignorance of Greek.

apostolic authorship. It is by vulgar pomposity, verbose pedantry, and barren plagiarism that this document is distinguishable from every other book of the New Testament.

It remains briefly to vindicate the Author of the First Epistle of St. Peter from having written the Second; and here we must touch on the theory that the differences in style between the two Epistles may arise from the fact that the Second Epistle was a translation, or that, as St. Jerome says, the Author "used different interpreters." Now a translator or interpreter might undoubtedly tinge with pedantry a simple and natural Aramaic original by inserting uncommon words, and he might also commit idiomatic blunders for which the original would not be responsible; but there are in this Epistle *faults of thought* for which no mere translator can be held responsible. For example, such tautology as we have indicated above, could not have been inserted in the course of a translation. Again (on the supposition that the Aramaic writer did not copy others) the translator of the Aramaic Epistle would find it impossible to copy (as our Author has copied) Jude, Josephus, Philo, and probably Clement. Imagine an English translator of the Second Epistle ordered to write a translation of it which should contain large extracts from the Epistle of St. James, and groups of words, and a thought or two, from Clarendon, Bishop Butler, and Burke; and we shall form some conception of the difficulty involved in the supposition that the patchwork style of the Second Epistle may be a mere fault of the Greek translator, for which the original Aramaic may not have been responsible. Besides, it may be shewn from other considerations that no "difference of interpreters" could account for the difference between the two Epistles. Besides the presence or absence of tautology, there are other differences of style which no translator can obscure. For example, one author states his propositions as subject to conditions and is fond of "if";

another prefers to press on without "if's"; one likes comparisons and abounds in "as" or "like," he will tell you the motives, the results, the causes of the actions of which he writes, and consequently you will find his pages sprinkled with "in order that," "so that" "because"; the other confines himself to simple statement. Now although considerable allowance must be made for difference of subject and tone, which may greatly alter the style of the same author at different times, yet the two Epistles diverge so widely in the use of those particles *which imply difference of thought*, that this divergence, in itself, is almost sufficient to prove difference of authorship.¹ Another divergence (which cannot possibly be attributed to the translator) is that, whereas the First Epistle quotes the Old Testament freely, the Second never quotes from it as such, the only quasi-quotation being the reference to "the proverb" (ii. 22).

On other internal differences between the thought of the two Epistles it is not possible now to dwell; and an attempt might possibly be made to explain these by the different circumstances under which the two were written. Yet undoubtedly, when the author of the Second Epistle writes (iii. 1), "This second epistle, beloved, I now write unto you, *and in them*" (the "both" of our Version is implied, but not expressed) "*I stir up your sincere mind*," etc., it is difficult to suppose that this language (if genuine) could have been used by a writer referring to a letter written very long before, and under circumstances very different from the present. One would have supposed that he would rather have written "and in this, as in my former letter,"

¹ 1 Pet. uses *ei* fifteen times, 2 Pet. twice; or if the numbers be calculated in proportion to the length of the Epistles, *ei* in 1 Pet. occurs $10\frac{1}{2}$ times to 2 in 2 Pet. The proportions of (a) *ὡς*, (b) *ὡς*, (c) *ἀλλὰ*, (d) *ὅτι*, (e) *διότι*, (f) *οὖν*, (g) *ὥστε*, (h) *μέν*, (i) the Relative Pronoun used demonstratively, (k) *εἰς* (often denoting purpose) are severally (a) 20 : 10, (b) $9\frac{1}{2}$: 1, (c) $11\frac{1}{2}$: 6, (d) $8\frac{1}{2}$: 0, (e) $2\frac{1}{2}$: 0, (f) $4\frac{1}{2}$: 1, (g) $1\frac{1}{2}$: 0, (h) $4\frac{1}{2}$: 0, (i) 20 : 6 or 7.

or at all events that he would not have spoken of the long distant production as still identical in time with the present, "I stir up." Yet what an interval appears to have elapsed! In the times of the former letter the "fiery trial" of persecution is rife; in the times of the latter, it has so completely disappeared that there is not even any expression of thankfulness for deliverance from it. In the former, the danger is from without; the latter speaks only of dangers from within, and is wholly devoted to warnings against heretical teachers. In the former, the day of the Lord is dawning, Christ is ready to be revealed, and "the end of all things is at hand"; but the latter, although it warns its readers to "look for" and to "hasten" the day of the Lord, evidently contemplates it as remote: "*there shall come in the last days* scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming?" so that the writer evidently regards the "last days" as not yet arrived, and even when they have arrived, still there shall come, not "the day of the Lord," but only "mockers," mocking at its delay.

For these reasons of internal evidence enumerated in this and the preceding articles, for the radical difference not only of words and idioms, but also of thought—the difference which distinguishes a simple and original writer from a pedantical phrase-compiler who bungles and blurrs even where he is copying, and, when he is not copying, writes as though he had selected from a glossary the rarest words in the Greek language—for the essential ignobility of style, no less than for the evidence that the writer has been imitating works of so late a date as to be incompatible with the theory of Apostolic authorship, we claim that the memory of St. Peter ought to be formally delivered from the suspicion of having composed this unworthy production. There remain in reserve other points of internal evidence with which our readers are familiar; the patron-

ising mention of "our beloved brother Paul" side by side with the mention of St. Paul's Epistles as a part of "Scripture;" and the description of the Transfiguration on "the Holy Mount," justly characterized by Canon Westcott as "artificial." On these we have not touched; but, when combined with the former class of evidence, they present a combination so strong that it seems to us inconceivable that any unprejudiced Greek scholar should reject it; and when this cumulative evidence is further combined with the negative external evidence which proves (Westcott) that the Eastern and Western canon originally agreed in rejecting this document, and that while the First Epistle is quoted from the earliest times, there is no trace of the existence of the Second till toward the end of the second century after Christ, then we cannot but feel that we have a claim to a verdict from others beside Greek scholars, a verdict which may fairly be delivered by every reader of the English Bible who is competent to sit on a jury and to weigh evidence; and the verdict should be that the Galilean fisherman, whose faith was the Rock on which the Church was founded, is "not guilty" of writing the pedantical and ignoble collection of plagiarisms, commonly attributed to him as his "Second Epistle."

It was rejected in the earliest days by the silence of the Fathers and in later times by the express condemnation of Origen and Eusebius; and though the judgment of Jerome foisted it on the mediæval canon, it was again questioned or rejected at the Reformation by Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, and Scaliger; in modern times by Neander, De Wette, and many others; and in our days and country it is at least so far rejected by our ablest theologian, that Bishop Lightfoot declines to use it "for polemical purposes." But the time seems now to have come for a more general condemnation. The only reason for not using the Epistle "for polemical purposes" is (it is to be presumed) because it cannot be for

these purposes used by us with any effect. Our antagonists would retort, if we were to use it for these purposes, that we were quoting from a forged document; and we could not disprove their assertion, nor even shew that probabilities were against them. But if the document is probably a forgery "for polemical purposes," does it become anything else but a forgery "for spiritual purposes," or for any other purpose whatever? Let the reader remember that this forgery—supposing it to be a forgery—is not of the nature of a Psalm attributed to David, or Proverbs attributed to Solomon, by some anonymous author in whose work the element of devotion or of wisdom might remain nearly the same, whoever the author might be. This letter, on the contrary, is forged in order to prove, on the authority of the Apostle St. Peter, facts that could not be proved without his authority; instead of being a simple expression of piety, it utters in St. Peter's name prophecies that the Apostle never uttered, records his attestation to miraculous events in language which he never authorized, and introduces him as the patronising friend of St. Paul in a character which we have no reason to believe that he would have accepted. In such a forgery as this, what is there that should prepare us *a priori* for any other conclusion than that to which we have been led by a detailed examination of its subject matter, viz. that it is a compilation altogether below the level of the First Epistle of St. Peter, and wholly unworthy of being considered, in any sense, inspired?

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

SHORTCOMINGS OF TRANSLATION.

THE appearance of the Revised Version of the New Testament will lead, we cannot doubt, to a wider study of the full meaning of this portion of God's Word, and, such study once earnestly undertaken, we may confidently reckon on a more earnest acceptance of the truths therein made known to us. The best weapon that could be forged against scepticism, is a just knowledge of that which is written. The comparison of new renderings with the old will disclose shades of meaning hitherto unsuspected by the English reader, and point out connexions and relations where none have before been visible to him. And the more earnest and scholarly criticism is bestowed on the new Version, the more accurately will the value of the work that has been done, as well in the settlement of the original Text as in the English renderings, be estimated both by learned and unlearned. To reach such an estimate is a task which asks some years for its performance.

But even if such an examination make it plain that all has been done which now can be done to bring the older Version into a form more accordant with our present English speech, and to make it more representative of the oldest original Texts, there will still be many a passage to which no translation can do full justice, and which must be left for the expositor to make more lucid by commentary, expansion, and paraphrase. And no labour of the preacher could be better spent than in pouring all the light that is to be gained on such texts—and their number is not few—as seem to be unmanageable in a mere translation. No two languages quadrate in such wise that the single words of one will stand for the single words of the other. The difficulty is felt as soon as ever we proceed beyond mere primary nouns and verbs. Secondary and metaphorical

meanings have sprung up so differently in different tongues that the atmosphere, so to speak, which surrounds the one word differs often very widely from that by which its representative in a translation will be surrounded.¹ And we ought not to forget, as a translation from a dead language sometimes inclines us to do, that prophets and apostles used Hebrew and Greek as we use English; that to them the words they employed were living things, active with all their various shades of meaning and application; and that till we have grasped somewhat fully what the words, each in its whole bulk, represented to them, our labour on Bible exposition is not ended. In which case it is not likely to be ended for many a year to come.

A good example of what is missed, and must always be missed, by the reader of a translation may be seen in James i. 17. There in the Authorized Version God is spoken of as One "with whom is no variableness, *neither shadow of turning.*" From the last four words the English reader carried away most probably no more than the notion that St. James spake of God as a Being who was ever the same, and subject to no particle of change. When such a reader turns to the Revised Version he finds that an attempt has been made (and perhaps as well made as is possible for a mere translation) to give him a better grasp of the writer's full meaning. There the words are translated, "with whom can be no variation, *neither shadow that is cast by turning.*" He may be pardoned if he does not at once discern what the new rendering is intended to convey; but he will know at a glance that "shadow" does not in the Revised Version mean, what before it seemed to him to mean, simply "a particle or morsel" as in the common phrase, "There's not a shadow of a

¹ In his Translation of Pope Gregory's Pastoral Care, king Alfred felt this so keenly that he very often gives two, or even three verbs to represent in the English all that he felt was intended by the Latin.

chance." He finds that shadow is employed in its original primary sense, and if he be led thereby to puzzle over, and at last to puzzle out, the sense of the whole phrase, a great deal will have been gained for him by the new translation.

But I think that for nineteen out of every twenty readers, who cannot turn to the Greek for information, the expositor will be needed to explain St. James's magnificent figure; to tell them that he meant by his Greek to convey (and does convey) the sense that God is like the sun in the zenith, shedding directly down light but no shadows: and not only so, but that God's zenith is everywhere,—not like that of the created sun, in one place only at a time, but shining down equally in all places, and always present everywhere with the same beneficence and the same power. Such a God, who sees all things and all men, free from the many shadows that attend on human observations, to whom all light is pure, is One who alone can judge what are really good and perfect gifts, and his gifts, however we may estimate them, are the only ones which deserve to be called good and perfect. Such is the grand notion of God contained in the Greek, and which, in the Authorized Version, was lost altogether. If the new rendering leads men to know all St. James's meaning; that God is One to whose eyes all is seen, and all seen alike; One whose view can be subject to no deflection; One to whom none of his creatures, whether they live for his mercy or his judgment, can ever be in the shade, ever seen untruly, there can be no question of the gain to those who read; but it seems hardly probable that this gain will be secured by translation only without exposition.

In a smaller way the like need is felt in such passages as Proverbs iv. 7: "Get wisdom; and with all thy getting get understanding." This, as a rendering of the Original,

could hardly be surpassed; and yet, I fancy, a large proportion of English readers draw from it simply the exhortation: "Whatever else you get, be sure to get this wisdom." The marginal reference points them to Matthew xiii. 44; but marginal references are not in all Bibles, nor consulted by all readers. And so, many go over the words without realizing how much grander than they think is the teaching of the Proverb-writer, and that it tells how this heavenly wisdom is the pearl of great price, and must be secured with, *i.e.*, at the cost and sacrifice of, everything else that can be gotten.

And there are not a few words both in the Old and New Testaments which should fill a much larger space than mere translation will allow them to do, and which therefore are not likely to be appreciated in their completeness without the help of exposition. Such a word is the Hebrew **חָסַד** generally translated "to put trust in." As a rendering probably nothing better will ever be found in English; but it by no means exhausts the Hebrew word, which speaks much of the covenant relation between God and man, and of the satisfaction of a need which the heart, even of the natural man, soon begins to feel.

For even without a knowledge of Revelation, when men have surveyed the universe in the light of their own personality and reason and conscience, they have been led to a belief in a personal Godhead, and also to feel the spirituality of their own nature, and that their true self was meant for more than it could find here. Now a covenant between God and man gives to such a faith and sense in men exactly that of which they stand in need. It fits in with the belief in a personal God, and with the feeling of a spiritual nature within man; and it speaks of a power of communion between Heaven and earth.

As soon as Revelation speaks, it tells of this communion in earliest days uninterrupted, when God talked with man;

and, although through sin that blest state was forfeited and the curse came, yet amid the penalties a compact is made plain. The bread, though to be eaten in the sweat of the brow, will still be given; and, as soon as death by sin has come into the world, we hear of a connexion between man and his Maker; for the blood of murdered Abel crieth unto heaven for punishment. It is but little that man can do on his part in the covenant (must it not ever be so, when the parties to it are God and man?) but with that little God will be satisfied; and men begin for a time to call themselves by the name of the Lord, and to feel that they are the liege servants of Jehovah.

After the flood a covenant is made in set terms; and henceforth the records of God's book are full of it, and **חֹדֶן** is one out of many words which testify to the relation established between man and God. The whole usage of the word shews us that, at the full, it expresses, on the one side, a need for protection, which can however be boldly claimed, because it has been promised by the other. And, in return, there is looked for only the rendering of a loyal obedience. And it is to be noted that for all his guardianship, this alone does the Protector anywhere claim. He is a sovereign, but not as this world's kings, for then might his servants be called upon to fight his battles; now they only call forth his constant blessings on themselves by a faithful trust in the Power which shelters and preserves them.

An instance of the fuller force of the word **חֹדֶן**, on one side, is found in Judges ix. 15, a passage in which it does not refer to the bond between God and man. The bramble (who by the use of this word is made to ape the mighty Protector, and to speak in the grandest terms) says unto the other trees: "If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and *put your trust* in my shadow." This is but mimicry of the true Lord's offer, whose liegemen need

only come and live under the castle-wall, and call themselves by their Master's name; and, doing so, they shall be in safe keeping. Jotham desired to make the election of Abimelech appear ridiculous and so he compared him to the meanest of trees, but put into his mouth the largest of promises.

And from Deuteronomy xxxii. 37, 38 we find of what nature the service is which the Master wants, and which, if rendered to Him, will constitute a claim for constant protection: "Where are their gods?" Jehovah asks concerning the people that should be his: "Where is their rock *in whom they trusted*, which did eat of the fat of their sacrifices, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings? Let them rise up and help you, and be your protection." Victims had been offered, and wine poured out to them that were no gods. Victims and wine alike were God's gift, and to present them unto Him, was but to give Him of his own; yet He stipulates to accept this as full service. How great then the faithlessness which will give these things to another! And it is only when the offerer feels the nothingness of all he has to bring that the offerings of the servant are made in the true spirit. "Of thine own have we given Thee," were David's words (1 Chron. xxix. 14), when he brought his largest gifts before the Lord; and the offering was prefaced with the humble confession: "Who am I, and what is my people that we should be able to offer so willingly after this sort? All things come of Thee."

When, with this covenant relationship in our thoughts, we turn to the passages where **חסה** occurs, we find that it puts a new force into nearly every one of them. How it adds to the bitterness of some reproaches! As when the prophet (Isa. xxx. 2) inveighs against those who *put their trust* in the shadow of Egypt. Having one Lord, able and willing to save, they have broken faith with Him, have

proved themselves rebels and taken service with another. "Therefore," he adds, "shall the strength of Pharaoh be your shame, and the trust in the shadow of Egypt your confusion."

We cease to wonder too at the oft-repeated claim which the Psalmist makes upon God (Ps. vii. 1; xi. 1; xvi. 1, etc.). "O Lord my God *in Thee do I put my trust*, save me from all them that persecute me, and deliver me." Why should mere trust for safety constitute a ground for crying out thus? We grasp the reason only when we think on God's covenant, and that this was all Jehovah asked. For this cause does the Psalmist come boldly to the throne of grace.

We can understand also better the largeness of the promises which God makes for such liegeman's trust. Because He is the other party to the covenant, therefore do Jehovah's angels (Ps. xxxiv. 8) "encamp round about them that fear Him, and blessed is the man *that trusteth in Him*." Those who shew such trust "shall possess the land" (Isa. lvii. 13), saith God, "and shall inherit my holy mountain." For such (Ps. xxxi. 19) God "worketh goodness (oh how great) even in the sight of the sons of men," and (Ps. xxxiv. 22) "none of them shall want redemption, none of them shall ever be desolate." "For" (Nah. i. 7) "the Lord knoweth *them that trust in Him*"; and to be thus known of God the Apostle felt (2 Tim. ii. 19) was to have rested on the only sure foundation, to have found the true Master and Saviour.

Another word of the same class, but shewing a different side of the picture, is **בגד**, often translated "to deal treacherously," and the participle of which is the Proverb-writer's favourite term for "transgressors." The verb in its simplest use appears to convey the idea of concealment; and from it is taken the most usual word for "a garment," that which was first used for concealment, not for comfort. For we cannot help pausing to recall that primal state in which

all was innocence, when there existed nothing that wanted hiding, when garments were not, and having them not, yet men were not ashamed. For the concealment which our verb expresses is always closely connected with transgression. We find an example in 1 Samuel xiv. 33. The people had sinned against God's law by eating flesh with the blood; and Saul describes their offence by the verb which we are considering: "Ye have *transgressed*," and in the margin the Authorized Version gives "*dealt treacherously*." But, to the chosen people, to eat with the blood meant to do as the heathen did, and to hanker after their idolatrous practices. The words of Ezekiel when he describes the just man as one that hath not eaten upon the mountains, that is, who hath not gone up to worship at the heathen high places, and taken a part in their sacrifices and feasts, will occur to all, and the significant way in which they are followed by "neither hath lifted up his eyes to the idols" (xviii. 5). And the same prophet describes more exactly in another place (xxxiii. 25) the close connexion between the one offence and the other: "Thus saith the Lord God, Ye eat with the blood and lift up your eyes toward your idols." And we shall see from further examples how the "treacherous dealing" implied in our word was really faithlessness to the covenant and turning away from Jehovah.

With the prophets it is a constant word in God's complaints against his people. Thus (Isa. xlviii. 8), "I knew that thou wouldst *deal treacherously* and wast called a *transgressor* from the womb." And Jeremiah testifies (v. 11): "The house of Israel and the house of Judah have *dealt very treacherously* against me saith the Lord." So too the Psalmist (lxxviii. 57): "They turned back and *dealt unfaithfully*, like their fathers"; and Hosea (vi. 7): "They like men have transgressed the covenant, they have *dealt treacherously* against me."

But we only reach the full notion of the word and realize the tender nature of the covenant which Israel had transgressed, when we read such passages as Jeremiah iii. 20 : "Surely as a wife treacherously departeth from her husband, so have ye *dealt treacherously with Me*, O house of Israel, saith the Lord." Hence we find that God is speaking in that figurative language which He has deigned to use for picturing the close relation between Jehovah and his people, and between Christ and his Church. Hence we understand what the oft repeated lamentation means, "*they have dealt treacherously.*" How full it is of what God would have done for his people ! How eloquent it is with the abundance of his love ! Hosea (v. 7) carries the figure somewhat further : "They *have dealt treacherously* against the Lord, they have begotten strange children " ; and Malachi (ii. 11) explains the figurative language of the prophets who were before him : "Judah *hath dealt treacherously*, and an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem, for Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, and hath married the daughter of a strange god."

Such is the climax of the "treacherous dealing," the end of which God had known from the beginning. Such the utter setting at nought of his covenant, wherein so much was given, so little asked. Jehovah would have won his people to Himself by all the love which the closest of family ties can suggest, and no words can be found to express their faithlessness better than "Judah hath *married* the daughter of a strange god." How like the Lord's lament over Jerusalem is God's complaint that Judah "hath profaned the holiness of the Lord !"

We will gather a further example or two from the New Testament. Look for instance at 2 Peter i. 4, "that by these [great and precious promises] ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust." For an idiomatic translation

this could not be much improved, and the Revised Version has little change. But from neither Authorized nor Revised Version does the English reader gain a complete insight into the Apostle's meaning. A very literal rendering of the Greek might be given thus: "That *through* these promises ye may *become* partakers of the divine nature, having escaped *from* the corruption that is in the world *in lust*."

If we examine this less attractive sentence, we shall see that we have gained something thereby; it is not however all that may be gained. First the word "become" infuses a very different shade of meaning into the whole passage. The "great promises" are not given that men shall at once *be* partakers of the divine nature, but that they may be put on the road to *become* so. God gives the seed, without which there could be no growth, but He leaves man responsible for the culture thereof. The sower goes forth to sow, and he sows on all lands; but it is only on that which has been made fit to receive the seed, that it brings forth its abundant fruit. This is also made clearer by the preposition "through." God's gifts are means of salvation, but are not necessarily salvation itself. He desires that the human race should be restored, that it should become again what it was when He had completed his design at the creation, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." But the moral new creation does not follow so obediently on the Maker's word and will as did the material first creation. There is a power at work in the world which mars what God would save. And the reality and activity of this power is marked in the literal translation given above by the preposition "from." That from which deliverance is needed is not some danger into which we may chance to fall, but an active potential agency *from* which we want to be helped to flee away.

And the second clause has its points of interest. Cor-

ruption is in the world (writes the Apostle), but at once he corrects his statement and in a very striking manner. He adds the words "in lust." The preposition in the first expression is exactly the same as in the second. By the first he had said "corruption is *in* the world;" but thought follows thought, and he adds, not in the material creation, that is a *κόσμος*, an order, obedient to its Maker; but the corruption is "*in lust*," that which has its home in man. There the evil power resides, and it is from this inward corruption that the promises are given to help us to escape. But the word translated "corruption" means also "destruction," and that shade of its meaning was in the Apostle's mind as he wrote. The word occurs below (ii. 12) where he is speaking of "brute beasts made to be taken and *destroyed*" (literally, "for capture and *destruction*)." You cannot have both words in a translation; but how much more force does it give to the sentence to know that in the "corruption" there is the germ, which, unless its growth be stopped, will wax unto "destruction." Corruption comes first; but, leave that unchecked, and destruction is sure to follow.

And now we can get a glimpse of further meaning. The simple verb *φείγω* means "to try to escape" "to run away in flight," but does not necessarily imply that the attempt is successful. But the Apostle has used a compound verb, the full force of which is "to succeed in escaping;" and this sense should be in our minds as we read the verse. We should then have as a full paraphrase something like this: "Through God's exceeding great and precious promises, accepting and using them as means to help you in your spiritual progress, you may grow to be renewed into the divine likeness, for you will in this way be helped to make a thorough escape from the corruption, and consequent destruction, which human lust after evil has brought into the fair order of God's universe."

Another passage into which much additional force may be infused by a like appreciation of its full translation is Romans viii. 18. The Authorized Version rendered very beautifully, for its day: "I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." But, in our day, we lose something by reason of the colloquial use which has brought the verb "reckon" to mean in modern speech little more than "I suppose." St. Paul's verb implies a veritable reckoning, the casting up and comparing of an account. The Apostle knew by revelation something of the glories of the world to come, while the long catalogue of his sufferings given in his letter to the Corinthians (2 Cor. xi. 23-28) proves that he had more than a common share in the sufferings of this present time. But he has struck a balance and the account is all in favour of the joys that are in store for those who walk after the spirit.

But it is in the word "sufferings" that the need for a fuller conception of the sense most shews itself. The word in the original is akin to our English "passion," and varies in meaning as widely as its English cognate. "Passion" means suffering at times in English, but it often means something quite different; and so it is with the Greek word. We find it in a former chapter of this same Epistle (Rom. vii. 5) rendered "the motions" of sins *Rev. Vers.* the sinful passions, where the Apostle is describing the previous life after the flesh of those who now serve in newness of the spirit. So too in Galatians v. 24 it is translated "affections." "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the *affections* and lusts," where, as before, the reference is to those things in which the flesh finds pleasure and not pain.

Now if in our minds this other sense be added to the received rendering of the verse, we shall gain an argument from the Apostle's words which will apply even more widely

than that which may be drawn from them as they appear in our English Bibles, and one which suits St. Paul's reasoning and the other uses of the word very completely. He has been speaking in the earlier part of the Chapter about the distinction between those who live after the flesh and those who live after the spirit. The mind of the flesh is enmity against God, and they that are in the flesh cannot please Him. Then, addressing the Romans as those who had received Christ, he continues: "We are debtors not to the flesh to live after the flesh, for if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die." And then, as if to console them for what to the carnal mind might seem to be a great sacrifice for Christ, he tells them that the end of all this denial of the flesh is, that they who suffer with Christ may also have a share in his glory. But the suffering might arise not from pains inflicted, but from the deprivation of such things as to the natural man seemed to be pleasures. So the Apostle employs the word *παθήματα*, which equally embraces both notions, and he says: "I make account that the *παθήματα* of this present time, be they sufferings or be they affections of the flesh, be they of sorrow or of joy, are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed to us-ward."

And surely this additional sense speaks to a wider range of men than the more limited, and also puts the Apostle's argument in a more telling form. The *sufferings* of the present life may make some hearts rebel against God and Christ, but some they surely bring nearer to God, as they did David: "Before I was afflicted I went wrong, but now have I kept thy word." The joys and the attractions of the world, however, pull all the contrary way. They take the thoughts far away from the world to come and all that has regard thereto. To men, then, who are in this temptation, it must be a precious lesson to be taught, that it was not only to the painful side of human experience that the

words of St. Paul had reference, but to its pleasurable side also: and that, with a mind fully made up, he proclaims the result of his deliberate estimate, and leaves it on record, that the world can neither inflict pains nor hold out attractions which should compare in the Christian's mind with the hope for which he yearns.

J. RAWSON LUMBY.

DAN AND DAN-LAISH.

WHEN Abraham and his little army pursued Chedorlaomer, they overtook him at Dan (Gen. xiv. 14), and when Moses from the top of Pisgah took his survey of the promised land, he is said to have seen "all the land of Gilead *unto Dan*" (Deut. xxxiv. 1).

Again, we learn that after the division of the land, the children of Dan found their portion too small for them, and sent forth a party of armed men, who took the city of Laish, and called it Dan after the name of their father (Jos. xix. 47; Jud. xviii. 27-31).

From these facts it has been argued that Genesis and Deuteronomy must, in their present shape at least, be of later origin than the occupation of Canaan by the Israelites; or, that Laish and not Dan must have originally stood in the passages quoted from these two books; and that Dan was substituted by some later hand.

In the first place, it seems very unlikely that any later hand should have substituted Dan for Laish in Genesis xiv. Several other places are there mentioned by their ancient names, and in these cases the more modern name is attached to the ancient one. Thus we have "*Bela*, which is Zoar;" "the vale of *Siddim*, which is the salt sea;" "*En-mishpat*, which is Kadesh." Why, if Laish was in the original document, did the corrector not write, as in the other instances, "Laish, which is Dan"? Of course this argument does not apply to the occurrence of Dan in Deuteronomy.

But, secondly, it is plain that any objection to the occurrence of Dan, either in Genesis or Deuteronomy, would be removed if it could be shewn that there were two places called by that name. Nor is this suggestion to be regarded as a makeshift to get rid of the pressure of an inconveniently strong argument. Instances can be given, by the score, of names which belonged to two or more cities in Palestine; indeed we had almost said that it was more common for a given name to belong to two places, than to be the exclusive property of one. And there *are* two Dans mentioned in Scripture. When David sent out Joab to number the people of Israel from Dan even to Beersheba, we are told that he came "to Gilead, and to the land of Tahtim-hodshi; and they came to Dan-jaan, and about to Zidon, and came to the stronghold of Tyre" (2 Sam. xxiv. 6, 7). What town was this, which is called Dan-jaan to distinguish it from some other Dan; and that even although the Dan, which is commonly coupled with Beersheba, is mentioned a few verses before? All we know of it is that Joab came to it after he had passed through Gilead. If then Dan-jaan were situated in the northern border of Gilead, it would very well agree with Deuteronomy xxxiv. 1: "And the Lord shewed him all the land of Gilead unto Dan." It would also very well suit with the mention of Dan in the history of Abraham; for Dan at the head of the Jordan (Tel-el-Kadi) did not lie on any of the great roads from the Jordan to Damascus, while Dan-jaan, on the border of Gilead, might well lie either on the road which crossed the Jordan below the sea of Galilee, and passed by Fik and Nowah; or on the other road which crossed above the sea at "Jacob's bridge." This solution, which is in the main that given by Hengstenberg, is sufficient to set aside the hypothesis that the passages in Genesis and Deuteronomy in which Dan occurs were the work of a later hand: for if it cannot be proved that Dan-laish and Dan-jaan are the same, then it follows that it cannot be proved that the Dan of the days of Abraham was the same city as that which derived its name from the Danites.

The weak point of this hypothesis, however, is the assumption that Dan-laish is identical with the Dan which was situated close to the source of the Jordan. No doubt this is the commonly received opinion, but there are circumstances which render it extremely improbable that this should be the case.

Let us examine the geographical position of Dan. There are

two principal sources of the Jordan, about four miles distant from each other. The most easterly is at the modern Banias, the ancient Paneas, or Caesarea Philippi, and possibly the Hebrew Baalgad. The westerly source of the river is at Tel-el-Kadi, the "hill of the judge," or, "of Dan." The former of these two places, Panias, was for a long time identified with Dan-laish. Even the Jerusalem Targum calls the Dan mentioned in Abraham's days, "Dan of Caesarea"; and this also was the only Dan with which Jerome was acquainted. When therefore it was found that Josephus spoke of "Dan, for so," says he "the other source of the Jordan is called," it was supposed that he spoke of a second Dan, different from that one which had been identified with Panias. Josephus however knows of only one Dan. When he relates the adventure of Abraham, he speaks of it as the other source of the Jordan in the language just cited. When he relates the expedition of the Danites, he describes Laish as a day's journey from the great plain of Sidon, not far from Lebanon and the head of the lesser Jordan. And in his account of the idolatry of the calf he describes Dan in the same terms, as at the head of the lesser Jordan. It is plain, then, that if there was in point of fact more than one Dan, Josephus has confounded them. The same is true also of Jerome. No great stress however can be laid on this. They knew of one Dan, and not unnaturally referred to it all Scripture notices in which its name was mentioned.

The question now assumes this form: As it is quite certain that there was a Dan at Tel-el-Kadi (in which name the original Dan seems to be preserved), at the head of the lesser Jordan, we have to ask, does this place agree with the notices we have of Laish, afterwards called Dan? We submit that it does not.

For, in the first place, immediately after the narrative of the taking of Laish by the Danites (Jud. xviii.), there follows the story of the Levite and his concubine, in the course of which it is said (Jud. xx. 1), that the children of Israel were "gathered together as one man from *Dan* even to Beersheba." Is it likely that so soon after the Danite expedition, Dan-laish could have come to be recognized as the northern boundary of Israel? It is true that we are left altogether to conjecture as to the relative dates of these two events; but critics are generally agreed that the two occurrences took place much about the same time.

In the second place, the springs of Jordan, and therefore Dan

at Tel-el-Kadi, were within the bounds of the territory of the tribe of Naphtali, and could not well have been seized and appropriated by the Danites. At least, if the city thus violently taken possession of had belonged to Naphtali, we should have expected some notice of the fact. The 19th chapter of Joshua, though the account of the boundaries is somewhat obscure, owing to our ignorance of the geography of Northern Palestine, makes it very clear that the territory of Naphtali extended to the Jordan. And when, in the reign of Baasha, Benhadad sent his captains against Israel, Ijon, and Dan, and Abel-maim are mentioned among the store cities of Naphtali which they smote (1 Kings xv. 20; 2 Chron. xvi. 4).

Thirdly, let us examine what data we have for the determination of the geographical position of Laish or Leshem. It was "far from Zidon;" and "in the valley that lieth by Beth-rehob" (Jud. xviii. 28). Tel-el-Kadi, according to Josephus, is not more than a day's journey from Tyre. Unfortunately, Beth-rehob has not yet been identified. In some maps the name Rehob may be found assigned to a place nearly due north of Dan, and on the south bank of the Litany. This site, however, is purely conjectural; and if it were the true one, Rehob and Dan would not be in the same valley, as the text just quoted appears to imply. Something more, however, may be learned from Scripture concerning it. In the reign of David, the Ammonites hired "the Syrians of Beth-rehob, and the Syrians of Zoba," with men of Maacah and Ishtob, to assist them against Israel (2 Sam. x. 6). When they put the battle in array, "the Syrians of Zoba, and of *Rehob*, and Ishtob and Maacah, were by themselves in the field" (ver. 8). Hence it is plain that Beth-rehob was one of those small Syrian kingdoms of which Damascus was the chief, and that it was sometimes called by the name of Rehob. Now there were within the territory of the tribe of Asher two cities of the name of Rehob, neither of which, however, can be the Beth-rehob of which we are in search; for a Syrian kingdom could not in the reign of David have been within the borders of Israel's land, and, besides, they must have been near Zidon, whereas Laish was far from it. For the same reason we may safely conclude that Beth-rehob could not have been the modern Hunin, with which Robinson has identified it. For Hunin is south-west of Tel-el-Kadi, and at no great distance from Zidon.

But there is another notice of Rehob, which throws further light on its situation. When the spies went up to search the land of

Canaan, they began at the wilderness of Zin on the south, and continued till they arrived at "Rehob, as men come to Hamath," which was the northern terminus of their labours (Num. xiii. 21). The words in the original (*leba Hamath*), are the same which in other places are rendered "the entering into Hamath," and are frequently used to designate the northern limit of the promised land in Israel's most prosperous days. Here another geographical question opens, for there is *not* a settled agreement as to where this "entering into Hamath" was. Even the articles in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible are not altogether consistent on the matter. The great valley which lies between Libanus and Anti-libanus, and is watered by the Litany or ancient Leontes,—the Celo-syria of ancient times, now called *el Buk'a'a*,—extends from the mouth of the river near Tyre to the neighbourhood of Baalbek, or Heliopolis. Above Baalbek is the water-shed which separates the valley of the Leontes from that of the Orontes, or modern Asy. The sources of the two rivers are not more than 15 miles apart. The valley beyond Baalbek still preserves the same north-eastern course to Emesa, the modern Hems; and thence in a more northerly direction to Hamath, or Epiphania. The distance from Dan on the Jordan to Baalbek is about sixty miles, from Baalbek to Hems seventy miles, and from Hems to Hamath thirty miles. Those who support the opinion that this Dan was Laish, and near Rehob, make the "entering into Hamath," to lie in the lower portion of the valley, *160 miles from Hamath*. This is surely very improbable. But it may be positively disproved. Among the dozen passages in which "the entrance into Hamath," is mentioned, there are two or three which throw light on its geographical position. Among the nations which God left to prove Israel at their settlement in Canaan were "the Sidonians, and the Hivites that dwell in Mount Lebanon, from Mount Baal-hermon unto the entering in of Hamath" (Jud. iii. 3). Now Mount Baal-hermon was the southern extremity of Anti-libanus, and the entering in of Hamath must therefore have been a considerable distance to the north, in order to include the territory of the Hivites. Again, among the parts of Canaan that still remained to be possessed at the end of Joshua's life were "the land of the Giblites" (*i.e.*, Gebal, the ancient Byblos, now Jebeil, on the coast, and more to the north than Baalbek), "and all Lebanon towards the sunrising, from Baal-gad under Mount Hermon unto the entering into

Hamath" (Jos. xiii. 5). The phrase used here is evidently intended to be equivalent to that employed in Judges; Baal-gad, if not Paniaas (*i.e.*, Cæsarea Philippi), as some have supposed, must have been in its immediate neighbourhood; and the entrance to Hamath must, to include all eastern Lebanon, have been farther to the north than Baalbek. The western boundary of Canaan is thus described by Ezekiel. "The west side shall be the great sea, from the border till a man come over against Hamath" (*ghad nokach leboa Hamath*, Ezek. xlvii. 20). To illustrate this phrase of the prophet it is only necessary to observe that at the northern extremity of the range of Libanus, there is a low-lying plain, some ten miles across, lying between Lebanon and the next mountain range, called Jebel-el-Anzeyry, which also runs parallel with the coast. This gap or depression, called El-Junie, opens into a plain called El-Budkeia, watered by the Nahr Abrosh, the ancient Eleutherus; and this level country stretches, not only across Libanus, but across Anti-libanus also. Thus it necessarily happens that not only the access to Hamath from the sea is through this depression, but also that the great road from Palmyra and other places toward the east finds its way into the valley of the Orontes through this gap. This then, surely, is the entering in to Hamath, and it is so marked in the map attached to Wilson's "Lands of the Bible." Hems, the ancient Emesa, is situated exactly on this plain, and the city of Hamath is about thirty miles to the north; but the territory belonging to it extended far to the south of the city; in all probability as far at least as this "entering in to Hamath."

There is not much evidence to assist us in ascertaining the geographical position of the small Syrian kingdoms of which Rehob or Beth-rehob was one. They were Aram-damasek, Aram-zobah, Aram-hamath, Aram-maachah, Aram-rehob, and Ishtob. Damascus is of course well known; Maachah, which was a small territory, must have lain between Bashan and Damascus; Zobah, again, must have been to the north of Damascus, between that city and Hamath, and adjoining the territory of the latter. Hamath, as we know, was on the Orontes, and, after David's victories, appears in the time of Solomon to have been united to Zobah (2 Chron. viii. 3, 4). Ishtob or Tob probably lay to the east of Maacah. In all probability, Rehob lay south of Hamath, for there only can room be found for it. Perhaps the chief city, Beth-rehob, was on the site of Emesa, or Hems. If then Laish lay at the foot of the

eastern slope of Lebanon, somewhere not far from the source of the Orontes, the situation would answer all the necessary conditions. It is far from Zidon; it is "in the valley that lieth by Beth-rehob," "as men come to Hamath." Furthermore, the phrase "far from Zidon" seems to imply that Laish was a Zidonian town, which might expect help from the parent city, and it is well to observe that, according to Joshua xiii. 6, all the hill country, that is, all Lebanon, belonged to the Zidonians.

The result, if the argument in the preceding pages is well-founded, (and at the least it will be allowed to be probable), is that Dan at the source of the Jordan was a very ancient city, probably also a sanctuary and a seat of judgment, whence it derived the name by which it was known, long before the patriarch received, in Mesopotamia, the same name, which he transmitted to one of the tribes of Israel. To this place the confederate kings repaired after their victory at Sodom, and there Abraham surprised them, and rescued Lot. It was this Dan also that bounded Moses' views from Pisgah of the promised land. And, indeed, the phrase, "from Dan to Beersheba," became the current one for expressing the whole extent of the land of Israel.

But when the men of the tribe of Dan found the limits of their territory too contracted, and set forth in quest of a habitation, they did not appropriate a city belonging to the territory of Naphtali; but, passing beyond the boundaries of that tribe, yet not beyond the limits of the land given to them by God, as laid down in the days of Joshua, they travelled for one hundred miles or more up the great valley of Lebanon; and there finding the Syrian city of Laish, took violent possession of it. We do not know that it is ever again mentioned in history.

With respect to Dan-jaan, it is impossible to come to any certain conclusion. It may have been the same as Dan-laish; for, before the numbering of the people, David had subdued the Syrian kingdoms of Zobah and Rehob. If so, there may be some affinity between the name Dan-jaan and Baal-jaan, a Phœnician divinity, whose name, according to Furst, occurs on coins. Or, this town may be the same as Dan on the Jordan, which Joab visited on his way from Gilead to Tyre.

There is one other Scripture passage which ought to be referred to. We read of Hiram, the worker in brass whom Solomon employed in building the temple, that he was a widow's son

of the tribe of Naphtali, and that his father was a man of Tyre (1 Kings vii. 14); and, again, that his mother was of the daughters of Dan (2 Chron. ii. 14). This statement has been explained as illustrating the mingling of races likely to be found in Dan on the Jordan, *on the supposition that it was Dan-laish*. It was a city of Naphtali, originally inhabited by Tyrians, who were driven out by the men of Dan. But as there is no mention made of any locality, the description would be equally applicable to Dan-laish, if situated, as it is the object of this paper to shew, "as men go to Hamath." No doubt it is not within the bounds of the tribe of Naphtali; but a mixed population of Tyrians and Danites would certainly be found there; and if the Israelites dwelling in that city desired to intermarry with their own people, the daughters of Naphtali were their nearest neighbours.

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WALTER WOOD.

THE GREAT HYPERBOLE.

ST. JOHN xxi. 25.

THERE are good men who deny, or very reluctantly admit, that any inspired Scripture can ever have been lost, although there are many and unmistakable indications in the Bible itself that a considerable number of such Scriptures, once known and quoted in the Church, have not been gathered into our present Canon. It is their very respect for Scripture which impels them, at least on this point, to reject the testimony of the Scriptures. They cannot bear to think that any Divine word has been lost; and so, in the teeth of all evidence, they refuse to believe that any such word has failed to reach them. But surely there is one very large and obvious fact which they have overlooked, or have not duly weighed. For they believe, as we believe, that after the ascension of our Lord *all* the Apostles went forth to preach the gospel they had received from Him. There must, therefore, have been a Gospel according to Philip, a Gospel according to Thomas, a Gospel according to Bartholomew, Andrew, James, Jude, Simon Zelotes, as well as a Gospel according to Matthew, and another according to John, and another according to Peter (if, as is commonly assumed, Mark was only Peter's penman), and another according to Paul, which may still be recovered from his Epistles—as, indeed, it has in large measure been recovered by Dr. Matheson in the pages of this very Magazine. And these Gospels must have been inspired; for Christ had breathed upon all the Apostles; they had all received that Holy Ghost who was to shew them, and who

did shew and bring to their remembrance, all things whatsoever He had commanded them. But where are those Gospels now? Inspired Gospels, many inspired Gospels, must have been lost, whether they were only spoken Gospels, or whether, as may have been the case, they were also written out. And among these lost Gospels there must have been some which would have largely added to our knowledge both of the man Christ Jesus and of the men who wrote or uttered them.

I, for one, would give much to read the Gospel according to Thomas the Twin, the Gospel as it shaped itself in his incredulous but tenacious soul, and cannot but think that it would have been a very suitable Gospel for a sceptical age such as this. A change may have passed upon him after he received the Holy Ghost, like that which made a new man of Peter; and in that case we should have had to pick out his doubts from his beliefs, to infer what had once been most questionable to him from what he afterwards most strongly and emphatically affirmed. Or, like Matthew, he may have been raised rather than changed by the heavenly inspiration and gift, may have been illuminated and exalted rather than transformed. And, in that case, what proofs and arguments he would have plied us with, reasoning with us as he had reasoned with himself; and what a gracious toleration, what a tender and strengthening sympathy he would have shewn to as many as are content with the lower blessedness of believing because they see! In either case we can hardly doubt that the Gospel according to Thomas would have been most welcome and precious to as many as have had to fight with "the spectres of the mind," to as many as have suffered from the sceptical infections of the age.

Is his Gospel, are the Gospels of his silent brethren, for ever lost to us then? Not necessarily. As I sometimes please myself by imagining that from heaven, if I should

ever be admitted within its happy precincts, I may be allowed to see those fair or sublime earthly scenes which I have longed to see but have never been able to visit, so also I sometimes refresh myself with the hope that I may then be permitted to learn what I can never learn here, how the glad tidings of great joy took form in the minds of Thomas, Philip, Andrew, and the other holy men of whose teaching no record has been handed down to us. If there is a library in heaven—as I think there must be and trust there is, or what is to become of those of us who have spent our life in and among books?—no doubt we shall find all these lost Gospels in it; and one of the first that I shall take down from the shelves will be the Gospel according to Didymus, if at least I have eyes for aught but the gospel in the looks of his Master and mine.

Not only are there lost Gospels, Gospels lost to us for a while certainly and perhaps for ever, but also no one of the Gospels we possess affects to give us more than a brief selection of what Jesus said and did. St. John, for instance, expressly tells (Chap. xx. 30): “And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples which are not written in this book”; and this assertion is confirmed in Chapter xxi. Verses 24 and 25 of his Gospel. For these two verses are not attributed to St. John. Most of the scholars to whose opinion we defer agree in ascribing them to one of his disciples, speaking in the name of the rest,—probably one of the Ephesian elders speaking in the name of the whole presbytery. St. John had closed his Gospel at Verse 23, with words which Jesus had spoken of himself, the disciple whom He loved. And the Ephesian elders append their certificate: “*This* is that disciple who testifieth of these things, and wrote these things; and *we* know that his testimony is true. And there are also many other things which Jesus did; the which (adds the scribe who holds the pen) if they should be written every one, I suppose

that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." So that, even when the last Gospel was finished, the uppermost thought of those who had listened to the teaching of the Apostles was: "So much, indeed, has been written down; but, O, how much more has been left unwritten!"

The fact, therefore, to which we have to reconcile our minds as best we may, is that we have in our hands only a brief selection, a short summary, of the things which Jesus said and did; that of by far the larger part of the signs He wrought and the words He uttered absolutely no record has been preserved. Indeed it is impossible to read attentively the four Gospels we possess without becoming aware that the discourses they contain were spoken on a comparatively small number of occasions; and that hence by far the greater part of his teaching has been lost to the Church. And this inference is, as we have seen, confirmed and put beyond all doubt by the express testimony of St. John and his disciples.

At first sight the fact is a very unwelcome one, I confess; and if we cannot but hope that we may one day be permitted to read the Gospel according to Thomas or Philip, how much more must we hope that we may be permitted to see the original Gospel, the Gospel as it shaped itself in the mind and heart of Christ Himself! But the longer we look at this unwelcome fact the more tolerable it grows to us, the more welcome even and the more admirable.

For, as we consider it, we see, first of all, a Divine stamp or signature upon it. There is the same prodigality, the same apparent waste, in the natural world, where a thousand seeds are scattered for one that strikes root and brings forth its flowers and fruit. A man, to whom wisdom is a strain, and beauty of thought and expression a difficult achievement, may well make much of every wise and beautiful word he elaborates, and take infinite pains to plant it

in the memories of men and place it beyond the reach of accident. But if Christ was, as He claimed to be, the Son of God, we should not expect *Him* to be careful of his words or jealous for his fame. We should expect to find in Him the generous bounty, the ceaseless prodigality of Nature. So much as this, indeed, He claimed for Himself when He compared Himself to a Sower going forth to sow, and scattering the precious seed on all soils,—here to be choked by thorns, there to be pilfered by the birds of the air, and here to perish beneath the heat of the sun shining down on earth but thinly strewn over the rocks. He Himself did not expect many of his words to survive; but He knew that where they fell, as some of them did fall, into good and honest hearts, they would quicken and thrive and bring forth fruit abundantly; as, indeed, they have done throughout all the world.

We must remember, too, how impossible it was that a life and wisdom like his should be adequately set forth, let records be multiplied as they might. Men can only shew us what they see; and what they see in any teacher, human or divine, depends on the bent and limits of their several minds. Most of us have framed some conception of the prime minister of the day; but the conception in each of our minds differs from that in any other; no two of them are alike; in some measure they have taken form and colour from the minds which have framed them: and if all these various conceptions could be projected side by side upon a screen, he would have much ado to recognize himself in any one of them. And, in like manner, each of the Apostles had his own conception, his own mental image of Christ, though they all listened to the same words and saw the same signs. Hence, when we read the Gospel according to St. Matthew, if we see much of Christ in it, we also see something of Matthew; and when we read the Gospel according to St. John, if we see more of Christ,

we also see more of John, insomuch that it is often difficult to say where a discourse of Christ ends and St. John's reflections on that discourse begin.

We have but four Gospels, four memoirs of Christ, each of which is tinged with colours drawn from the mind of its author. Should we have been in better case if we had four, or forty, more? It may be doubted. When we read that had all the things which Jesus said and did been written every one, even the world itself could not have contained the books that would have been written, we smile as at an enormous exaggeration or a poetic flight. We commonly call it the great, or the sublime, hyperbole of St. John. But would it not be at once more true and more reverent to say that it is no hyperbole, but the simple truth; to admit that as no human life can be adequately set forth in words, so, much more, the deep and divine significance of what Jesus said and did, of his life who was the Life of the world, could not possibly be set forth; that no book, even though it were big as the world, could record, no words utter, all that was in Him? And if we had a book as big as the world, who could read it? If, even, the very Gospel had to be extracted from a hundred Gospels, or from a single Gospel which omitted nothing that He said or did for thirty years, or for the thirty months (say) of his public ministry, which of us could have mastered it? Only students, who gave their lives to the task, could have got to know Him; and if they wanted to make him known to the general public, they would have had to do precisely what the four inspired Evangelists have done so much better than they could do,—reduce the vast bulk to a brief compass, and select only such signs and such discourses as they held to be most characteristic or most significant.

What we *want*, therefore, we *have*. For all practical purposes we are better off with these four brief memoirs

of infinite significance in our hands than if we had a Gospel which no library could hold and no student overtake.

For the end for which these Gospels were written was not that we should come to know all about Christ—which seems to be the aim of most of our modern lives of Him; but that we should come to know Christ Himself and be brought into a vital relation with Him. They are but windows through which we look at Him as He passes by, bearing the burden of the world's sin, that He may take it away. St. John confesses that he has given us only a selection from the words and facts with which he was familiar, that he did not attempt to write in his book all the signs which Jesus did in the presence of his disciples. But he goes on to tell us (Chap. xx. 31), in words for ever memorable and full of the profoundest meaning, that he wrote what he did write in order "*that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.*" By which he did not mean simply that he wanted to persuade men that he was recording real historical facts, or even that he wanted them to recognize in Jesus the Christ long promised to the Jews. He was writing for men who already believed all that. What he wanted to do was so to set Jesus the Christ before them as to quicken and confirm in them a faith which should make Christ spiritually present to them, and influential, and supreme; so to exhibit Him as that He might be, and they might be sure that He was, their Saviour from all sin, the Prince by whose law their life was ruled, the God manifest in the flesh in order to confer on them the power of a divine and endless life, a life rooted in righteousness and clothed with radiant beauty. Out of the multitude of words and signs which thronged his memory he selected these which he thought would most clearly reveal Christ as the creative Word by whom all things were made, the Light which lighteth every man that

cometh into the world, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world, and the Life which giveth life to all. And he recorded these significant signs and words, not simply to enrich us with a new philosophy, or a new morality even, but to endow us with a new life, life in Christ, life like Christ's, a life without spot and without end.

Did he make a wise selection? Did the brief Gospel he wrote suffice to shew Christ to men and to quicken them to life in Him? Let the event reply. Even in the lifetime of the Apostle thousands were brought to know Christ by the words he wrote, and so to know Him as to become new men in Him. And ever since that age his Gospel has proved a very river of the water of life, carrying life wherever it has come, and leaving broad margins of verdure and fruitfulness on either bank. Yea, let our own hearts reply. For which of us has not been quickened and gladdened by this living stream? which of us has not learned to know Jesus the Christ, the Son of God, the Saviour of the world, from the discourses which St. John has reported, with a fulness, a joy, a wonder, we should never have felt but for these life-giving words? Over these words indeed, so simple in their form, but in their significance so inexhaustible and profound, more than any other words even in the Bible itself, the Spirit of all Wisdom broods and moves with creative and redeeming energy. Above all other words they are spirit, and they are life.

Though, then, we must admit that whole Gospels have been lost to us, and that in our canonical Gospels we have only a selection from what Jesus did and said, I do not think we need regret that many Gospels have been lost, at least for the present, or that whole libraries have not been filled with the records of the Son of Man. Enough has been given for present use, enough to secure such a knowledge of Him as will bring us everlasting life; and the rest may be accorded us in the ample leisure of

eternity, when we are taken to dwell in the many mansions of the Father's House,—in which there surely must be room for all the Gospels ever written or spoken, even though they would make a book too big for this world to contain.

ALMONI PELONI.

THE REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT.

THE STYLE.

THERE are two competing theories of translation: one, in which the predominant object is to express as exactly as possible the full force and meaning of every turn of phrase in the original, and the other in which the predominant object is to produce a result which shall not read like a translation at all, but which shall move in its new dress with the same ease as in that which is native to it. I say in each case the predominant object; for in the hands of good translators neither the one nor the other of these two things can ever be entirely ignored. The question would be merely which should come first, and which second, in the translator's mind; and when the two conflict and it is necessary to make a choice between them, on which side the sacrifice should be made.

Very roughly speaking, it may be said that these two theories have their head-quarters in our two oldest universities. At Cambridge, scholarship is more exact and close; at Oxford, it is looser but has in it larger affinities with general literary culture. It is quite possible that this distinction may not be permanent, and that it may be due in a measure to personal influences which may be changed and even reversed in the future; and yet it would seem to be not without connexion with the traditional lines of

study pursued respectively on the Isis and on the Cam. Anyhow, the distinction is, I believe, generally recognized as a fact. It will be sufficiently clear to any one who will open two such very representative books as Prof. Jowett's translations of Plato or Thucydides, and Bishop Ellicott's translations of St. Paul's Epistles. Or, again, it would be well illustrated by a piece of advice which I once heard given in a Balliol lecture-room: "Remember, gentlemen, that style is the first thing and accuracy the second"—a piece of advice which, if I am not mistaken, would shock the righteous soul of a Cambridge don, and which, it is only fair to say, had been pretty nearly inverted by a tutor of an older school not many days before.

If there is, then, such a different colour and complexion to the scholarship of the two universities, it was naturally a question of much importance to which of the two the work of revision would chiefly fall. It should be borne in mind that the movement in favour of Revision had been from the first rather specially identified with Cambridge. Prof. Scholefield, Archbishop Trench, Dean Alford, Bishops Ellicott and Lightfoot, were all Cambridge men. And among all the advocates of Revision there were none so eminent and influential as these. It was therefore not at all surprising if, in the final distribution of the work, by far the larger share fell to Cambridge men. To the New Testament Committee as originally constituted, Cambridge contributed no less than fifteen members: Archbishop Trench, Bishops Ellicott and Harold Browne, Deans Alford, Bickersteth and Merivale, Professors Hort, Kennedy, Lightfoot and Westcott, Dr. Scrivener and Dr. Vaughan, Canon Blakesley and Mr. W. G. Humphry. Of these all but two or three (Dean Alford was removed by death, and the Archbishop of Dublin retired after attending 63 sittings) took an active and energetic part in the work. The Oxford contingent on the other hand numbered from first to last

only five names, Bishops Moberly of Salisbury, and C. Wordsworth of St. Andrews, Dean Stanley, Dr. Scott Dean of Rochester, and Archdeacon Palmer. And of these it would seem that Bishop Moberly attended only on 121 occasions (out of 407) and the Bishop of St. Andrew's only on 100,¹ while Archdeacon Palmer joined the Committee some time after it began its sittings.²

As an Oxford man myself I have no wish to complain of this disproportionate representation. It was perfectly justified by the state of New Testament scholarship in the two Universities and the degree of interest taken in the question. I merely state a matter of fact. And I suspect that the real balance of voting power on the Cambridge side would be greater even than it would seem to be, for the tendency of Nonconformist scholarship appears to be all in the Cambridge direction.

We shall thus be prepared to find, as we do find, in the Revised Version a very decided leaning towards the first of the two theories of translation of which I spoke. From the results of their work, as well as from the expressed opinions of the Revisers, it is clear that accuracy has been the first and dominating consideration, and that the question of style has held a secondary place.

I have little doubt that in principle it was well that it should be so. The method of considering, as the first and main thing, how the passage translated sounds in English, is open to serious objections. It is very liable to convey a mistaken, it is sure not to convey a full, idea of the mean-

¹ These figures are taken from the *Quarterly Review*, January, 1882, p. 62.

² It is true that the paper read by Archdeacon Palmer at the Church Congress shewed that he was quite in harmony with the majority of the Committee; nor do I at all mean to imply that the Oxford members would be ranged on one side and the Cambridge members on the other. If the Bishop of St. Andrews has protested against the method pursued by the Committee, his brother of Lincoln and the Archbishop of Dublin have done very much the same thing, and it is commonly understood that Dean Merivale expressed his disapproval by withdrawing.

ing of the original. It is apt to smooth down individualities of expression and to obliterate the idiosyncrasy of the writer. But it is needless to say that if ever there was a book in which such a process was to be deprecated and avoided it was the Bible. If ever there was a book in which the minutest shades of characterization should have the fullest play, and the very maximum of meaning should be wrung out of the text, it was precisely the one the translation of which the Committee sat down to revise.

All this I acknowledge in the amplest manner possible. I believe that the Committee were bound to fix upon the very best Greek text that they could find. They were bound to seek, as well as they could, for the exact words which the Apostles and Evangelists wrote. And having ascertained these within reasonable probability, they were bound to base their translation upon them, undeterred by any consideration as to whether they were likely to be acceptable or accepted, prepared to face a certain amount of inevitable obloquy, and content to leave the ultimate result to time. Having done this, they were further bound in all places where truth of opinion was involved to give what they considered to be the best and most probable interpretation; it was, besides, highly desirable that they should do the utmost in their power to bring out any characteristic features, however seemingly insignificant. They were right to consider nothing beneath their notice; for in Scripture, as in science, experience teaches that nothing is really "common or unclean," and that points apparently trivial may at any time start up into unexpected importance.

And yet the translator must exercise a certain amount of discretion. It will be necessary for him to estimate the degree of probability which he will regard as decisive. He will have to determine what he will endeavour to convey by translation, and what he will reserve for other means of

communication—Greek Testament lectures, Bible classes, Sunday schools, and the like; and in places where there is a conflict between different considerations, he will have to decide which is to yield.

My own grounds of complaint against the Revisers would be mainly three. (i.) That they have thought themselves obliged to do what might have been safely and with advantage left to other agencies: (ii.) That they have not attached sufficient importance to a free and natural English diction and rhythm: and (iii.) that in a variety of ways they have not allowed enough for the principle of Association, either as enhancing the value of existing renderings or as raising objections to new ones.

These three counts may be summed up in the one which is so commonly heard, and to which I feel compelled to assent, that they have made a great number of needless and, on the whole, detrimental changes.

Before I proceed to enlarge further on these points, I should like to clear my conscience by saying how much I regret to find myself obliged to urge them. The very things which, from a critical point of view, I cannot help regarding as errors of judgment, from a moral point of view excite my most sincere admiration. It would have been much easier for the Revisers to make few changes than to make many. It would have cost them less trouble (though perhaps not so much as might be thought at first sight), and it would have ensured them success. If they had made a sixth part of the changes they have done, their work would have been received with acclamation. The few grumbling Progressists would have remained unnoticed, and popular gratitude would have crowned their labours. But they deliberately cast this prospect aside. They deliberately girded themselves to a much more formidable task than that of removing the more obvious blemishes. They set themselves to reconsider the Authorised Version word by word, and to

correct everything, however trivial, which seemed to need correction. It was an heroic decision; and it has been carried out with heroic patience, fidelity, and care. The result is a work of the greatest value, a work which has stirred, and will continue to stir, the English mind to its very depths, and compel men to study their Bibles in a way in which they never had studied them before. It has banished dilettantism from ministers and people for many a long day. Thirty-six thousand alterations, and each with a reason to be discovered and thought over! There is an intellectual stimulus, which cannot help becoming a moral stimulus as well. And the Version will do much to satisfy many of the questions which it raises. And yet, while fully recognizing this, and while believing most sincerely that the Revised Version has a momentous office to fulfil in the Providential ordering of events for this, and it may be for more than this, generation, I cannot at the same time resist the conclusion that viewed with reference to its avowed object, to give a Revised Bible to the English speaking peoples for general and common use, and viewed as it is in its present form, it is nothing less than a failure.

Let me distinguish. So far as the text is concerned, I think, as well as I am able to judge, that the Revisers are right in the main. But I dare not speak too positively. There are still motes here and there "to trouble the mind's eye." And I could have wished that a few more years had elapsed, so that the question might have received a thorough discussion. The Revisers have boldly anticipated the judgment of posterity, and time only can shew whether posterity will endorse what has been done.

As to the interpretative scholarship my own opinion would be worth little. But the criticisms that have been passed by eminent men like Canon Evans and Dr. Field, in by far the greater number of instances, I confess, carry conviction. They seem to shew, what is especially dis-

appointing, that the Version does not even embody the best scholarship that was to be had. And in more than one case the serious doubt is raised, whether, supposing the Revised Version to represent the scholarship of to-day, it is likely to continue to represent the scholarship of to-morrow. While the old translators trusted more to common sense and less to rigid law, the new translators have inverted these relations: and yet in not a few instances a wider learning or a more searching analysis seems to shew that after all common sense was right.

Under this head the success is less complete than I had hoped. But it is in regard to my present subject—style, that the shortcoming seems to me to be greatest. And it is here especially that there is much that I should wish to see simply undone.

The three counts mentioned above very frequently coalesce in one, and I hope to give some examples of them presently. But, as I have hinted, a shorter way of stating them would be to give utterance to the wish that the Revisers had thought rather more highly of the Authorised Version, and had been rather less sanguine as to their ability to alter it for the better.

There is another kind of truth besides verbal accuracy; there is a truth of feeling, a truth of effect; and this I cannot but think that the Revisers have too much left out of sight. The Authorised Version owed its birth to the grandest epoch in the history of the English people. Great thoughts and great emotions filled the air. There was an outburst of poetry such as had never been seen before and has not been seen since. And while men's minds were steeped in poetry, they were also steeped in religion. The distracting fields of science and business were either closed, or else, where they were open, appealed to the imagination in ways in which few things appeal to it now. The whole element of prose was much more restricted than it has since

become. Even that which was in name prose felt the poetic afflatus in every line; and with this poetic afflatus another, no less mighty, was combined,—the afflatus of faith. Is it not a perilous undertaking to correct work done under such conditions? Are the conditions of our modern life at all equally favourable? An age that seems to be incapable of composing a single prayer—that can only substitute for the fresh gush of religious feeling a cento of phrases borrowed from bygone times, or else a cold sermon in brief, lifeless and uninspired¹—was this the age to remould that which had once come warm from the pens of martyrs, the living product of the best years of English religion? I do not for a moment wish to cast a doubt upon the sincere goodness of those honoured men who formed the New Testament Committee. But their goodness is of a different and essentially more prosaic cast. In a humbler, though perhaps larger sphere, the present age has achievements of its own to record.

“ But yet I know, where'er I go,
That there hath passed away a glory from the earth.”

And that glory once gone, no art and no care of man can recall.

It would be as absurd as it would be unjust to find fault with the Revisers for not possessing a qualification which they could not, by the nature of the case, possess. But that which one regrets is that they seem to have felt so little misgiving on this score. If they had felt it, they would surely have held their hand many a time when they have not done so.

The department in which the poetic sense would especially make itself felt is that of rhythm and the choice of

¹ Who, for instance, has ever seen in print or heard a contemporary prayer fit to compare for a moment with the collects in the Book of Common Prayer (translated or original), or with the “Devotions” of Bishop Andrewes and other writers of the 16th and 17th centuries?

words. And, strange to say, a number of writers and speakers have treated these as matters of quite subordinate, not to say insignificant, moment. If the Bible were a manual of science or philosophy, I should agree with this estimate. But the Bible has little to do with science or philosophy; nor yet is it, as it used to be thought, a mere storehouse of cut and dried dogmas. It is the book of religion; and of religion not stereotyped in formal phrase, but tingling with a rich and powerful life from end to end. The Bible is the book of religion, and its object is to touch and stir the hearts of men. For this end rhythm and the choice of words are far from being unimportant. They may just make all the difference between a thought falling flat and dead, and the same thought striking a spark and kindling a flame. Where would poetry be without its rhythm and without its felicities of diction? And yet the New Testament, like a great part of the Old, is really of the nature of poetry; and this is one of the secrets of its power. It hardly seems to have been realized that the task of revising the familiar version of the New Testament is, to a certain real extent, as if one should sit down to "revise" (*i.e.*, very often "re-write") "Hamlet" or "Paradise Lost." It is strange what an amount of dulness of perception there seems to be on this subject. Some one (I forget who) has somewhere said that the Charity-chapter may be read in its new form without any sense of loss—"Charity suffereth long and is kind"—"Love suffereth long and is kind." He that hath ears to hear let him hear!

I will dwell for a moment on this question of Charity or Love, because it is a good example of the point that I am urging. I had made up my mind that the change was inevitable, however much it was to be lamented. Arguments such as those ably stated by Mr. Beet in this Magazine, seemed as if they must needs overpower the less tangible reasons alleged on the other side. Even the

fact that—to say nothing of this particular chapter, itself perhaps the most exquisite piece of English prose that ever was penned—a whole train of beautiful associations, ranging from the Vulgate to the Book of Common Prayer and from Giotto to Bunyan, would be destroyed at one fell stroke; even this did not seem sufficient to sustain the weight of the theological considerations which connected the “Love” of 1 Corinthians xiii. with that of Romans xiii. and St. John. But on returning to the subject with the counter arguments of Canon Evans¹ and others before me, I am tempted to think that “Charity” might have been allowed to stand, with “Love” in the margin and a reference to Romans xiii., etc. At any rate a procedure is absolutely intolerable which leads to such a rendering as that in the Revised Version of 2 Peter i. 7, “In your faith supply virtue. . . . And in your godliness love of the brethren; *and in your love of the brethren love.*” How the distinguished scholars who formed the New Testament Committee could possibly acquiesce in such a version as this, it is to me difficult to conceive.

While I am speaking of 1 Corinthians xiii. I will venture upon two observations. The first is that if in Verse 1 “a tinkling cymbal” (admirably as the sound harmonizes with the keynote of the whole chapter) is too light for the kind of noise intended, “clanging” is also too heavy, besides being awkward in itself. I would venture to suggest “clashing”² as unobjectionable on these grounds and more nearly representing the real sound of cymbals, which the Greek also well imitates. With still more diffidence I could ask whether Verse 3 is not one of those rare instances in which we might attempt to improve upon the Authorised rendering. “Bestow all my goods to feed the poor,” is

¹ See *The Speaker's Commentary*, N. T., vol. iii. p. 376.

² A reference to Skeat's *Etymological Dictionary* will shew that the radical idea in the word is sound, and not, as might be thought, collision.

at once a cumbrous and a poor rendering of *ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου*, though it gives a breadth of phrase which comes in happily for the rhythm. Have we not a word in English which has come to mean very much the same thing as *ψωμίζειν*? We speak of “parish *doles*” for “gifts of food”; and might we not in like manner here say, “give away . . . in *doles*” or “*dole away*”? This would recall the crowds of poor gathered round the gates of a monastery or a church porch, with a kindly (or unkindly) almoner.

It will be said that the considerations on which stress has been laid above tell no more against the present Revision than against all Revision. It is true that they do tell against it, as far as they go. The scientific defects of the Old Version, however, seem as if they would make revision necessary sooner or later. We should have therefore to limit ourselves to the practical compromise, that in any Version the great object should be to obtain a maximum of accuracy with an absolute minimum of change, and that in all cases of real doubt the existing text should be left undisturbed. This is in effect very much what the Convocation of Canterbury had laid down, with that wise instinct which is so constantly found in large bodies of men. Nor would I question the fact that the Revisers have kept the rule of making none but “necessary” changes, in view, and that they have fully believed that the changes that they have made were necessary. But as to the judgment and success with which they have carried out their task, I must confess in many instances to very grave doubts indeed.

I am well aware of the excessive difficulties of the problem. The more fully that problem is realized the more formidable will it appear, and the more conscious we shall be that it is one which would tax to the uttermost the very finest scholarship that the country can produce. And yet the country *does* possess fine scholarship. To say that

the English people are not capable of revising their own Version is a confession of weakness that we are not yet compelled to make.

Let me give a few examples of what I mean by "fine scholarship," and let me illustrate at the same time the great desideratum of a "maximum of accuracy with a minimum of change." Here is an example from a recent number of the EXPOSITOR. It was shewn that ὥστε with the infinitive lays stress upon the cause in contradistinction to the effect; that therefore it was not strictly correct to say (as in both versions of Matt. xiii. 32) "it becometh a tree, *so that* the birds of the air come and lodge in the branches thereof." The difficulty is met by simply writing "*for* the birds of the air *to* come," etc. Again objection was justly taken to the uncouth and scarcely intelligible rendering of the new reading in Acts xxvi. 16 "to appoint thee a minister and a witness both *of the things wherein* thou hast seen Me, and of *the things wherein* I will appear unto thee." How much nearer to the English idiom is the simple yet accurate rendering suggested to me by Canon Evans, "*how* thou hast seen Me, and *how* I will appear to thee." Similarly in Luke xi. 41 the new Version is "give for alms *those things that are within*"; but putting aside for a moment the question of interpretation, how much better is it to say, as Canon Evans has also suggested to me, "give for alms *what you can*!" There is a clear distinction between ἰάσθαι and θεραπεύειν (θεραπεία) and this both Canon Evans and Dr. Field, independently of each other, propose to express by "heal" and "cure." The mention of Dr. Field reminds me of those beautiful notes, the third part of the "Otium Norvicense," which it has been the good fortune of the Revision to call forth. They are a perfect repertory not only of wide and remarkably apposite learning, combined with originality and independence of view, but also in an especial sense of the particular quality

of which I am speaking. The force of the preposition has hitherto been lost in *προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον*, but all the change that is needed is to substitute "come" for "go"—"*come up higher.*" *τολμήσας εἰσῆλθε* is not "went in boldly" but "*took courage and went in.*" *οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀνέγνωτε ὃ ἐποίησε Δαβὶδ* in Luke vi. 3, is not "Have ye not read even this *what* David did"—which would be *τι ἐποίησε* as in the other Gospels—but "*this that* David did." Other proposed renderings, perhaps rather more doubtful but in style very attractive, are Matthew xiii. 12. "To him shall it be given and *given in abundance*"; Matthew xxvii. 24, "When Pilate saw that he *did no good*"; and John xii. 19, "Perceive ye that ye *do no good* at all"; Mark i. 30, *κατέκειτο* "*kept her bed*" (which is found in the Authorised Version of Exod. xxi. 18, and seems to be admissible); Mark vi. 26 "and would not *disappoint* her" (*ἀθετηῆσαι*); Luke xv. 13, *ζῶν ἀσώτως* "with *prodigal* living," where Dr. Field seems to have shown that "profligate expenditure" is the leading idea of the word, not to speak of the link which is thus supplied with the familiar title of the parable; 1 Corinthians iv. 6, *μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἑμᾶυτόν* "I have transferred *by a fiction* to myself and Apollos." This last I cannot help thinking a specially happy and luminous translation.

Somewhat bolder and more elaborate would be the rendering "*pair or compare,*" proposed by Mr. Waite¹ for the difficult *ἐγκρίναι ἢ συγκρίναι* of 2 Cor. x. 12 where the play on words is dropped entirely in the Authorised Version and Revised Version, "We are not bold to *number* or *compare* ourselves with," etc. (Revised Version adding in the margin, Gr. *to judge ourselves among, or to judge ourselves with*). I very much hope that all these three names may

¹ I should have quoted more examples from Mr. Waite's excellent Commentary but that they are for the most part fitted rather for a Commentary than a Version. There is, however, abundant evidence of a remarkable command of English diction and power of moulding it into a suitable shape.

appear on the Committee which I suppose will sooner or later revise the Revision. They would strengthen it just on the point where it seems to be weakest; for, with all the learning and exegetical ability represented upon it, I fear that it cannot be credited with a very fine discretion or with great dexterity in the handling of English. How few of the renderings can be described as "felicitous!" A spirit of diligent and conscientious care reigns over all, but ease and grace are lost in the mechanical application of rules.

Errors of omission I cannot help thinking that there are some,¹ but errors of commission I suspect that there are very many more. At the head of these comes the ominously long list of passages where the Old Version might well have been allowed to stand, and where it has been altered simply for the worse. It is hard to imagine what can have induced such a change as that in 1 Corinthians v. 1, where it has been shewn² that the Authorised Version was "beautifully correct," while the new rendering is not only bad Greek, but attributes to the Apostle an indelicacy which he would have been the last to commit. Not less certainly wrong would seem to be such a rendering as "I beheld Satan *fallen*, as lightning from heaven." Nor is there any gain in accuracy to compensate for the feebleness of "Herodias *set herself against him*" (ἐνείχευ αὐτῷ) or for such an unwieldy phrase as, "perceiving in himself that *the power proceeding from him had gone forth*,"

¹ Of the real difficulties of New Testament translation some have been faced but with very doubtful success (*c.g.* σκάνδαλον, σκανδαλίζω), but many have been left untouched. Perhaps the hardest word in the whole Greek Testament is ψυχικός, and I am not at all prepared to say that in regard to this abstention was not best. And yet "natural" is hardly even a paraphrase of the Greek. Would it be possible to borrow a hint from the old rendering of Jude 19 (a typical verse for the understanding of the word) and translate not "sensual" but "sensuous"? The ψυχή expresses itself in the life of the senses. I see that δικαίωμα, in Rom. v. 18, is translated "act of righteousness"; might not "justifying act" be better?

² See the EXPOSITION, Jan. 1882, p. 4 ff.; also March, p. 164 ff.

or for the bad grammar of "I am *he that beareth witness of myself*"; or for the contextual difficulty of "*every evening* (Gk. *whenever evening came*, margin) he went forth out of the city";¹ or for such unnatural English as "having a *great* priest over the house of God."²

It is on points like this last that the Revisers seem to me to be most at fault. They have courageously driven their ploughshare through the beautiful English of the Old Version, too little heeding what they uproot and too little sensitive as to what they put in its place. Noble idioms like "this is the Lord's doing," "neither bid him God speed"; flashes of poetry that light up all their contexts like "vials of wrath," "and the Lamb is the light thereof"; sound native forcible English, like "a strong delusion," "the string of his tongue was loosed," "enter into thy closet," "sue thee at the law," "much people," "vex certain of the church," "the birds of the air," "wages of iniquity," "brightness of his glory," must all go; and in their stead we are to have such expressions as "come and break your fast," "after they had broken their fast," "the vessels of the potter are broken to shivers." Here are some specimens of the treatment of a single word.

AUTHORISED VERSION.

Matt. vi. 25. Is not the life more than meat and the body than raiment?

Matt. x. 10. The workman is worthy of his meat.

Acts ii. 46. [They] did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart.

REVISED VERSION.

Is not the life more *than the food*, and the body than the raiment?

The labourer is worthy of his *food*.

They did *take their food* with gladness and singleness of heart.

¹ For the last four examples (to which many might be added, *e.g.* Acts vii. 35; x. 28; Rom. xv. 20; 1 Cor. x. 13; xiv. 8; 2 Pet. iii. 8), see Dr. Field's *Otium Norvicense*, pars tertia, which I never open without increasing admiration.

² See *The Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1882, p. 38. I have contested the views of this uncompromising critic as regards the Revised Text, but I find myself too much in sympathy with him as regards the *Translation*.

Who would not wince at hearing the new version of these passages read! It was one of the excellences of the Old Version, that with all its simplicity of speech it so seldom loses its dignity; though treating of common things it is rarely,¹ if ever, itself common. Of this the passages before us were a good example. They have just the quality of poetry. By the use of a word slightly unusual, but in no way affected or unnatural, base associations are cut away and the elevated level of the discourse or narrative is left unimpaired. For us the effect is still happier than it probably was originally, for the word has now grown thoroughly into its place; it is like a stone that is mossed and lichened over and that only adds to the beauty of its surroundings. But because there was something anomalous about it, a piece of glaring new red brick must needs be put in its place.

I shall be told no doubt that "meat" would be understood to mean "butcher's meat." In the North, where I am writing, this objection would not apply. But what else are Sunday Schools for if not to remove such elementary blunders as these? At the worst no great harm was done—nothing to compare with the harm of ruining a masterpiece and fixing a stamp of commonness and *βαρυσία* upon words to which they are utterly alien.

The rule that has worked the greatest mischief is probably that of uniform rendering. To this fetish of uniformity it is hard to say how many beauties have been sacrificed. I am not speaking now of such irregular and illicit beauties as "whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away." One must needs steel one's heart to the loss of these, lovely as they are, and wistfully as one cannot but think of them. It is not

¹ Just, perhaps, in such cases as Phil. ii. 1; Col. iii. 12; 1 John iii. 17; and there is an occasional lapse of another kind, like "*Occupy*, till I come."

however of them that I am speaking, but rather of those quiet and unobtrusive beauties which arise merely from choosing the English idiom which corresponds most nearly to the Greek, and which is most appropriate to the particular context, without being rigidly tied down by the rendering given to the same word elsewhere. On this point I would cordially echo the words of Dean Perowne. "In the case of different writers, or even in all places of the same writer, where the word is not characteristic, and where it occurs in a very different context, to attempt to render it uniformly by one English word is mere pedantry, and is the surest way to destroy all freedom, and all dignity of language. In English, as in all languages, a word takes a peculiar colouring from its neighbourhood. A light is flashed upon it, a shadow touches it, according to the place it holds in a sentence. Few words present always the same unchanging aspect. It is quite impossible, therefore, with any regard for English idiom, with any feeling for delicacy, or beauty, or strength of expression, to keep one word in one language as the sole equivalent of a word in another."¹ This is no idle æstheticism. No one knows by what subtle channels of association words have an effect upon the mind. But we may be sure that the poetical element enters in largely here, and that any harshness, stiffness, or crudity of expression will blunt its edge and destroy its force in a way for which no amount of dogmatic or exegetical accuracy can atone.

I have spoken of Dr. Perowne's criticism; and I cannot but think that of all those that the Revision has called forth, though one of the earliest, it is still one of the very best. Almost all that it contained on the subject of style I should be glad to adopt word for word. Four ways especially are pointed out in which the Revisers have erred. (i.) In the direction of too great literalism; (ii.) in the

¹ *Contemporary Review*, July, 1881, p. 163.

inversion of order (a very frequent and vexatious form of change); (iii.) in the uses of tenses; (iv.) in the use or omission of the article. The last two points may perhaps raise questions on which I should hesitate to pronounce confidently. But I should like to add to the instances given of an objectionable use of the tenses, one in particular that has struck me, and that I have not seen commented on elsewhere; I mean the attempt to reproduce exactly the historic present. There can be no doubt that the use of this tense is more common in Greek than in English; and the old translators, with the admirable instinct which characterized them, frequently ignore it. In this it is much to be regretted that their successors have not followed them. The consequence is a painful loss of solemnity in some places where it was most needed. Let any one read the fifteenth chapter of St. Mark's Gospel, and he will, I think, understand what I mean. In other ways, too, this chapter will illustrate the effect produced by petty changes. It is indeed generally in the Gospels that this is most felt. The pure pellucid flow of the old narratives is gone. The movement has become stiff and wooden, and that just where those qualities are most fatal. In the more argumentative portions of the Epistles we are often conscious of a distinct gain in clearness and accuracy, but in the Gospels the wish will many a time rise to the surface, Would that the old familiar words had been let alone!

In looking back over the Version one is reminded of the architectural restoration of some of our great churches and cathedrals. I do not mean of course the ruthless vandalism of Wyatt and the men of his day, but some of the severer restorations that have taken place within our own memory. The architect has had an ample knowledge of his craft; he has been well instructed in the true laws of Gothic; and he has applied them with a conscientiousness in which the only fault is that it is too rigorous and thorough. The

whitewash is gone and the intrusive monuments have been swept away, all manner of miscellaneous and anachronistic additions have been removed, and a fine regularity and symmetry takes the place of the old unscientific jumble of many ages and many styles. An impressive uniformity and completeness is the result. And yet, with the rubbish, not a few details have disappeared which had got naturalized in their place and possessed an interest and value and beauty of their own; and the worshipper, especially if his own hair is grey, feels less at home and less happy in the midst of these straight lines and unbroken curves than he used to do when his eyes could linger on the quaint niches and corners, and lovingly trace the historical eccentricities of the old building, as he knew it when he was a boy.

Or, again, one is reminded, with some necessary deduction from the degree of censure which they might seem to convey, of the pathetic lines in which Wordsworth describes his boyish experiences of "Nutting."

"Then up I rose
And dragged to earth both branch and bough, with crash
And merciless ravage; and the shady nook
Of hazels, and the green and mossy bower,
Deformed and sullied, patiently gave up
Their quiet being; and unless I now
Confound my present feelings with the past;
Ere from the mutilated bower I turned,
Exulting, rich beyond the wealth of kings,
I felt a sense of pain when I beheld
The silent trees, and saw the intruding sky—
Then, dearest Maiden, move along these shades
In gentleness of heart; with gentle hand
Touch—for there is a spirit in the woods."

It is impossible to praise too highly the courage, the conscientiousness, the singleness of purpose, with which the Revisers of the New Testament have accomplished what they felt to be their duty; but I could have earnestly

wished that they had had a gentler, and a lighter, and a more delicate and sensitive hand. For surely in these woods too—in these woods much more—“there is a spirit,” which a rude transplanting is only too apt to expel.

W. SANDAY.

THE SENSE IN WHICH ST. PAUL CALLS
HIMSELF AN ECTROMA.

1 CORINTHIANS XV. 8.

“And last of all, as if it were unto the *ectroma*, he appeared also unto me.”

I.

It is obvious that the word *ectroma* is here applied in a highly figurative sense. But in order to determine the notion which it is intended metaphorically to convey, it will be necessary, in the first instance, to ascertain as precisely as we can the sense which the writer attributed to the term taken literally. In this latter enquiry the obvious course to pursue is, first of all, to refer to its use in that Hellenistical translation of the Old Testament which both the Apostle himself and the Christians whom he was addressing were constantly in the habit of perusing. In the Septuagint, then, the word *ectroma* occurs three times. The passages as given in that translation are as follows:—

(1) Numbers xii. 12, “Lest she become,” (or, according to another reading, “Let her not become,”) “as if a thing like unto death, as if an *ectroma* coming forth out of its mother’s womb.”

(2) Job iii. 16, “or an *ectroma* coming out of its mother’s womb, or as babes which saw not the light.”

(3) Ecclesiastes vi. 3, "I said, Good above him is the *ectroma*."

In both the second and the third of these passages the context makes it certain, that the particular object, which, in the Hebrew designated as *nephel*, is described by the LXX. as *ectroma*, is a still-born fetus. In the first passage it appears as subsisting in a lower stage of development than the *νήπιοι* who plainly are still-born. In the third passage the Preacher enlarges upon the circumstances of its condition thus: "For it came in vanity, and departeth in darkness, and its name shall be covered in darkness; moreover it shall not see the sun." In the first passage the Seventy have interpolated the words "as if an *ectroma*," not found in the Hebrew, apparently as a gloss on the preceding words "as if a thing like unto death." This confirms the conclusion that in their view an *ectroma* was a dead thing.

That deduction is corroborated by the sense of *nephel*, the Hebrew equivalent of *ectroma*, in the only other instance in which it occurs in the Hebrew Bible. This is Psalm lviii. 8, "As a snail which melteth let every one of them pass away; like the *nephel* of a woman, that they may not see the sun." In this case the LXX follows another reading of the Hebrew text, for which see p. 278. In reference to this Hebrew noun, Gesenius, in his *Thesaurus (in voc.)*, notes that it is used in the same sense in the Talmud.

Philo, St. Paul's somewhat senior coeval, employs the word *ectroma* with the same signification.

But the proof that this is the true and only meaning of *ectroma* is not found only in the usage of Hellenistic Greek: it appears also to have uniformly this signification in other Greek writers as well. It occurs repeatedly in Hippocrates, a medical writer of the fifth century before Christ; in Aristotle, in works of his on natural science; and in Galen, in the second century of the Christian era. I am apprized

by a letter which I have seen, written by a physician who is also a classical scholar, and who has investigated its use in Hippocrates and Aristotle, that "the result of his researches is that *ectroma* always means a lifeless abortion."

One more point of evidence may be mentioned, one which may be justly considered as of decisive cogency: this is the sense in which Greek commentators, and Greek grammarians, illustrating the use of noticeable phrases, have interpreted *ectroma*. They concur in giving it the meaning of an imperfectly formed still-born embryo.¹

In our Authorised Version, the word *nephel*, both in the two passages (Job iii. 16, and Eccles. vi. 3) in which the Septuagint renders it *ectroma*, and in Psalm lviii. 8, the remaining instance of its occurrence in the Hebrew Bible, is represented by "untimely birth." This follows Luther's lead, who in each case gives in his German Bible "unzeitige Geburt."

This being so, it is difficult to understand on what grounds, in this passage of St. Paul, most of the English Versions, including the recent Revised form of the Authorised Version, have departed from the rendering which with all consistency Luther gives here also, and have substituted for it "one born out of due time;" the only important exceptions that I know being Wickliff's Version, which has "a dead-born child," and the Roman Catholic Version of Rheims which, following the Vulgate, gives with apparently the same sense "an abortive." We are naturally led to ask, Is any different notion intended to be conveyed by this substituted form, as compared with the "untimely birth" given in the three above-cited passages in the Old Testament? Can this new phrase be designed to suggest, or at all events to leave room for, the notion of (say) a seven-months child born alive and likely to live? If so, we are bound to

¹ The particulars which substantiate these statements the reader will find in an Additional Note, pp. 277-280.

take account of the fact that this last interpretation of the term is resisted by its use in every single passage adduced from any Greek writer; in no one instance, so far as I have been able to ascertain, does the word *ectroma* occur with reference to an ante-dated *living* birth.

The circumlocutory phrase "untimely birth" indicates, *i.e.*, points (so to speak) to the whereabouts of, the object recited by *ectroma*, without precisely naming it. In two respects it fails of being an exact equivalent: (1) it puts forward the notion of time, whereas the Greek word estimated by its etymological import makes no reference whatever to time; (2) it does not directly express the abortive character of the product, while *ineffectualness*, *frustration*, appears to be the predominant notion of the Greek word. "Abortion" will seem to be more nearly equivalent; for the "an abortive" of the Rheims Version is hardly English. The rendering "untimely birth," however, is recommended to our acceptance by the consideration that it naturally points the reader's attention back to those other passages in the Bible which plainly shew its meaning. Only, the reader of the English Bible will need to be warned that, in the original Greek, there is no such reference to *time* in the word *ectroma* as can be regarded as forming a connecting link between the word and the context: the supposition that there is, will prove, as I venture to think, altogether misleading.¹

¹ We have in the case before us one exemplification amongst many of that entirely unembarrassed outspokenness in respect to natural objects, which is characteristic of the virile tone of ancient literature, but which would be felt to be revolting in a writer of the present day, when all our literature (except of course such as is of a purely professional character), as well as the language of our public speakers and of our social intercourse, is so deeply pervaded and toned by sympathy for the feelings of the female sex. The difference between ancient and modern times in this respect is very remarkable; but in no portion of the literature of antiquity is it more noticeable than in our Sacred Books; for in these it strikes us the more in proportion as the moral tone characterizing these is the more elevated and pure. For other examples, we may refer in particular to such passages as Acts xi. 3; Gal. v. 12; Phil. iii. 2, 3, all in the Greek.

The whole evidence points to one conclusion, from which as I apprehend there is no escape: the meaning in which the Apostle here uses the word *ectroma* is that of the immature embryo which has come away from its parent in a miscarriage. Casting about for an image which shall adequately express the intense feeling which at this moment oppresses him of the utter insignificance of his own self-achieved moral and spiritual development, apart from the grace of God and as contrasted with the place among the Apostles nevertheless conferred upon him, he can find it only here,—in the diminutive imperfectly moulded creature which has been arrested at the very lowest initial stage of humanity and is lying there before your eyes dead.¹

The same intense consciousness of his own moral nothingness while in view of his having been called to be an Apostle, which in the present instance impels St. Paul to

The remark does not apply to such passages as Rom. i. 26, 27; 1 Cor. vii. 3, where the introduction of such references was a matter of grave necessity or solemn importance.

In how great a degree the Hebrew mind was familiar with the *ectroma* as a subject of thought, is evidenced already by the passages above cited from the Old Testament Scriptures. As a further illustration of this, I cannot forbear from referring to a rabbinical passage, in other respects very remarkable, which Dr. Biesenthal (*Trostschreiben des Apostels Paulus an die Hebräer*, p. 104) quotes from "the oldest Jewish Haggada," tracing an analogy between Isaiah and the Messiah, as severally dealing with "God's children." The Messiah is apprized by God of "a week's suffering" appointed for Him: "if Thou art grieved thereat, I will henceforth drive them away into exile. The Messiah answered, Lord of the World, with heart's-joy and delight do I take upon me all these sufferings, so that not one single soul out of Israel shall perish. But not the living only shall in my days be succoured, but also the dead! yea, even those that long ago from the time of Adam have deceased! yea, even the untimely births, and those that were only in Thy will to be created but not yet have been created! yea, that is my will! that do I undertake!"

¹ This is no new conception of the sense of the passage. After writing as above, I found in Theodoret's comment on it a very similar sentence even: "Desiring to stigmatise himself as the meanest of all mankind, he passes by all those who after being fully formed in the womb have then according to the laws of nature been born, and describes himself under the image of the fetus of a miscarriage [*ἀμβλωθρίδιφ ἐαυτὸν ἀπεικάζει ἐμβρύφ*] which has not been entered upon the roll of human creatures." Compare also Dr. John Lightfoot's note on the passage in his *Exercitations*.

have recourse to the image of an *ectroma*, prompts him on another occasion, when writing to the Ephesians (iii. 8) to coin the *comparative-superlative* adjective ἐλαχιστότερος—an unparalleled barbarism of grammatical inflexion, the extreme ruggedness of which is in our Authorised Version as well as in its Revised form smoothed very much out of sight by the rendering “less than the least.” This ἐλαχιστότερος bespeaks a writer struggling (we might say) with language in the endeavour to wring from it, if he can, an adequate representation of the idea before his mind: “To me, the man *haster* than all saints, was this grace given, to preach unto the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ.”¹

The surmise was broached by Wetstein, that *The Ectroma* was a nickname fastened upon the Apostle by his enemies, in consequence of a noticeable smallness characterizing, as many have supposed, his physical make. The effect upon the eye of an observer of such marked diminutiveness, supposing it to have existed, may be conceived to have been heightened by a certain painful disfigurement, which there is good reason to believe had in some way or other been produced by the malady, whatever it was, with which unquestionably he had long been afflicted.² The hypothesis, however, that it was from such a contemptuous jeer of adversaries that St. Paul borrowed this designation

¹ The τῷ ἐλαχιστοτέρῳ in the one passage closely corresponds to the τῷ ἐκτρώματι in the other, not only in the near resemblance of meaning in the two phrases employed, and in their relation to the context, but also in the use of the article: in both cases it is the article of strongly emphasized distinction, as in Luke xviii. 13, ὁ Θεὸς, ἰδούσθητί μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ; Rev. iii. 17, σὺ εἶ ὁ παλαίωρος καὶ ἔλεεινός, κ.τ.λ. This mode of explaining the force of the article is, I think, preferable to that of some commentators, which, assuming apparently that in the company of the Apostles there would of course be one *ectroma*, supposes St. Paul to mean that *that* one was himself.

² On St. Paul's personal appearance, see Conybeare and Howson, vol. i. ch. 7, near the end; and on the subject of his malady, see Canon Farrar's *Excursus* on St. Paul's *Thorn in the Flesh*, in his *Life of St. Paul*, vol. i. pp. 652 seq., and Mr. Waite's *Additional Note* in the *Speaker's Commentary on the New Testament*, vol. iii. p. 475.

of himself, rests on a very precarious foundation ; inasmuch as the term in question would seem to be a too enormous hyperbole to apply to any one not actually an extraordinarily small dwarf. Most certainly it is of no real help to us at present. For even if this hypothesis be accepted, it still remains clear that the particular phase of extreme insignificance which the Apostle had in view in so designating himself had nothing whatever to do with bodily appearance, but appertained exclusively to his moral or spiritual personality.

In illustration of the Apostle's expression critics have cited Horace's words (*Sat.*, I. iii. 44-47),—

Strabonem
Appellat Pætum pater; et Pullum, male parvus
Si cui filius est, ut abortivus fuit olim
Sisyphus ;

this Sisyphus, according to an old Scholiast, being a pigmy of a man, formerly possessed by the Triumvir Antony, barely two feet high. Horace's application of the word *abortivus* does not, however, warrant the notion that this noun was ever in plain style used of other than a still birth. It is not so used even here. Rather, the fact that the dead creature cast forth in a miscarriage is commonly of extremely small dimensions is the very circumstance that furnishes the point of Horace's application of the phrase: it is applied to Sisyphus in sportive exaggeration. In fact, although a seven months child born alive is of course at its birth of smaller dimensions than it would have been if born after the full term of gestation, yet this does not hinder but that it may afterwards grow to be a man or woman of ordinary size. But I venture to question whether *abortivus* in Latin is ever to be found any more than *ἐκτρώμα* in Greek, except with reference to a stillborn miscarriage. At the same time, Horace's use of the phrase may be admitted to be a fair illustration so far as this:

that both the satirist uses the noun *abortivus*, and the Apostle *ectroma*, with allusion to the extreme diminutiveness of an "untimely birth."

A good many critics have referred to a passage in Suetonius's *Octavius* (chap. 35), in which, according to one reading of the text, we are told that the public of Rome gave the nickname of *abortivi* to a large rabble of senators irregularly and corruptly created in the disorders which ensued upon Caesar's assassination. But it is not improbable that instead of *abortivos* the true reading is *Orcinos*. Admitting, however, the other reading, any similarity which can be recognized in the use of the figure in the two cases must be regarded as a result of pure accident. It is an obvious remark, long ago made (see Estius's *Commentarius* and Poole's *Synopsis*), that it is altogether incredible that this morsel of Roman civic gossip, of three generations previous, had reached the remote sphere of social existence with which St. Paul's life was conversant.

If *abortivi* was the epithet applied to those senators, it must have been employed, not as in the case of Sisyphus just now adverted to, with reference to the notion of diminutiveness, but as implying that they were no more fit to be accounted senators than the dead little creature produced by a miscarriage is fit to be accounted a man. This, as I apprehend, would in part approximate to the Apostle's application of the term; but a very important distinction is to be noted between the two cases,—a distinction which in fact is fundamental.

The sobriquet, whether *Orcini* or *abortivi* fastened, in the case of these senators, upon their very persons *as* senators: in their persons the highest step of Roman nobility appeared debased, alike by the unworthy means through which it had been acquired and by their own coarseness of character and vulgarity of demeanour,—*deformi et incondita turba* is Suetonius's description of them; they

were as senators a monstrous brood of social non-entities. But in the case before us, though St. Paul immediately afterwards, with evident reference to his word *ectroma*, describes himself as "the least of the Apostles," it is evident that both that description of himself and this vilipending epithet *ectroma* were meant as applying, not at all to his official personality, but solely to his own individual personality antecedent to his call to be an Apostle and viewed in contrast with his being invested with that function. In himself (he means), in his own moral and spiritual personality apart from the Divine grace, he was a miserable *ectroma*. But, as to his apostolic character,—on the one hand, in respect to its origin, this was of the very sublimest; for his apostleship had been conferred on him by none other than God through Christ; and on the other hand, in respect to the manner in which this holy function had been sustained, "by the grace of God" his apostolate vied in spiritual achievement with that of any other Apostle whatever; for not one of them all had laboured so energetically as he had done.

This is a point on which it is necessary to be quite clear. St. Paul's thought is infinitely remote from any notion of either irregularity, or incompleteness, or inferiority in any respect whatever, attaching to his *apostleship*. All that he has anywhere written respecting his status and work as an Apostle makes it evident that any such depreciation, either of his call to be an Apostle or of his behaviour in the execution of his trust, was wholly abhorrent from his consciousness and his habits of feeling; the admission of such a thought would in fact have seemed to him nothing less than *prevarication*,—a false betrayal of the high commission which he held, and a treason against the might of spiritual agency which was evermore operating through him and with him.

The more complete exposition of the grounds of that

intense sense of his own nothingness which the Apostle has embodied in this word *ectroma* as now interpreted, as well as of the impulses which just here prompted him to its utterance,—points which I venture to think will be found to furnish an interesting and not unimportant illustration of the Apostle's character,—I must reserve for an ensuing Number. For the present, I can only claim space for an additional note, in which to introduce, for the satisfaction of such of my readers as may care to see them, a few facts and observations appertaining more specifically to the region of verbal criticism, than would interest the general reader.

E. HUXTABLE.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

It may be more satisfactory to my readers to see some of the passages referred to in their original form.

(1) Num. xii. 12. LXX. *μὴ γένηται* (*Alex. γένοιτο*) ὥσεί ἴσον θανάτῳ, ὥσεί ἔκτρομα ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ μήτρας μητρός, καὶ κατεσθίει τὸ ἥμισυ τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτῆς.

Vulg. Ne fiat hac quasi mortua, et ut abortivum quod projicitur de vulva matris sue; ecce jam medium carnis ejus devoratum est a lepra.

Heb. אֶל-נָפֶחַ תְּהִי כַּמִּית אֲשֶׁר בְּצֵאתוֹ מִרְחֶם אִמּוֹ וְנֶאֱכַל הָעֵץ בְּשָׂרוֹ.

A.V. "Let her not be as one dead, of whom the flesh is half consumed when he cometh out of his mother's womb."

(2) Job iii. 16. LXX. *ἢ ὥσπερ ἔκτρομα ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ μήτρας μητρός, ἢ ὥσπερ νήπιον οὐκ οὐκ εἶδον φῶς.*

Vulg. Aut sicut abortivum absconditum non subsisterem, vel qui concepti non viderunt lucem.

Heb. : אִנּוּ כְנֻפֶּל טְמוֹן לֹא אֶהְיֶה בְּעֵלְמַי לֹא-רָאוּ אֹר.

A.V. "Or as an hidden, untimely birth I had not been; as infants which never saw light."

I am at a loss to understand what led the LXX. to put *ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ μήτρας μητρός* (as in Num. xii. 12) in the place occupied in the Hebrew by the words *טְמוֹן לֹא-אֶהְיֶה*. The participle *טְמוֹן*, apparently, either means "put out of sight as soon as born," or else points to the condition of the *ectroma* as both unknown and itself

sealed up in unconsciousness, according to the description given in Eccles. vi. 4, 5.

(3) Eccles. vi. 3. LXX. εἶπα, Ἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν τὸ ἔκτρομα.

Vulg. De hoc ego pronuncio quod melior illo sit abortivus.

Heb. : אֶמְרָתִי טוֹב כְּמִנּוֹי הַנֶּפֶל.

A.V. "I say *that* an untimely birth is better than he."

The Hebrew word *nephel* which *ectroma* represents in this last passage occurs again in Psalm lviii. 8 : נֶפֶל אִשָּׁת בְּלִהְיוֹתָּ שָׂמִיט : where the A.V. has "like the untimely birth of a woman, *that* they may not see the sun," and Jerome, "quasi abortivum mulieris, quod non vidit solem." But here the LXX. give ἔπεσεν πῦρ καὶ οὐκ εἶδον τὸν ἥλιον, and the Vulgate, 'supercecidit ignis, et non viderunt solem;' as if the Hebrew were נֶפֶל אִשָּׁת. There seems, however, no reason to doubt but that the Masoretic reading is the true one; and this being so, the passage confirms the sense assigned to *nephel*, and therefore to *ectroma*, its Greek representative.

Another confirmatory particular, brought to my notice by the Rev. T. L. Kingsbury, to whose learning and kindness I owe in this inquiry a variety of valuable references, is drawn from Isaiah xiv. 19. The Authorised Version has there the clause, "but thou art cast out of thy grave *like an abominable branch*"; these last words following the Masoretic text כִּנְעֹר נִתְעַב. But the LXX. gives for כִּנְעֹר, ὡς νεκρός, while we learn from the fragments of Origen's Hexapla, edited by the Rev. F. Field (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1868, Tom. ii., Fasc. ii.) that Aquila rendered it ὡς ἰχώρ (*i.e.*, as explained by Jerome, quoted by Mr. Field, *tabes et pædor*); Symmachus, ὡς ἔκτρομα; and Theodotion, ὡς βλαστός. These last three translators did their work in the second century of our era. These renderings of the LXX. and Symmachus seem at first sight to point to the conjecture, that in their Hebrew text the word was כִּנְעֹל. But Theodotion's ὡς βλαστός shews that he read כִּנְעֹר, as also Origen and Jerome appear to have done; and since נֶעַר is used in Isaiah xi. 1 and Daniel xi. 7 in a figurative sense to denote an offspring, like the Latin *soboles*, it is conceivable that both the LXX. and Symmachus understood the term here likewise as a poetical figure for "offspring," and that finding it qualified by "loathed," they further particularized its meaning by supposing it to refer to an *ectroma*. Perhaps Aquila's ἰχώρ refers to the *tabes et pædor* thrown out as refuse along with it. This interpretation would give to the otherwise mysterious phrase "loathed branch"

a sense very suitable to the context, by exhibiting the proud monarch of Babylon as put on a level with an object utterly insignificant and disgusting. But whatever may be thought of this, so much is clear: Symmachus's rendering taken side by side with that of the LXX. points to the like conception of *ectroma* as has been before arrived at.

Philo uses the term in the same sense in his *Leg. Alleg.*, Tom. i., p. 59 (cited by Wetstein), as follows: οὐ πέφυκε γόνιμον οὐδὲν τελεσφόρῳ ἢ τοῦ θαλάσσης ψυχῇ· ἃ δ' ἂν καὶ δοκῇ προφέρειν, ἀμβλωθρίδια εἰρίσκεται καὶ ἐκτρώματα καὶ ἐσθίοντα τὸ ἡμῖν τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτῆς. For the difference between ἀμβλωθρίδια and ἐκτρώματα (perhaps not always observed), see Eustathius, cited below.

So Hysychius: Ἐκτρώμα· παιδίον νεκρὸν ἄωρον· ἐκβολὴ γυναικός. Theophylact, in *1 Tim. i. 10.*: ἐκτρώμα λέγεται κυρίως τὸ ἀτελεσφόρητον ἐμβρυον ὃ ἀποβάλλεται ἢ γυνή. Eustathius, in *Hom.*, p. 1239 (cited by Wetstein): περὶ ὧν φασὶν οἱ παλαιοὶ οὕτω· ἀμβλῶσαι τὸ φθεῖραι βρέφος ἐν γαστρὶ, καὶ ἀμβλωθρίδιον τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἐκτῶσαι δὲ καὶ ἐκτρώμα τὸ μήπω τετυπωμένον. Polychromius, in his *Cutena*, in cap. iii. 16: *J. d. i.* p. 128 (cited by Suicer): ἐκτρώμά ἐστι, τὸ μηδέπω διαμορφωθὲν τελείως ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ.

We have in Ignatius's letter to the Romans (ch. 9) the passage: Ἐγὼ δὲ αἰσχύνομαι ἐξ αὐτῶν (sc. the members of the Church in Syria) λέγεσθαι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁγίως εἰμι, ὧν ἔσχατος αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκτρώμα· ἀλλ' ἠλέημαί τις εἶναι, ἐὰν Θεοῦ ἐπιτίχω. But the passage presents a mere imitation of St. Paul's words, and gives no help for determining the meaning of the noun.

The meaning of the verb ἐκτιτρώσκω and its derivatives may be supposed to have its root in the notion of *hurt*, *damage*, which seems inherent in τιτρώσκω (see Liddell & Scott *in verb.*), this notion of *hurt* having, perhaps, in the specific sense in which ἐκτιτρώσκω is used, reference, at least primarily, to some *hurt* to the matrix of the parent occasioning or accompanying the issuing from it of the fetus, as e.g. in *Herod.* iii. 32; but possibly also with a secondary reference to damage done to the embryo.

Such an interpretation of the primary meaning of the verb may help to explain its use in two passages referring to one and the same subject, communicated to me by Mr. Kingsbury. Dio-dorus Siculus (iii. 63) writes: (Semelem) τελευτῆσαι καὶ τὸ βρέφος (Dionysus) ἐκτῶσαι (qy. *broke away*) πρὸ τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου; and Philostratus (*Icones*, i. 14), ὁ δὲ Διόνυσος τῆς μὲν μητρὸς ἐκτρώσ-

κει (*sic.*, not ἐκτιρώσκει). The birth of this very vivacious god, occurring under conditions altogether extraordinary, furnishes the one exceptional case of a living product of ἔκτρωσις which has come to my knowledge. The application of the verb ἐκτιρώσκω in this instance is further anomalous in its departure in other respects from its regular sense; for this, according to Liddell & Scott, is either *to miscarry* or *to cause miscarriage*.

Elsewhere, the verb ἐκτιρώσκω and its derivatives appear used solely, if I mistake not, in respect to cases of miscarriage, in which the process of reproduction is frustrated.

In respect to ἀμβλίσκω, ἄμβλωμα, ἐξάμβλωμα, which the grammarian Thomas Magister insisted upon as alone the correct words to use in place of ἐκτιρώσκω and its derivatives, the notion of *dulness, sluggishness, want of thoroughgoing efficiency*, viewed as attaching to the parent, may perhaps account for their having this specific sense; though here again the notion may be conceived of as passing on to the frustrated product.

Further illustration of the lexical question is furnished by Triller's note on the passage just now referred to in Thomas Magister, and in the following passages, likewise communicated to me by the same friend:—Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.*, vii. 8, 3; *ib.*, *De Generatione Anim.*, lib. iv. p. 291; Hippocrates, *de Aere, Aquis, et Locis*, p. 343; *ib.*, *Lib. de Sterilitate*, p. 641; *ib.*, *Libb. de Mulierum Morbis*, *passim*.

FIDELITY AND BIAS IN VERSIONS OF THE BIBLE.

"The expressions are as direct as strong, and a true believer will neither attempt to divert or dilute their strength"—COLERIDGE.

THE words of sacred books become necessarily more precious from their very familiarity. When the Authorised Version was published in A.D. 1611, one of the first Hebrew scholars of that age, Dr. Hugh Broughton, said that he would rather be torn to pieces by wild horses than impose such a version on the poor Churches of England. It was

attacked both on the side of scholarship, and on the side of English idiom and rhythm, both by Romanists and by scholars who had hitherto used Tyndale, or the Genevan, or the Bishop's Bible. But when, in their turn, the sentences of King James's translators had gained the charms of association, then it was justly belauded by writer after writer, from Selden to Archbishop Trench, in terms of which none seem to be too warm or too affectionate. The New Revisers speak of "its simplicity, its dignity, its power, its happy turns of expression, its general accuracy, and we must not fail to add, the music of its cadences, and the felicities of its rhythm." Faber, in a celebrated passage, often incorrectly attributed to Cardinal Newman, says, "It lives on the ear like a music that can never be forgotten, like the sound of church bells, which the convert hardly knows how he can forego. Its felicities often seem to be almost things rather than mere words. It is part of the national mind, and the anchor of the national seriousness. Nay, it is worshipped with a positive idolatry, in extenuation of whose grotesque fanaticism its intrinsic beauty pleads availingly with the man of letters and the scholar. The memory of the dead passes into it. The potent traditions of childhood are stereotyped in its verses. The power of all the griefs and trials of a man is hidden beneath its words. It is the representative of his best moments, and all that there has been about him of soft, and gentle, and pure, and penitent, and good, speaks to him for ever out of his English Bible."¹

This passion for the sacred in familiar forms has led to curious results in all ages. On one occasion a priest, in reading the Gospel, altered the very homely word *krabbaton*—"a *mattrass*-bed"—into the more dignified and Attic word *skimpous*. Immediately the Bishop rose in his seat

¹ Faber, *On the Lives of the Saints*, prefixed to a *Life of St. Francis of Assisi*. 853.

and indignantly rebuked the reader, with the remark that if the word *krabbaton* had been good enough for the Evangelists it was surely good enough for him. In another instance, narrated by St. Augustine in a letter to St. Jerome, an African Bishop had substituted the word *hedera*, "ivy," for *cucurbita*, "gourd," in reading the third chapter of the story of Jonah. He had done this because St. Jerome had chosen the word *hedera* in his Vulgate, whereas the Old Latin Version, with which the people were familiar, had *cucurbita*. No sooner had he uttered the unlucky word, than the congregation, indignant at missing the "gourd" to which they had been so long accustomed, rose up and shouted "No! no! it was not 'ivy' it was a 'gourd!'" The Bishop replied that he was following the learned St. Jerome, but the Greeks declared that their LXX., which rendered the word by *kolokynthos*, or "gourd," was right. A hot discussion arose—"a tumult" says St. Augustine,— "because of the different sound of a single word."

Finally the Bishop said that he would consult the Jews. The Jews however, either from ignorance or malice, declared that the Hebrew word meant "*gourd*" and not "*ivy*"; and the poor Bishop was so shocked at having committed a crime against the majesty of the Septuagint, that he proposed at once to abdicate his bishopric, and even resign his priestly orders.¹ The story has a certain look of naturalness and probability about it, though no doubt it *may* have been invented by the enemies of the Vulgate to annoy St. Jerome. The saint, however, in his reply to St. Augustine, from his holy cavern at Bethlehem, laughs a little at the innocent and unfortunate bishop. After all, he says, his translation was perfectly right. The Hebrew word is *kikēion*. The translators of the Septuagint, not knowing what the plant really was, called it a "gourd." Properly speaking it is just as little a gourd as it is ivy,

¹ Aug. Ep. 71, ad. Hieron., p. 610.

which latter term (*kissos*) was chosen by the careful Aquila. In choosing it he may have been influenced by the *similarity of sound* between *kikilon* and *kissos*, as (St. Jerome might have added) the LXX. themselves frequently are in other instances. The plant really is the *Ricinus*, *Palma Christi*, or castor-oil plant, which has large leaves, and grows rapidly to a great height: but—unlike both “gourd” and “ivy”—has no tendrils, and stands on its own stem.¹ We must however add that, since this was the case, St. Jerome might just as well have left the word alone. No good purpose was served by substituting one incorrect term for another.

But modern history furnishes us with proofs that the preference of the familiar to the correct is always a powerful feeling. We have all heard of the significant and typical anecdote of the old priest, who, in the days when the knowledge of letters began to revive, angrily refused “to exchange his old *mumpsimus* for their new *sumpsimus*.” We have retained in our Prayer-book the earlier version of the Psalms written by Bishop Coverdale, because of the extraordinary sweetness of words which we have heard from childhood, although we are well aware that it is often incorrect, and occasionally meaningless. In spite of its defects we shall, perhaps, never grow weary of listening to it,—

“As for some dear familiar strain
Untired we ask, and ask again,
Ever, in its melodious store,
Finding a spell unheard before.”

Can it then be said that custom is dearer to us than truth? Do we love rhythm better than accuracy? Do we desire the plain bare facts of that which we call the Word of God, or do we desire melodious glosses and mistaken interpretations?

¹ Jer., Ep., 74.

Judging from the singular outcry with which the Revised Version has been received, one might be led to suppose that euphony was indeed the important matter, and exactness an entirely subordinate requirement. An analogous conclusion might be supported from the history of many other translations of the Bible. Even in this century, for instance, books have been written which deliberately support the thesis that the Septuagint Version was inspired.¹ Mr. Grinfield's "Apology for the Septuagint" may in this respect be regarded as a literary anachronism. Bishop Wordsworth seems, however, to lean towards a similar conclusion. "The story current in ancient times," he says, "concerning supernatural agency in the production of the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, shews the sense of the ancient Church as to the need of Divine guidance in such a work."² Divine guidance—yes; but supernatural inspiration, no; for, as Jerome said long ago, "aliud est vatem, aliud esse interpretem."³ If there be one thing more certain than another, it is that the Septuagint version is not inspired; its different parts are singularly unequal in merit; it abounds in errors of every description; it was carried out by translators of whom some were but very partially acquainted with Greek and some very partially acquainted with Hebrew, while some again seem to have been equally ignorant of both languages alike.⁴ So completely is this the case that St. Jerome ventured to conjecture that in some instances they had purposely refrained from revealing to pagans the mysteries of their religion.⁵

¹ This was the view of some of the Fathers, as Just. Martyr, Irenæus, Augustine, *De doct. Christ.*, iv. 15; sometimes Jerome (*Præf. in Paralip.*), etc.

² *On the Revised Version*, p. 9.

³ *Jer. Præf. ad. Pent.*

⁴ "Septuaginta quod nesciebant dubiis protulere sententiis." *Jer. In Ruf.* ii. p. 423.

⁵ *Conjicio noluisse tunc temporis Septuaginta interpretes fidei sue sacramenta Ethnicis prodere.* *Jer. ib.* p. 431.

The object of my present paper is not, however, to point out the defects of this or that Version of the Bible. To do so would be an inexhaustible task. It is indeed a problem whether any book on the words of which depend issues of unspeakable importance *can* be adequately translated at all. A very painful but deeply instructive treatise might be written on the injuries to nations, and even to whole ages, which have resulted from the appeal to words supposed to be immediately inspired, which have been in reality nothing but erroneous renderings of the Original, or which have come to connote a whole range of conceptions of which the Original was entirely innocent. The most honest, the most painstaking, the most accurate of translators may yet make the sacred writers express sentiments which were far from their true meaning.¹ The best forms of language are still imperfect. They illuminate the realms of thought, not with a full noontide radiance, but only with a moonlight, which admits of many misleading shadows, and even of many inevitable illusions. To change the metaphor altogether—language, even at its best, is but an *asymptote* to thought. No language can ever speak in the identical accents of another. The words and the sentences may be rendered; but the words and sentences in their new form assume a different aspect, and imply different shades of significance. The engrafted thought is modified by the tree to which it is transferred, and of both tree and graft it may be said with great truth, “*miranturque novas frondes, et non sua poma.*” It is as little possible to express the thoughts of one age and tongue with absolute identity of meaning in the idioms of another—as

¹ The stories of modern versions of the Bible into heathen languages are startling. The word used for “God” in Chinese was perhaps directly suggestive of false views. The account of the original rendering chosen for “God is Love” in the Kafir Bible is positively shocking. Gregory Martin ventured to say of our Protestant Bible that it “was not God’s word, but the devil’s,” and Faber ends the beautiful passage above quoted, by the words, “and all this is an *unhallowed power.*”

it is to square the circle. We can get at nothing beyond approximations. If even in the same language identical formulæ may mean widely different things on the lips of contemporary speakers, how can we suppose that the sentence of an Englishman in the nineteenth century can express, in all its delicacy and with all its connotations, the thought of a Jewish Apostle who wrote in Greek at the beginning of the first?

I must not, however, be led aside from my main purpose, which is merely to touch upon the plain influence of *bias* as exhibited in different versions.

I. Of all translators I think some of the old Seventy were the freest. Yet they rendered to the world an inestimable service. They familiarized the Greeks and Romans alike with the monotheistic idea and with the historic revelations on which it was founded. They created that technical language of theology which was afterwards of infinite use to the Apostles and Evangelists. They were, on the whole, so far correct and intelligible, that even those of the New Testament writers who were familiar with Hebrew, and who in some instances correct the LXX. by the Original, were yet generally content to avail themselves of the Greek version which they found in possession of the popular ear. Even to the Jews of Palestine it had the charm of familiarity. It is probable that in most parts of Palestine, much more in all other countries, it was "read in the synagogues every Sabbath day." By a most interesting coincidence, arising from the juxtaposition of two rare expressions, we are able to prove that St. Paul must have heard the *Parashah* and *Haphtarah*, or what we should call the first and second Lessons, read *from the Septuagint* in the synagogue of Antioch in Pisidia on a certain Sunday more than eighteen centuries ago.¹ And yet the theory of

¹ I may perhaps refer to my *Life of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 369, to elucidate what is here said.

translation which the Seventy adopted—or at any rate the practice followed by the ablest of them—was in some instances radically unsound.

I will say nothing of the text which they had before them. It was without any question exceedingly corrupt. In no other way can we account for a host of divergences which arise from the resemblances between different Hebrew letters. But besides this, they do not seem to have recognised the rule that a translator is not an expounder or a commentator, and that it is his first duty to be rigidly faithful.¹

There are three theories which a translator may adopt.

(1) He may think himself entitled to translate freely, giving his impression of the general sense, and even modifying the original by addition, omission, or substitution when he thinks it expedient to do so. If he be a man of genius he may thus produce a remarkable work, such for instance as Coleridge's *Wallenstein*, of which even Schiller availed himself in later editions. But translations produced on this plan are very unsatisfactory *as translations*. We are, for instance, to this day uncertain in reading the Latin translation of some of the works of Origen whether what we read is the opinion of Origen or only the opinion of the Presbyter Rufinus. "*Aliud est vatem*," says St. Jerome, "*aliud esse interpretem*."

(2) He may keep to his original with such bald slavish accuracy as even to sacrifice the sense and idiom of the language into which he is translating. This is the characteristic of the Greek translation of Aquila, which proposed to represent more closely than all others "the Hebrew verity."

¹ St. Jerome, after carefully examining the Psalter in the LXX. for the purpose of his version says, "Longum est revolvere quanta Septuaginta de suo addiderint, quanta dimiserint quæ in exemplaribus ecclesiae obelis asteriscisque distincta sunt." *Ep.* 34.

(3) He may steer an intermediate course between these extremes, as has been done in the majority of English versions, as well as in the Greek versions of Theodotion and Symmachus, in the Vulgate, and in Luther's German Bible.

The Alexandrian translators took the first view of their duty.

(i.) For instance, they sometimes *omit*.

The omission from some MSS. of 1 Samuel xvii. 12-31 and 55-58 can only be due to the desire of avoiding a contradiction. The omission of Exodus xxxii. 9, "And the Lord said unto Moses, I have seen this people and behold it is a stiffnecked people," can only have risen from the same national vanity which led them to alter the fact that they were "set on mischief" (Exod. xxxii. 22) into the mild remark that "they were impetuous."

(ii.) Much more frequently they *add particulars of their own*. These are sometimes in the direction of the Halachah,—that is, they consist of traditional minutiae connected with the ceremonial law; and sometimes in the direction of the Hagadah—or traditional particulars connected with the narrative. The reader may be glad, perhaps, to be furnished with specimens of both.

a. To the number of *Halachic* additions—little clauses and expressions intended to convey minute Levitical prescriptions such as formed part of the oral law—belong the following.¹

In Exodus xii. 15, "Ye shall *put away* leaven," becomes "Ye shall *destroy* leaven."

In Verse 18 we find "*Beginning* on the fourteenth day, ye shall eat unleavened bread." There is no *beginning* in the original. It is an Halachic addition, intended to emphasize the traditional prohibition to touch unleavened bread on that day at all.

¹ See Frankel, *Vorstudien*, pp. 86-92.

In Chapter xiii. 16 they render "frontlets" by *asaleuta*, literally "things unshaken," as Aquila does by *atinakta*, which has the same meaning, implying apparently the firmness with which the phylacteries should be fastened.

One more instance may suffice. In Exodus xxii. 9 we have, "For any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and he whom the judges shall condemn shall pay double unto his neighbour." This in the LXX. becomes by a very curious change, "About every loss that is proclaimed, whatever it be, the judgment of both shall come before God, and the one convicted by God shall pay double to his neighbour." It might seem that here we have an allusion to some form of trial by ordeal. But "God" is merely Elohim, *i.e.*, in this instance the Judges. It is however probable that there is an allusion to some curious rules and customs about the discovery of lost goods which are mentioned in the Talmud.

β. Among *Hagadistic* additions—those which preserve for us some Jewish legend and tradition—are the following : In Genesis ii. 2, they change the "seventh day" into "the sixth day."

In Exodus xiii. 18, they tell us that the Israelites left Egypt "*five abreast*."

In Deuteronomy xxxii. 8, they say that "He set bounds to the people *according to the number of the angels of God*."

In Joshua xiii. 22, they imply that Balaam (like Simon Magus in later days) was dashed to the earth *in an attempt to fly* (ἐν τῇ ῥοπῇ).

In Joshua xxiv. 30, they recorded that the flint knives with which the Israelites had been circumcised in the wilderness were buried in Joshua's grave.

In 1 Samuel xix. 13-16, they tell us that Michal put a still palpitating *goat's liver* on David's bed.

In 1 Samuel xx. 30, they infer that Jonathan was de-

scended from one of the maidens seized at the dance at Shiloh.

In 1 Samuel xxi. 13, they make David show his madness by *running on all fours*.

In 1 Samuel v. 4, 5, they tell us that Dagon's priests never stepped *upon* his threshold after

"The captive ark
Maimed his brute image, head and hands lopped off,
In his own temple, on the grunsel edge
Where he fell flat and shamed his worshippers."

In 1 Samuel v. 9, they think it worth their while to inform us that the Gittites, afflicted with hæmorrhoids, "made themselves seats to sit upon."

(iii.) In instances far more frequent they *explain or modify*. Some of these glosses are harmless enough. If a Greek reader in studying the list of clean and unclean animals suddenly stumbled across the word *dasupous*, or "rough-foot," and was puzzled for a moment at this odd rendering of the Hebrew *arnebeth*, or "hare," he would soon recall with a smile that the courtly translator, who was working for Ptolemy Philadelphus or Philometor, and whose work was to be placed in the Royal Alexandrian Library, would hardly render the word by the Greek *Lagos*, because if he did he would offend the king by shewing that the title of his dynasty—the Lagidæ, so called from Ptolemy Lagos—was derived from the name of an unclean animal!

Again, if he found Moses, or Balaam, or the sons of Jair, not mounted on "*asses*," as they were in the original, but accommodated with "*beasts of burden*," or even with prancing "*steeds*," he would not forget that, though the ass is in the East a valuable and honoured animal, it excited the ridicule of Greeks and Romans, who associated it with poverty and degradation.

Again, when a reader finds that they transfer from Eli

to Eli's "little servant" (*παιδάριον*) the utterance of the rebuke to Hannah about her supposed intoxication, or that they accommodate Samuel with a chariot in 1 Samuel xv. 12, he would not be very indignant at these minute proprieties.

A similar bias—a bias however of national pride and a tendency to euphemism—is traceable again and again. In Exodus iv. 6 they avoid the notion that the hand of Moses became *leprous* by simply saying that it "became as snow." Nor in Exodus ii. 1 will they suffer him to be "of *uncircumcised* lips," but only "thin-voiced." In Exodus vi. 12, by a dexterous interpolation they save Amram from marrying his aunt. In Exodus vi. 20 they only allow that Simeon had a son by a *Phanician*, not by a *Canaanitish* woman.

If a Jewish student of the LXX. found that the Egyptian name of Joseph was not Zaphnath Paaneah but Psonthomphanēch, he would be glad of the preservation of an accurate local tradition; and he would find some interest in the rendering of Urim and Thummim by "*Manifestation and Truth*," in which perhaps there is a suggestion that the pectoral of the High Priest was analogous to the sapphire pectoral—a symbol of truth—worn by the Egyptian hierarchs.

These tamperings with the original, though they shew bias and literary unfaithfulness, were comparatively venial eccentricities. But the alterations introduced by the Alexandrian scholars were far more serious and even fundamental, and they furnish us with an instructive example of the effect which may be produced on the minds of translators by the views of their age and nation.

If the question be asked "Do the Seventy—apart from their other variations—go so far as to shew *distinct theological bias*?" the answer must be that they shew it to a marked extent; to such an extent that they never

hesitated to alter the words of the Original in favour of their own prepossessions.

For instance, the representation of God to man in the Scriptures of the Old Testament was inevitably, and to the unspeakable benefit of mankind in all ages, but especially in early ages, a representation of the Divine under human aspects. In other words it was marked by the two tendencies which have been technically described as "*Anthropomorphism*" and "*Anthropopathy*." Anthropomorphism is the description of God by means of physical and human attributes. Anthropopathy is the description of the mind of God as swayed by human emotions,—as subject to wrath, change, repentance, joy, jealousy, and grief.

Both of these ancient tendencies—so reverent from their very simplicity—were alien from the Alexandrian philosophy. They jarred upon the primary tenet of that philosophy, which was the supreme exaltation of the Divine into an awful Abstraction, removed indefinitely far from the possibility of any contact with matter or with man. It was this conception of an immeasurable abyss between God and our earth which made them embrace with so much avidity the notion of intermediate agencies—*Mênra* and "Wisdom," and the *Logos*, and multitudes of inferior *logoi*. It may be thought strange that under these circumstances they left untouched such expressions as "the arm," "the finger," "the eye" of God. This, however, they could do, because the philosopher Aristobulus, who was perhaps the translator of Exodus, had in his *Syngramma* or Introduction, expressly warned Ptolemy Philometor that these must simply be regarded as pictorial phrases. Such a phrase as "God stands" meant, he said, that there is a fixed order of the Universe. Such a phrase as "God spake" merely indicates the law of causation.

It will be seen that in passage after passage the influence of this Alexandrian theosophy has shewn itself in unfaith-

ful renderings. In Genesis xviii. 30, "Oh let not the Lord be angry," is softened into "*Is it anything, Lord, if I should speak?*" Thus, Exodus iv. 16., "Thou shalt be to him instead of God," becomes "Thou shalt be to him *all that concerns God*" (τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν).

Exodus iii. 1. "The mountain of God, even Horeb," is only called "the mountain Horeb."

In iv. 20. "The rod of God" is amplified into "the rod (received) from God."

In iv. 24. Moses is met, not by "the Lord," but by "*an Angel of the Lord.*"

In v. 3. "Lest He (Jehovah) fall upon us with pestilence or with the sword," becomes "*Lest perchance death or massacre should befall us.*"

In xix. 13, for "When the trumpet soundeth long they shall come up to the mount," we have "When the voices and the trumpets and the mist goes away from the mount, they shall go up to the mount."

In xxiv. 10, 11, instead of "They saw the God of Israel. . . . And upon the nobles of the children of Israel He laid not his hand; also they saw God," we find "They saw the place where the God of Israel stood; . . . And of the elders of Israel not one perished, and they were seen in the place of God."

In xxv. 8, "That I may dwell among them," becomes "And I will be seen among you."

In xvii. 16, the Hebrew has (literally) "Because the hand upon the throne of the Lord." This becomes "Because the Lord wars with a secret hand."

The instances in which the Seventy can be charged with deliberate falsification seem to lie chiefly in this direction. In all matters which affected the subsequent controversies between Judaism and Christianity they were faithful guides. In point of fact, the Christians found the Greek version so useful to them, as representing in many important

passages not only the Hebrew text, but also the opinions of learned Jews as to its meaning more than two centuries before Christ, that the Jews gladly availed themselves of Aquila's bald, unidiomatic, and almost unintelligible version instead of it. They called it "the Hebrew verity." Aquila was charged with unfaithful bias when he translated *gnalemāh* in Isaiah vii. 14, not as the LXX. did by "a virgin" (παρθένος), but by "a young woman," (νεάνις) in order that Christians might not appeal to this prophecy.¹ Theodotion, who revised the LXX., did so in the interest of *his* views. But, besides this, the Fathers accuse the Jews of directly tampering with the text of the LXX. The most famous instance of this is to be found in Psalm xcvi. 10, where in the days of Justin Martyr, and even in those of Tertullian and Augustine, was found the reading "He reigned *from the wood*" (ἐβασίλευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου), i.e., from the Tree or the Cross,—a reading which found its way into the *Vetus Italia*.² The absence however of the phrase from the Greek manuscripts seems to shew that it was not suppressed by Jewish fraud, but that it originated in a Christian gloss.

II. I am not aware that the influence of *bias* has ever been charged on the Vulgate translation, the work of the great St. Jerome. Even Augustine, so morbidly jealous of variations, congratulated Jerome on his rendering of the New Testament,—thanking God for the work, and admitting that when it was compared with the Greek it contained scarcely anything to complain of. There might, indeed, he said, be some few things which might raise an objection, but the utility of the work in general was so great that no one could without ungraciousness dwell upon them. Defects of course there are in the Vulgate, but they do not arise from any bias or unfaithfulness. Taking it all

¹ Iren., *adv. Hær.*, iii. 24. Euseb., *ad. Ps.* xc. 4, and Jerome, in various passages, speaks unfavourably of Aquila's version, because of its Jewish prepossession. ² Just. Mart., *Dial. c. Tryph.*, § 73. Tert., *adv. Marc.*, iii. 19.

in all, it is an astonishing monument of the learning, candour, and diligence of its illustrious author.

III. In the fourth century lived a good man and a devoted missionary, the Arian bishop, Ulphilas. He was the apostle of the Goths, and translated the Bible into Gothic. It is from his version that our only knowledge of the Gothic language is obtained. Although he was an Arian, no charge of unfaithful bias has been brought against him. It is however a curious and significant fact that he left such stories as those in the Book of Judges purposely untranslated, because he was afraid that they would kindle the wildest passions of his turbulent converts. He felt that for *them* at any rate it would be impossible to draw profit from the record of fierce animosities and exterminating wars. Such omissions cannot however be put down to "bias." They rather fall under the head of "economy" and "accommodation." I do not know that Ulphilas can be blamed for them any more than the compilers of any Lectionary who choose out some portions of Scripture as more edifying than others, and who have sometimes passed over whole books without selecting from them a single Scripture Lesson.

IV. The Version of Luther—which did more than any other book to fix the standard of the German language—has never been charged with many instances of wilful bias. Coleridge, indeed, in an interesting passage, describes Luther sitting in his room in the Castle at Wartburg, perplexed and tormented by some text which seemed to tell directly against his own most cherished views, and so convinced that he is in some way under the glamour of that Satanic foe in whose constant presence he firmly believed, that, at last, he seizes his inkstand and hurls it at the head of the insulting fiend. The fiend, we gladly admit, was fairly put to the rout. But there was one reason why Luther was little tempted in general to play fast and loose

with the text, were it in ever so slight a respect. It is because his faith—being deeper and wider than that of most modern theologians—was not pinned to a Book but to a Person. That modern and unreasoning worship of the letter which has been so pregnant of disasters, and against which we are so solemnly warned in Scripture itself, existed as little for him as for Calviu. It is a growth of later and corrupted Protestantism.¹ If any one were now to write as those great men and great Christians wrote about various passages of Scripture, he would in these days call down upon his head—if that be worth considering—the whole thunder of such artillery as the “religious newspapers” could summon for his demolition; he would hear in all the voices of the religious critics alike “the *Damnamus* of Augsburg and the *Anathema* of Trent.” Luther felt the less temptation to introduce any bias of his own into the words which he was translating, because he openly professed—as did other great theologians of that day—“to find the Canon in the Canon.” Take as a specimen of his style of criticism the remarks which he makes on the Epistle of James, and on the Revelation of St. John. Of the former, as every one knows, he had but a low opinion, and went so far as to call it “a mere Epistle of Straw,” which “throws one thing into another without order.” Of the latter he said that he held it to be “neither apostolic nor prophetic,” and that he could “find no reason for believing that it was set forth by the Holy Spirit.” “My spirit,” he adds, “cannot adapt itself to the production; and *this is reason enough for me that I should not highly esteem it, that Christ is neither thought nor perceived in it.*”

¹ “The Judaizing spirit in this matter,” says Dean Plumptre, “culminated in the *Formula Helvetici Consensus* which pronounces the existing Old Testament text to be “tum quoad consonas, tum quoad vocalia, sive puncta ipsa, sive punctorum potestatem, tum quoad res, tum quoad verba, θεόπνευστος.” Dean Burgon has also declared the very sentences, words, and letters of the Bible to be inspired. To talk thus is fetich-worship.

There was, however, one very memorable instance in which even Luther was not strictly faithful to the Original. It is in the word "*alone*" which he interpolates into Romans iii. 28. "Therefore we reckon that a man is justified by faith *ALONE* without the works of the Law." It originated the term *Solipidian*, and is what Erasmus called the "*vox sola tot clamoribus lapidata.*" Luther might indeed have pleaded that it was a legitimate *inference*, and even that he found it already existed in the Nuremburg Bible (1483),¹ and the Genoese (1476).² Still the fact remains. The word was *not* in the original. Whether it is or is not an appropriate *gloss*,—whether it would or would not be legitimate *in a paraphrase*—is an entirely different question. The one thing certain is that all such interpolations are unjustifiable in any faithful translation.

We will now come to our Authorised Version, since space does not allow me to speak of the Rheims and Douay Versions, and of the English Bibles which preceded that of 1611. There are nine or ten instances in which King James's translators are accused of shewing the influence of bias chiefly in (i.) absolutist, (ii.) Calvinistic, (iii.) prelatival, and (iv.) anti-Romish directions. It is a token of English honesty and faithfulness, of which we may well be proud, that in scarcely one of these instances can it be maintained that they were really guilty of bending their Version, as though it were some Lesbian rule,—some *κανὼν μολύβδινος*—to suit their own dogmatic prepossessions.

(i.) *a.* One of the charges against them was that they were guilty of flattery in the inaccurate rendering "*God save the king.*" But the rendering is an idiomatic equivalent to the original, and they found it in older versions.

β. A more serious charge was that they had introduced the words "*wizard*," "*witch*," "*witchcraft*," and "*familiar*

¹ "Nur durch der Glauben."

² "Per la sola fede."

spirit," out of complaisance to the well-known demonology of King James. Much indeed might be urged against these renderings. The word rendered "*wizard*" (Lev. xix. 31; xx. 6, etc.), simply means "*a wise man*." Countless horrors, continued for generations—down even to 1720 when the last witch was burnt in Scotland—might have been spared to the human race if instead of the word "*witch*," could have been substituted—according to the true meaning of the original—some word like "*enchantress*," or the *φαρμακός* of the LXX. Again, the word for "*familiar spirit*" means properly "*a bottle*," and the "*consulters of evil spirits*" are called by the LXX. "*ventriloquists*" (*ἐγγαστριμυθοί*). It is indeed terrible to think that by virtue of wrong or highly uncertain translations, a new terror should have been added to millions of human lives. But in this respect our translators erred quite innocently, as the renderings already existed in older versions; they accorded with a belief then all but universal; and if the translators were, as Bishop Hutchinson declared, influenced "*by the great reverence which they had to the King's judgment, and the testimony he gave them of facts in Scotland*," there is at least no tittle of proof that such was the case. And they certainly removed from the margin in Exodus xxii. 18, a description of the doing of witches which, as Dr. Eadie justly says, would have been very acceptable to the British Solomon.

(ii.) The unfair influence of Calvinistic views is charged upon them in their version of the following passages.

a. Acts ii. 47, "*And the Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved*" (*τοὺς σωζομένους*).

β. Hebrews vi. 4 ("*For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened etc.*"), . . . *if they shall fall away* (*καὶ παραπεσόντας*) to renew them again unto repentance."

γ. Heb. x. 38, "*Now the just shall live by faith; but if any man draw back* (*καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται*), my soul shall

¹ *Historical Essay on Witches.*

have no pleasure in him." (The *Italics*, which shew that "any man" is not in the Original, were not added till 1638.)

That these versions are positively wrong and misleading is admitted. In our Revised Version they are corrected and altered into "*those who were being saved*," "*and then fall away*," and "*if he shrink back*." The charge of Calvinistic bias may be strengthened, perhaps, by the unfaithful renderings admitted by the translators into the margin of Romans iii. 25 "*forordained*" (for *προέθετο*), and v. 12 "*in whom*" (*ἐν ᾧ*). Yet two powerful considerations may be pleaded in their favour. One is that even in these renderings they have followed older authorities, and may even have been persuaded that they were not departing from the true sense of the Original. The other is that they have again and again resisted the very powerful influence exercised over them by Beza. The high reputation of Beza, both as a Greek scholar and a great theologian, could hardly fail to make itself felt among them. Yet how successfully they protected themselves from the gross instances of unfaithfulness into which his authority would have led them! If they had followed his guidance we should have been robbed of two doctrines which are unspeakably precious. One is the doctrine of Christ's descent into hell, which, in Acts ii. 31, becomes in the hands of Beza merely the leaving of "*his corpse in the grave*." The other is the doctrine of the universal offer of salvation. In 1 Timothy ii. 4, "who willeth *all men* should be saved," becomes with Beza "*quosvis homines*." In 1 Timothy iv. 10, "the *Saviour* of all men" is wantonly altered into "the *Preserver* of all men." In 1 Timothy ii. 6, "Christ Jesus gave Himself a ransom" not "for all" but "*pro quibusdam*." In Romans xi. 32, "God hath shut up all unto disobedience *that He might have mercy upon all*," becomes "that He might have mercy on all *these*." Now these can only be called wanton and perilous perversions of the Word of Life. They should be

as warning beacons to shew all later translators into what quagmires of human system and human falsity they may be led by the prepossessions of a dogmatic theology. But in each of these instances our translators refused to be made unfaithful by the Calvinistic bias. Even in James ii. 14 they were bold enough to render "Can faith save him," in spite of Beza's "*fides illa*," and in spite of the Greek article which has induced even our Revisers in this instance to accept Beza's rendering as correct.¹

(iii.) The Translators of the Authorised Version have been accused of Anti-Romish bias specially in three or four instances.

α. They render 1 Corinthians xi. 27, "Shall eat this bread *and* drink this cup," where they unwarrantably substitute "*and*" for the "*or*" of the original.

β. In Galatians i. 18 they render *ἰστορήσαι Πέτρον* by "to see Peter," instead of "to visit," where they seem purposely to have chosen too mild a word.

γ. In Matthew xix. 11, they render *οὐ πάντες χωροῦσι* by "all men cannot receive this saying," an inaccuracy for "all men receive not," though the fact that it is not indefensible is shewn by its acceptance by our Revisers.

δ. In Hebrews xiii. 4, they have "marriage is honourable in all," where others, and among them our Revisers, think that the ellipse should be supplied by *ἔστω* not *ἔστι*, and render it "Let marriage be honourable in all." If however there *was* an anti-Romish bias at work in these passages let it be again remembered to the credit of the Translators, (i.) that they removed many renderings which were known to give offence to Romanists, such as the word "images" for "idols" in 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. v. 5; 1 John v. 21; and (ii.) that in the case of renderings to which Romanists had objected, they put an end to all

¹ Other notable instances in which the Translators refused to follow Beza, are in his view of Rom. ii. 7, v. 16; 1 Cor. xiii. 2.

cavil by adopting the renderings of the Rhemish Version. In this way they freely admitted such terms as "*ordained*," Acts xiv. 23 (omitting "*by election*"); "*confess*," in James v. 16; "*tradition*," in 2 Thess. ii. 15; "*regeneration*," in Titus iii. 5, and "*church*" in Hebrews xii. 23.¹

(iv.) A fourth set of translations have been attributed to *ecclesiastical bias*. Dr. Hill, in a famous Spital sermon, said that he had been told that the somewhat imperious Bancroft had ordered the Translators to make the Version "*speak prelatical language*," and that Bancroft had himself altered the Version to this end in no less than fourteen places. If the charge be true, the blame of it must lie at the door of Bancroft, of whom it seems to have been the general opinion that "there was no withstanding him." It can hardly be doubted that the translators avoided the word "Bishops" in Acts xx. 28 and put "*overseers*" instead, because otherwise it would have been obvious that in the Apostolic age the words "presbyter" and "bishop" were practically identical. Nor is it easy to excuse the adoption of "*oversight*" in 1 Peter v. 2, for the "*bishopric*," of Acts i. 20. All that can be said is that Bancroft exercised a strong authority, and that the organization of the early Church was less clearly understood in King James's time than it has become in our own day.

I think that it will be clear, even from this rapid sketch that, in spite of small human infirmities, we have every reason to be proud of the fidelity of King James's translators. But, if so, we have yet deeper cause for thankfulness at the courageous fidelity displayed by our Revisers. Nothing could more admirably shew the confidence of faith than the fact that scholars of all denominations, and among them Unitarians and Romanists, were invited to sit on the Revision Committee. Dogmatic bias has not led them to retain the interpolation of the three

¹ See Westcott, *Hist. of the Eng. Bible*, p. 280.

witnesses in 1 John v. 7 ; or to pass over the later additions to the text of the Gospels in Mark xvi. or in John viii. or the marginal gloss of half a verse in Romans xiv. 6. Nor has it led them to spare the spurious baptismal confession of Acts viii. 37 ; nor the "fasting" of Matthew xvii. 21 ; Mark ix. 29 ; 1 Corinthians vii. 5 ; nor the inexcusable mis-translation of "*for Christ's sake,*" instead of "*in Christ,*" in Ephesians iv. 32 ; nor the angel that troubled the water in John v. 4. Nor have they preserved the Θεός for δς in 1 Timothy iii. 16 ; nor the familiar melody of the Angels' song in Luke ii. 14 ; nor even the century-honoured clauses and cadences of the Lord's prayer. Respecting some of these points—and many more instances might be cited in which they have sought truth only—the judgment of some may differ from them ; but another generation will see that the Revisers were at least actuated by an heroic fidelity, and that though they clearly foresaw the outburst of objection—often bitter and petulant—which their labours would provoke, they were quite willing to be of those—

" Whose sinewy wings by choice do fly
In the fine mountain air of public obloquy."

Probably every scholar finds something here and there in the work of the Revisers which he would gladly have seen altered. There are one or two points in their work—though only one or two—which I for one deeply regret. But at present, while they are being assailed from so many quarters, and especially in such articles as those which have appeared in the *Quarterly Review*, I will confine myself to a very humble testimony to their courage and fidelity, and will only express for my own part that sense of profound gratitude to them for their patient, disinterested, and admirable labours which will I believe be expressed more emphatically and more unanimously by generations yet to come.

F. W. FARRAR.

THE HEAVENLY CITIZENSHIP.

PHILIPPIANS iii. 20.

ST. PAUL wrote this letter from Rome. Writing at Rome, he addressed himself to the Church of a Roman colony. It was natural, therefore, that he should use metaphors and illustrations drawn from civic rights and duties. Both in Rome and in its colonies the privileges of citizenship were great, and greatly prized. Rome was the centre and mistress of the civilized world. The Roman citizen was not only safe wherever he went, but honoured and admired. He held himself to be the equal of tributary princes and kings, if not their superior. He was eligible to the highest offices of the State. He had a voice in the election of the ministers and rulers of the Commonwealth, even up to the godlike Emperor himself. He was exempted from many burdens, taxes, benevolences, exactions, imposed on the subject races. He could neither be scourged uncondemned, nor examined by torture. Even if found guilty of the foulest crime, he could no more be crucified than an Englishman could be impaled; while, if he were cast in any civil suit, he had a right of appeal to Caesar. If he were a man of any energy and intelligence, he had boundless opportunities of acquiring wealth; if he were poor and indolent, bread and games were provided for him at the public expense, baths were built for him, and theatres; the public gardens and walks were open to him; he might enroll himself among the clients, and so secure the protection, of some wealthy and powerful noble; he could take his share in the imperial doles and largesses, which were of constant recurrence. All this he might do and claim, not as a favour, but as a right, simply because he was a citizen. And though, on the one hand, these rights and privileges did much to foster indolence, the spirit of faction, and the

love of pleasure, on their nobler side they did much to quicken and encourage public spirit, to give the Roman a simple and dignified bearing, a haughty and indomitable courage, a capacity for handling public affairs and for carrying on the public service. To be adopted into the ruling and imperial race was, therefore, a natural object of ambition to the abler, wealthier, and more high-spirited subjects of that vast empire.

And this ambition might be attained even by those who were not born in Italy. The Roman empire, as subsequently the Roman Church, aimed at absorbing all its more capable vassals, and opened the highest careers to all who were competent to pursue them. Any man who had distinguished himself, nay, at last any man who cared to expend "a large sum," and any city or state which had rendered a great public service, or had displayed a conspicuous fidelity to the Republic, or had espoused the cause of a triumphant faction, might hope to be admitted to the Roman citizenship, and even to all the rights and immunities inherited by the Italian stock. Many of the cities visited by St. Paul, both in Asia, and in Europe, possessed this *jus Italicum* as it was called, *i.e.*, they were accorded an equality of political rights and functions with the free-born citizens of Rome. Like them, they could vote in public elections, aspire to public office, claim exemption from exactions and shameful punishments, and were protected wherever they went by the same world-wide authority.

Philippi was one of these Roman colonies; and hence it was called "*Colonia Augusta Julia Philippensis*." It was the seat of government for the province, the market and centre of commerce. It had its public baths, theatres, and gardens, its doles and largesses, its suffrages and exemptions. And as all colonies are apt to take an exaggerated pride in the glory of the mother City or State, to ape its manners

and customs, to carry its honours with a boastful difference, so in Philippi, that lesser and provincial Rome, Rome herself was out-Romed. The sixteenth chapter of Acts, which records St. Paul's visit to Philippi, is full of this colonial spirit. The duumvirs, prætors, and lictors swell and fret across the page. The heedless insolence with which Paul and Silas are treated so long as they are taken to be mere travelling Asiatics, their appeal from mob law to the tribunal of the public magistrate, the ring of pride in the very charge alleged against them: "These men, mere Jews, do teach customs which it is not lawful for us to receive, *we being Romans*;" the high Roman spirit of the jailer who cannot endure to live when he seems to have failed in his duty to the State; St. Paul's indignant assertion of his violated citizenship, and the affright of the magistrates when they learn that they have scourged Romans uncondemned: all these incidents remind us that we are in a Roman "colony," and call up its very form and pressure, its very life and spirit, before us.

To this spirit, so rife in Philippi, to this ingrained pride of citizenship, St. Paul constantly appeals in his Epistle, thus making himself a Philippian to the Philippians, that he might the more effectually win them to the faith and service of Christ. That appeal is evident in the brief passage before us. What he virtually says to the Christian citizens of Philippi is: "You possess, and are proud to possess, the citizenship of Rome; but, remember, you have a still higher and nobler citizenship. Heaven is your true home, the kingdom of heaven your true commonwealth, the spirit of heaven your true spirit. You are members of that great spiritual and eternal kingdom of which *Christ* is Imperator and Lord. And this citizenship confers on you both rights and duties,—rights of access and appeal to the heavenly King, exemption not from base punishments alone, but also from base and degrading lusts. You are guarded from the

malice and violence of the principalities and powers of evil and of an evil world. You are fed and cherished by the bounty and grace of the King eternal, immortal, invisible. You owe Him allegiance therefore, and a constant heartfelt service. Take pride in Him, then, and in the ties that bind you to him. Fight for your privileges and immunities ; play the man ; prove yourself good soldiers of Jesus Christ. Assert and maintain your spiritual freedom. Subordinate your private interests to the public welfare. Labour to extend the borders of the Divine Kingdom. Let this heavenly citizenship be more and dearer to you than the civic rights and exemptions in which you are wont to boast."

So, again, in Chapter i. Verses 27-29, with an evident use of this same figure of citizenship, St. Paul exhorts them to stand fast in one spirit, to strive with one soul for the faith of the Gospel, that by their courage and fearlessness they may daunt their adversaries ; nay, he exhorts them to welcome the very pains and privations they endure in the service of Christ ; for, he argues, "Unto you it is *given*," *i.e.*,—Unto you it is *conceded* as a great and special honour,—"not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for his sake." Courage to do, to dare, and to endure on behalf of the heavenly State and Kingdom into which they had entered by faith, was the special virtue to which the holy Apostle called and urged them in the opening chapter of his Epistle.

And, in like manner, as we learn from our context, it was to this self-same virtue that he summoned them when he reminded them that their citizenship was in heaven. There were many around, if not among, them whose god was their belly, whose glory their shame, whose mind was bent on worldly ends ; many who were imbued with the fleshly and self-pampering lusts which the indulgences granted to the Roman citizen did much to foster and

develop. How was this worldly, carnal, self-seeking spirit, which made men "enemies to the cross of Christ," and doomed them to "perdition," to be overcome and cast out? Only as the Church at Philippi breathed a higher spirit, even a heavenly. Only as they felt and shewed that they were citizens of a nobler empire, and were possessed of rights and immunities which transcended all that Rome, or the world, could confer.

In short, St. Paul knew that a strong spirit can only be bound and spoiled by a spirit stronger than itself. The spirit of Rome met the Philippians everywhere, in all the details of their daily life; in the baths, the market-place, the forum, in all their intercourse with their neighbours and with the world; and this spirit, at least in the Apostolic age, was a spirit of pride, of self-indulgence and self-sufficiency, of conquest and disregard for the claims of servile and subject races. It was a spirit, therefore, against which those who had the mind of Christ were bound to strive, which it was their plain duty to renounce and subdue. But *how* was this worldly spirit to be cast out save by the incoming of a higher and an *unworldly* spirit? how were men to be taught to think less of Rome except as they were induced to think more of that divine Kingdom, in which there is neither Roman nor Greek, neither barbarian nor Jew, neither bond nor free?

It was thus, as Macaulay points out, that Cromwell met and conquered the world of his day, as represented by the Stuart and his adherents. Arrayed against him stood the king and his court, nobles and prelates, cavaliers and clergy, poets and dramatists,—all that was stately, reverend, brilliant, fascinating in the England of the time. There was no possibility, as he soon saw, of his overcoming such an array by the aid of merely professional soldiers, of men who felt the charm of the world as keenly as those against whom they fought, of "mere tapsters and serving men,"

as he called them. Before he could hope to overcome the Cavaliers he must enlist against them men of a still stouter and higher spirit than their own. And he found them in the Puritans. For these were men who, with all their faults and defects, made it the chief end of their lives to know, serve, and enjoy God; men to whom England was dear, but the kingdom of heaven dearer still. "*They* recognized no title of superiority but the Divine favour; and, confident of that favour, they despised all the accomplishments and all the dignities of the world. If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the registers of heralds, they were recorded in the Book of Life. If their steps were not accompanied by a splendid train of menials, legions of ministering angels had charge over them. Their palaces were houses not made with hands; their diadems crowns of glory which should never fade away. On the rich and the eloquent, on nobles and priests, they looked down with contempt; for they esteemed themselves rich in a more precious treasure, and eloquent in a more sublime language, nobles by right of an earlier creation, and priests by the imposition of a mightier hand." They, if ever men did, felt their citizenship, their true commonwealth, to be in heaven, and valued the English commonwealth only, or mainly, as it could be conformed to "the pattern on the Mount."

Now it was this very Puritan spirit, strained however of its sourness and fanaticism, which St. Paul sought to quicken in the Philippians, in order that they might victoriously contend with the subtle and potent influences of the Roman world. And, therefore, he strove to impress upon them the conviction that they were citizens of a more august empire, were called to a nobler warfare, and might claim ampler and more enduring immunities and rights.

Instead of standing helpless and dismayed, and feeling that they, "a few poor men," were summoned to encounter the forces of an empire wide and various as the world, he wanted them to feel that they were citizens of a kingdom which embraced all the good and wise of all ages, past, present, and to come; that they were even in close and intimate alliance with the spirits of just men made perfect, and an innumerable company of angels, as well as with the general assembly and church of the Firstborn; and that therefore they were citizens of an empire which as far transcends that of Rome as the heavens are higher than the earth.

Nor has the need for this appeal to a generous public spirit, for this high motive to courage and endurance, passed away. The world, the spirit of the world, is still with us. In modern England, as in ancient Rome, it meets us at every step, now with its charms, and now with its terrors. It is as subtle, as penetrating, as ubiquitous and multiform, as of old. It claims a home, or at least a right of way, in every heart. It often looks out upon us from the faces we love best and speaks to us through their lips, persuading us to prefer ease to duty, gain to principle, the praise of men to the approval of God. It takes a thousand forms in the streets through which we pass, in the transaction of business, in the public duties we discharge, in our private pleasures and amusements, in the books we read, and the friends with whom we converse. It travels with us wherever we go. It lurks in the very air we breathe, and in the whole round of our personal and social conditions. It is *not* to be evaded; it must be faced, subdued, conquered. And in this incessant conflict with the law and spirit of the world, in which our own hearts often play us false, we need the aid of every motive and inducement open to us. St. Paul suggests many such motives and incentives, and among others, this: he would have us habitually

cherish a noble pride in the fact that, if we are Christ's men, if we believe in the truths He taught and are trying to follow in his steps, we are the happy citizens of a vast empire the seat and centre of which is in heaven; we have been admitted to a goodly spiritual fellowship, to a select and imperial strain, which embraces all the wise and righteous men who have served their kind since first recorded time began. He would have us remember that, from the first, God has been gathering together his elect,—not Abraham, and Moses, and David alone, with the Hebrew prophets and saints, but also Melchizedek, Job, Jethro, Confucius, Sakya Mouni, Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, with all the heathen sages and moralists, statesmen and poets, who have taught truth and wrought righteousness, who have toiled and suffered for the good of the human race and helped to draw earth nearer heaven: and that God has been thus gathering them together and making them citizens of one high kingdom not for their own sakes alone, but that through them the whole world may be redeemed into the love and service of righteousness.

And is not his advice good and sound advice? *Is it not a most animating thought that we are not called to encounter the subtle and potent spirit of the world, which meets us at every step, unfriended and alone; that we are compassed about with a great cloud of witnesses who have won the battle which we are fighting now, and by a noble army who share the conflict with us and urge us by voice and example to play the man?* The consciousness that he was one of the ruling race gave pride and dignity to the port of the Roman, sustained him amid a thousand perils and toils, and enabled him to face death itself without a thought of fear. And we Englishmen are surely not destitute of the pride of race. It is that pride, it is the thought "I too am an Englishman," or "What will they say in England?" which has carried us through innumerable enterprises, adventures,

hazards at home and abroad, in the Arctic seas and on the sultry plains of Hindostan. And the similar but higher motive, "I too am a Christian"; "I belong to the wise and good of all races and all lands"; "Unworthy as I am, God has made me one with them, a citizen of the same great city," could not fail to animate us, to quicken us to courage and endeavour, did we but cherish it as we should. If we held our Christian calling to be our highest honour; if we deeply felt that to be a servant of Christ, a lover of truth and righteousness, was more and better than to attain any wealth, rank, distinction which the world can confer; if looking backward through the corridors of time and gazing on the effigies of the wisest and best of every age, we could say with a swelling heart, "I too am of them"—should we not be a higher manner of men than we are? When that chilling sense of loneliness and failure settles on us which paralyses the very nerves and sinews of action, and we are prompted to throw up the endeavour to do good and to become good, what new warmth and courage and hope would make a new summer in the soul did we but remember that we are members of a vast spiritual commonwealth to which we owe suit and service, and from which we may confidently expect sympathy and approval? When young men, away from home and its hallowed and restraining influences, strangers perhaps in a strange land, are tempted to do some great wickedness and sin against God, would it not help them to resist temptation, to be true to their Christian principles and convictions, were they habitually and vividly to realize the fact that they are members of a great and august community extending through all ages and all worlds, the honour of which is in some measure in their hands, and that, if they yield, they not only bring a stain on that honour, but lessen the sum of good influences which are at work for the redemption of the world? In fine, is there any conceivable set of circumstances, any post of danger,

any conspiracy of opportunity with desire, any occasion of honourable service, in which St. Paul appeals to the public spirit of his readers, in which his motive, "I too am a citizen of the heavenly kingdom," would not be at once an incentive and a safeguard?

If not, it becomes an urgent question, "How far do we cherish this generous public spirit, and make his motive our own?" So far as I have observed no citizen of this great country is ashamed of being an Englishman, or at all backward in avowing it. As a rule it is with a tone of some pride that most of us acknowledge when the question of nationality arises, "I am English." But are we equally ready with the avowal, "I am a *Christian*," and equally proud of it?

When men of business meet they do not blush to talk of money and investments, of how much this man is worth and how much that. Are we as ready to talk of Religion, or at least to shew that we love it as much as they love business and its gains? When Christian men join some group in the exchange, the club, or some public place in which questions of policy or finance are being discussed, if any unprincipled or corrupt device should be commended, or any filthy jest be broken, do they invariably enter a manly protest, or firmly decline to take part in any base scheme on the express ground that it *is* base, opposed to the Christian law and spirit, or leave the group in which such license is allowed? Do they not, at least sometimes, and in some cases, take part in the talk as though they too mistook money or success for the chief good, or feebly snigger at the jest they ought to have rebuked, or even cap it with another jest as broad? And are *these* the men to conquer and cast out the evil spirit of the world?

It will never be well with us, the kingdom of God will never come, until we give our whole heart to his love and service. We shall never bring unity and peace into our

own lives, and much less into the world at large, until we who are called after Christ are even prouder to bear his worthy Name than we are to bear that of Englishmen; until we prove that our "citizenship is in heaven" by the pure and heavenly spirit we carry into all the affairs of life. If we really believe, as we profess to believe, the Name of Christ to be above every name, it is simply impossible that we should ever blush to claim it. Rather, we shall count all else but loss that we may win Christ and be found in Him, and so prove ourselves not wholly unworthy of the Name we bear. We shall even count it all joy when to us also it is *conceded* that we should strive and suffer for his Name sake. We shall glory in Him as the very incarnation of all beauty and honour, all righteousness and love, and be willing, if need be, to lay down our very lives in his service.

EDITOR.

BRIEF NOTICES.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY. Edited by *Rev. Canon Cook, M.A.* (London: Murray). By the issue of Volume IV. of the New Testament series, this great work is at last completed. We offer the learned Editor our hearty congratulations on the happy and successful close of his anxious and laborious task, a task which has extended over eighteen years, and must, by the very nature of the case, have been attended by many difficulties and cares.

The final volume—which includes *Hebrews* by Dr. Kay, *James* by Dr. Scott, *1st Peter* by Canon Cook, *2nd Peter* and *Jude* by Dr. Lumby, the Epistles of *John* by the Bishop of Derry, and *Revelation* by Dr. Lee—is well up to the average standard attained in the previous volumes, the contributions of Dr. Scott and Dr. Alexander being most to our mind, and, in our judgment, most consonant, both in form and style, with the proposed aims of the work.

But it is not of this last volume so much as of the whole Com-

mentary that we propose to say a few words. And, on the whole, we may say that it has fairly fulfilled, while in some respects it has gone far beyond, if in others it has a little fallen short of, the promises made on its behalf. In the preface to Volume I. we were taught to expect a "Commentary on the Sacred Books in which the latest information would be made accessible to men of ordinary culture," and "amended translations of all passages proved to be incorrect" would be given. The latter of these two aims has been admirably carried out, and the amended translations suggested in the Notes are of real value to all students of the Bible. And if it must be admitted that the comments on some Scriptures are obviously written for scholars rather than for "men of ordinary culture," *e.g.* Dr. Lee on the Apocalypse, yet, on the other hand, nothing can well be better adapted to the wants of cultivated laymen than the expositions of *Job* by Canon Cook, of *Proverbs* by the Dean of Wells, of *Jeremiah* by the Dean of Canterbury, of *2 Corinthians* by Mr. Waite, and of some of the smaller Epistles of the New Testament by the Bishop of Derry. All these expositions, and not these alone, would do honour to any work, and can hardly fail to secure for the Speaker's Commentary a wide influence and a long lease of life.

At least two of the expositions contained in this work run so far ahead of anything which the Preface led us to expect as to demand a special word of recognition. Canon Westcott's comment on the Gospel by St. John is one of the most perfect, as Canon Evans's on the first Epistle to the Corinthians is one of the most original, in the English language, or indeed in any other. These two of themselves would suffice to give vogue and distinction to any work which included them.

The drawbacks and defects of this Commentary—for of course there is a *but* to all this praise—are, we think, that it is too decidedly *Churchy*, *i.e.*, sectarian, in its tone; and that, for the most part, it follows too closely on precedent and tradition, only rarely breaking away from the historical and orthodox interpretation of Holy Writ. These, no doubt, will be virtues and attractions, rather than drawbacks and defects, in the eyes of most of the members of the Established Church; but, outside that sacred circle, they will repel rather than invite. For there are many beyond the pale, as there are also a few within it, who seriously question the wisdom of the Fathers, with whom the historical

interpretation originated; who believe that despite their learning (and some of them were not even distinguished for that), and their devotion (and some of them were abominably worldly and even wicked), they were almost as much Pagan as Christian in their tone and modes of thought (as indeed how could those of them help being who were only converted from Paganism after their habits of thought had been formed?) and have gone far toward corrupting the stream of Christian doctrine near its source. And there are many more who hold it to be the chief mission of the scientific scepticism and criticism of the day to lead us back beyond the troubled stream of patristic doctrine to the sincere fountains from which it rose, to induce a wider and simpler view of the truths taught in the New Testament, and to bring us to a closer correspondence with the mind of Christ. Those who hold such views as these—and we suspect that they are growing in number every day and will continue to grow—will find much in many parts of the Speaker's Commentary to which they will object; but even they, if they once begin to use it, will also find in it so much to approve and admire that they will never willingly be without it.

THE PULPIT COMMENTARY (London: Paul, Trench & Co.), edited by Canon Spence and Mr. Eaeell, is not, of course, to be compared with the Speaker's Commentary. It is not written by men of the same eminence for broad and solid learning. It has not as yet contained more than one exposition—that of Dr. Morison on *Ruth*—which can take rank with those which we have mentioned in the previous paragraphs. And it is weighted with a mass of Homilies and Homiletic matter so enormous, much of it too so worthless, that no exegesis, however good, could be expected to bear up under it. Nevertheless, as we have said before, the expository part of the work is fairly good, now and then very good, and is never beyond the grasp of "men of ordinary culture."

Three volumes have recently been added to it: *Numbers* by Rev. R. Winterbotham, *1 Kings* by Rev. Joseph Hammond, and *Leviticus* by Rev. F. Meyrick. The expository section of all these volumes is quite up to the level of previous volumes, and the homilies, which occupy the bulk of the space, are quite down to the level of those that have gone before them. Both Mr. Winterbotham and Mr. Hammond are well and favourably known to the readers of this Magazine; but, while their work on *Kings* and

Numbers is very creditable of its kind, they neither of them seem to have had subjects so much to their taste as those which they have treated in these pages, or display so much power and originality in their handling of them. Mr. Meyrick sees a type of Christian truth in every detail of every ceremony of the Levitical legislation, and seems almost to believe that Moses saw one too! The immense difficulties which surround the questions of the authorship and date of the books of Leviticus and Numbers, in common with the other contents of the Pentateuch, are not adequately discussed, and perhaps could not be adequately discussed in volumes intended for popular use; only, in that case, it would surely have been better not to take them up at all than to make light of them, or to assume, as Mr. Meyrick does, that, apart from one or two points easily explained, there is nothing "which is incompatible with the authorship and date of Moses;" for even the "ordinary layman" knows by this time, thanks to the labours of Dr. Robertson Smith, that the difficulties in the way of that conclusion are very grave and formidable.

Of the "homilies" it will be better to say no more; since to those who know how much of its success this Commentary owes not to its better but its "worse" part—*i.e.* in plain words, to the dulness and mental poverty of men who profess to be preachers yet cannot preach—it is hard to speak of them with courtesy and patience.

THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD, by *Henry Hughes, M.A.* (London: Kegan Paul & Co.), is a rather large-minded statement of some of the leading Evangelical doctrines, and seems to have been written by a man of good natural gifts and some cultivation, but without the special scholarship, and especially without that familiar acquaintance with the history of the development of Doctrines, which would alone adequately equip him for his task. In one chapter, however, which appears strangely out of place and out of keeping with the rest of his work, he gravely departs from what is commonly accepted as Evangelical doctrine, and interjects into an exposition of moral and spiritual truths an excursus on Baptismal Regeneration. What else, at least, can be made of such phrases as these? "Baptism is the gate, and the only gate, of admission from the world into the Church." "A supernatural change of position takes place." "In Baptism this supernatural

union between our nature and the nature of Christ is first effected."

THE APOSTOLIC LITURGY AND THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS, by *John Edward Field, M.A.* (London: Rivingtons.) The object of this long treatise, which is not destitute of a certain kind of erudition and even of perverted ability, is to prove that, in a subtle, underhand, cryptographic way, St. Paul insinuates and maintains throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews "a continuous allusion to the *Holy Eucharist*, shewing that the writer keeps this always in view as the practical centre of Christian Worship and the highest expression of the Christian Faith;" and that, in the same obscure and not quite honest way, he makes, in the course of the Epistle, certain "quotations from the Greek Liturgy of St. James." We have examined it with care, as so strange a thesis demanded, and would fain save others from the weariness and indignation which it is likely to cause in any frank, sincere, and spiritual mind. In our judgment it is one long dull sin against reason and common sense, against the accepted canons of criticism, and most of all, against the very spirit of Christ, and shews to what depths the purely sacerdotal mind may fall.

THE INNER LIFE OF CHRIST as revealed in the Gospel of Matthew 3 vols., by *Joseph Parker, D.D.* (London: R. Clarke.) Dr. Parker's Commentary on the Gospel by St. Matthew, in which he endeavours to trace the progress of thought in the mind and teaching of our Lord, is now complete; and we can give the same praise (with the same qualifications) to the completed work that we gave to the first volume some months since. There are signs of true power in it, and glimpses of real spiritual insight; and though Dr. Parker has passed by some of the most characteristic and difficult sayings reported by the first Evangelist—*e.g.* Matthew xix. 29, 30, a most noble and matterful paradox—he seldom takes up either a sentence or an incident without making a sincere, strenuous, and often successful endeavour to get at its real meaning and to develop its moral force. We could wish, however, that the "Prayers" had been omitted; for they remind one only too sadly that the late Mr. Lynch's are almost the only modern prayers which will bear reading. The book, again, is not so well printed as it should have been; and it would be a compliment to say that

it is badly edited. It is not edited at all. It contains no index, no table of Scriptures even, nor so much as a running marginal reference to the Chapter and Verse in hand. If one wants to refer to any passage in the Gospel and see how the Author has dealt with it, there is absolutely no resource but to pull all three volumes off the shelf and to hunt it up through a mass of undistinguished pages as best one can. Can it be that, in his modesty, Dr. Parker never anticipated the possibility of any work of his becoming a "book of reference"?

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, by the late *James Hinton* (London: Paul, Trench & Co.), is a selection from Mr. Hinton's "printed manuscripts," edited by his sister-in-law and disciple, Miss Caroline Haddon. It is full of fine and suggestive thoughts, very characteristic of one of the keenest and most religious thinkers and men of science of modern times, and will be a very precious and fruitful legacy not to his personal friends alone but to all who are familiar with his works. One who should come to it ignorant of those works, and in especial of "Man and his Dwelling-place," would in all probability be utterly perplexed by much that he would find in it; but all who are acquainted with them will follow him with a sense of delight, even if not with conviction; while in those whom he honoured with his friendship this last product of his genius cannot fail to renew their deep and affectionate regret for one too early taken from us. It should, however, be carefully borne in mind that, in the note-books from which these extracts have been taken, Mr. Hinton roughly jotted down, for his own guidance, the thoughts which rose in his ever-busy brain, intending to revise and co-ordinate them before he gave them to the world—an intention frustrated by his premature death; so that no opinion found in this volume must be taken as a final and thoroughly weighed conclusion. In short, we have here only an infinitesimal part of the vast material collected for that *magnum opus* which he did not live even to commence.

In THE POET'S BIBLE (London: Isbister), *Mr. W. Garrett Horder* has collected a large number of poems which throw light on the words, scenes, and incidents of the New Testament. He has made a very admirable and catholic selection. Many of the poems are charming, though a few—notably those by Earl Nelson—seem to

owe their admission to their subjects rather than to anything resembling poetic inspiration. It may be doubted whether these poems, taken as a whole, are fraught with the expository and "revealing" power which Mr. Horder attributes to them; but there can be no doubt that they very pleasantly illustrate the Scriptures which they take for their themes, and will be very welcome, in this collected form, to many readers and lovers of the Bible.

THE NEW MAN AND THE ETERNAL LIFE, by *Andrew Jukes*. (London: Longmans.) The Church of Christ owes much already to the author of this thoughtful and devout volume, and must be content to run more deeply into debt to him now that it has appeared. The theme of the book is "the reiterated Amens of the Son of God," the twelve great sayings introduced by the oath "Verily, verily." In these sayings Mr. Jukes sees the history of "the new man" which is created after God in Christ Jesus, from his birth to his final victory and home-coming. That these divine sayings were *intended* to "form in themselves a distinct and perfect series," linked together by a master-theme, though uttered at sundry times and in divers places, is, of course questionable and will in all probability be questioned. But there is a touch of the mystic and the seer about Mr. Jukes; and if we would get the best he has to give us, we must not too curiously inquire into the logical sequence of his thoughts, or take his themes for theorems which require to be demonstrated. We must grant him his postulates, and follow where he leads, finding our gain in the insight he gives us into deep spiritual truths, and the elevating and sanctifying influence of his spirit and teaching on our minds. All who thus follow him through his latest work will surely find that they have got from him that which is worth much more than logic and whole demonstrations.

"DELIVER US FROM EVIL." Two letters addressed to the Bishop of London. By *Rev. Canon Cook, M.A.* (London: John Murray.) In these two letters the learned editor of the Speaker's Commentary utters his protest against that alteration in the Lord's Prayer which has excited more attention and more animadversion than any other change in the new Revised Version. His argument is a very strong one, and he backs it up with a long array of recognized

authorities, ancient and modern. It is impossible in the space at our disposal to follow him through the several steps of his argument. Nor is there any need to follow him. The very appearance of these letters, the mere fact that so many great authorities, among whom Canon Cook himself is not the least, can be cited in favour of his conclusion, is a sufficient and decisive condemnation of the new reading. For the Revisers were warned by the express terms of their commission to make none but *necessary* changes, to correct only *plain and clear errors*. And how can a change be necessary against which many of our best scholars protest, or that be a plain and clear error which so many high authorities pronounce to be no error at all? In the face of this protest it is impossible to doubt that, in this case at least, the Revisers have outrun their commission, and have introduced a change which is questionable on grounds alike of grammar, authority, and good sense.

A PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK, by *James Morison, D.D.* (London: Hodder and Stoughton.) Dr. Morison's Commentary on St. Mark is, as has been more than once pointed out in this Magazine, incomparably the best on this Gospel which we possess. And now that it appears in a third edition, with the learned Author's final corrections—the whole work having been carefully revised, and in parts condensed—it is to be hoped that it will enter on a new lease of life and influence. Our advice to persons about to form, or who have commenced to form, a Biblical library is: whatever else you do not get, get this.

THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST.

ST. MATTHEW xii. 31, 32; ST. MARK iii. 28-30.

I SHALL never forget the chill that struck into my childish heart so often as I heard of this mysterious sin which carried men, and for ought I knew might have carried even me, beyond all reach of pardon; or the wonder and perplexity with which I used to ask myself why, if this sin were possible,—if, as the words of our Lord seem to imply, it was probable even and by no means infrequent,—it was not clearly defined, so that we might at least know, and know beyond all doubt, whether it had been committed or had not. And, since then, I have again and again met with men and women of tender conscience and devout spirit who, by long brooding over these terrible words, had convinced themselves that they had fallen, inadvertently for the most part, into this fatal sin, and whose reason had been disbalanced and unhinged by a fearful anticipation of the doom they held themselves to have provoked. The religious monomaniac is to be found in well nigh every madhouse in the Kingdom; and in the large majority of cases, as there is only too much ground to believe, he has been driven mad by the fear that he has committed the unpardonable sin: although the man who honestly fears that he may have committed this sin is just the one man who has the witness in himself that he cannot possibly have committed it. If any preacher and teacher of the Word doubts whether this terrible fear broods heavily over the hearts of thousands within the pale of the Church, as well as outside it, let him put his doubt to the proof: let him give his congregation any reasonable explanation of the words

before us, and then see whether for many days afterwards he will not be thanked by members of his flock, whom he little suspected of indulging such a fear, for having saved them from a long suffered terror and perplexity.

Any minister, therefore, who knows that fear to be founded on a too literal and wholly mistaken interpretation of these words, would himself stand much in need of pardon—and might even, without much exaggeration, be said to have grazed the very edge of the unpardonable sin—if he did not, at suitable times and intervals, carefully explain what our Lord really said, what He really meant, when He spoke of this sin against the Holy Ghost.

The explanation is not far to seek, or difficult to give. For the keyword to the whole passage is the word αἰών, *æon*, age, which recent controversies have made quite familiar even to the unlearned: and the true rendering of the latter clause of Matthew xii. 32, as may be gathered from the margin of our Revised Version, is this: "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age, nor in that which is to come." Now the two phrases "this (present) age" and "the coming age," which our Lord here adopts, were perfectly familiar to the Jews, and had, as scholars are agreed, a clear and definite meaning on their lips. "This present age," or "the age that now is," was the age in which they lived, with all its apparatus of religious teaching and worship, the age of the Law and the Temple; while "the coming age," or "the age to come," was that happier time of which the advent of the long-promised Messiah was to be the sign and the commencement, although it could not fully come until Jesus the Christ ascended into heaven and poured out his Spirit from on high. That is to say, by "this age" the Jews who listened to our Lord meant what we should call the *Mosaic* dispensation; while by "the coming age" they meant the *Messianic*, or what we call the *Christian* dispensation. It was in this sense,

it could be in no other sense, that our Lord used, and was understood to use, these two phrases here. So that what He really affirmed was, that there is a sin which is just as unpardonable under the Christian dispensation as it was under the Mosaic dispensation. And though as yet we have gained no hint as to what this sin was, our gain is nevertheless great; for we see at once that by replacing the word "world" with the word "age" in this passage, *i.e.* by retaining the very word which Jesus used, and reading it in the sense in which He employed it, we discharge from the passage all reference to the future world, to the future life; we learn that, so far from speaking of the state and doom of men after death, He is simply speaking of the state and doom of men in this present life, in this present world, whether they live under the Law or whether they live under the Gospel; and thus all that is intolerable in his words, all that drives men mad as they brood over them, is removed at a single stroke.

But *what* is this sin for which, at least in the present world, there is no forgiveness, or no provision for forgiveness? It is that wilful and invincible ignorance which refuses to be taught, that love of darkness which refuses to admit the light even when the sun is shining in the sky. The Light that lighteth every man *had* at last come into the world, and was burning in upon the conscience of the Pharisees through the words and deeds of Jesus the Christ. They felt his power. In their hearts they were compelled to admit that his words were true words, that his works were good works. But his words were so much truer than their own that they found in them a rebuke of their ignorance, instead of an invitation to learn of Him; his works were so much greater than theirs that they found in them a reflection on their own impotence, instead of an invitation to trust in Him. He humbled their vanity. He exposed their insincerity. Hence they hated Him, and, in

their hatred, affirmed words which they felt were true to be untrue, and attributed works which they felt to be good to the power and craft of the devil. They saw the light, and knew that it was light; and yet they loved darkness more than light, because their deeds were evil. Like the servants in the Parable, they said, "This is the Heir," only to add, "Let us kill him, that the inheritance may be ours,"—ours, and not his.

Jesus, "knowing their thoughts," knowing too the desperate moral condition from which their thoughts sprang, simply warned them that it *was* desperate. They were deliberately sinning against light, against conscience, against all that was true and right and good; in a word, they were "speaking against the Holy Ghost," the Spirit of all truth and goodness; and so long as they did that, there was no hope for them. They were closing the heavenward window of the soul; and so long as they did that, how could any light from heaven shine into their souls? They were shutting the very door through which alone the Divine Influence could approach them; and so long as they did that, how could any Divine Influence reach them? If men *will* keep their eyes shut, how should they see? If they *will* stop their ears, how should they hear?

So far, then, from giving us a dark mystical saying in which our thoughts are lost, our Lord simply states a moral truism, as we might have inferred from the casual and unemphatic manner of his speech. And the truism is that, since salvation is necessarily of the *will*, if men *will* not be saved, they cannot be saved; if they will not yield to the Divine Spirit when it moves and stirs within them, they cannot be redeemed and renewed by that gracious Spirit. Under whatever dispensation they live, they are self-excluded from the kingdom of heaven, by the one sin which is therefore called an "eternal" or "æonial" sin.

But if the saying was a mere truism, it may be objected,

what need was there to impress it on the Pharisees? of what use was it to them? of what use is it to us? Those who ask that question might be answered by another: Have you yet to learn that mere truisms, as we call them, *i.e.* rudimentary, fundamental, familiar truths, are of all truths precisely the most important; and that the greatest service any teacher can do us is to quicken them to life, to bring them home and make them potent with us, by restating them in original, picturesque, or impressive forms? Man is a sinner, Christ a Saviour, God our Father,—all these are truisms; but are there any truths so momentous as these? and can any man render us a greater service than by so stating them as to give them power over us?

Yet, instead of pursuing this retort, let me rather try to meet the question more directly, by shewing how important *this* truism was to the Pharisees, and is to us. When they were penetrated by the truth of what Christ said, and felt the goodness as well as the power of his works, and yet wilfully ascribed his wisdom and goodness to the craft and power of the devil, we may hope that, blinded by prejudice and stung by fear, the Pharisees did not altogether know what they did. They must have known that they were doing wrong, but they may not have realized that they were deliberately resisting the Spirit of all truth and goodness, the very Spirit of God Himself, and so were putting themselves out of the pale of pardon, beyond the reach of salvation. Was it not well, then, that they should be plainly told what they were doing? Was it not well they should be solemnly warned that it was *God*, and not man, against whom they were fighting? And if, conscious of some sin, yet not fully conscious of their full sin, they comforted themselves with the hope—a hope commonly entertained by the Jews—that, though the blood of bulls and of goats could not wholly take away sin, yet in the coming age, the age of Messiah, all guilt,

or at least all Jewish guilt, would be for ever purged away, was it not well that Christ should tell them in so many words that the sin of which they were guilty was one which could no more be forgiven in the Messianic than in the Mosaic age; that it was a sin—the one sin—which by its very nature shut out all hope of forgiveness, whatever the Dispensation under which men might live?

It may have been a mere truism to say that, so long as men wilfully and deliberately shut out the Spirit of all truth and grace from their hearts, salvation was impossible to them; but to throw this truism into a striking and original form, to warn the Pharisees that it *was* the Holy Spirit of God which they were resisting, and that no provision for the pardon of that sin could possibly be made whether in the Messianic or the Mosaic age,—was not that worth while? was it not to render them the priceless service of which I have spoken, that of giving new life and force to a truth so familiar to them that it had ceased to move them?

Yet that this unpardonable sin might be pardoned, that it was the sin, and not the men who committed it, which could never be forgiven, is clear: for many of the Pharisees who had long resisted the Spirit of God in Christ—and, be it remembered that even Saul of Tarsus had long “kicked against the goads” which urged him toward the kingdom—afterwards repented of their sin, received his words, believed his works, and were welcomed into the fellowship of the Church. And even of those who never knew an earthly repentance, and of their doom in “the world to come,” this passage says absolutely nothing. It leaves us to our own conjectures, our own hopes; and neither approves nor condemns those who trust that in the world to come even those who leave this world impenitent may be taught “even against their will, and by means of a larger experience, the lessons they would not learn

here; and so be brought to confess their guilt and folly, and be taken at last—so as by fire—into the arms” of the Divine Compassion and Love.

But where lies *our* danger of committing this sin against the Holy Ghost, our need therefore of the warning that, so long as we persist in this sin, pardon and salvation are impossible to us? We fall into this sin, must be my reply, whenever we consciously and wilfully resist the Spirit of truth and goodness; whenever, *i.e.* we see a truth and do not accept it because it cuts our prejudices against the grain, whenever we know what is good and yet do it not, because we love some evil way too well to leave it. To speak against any form of truth or any form of goodness which we inwardly recognize as good and true, or even suspect to be true and good, is “to speak against the Holy Ghost”: and, be it remembered, “deeds speak louder than words.”

For all practical purposes we may even say that to sin against *Conscience* is to sin against the Holy Ghost; for Conscience is the organ and voice of God within the soul; and our Lord is here drawing a contrast between the action of God within the soul, and the manifestations of God which are external to the soul.

Sins against the Son of Man, He says, may be forgiven, although *He* is the express revelation of God and the very brightness of his glory; for men may never have seen or never have known Him as He is. He may never have been set before them, or He may have been so misrepresented to them that it was impossible for them to accept and love Him. And in their ignorance, not having known Him, not having felt his grace and power, they may speak against Him words which they would rather have died than spoken had they known who or what He was. But when men resist the God *within* them, when they refuse to hear and obey what they *acknowledge* to be his voice, what hope is

there for them in any age, under any Dispensation? And such a voice most men acknowledge Conscience to be. Its independence, and the authority with which it speaks, compel us to reverence it. For Conscience will not bend to our caprice, our taste, our choice. It will not pronounce a thing to be true because we wish it were true, or good because we are set on doing it. It refuses to serve our humours and inclinations. It is our master, not our servant, and delivers its verdicts with an absolute authority. We may refuse to submit to them indeed; but none the less we know them to be honest and true. Try how we will, we can neither coax nor coerce from it any sanction of that which is dishonest, untruthful, impure; we cannot even silence its protest against the sin that we love best. "Do you not perceive," asks Fenelon, "that nothing less resembles *you* than this invisible judge, who instructs with such authority and condemns with such rigour?"

This voice, then, which is not ours, and which will not bend to our will, nor sanction our desires, we feel to be the voice of God within us; it is through this voice that the Holy Ghost warns, pleads, condemns, approves. And, hence, to resist Conscience is to resist God, to sin against his Holy Spirit.

And in how many ways may we all fall into this sin!

In our religious life we sin against the Holy Ghost if, as we read the Gospel, we learn that in Christ Jesus we have precisely such a Saviour from all sin and uncleanness as we need: if, as we read, I say, Conscience leaps up in approval of what we read and urges us to accept the offered salvation, and we refuse to listen because we are too engrossed with the outward affairs of life, or too attached to some of the forms of sin from which Christ would save us to part with them yet, we commit the sin which cannot be pardoned, and from which we cannot be saved so long as we cleave to it. Or, again, if after we have accepted,

or professed to accept, his salvation, we catch glimpses of new and higher truths, and shut our eyes against them because we do not want to be at the trouble of revising and recasting our theological formulas; or if we are inwardly called to new and difficult duties, and turn away from them because they would impose a strain upon us or a sacrifice which we are not willing to bear,—in thus sinning against Conscience we sin against the Holy Ghost.

Nor is there any one respect in which we refuse to recognize truth as true or duty as binding upon us, whether in the formation of our political views or the discharge of our political functions, or in the principles on which we conduct our business, or even in the spirit in which we conduct our literary or scientific investigations, in which we do not or may not fall into this very sin. For the Holy Spirit is the Spirit from whom all true thoughts and all forms of goodness do proceed. To close our eyes to any truth, to neglect any duty, is not only to shut that truth out of our minds, and not only to lower and impoverish the tone of our life; it is also to grieve and resist that pure and gracious Spirit by whom we are made one with the Father and the Son; it is to impair the very organ by which truth comes to us, and to cripple the very faculty by which we are enabled for all dutiful and noble enterprise.

Truism as it is, then, there is no truth which we more need to lay to heart than this solemn and impressive warning against closing the heavenward windows and avenues of the soul.

Nor do I see how the accepted misinterpretation of this gracious warning could have obtained so great vogue among us, and wrought so much harm, but for the miserable misconceptions of the character and truth of God which have too long obtained among us, and our too common habit of forgetting, in our study of any difficult passage

by which we are profoundly impressed, the large and generous principles and convictions which can alone throw light upon it. Men are taught, indeed, to call God their Father in heaven, and to sing of his "new best name of Love": but then, as though these pious phrases were only phrases, as if they represented no real and eternal fact, they are also taught to think of Him as condemning the vast majority of his children to an everlasting depravity and torment, as only pardoning those whose pardon has been "purchased" from Him, and even—O shame to men made in his likeness and claiming to have received his Spirit!—as lying in wait to trap men in their sins, sins into which they fall unconsciously or against their will, that He may not be compelled to forgive them.

Such teaching, in its cruder and openly avowed forms, is not, happily, so common as it was, though it is much more common than some of us suppose; but its evil influence still lingers in the air and seriously affects the theological views of almost every section of the Christian Church.

What can it be but some remnant of this barbarous and blasphemous misconception of the God of all righteousness and grace which has led so many thousands¹ to fear lest, in some unknown and unintentional way, they have fallen into the mysterious sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost, which puts them beyond the pale of forgiveness? Can any man who honestly entertains such a fear really believe that he has a true and loving Father in heaven? What! a Father who sets subtle and hidden snares for our feet! a Father who will not forgive us sins which we did not mean to commit, even though, when we fear that we have committed them, we repent with strong crying and tears

¹ In the week in which I wrote this brief essay I read, in the daily newspapers, of no less than four cases in which men, respected by their neighbours, were driven to suicide or madness by this intolerable fear.

and go mourning all our days! He who can think so of God, and teach men to think so, hardly deserves to have a Father in heaven. We simply wrong our Father, wrong Him beyond all telling, when we do not believe that He will take pleasure in pardoning every sin that can possibly be pardoned; when, instead of conceiving of Him as lying in wait to detect and punish us, or as making the way of transgression easy to us so that we may slip into it unawares, we do not heartily believe that He makes evil ways hard to us, saves us from the snares which his enemy and ours has set for our feet, and will not condemn a single soul that consents to be redeemed. It is not his will that one of his little ones should perish. And the passage before us, so far from quickening fear or despair in us, should inspire us with hope and courage; for it distinctly assures us that with Him there is forgiveness, even in this present life, for every sin but that of conscious, wilful, persistent resistance to his kind and saving will, and thus once more reveals Him to us as in very deed our Father and our Friend.

Nor is it only God our Father whom we wrong by these hard poor thoughts of Him, we also wrong the pure and gracious Son of Man. When we reflect on it, we cannot but be amazed and ashamed that it should ever have been possible to us to think of *Him* as here imposing an intolerable burden of fear upon us. We ought to have known that we must have read his words wrongly, even though we could not put our finger on the mistake, if we ever so read them as to find in them an indefinite warning against an undefined but unpardonable sin. It is or should be incredible to us, if we have felt any touch of his grace, that He of all men should have meant by these words what He has too long been taken to mean. That He should warn the Pharisees, that He should warn us, that even He cannot save men who deliberately refuse to be saved, cannot give the light of life to those who wilfully

shut out the light from their souls,—*this* is credible enough, for it is in full accordance with his character and spirit. But that only *once* in the course of his ministry, and that in the most casual way, in the most matter-of-fact tone, He should have referred in passing to the most fatal of all perils, and never have defined what the peril was or taught us how to escape it,—is *that* credible? Is it *like* Him? Does it accord with his manner, his spirit? We might believe it of some “child of the devil”: but can we believe it of the Son of God?

It is so utterly opposed to all we know whether of God or of Christ that, even when we did not perceive the true meaning of these words, we ought never to have believed it, except perhaps in those immature years when we scarcely knew our right hand from our left. We ought, I think, to have felt instinctively that, whatever the words might mean, they could not possibly have meant that. And I suppose we should have felt it but for the influence of that barbarous and semi-pagan theology in which most of us were trained. For the interpretation of them, which often bred fear in our minds, is quite foreign to the whole spirit of the New Testament, as well as to the character of God and the teaching of Christ. From the Apostles of the Lord we have received such commandments as these: “Grieve not the Spirit,” “Resist not the Spirit,” and even “Quench not the Spirit.” Now it must surely be admitted that to grieve, or to resist, or, above all, to quench the Holy Ghost must be even a more deadly sin than to “speak against the Holy Ghost,” if by speaking against the Holy Ghost is meant the use of some mystic formulæ of outwardly or inwardly uttered words. And yet in none of these cases, not even the worst, do the Apostles assume an unpardonable sin, or threaten those who commit it with an irreversible doom. They simply warn us against any abuse of spiritual faculties, gifts, opportunities, as

inevitably detrimental to our spiritual life. They warn us against being false to truth and duty on the ground that to be untrue to any truth is to resist the Spirit of all truth, that to be unfaithful to any duty is to resist, and may be to quench, the Spirit of all grace. Yet if they had held our Lord to mean what the Church has taken Him to mean, if they had drawn the ecclesiastical distinction between venial sins and mortal sins, and knew that to grieve, resist, or quench the Spirit was a mortal sin which could never be forgiven,—would they not have told us so? ought they not, were they not bound, to tell us so?

On the whole, then, I think we may say, without hesitation or reserve, that the old, and still too common, reading of these words which has perplexed and tortured so many of us, and which has driven so many poor souls to madness or suicide, must, on the very face of it, be a wrong reading, since it is utterly opposed to the very character of God, to the mind that was in Christ Jesus our Lord, and to the whole spirit of the Apostolic teaching: while the new reading of them is commended to us by all we know of God the Father, of the Son of Man, and of the general drift of the New Testament Scriptures.

There is still in some minds, however, one difficulty in the way of accepting this new reading which must be met, and which I meet the more cheerfully because it will give an opportunity of noticing what is peculiar in St. Mark's report of this great saying; viz. the phrase "*Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of eternal sin.*"

The difficulty I am told is this. "When we read of a sin that cannot be forgiven whether in the Mosaic age or the Christian, we naturally assume our Lord to mean that it cannot be forgiven *even when it is repented of*; for *no* sin can be forgiven men until they repent; and

our Lord is here drawing a distinction between one sin and all others. What, then, can this distinction be but this: that, though all other sins may be forgiven when men repent of them, this sin *cannot* be forgiven, let them repent of it how they may?"

Considering how most of us have been trained to think of God and the things of God, that perhaps is a very natural, and even a reasonable, objection to take, though I should have thought that any reflective man would feel that it involved him in still greater difficulties than any it removes. For, first of all, *Christ* does not say that this sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be forgiven "even when men repent of it"; it is we who supply that terrible qualification, and thus read our own meaning into what He said. And, then, as we have just seen, to assume that any sin—and, still more, any sin not so clearly defined that we can be sure whether we have committed it or not—cannot be forgiven when we repent of it and renounce it, is to frame an assumption which runs right in the teeth of all we know of God, of Christ, and of the whole spirit of the Gospel as taught by those who knew Him best.

These are considerations so large and weighty that, of themselves, they might well make us pause and retrace our steps. But we may meet the objection much more directly. We may ask those who urge it: How do you know that there are no sins which God will not forgive men even *before* they repent, and even though they should never repent, at least in this present life? We may suggest that our Lord is here drawing a distinction between outward overt transgressions which may be forgiven us on, or even perhaps apart from, repentance, and the inward sinful principle which can never be *forgiven*, but must be renounced and cast out.

What is the sin which our Lord Himself compares,

or contrasts, with the unpardonable sin? It is the sin of speaking against Himself, the gracious Son of Man. But what is it to speak against the Son of Man? To speak against the Son of Man is to speak against, to reject, or deny, the revelation of God's truth, will, and love made in and through Him. It is to deny that there was any manifestation of God in the God manifest in the flesh; in more modern phraseology, it is to deny that there is anything divine in the Christian dispensation and faith. That, alas! is a sin only too common in our own days. There are intelligent and learned men only too many, and men whom, judged by any other standard, we should all pronounce to be honest and good men, who deny that God has ever given any immediate revelation of his will to mankind, who even doubt both whether any such revelation be possible and whether there be any God to make it. It is worse than useless, it is a mere crime against our own reason and conscience, to denounce these men as wilful and notorious sinners, or to assume that they are impelled to speak against the Son of Man by base and guilty motives, because their deeds are evil. Sinners they are indeed, and must be, for all have sinned. And some of them may be sinners in this special sense, that they have taken it on themselves to reject the Christian revelation without any due examination of evidence, without due consideration of its claims. But, on the other hand, who can doubt that some of them are just as honest in rejecting as we are in accepting it? They may have been blinded by intellectual prepossessions or an inherited bent of mind: but are we to blame blind men because they do not see, and to accuse them of a wilful rejection of the light that shines from heaven? And if we do not, will God?

The fault may be *ours*, rather than theirs. We may have turned the very light into a darkness. We may so

have misrepresented our Master to them that, instead of seeing Him as He is, they may have seen only that imperfect and misleading image of Him which we have made in our own likeness. If, as we sometimes confess, there lives more truth in honest doubt than in half our creeds, how are we to condemn men who honestly doubt because we have only placed the half, and the baser half, of our creed before them? If a man has honestly doubted, if he has followed the inward light and been true to the inward voice, and he should die before discovering that Christ is other and better than he knew, that He is indeed the true light of every man and the very brightness of the Father's glory; if, that is, he should never repent in this world of his sin in speaking against and rejecting the Son of Man, will *his* sin never be forgiven him, or will it not, rather, never be counted against him, however heavily he may reckon it against himself?

On the other hand, if a man has *not* been honest in his doubts and denials; if, besides sinning against the God without him who sought to reveal Himself to him, he has also sinned against the God within him; if when Reason or Conscience said, That is true and you ought to believe it, or, That is duty and you ought to do it, he has refused to accept the truth or do the duty which he felt to be clothed with Divine sanctions; if he has consciously shut out the light and refused to walk in it; if, in the language of our passage, he has added the sin against the Holy Ghost to the sin against the Son of Man, and if he should leave the world without repenting of his sin, how can we deny that he has put himself outside the pale of forgiveness by making forgiveness impossible? What may become of him in that other, future, world, we cannot say, we are not told, though we are still allowed to cherish the hope that new moral forces may be brought to bear upon him and may take effect upon

him; all we can be sure of is that so long as he deliberately shuts out the light, the light cannot reach him; that so long as he refuses to part with his sin, he cannot be saved from his sin.

Our reasonable conclusion would seem to be, therefore, that our Lord is here affirming that sins of ignorance, honest sins (such as those of Saul of Tarsus), sins which do not impair fidelity to the truths and duties which men feel to be true and right, will be forgiven even though, in this life at least, they should never be recognized as sins or washed away in tears of penitence (as I suppose St. Paul's sins would have been had he died while "thinking to do God service" by blaspheming and persecuting the Son of Man); while the one sin which cannot be forgiven so long as men cleave to it, the one sin which is eternally a sin and which adds a damning guilt to all other sins, is the sin which makes salvation necessarily impossible—viz., the conscious, wilful, deliberate, and persistent opposition to the voice of reason and conscience, that is, to the voice of God within the soul. And that surely is both reasonable and just; for who can complain that he is not saved so long as he refuses salvation by deliberately resisting the Divine influence which can alone redeem him from his sins?

So that our conclusion of the whole matter is this. The one sin which hath never forgiveness is that which alone lends guilt to our transgressions—a conscious and wilful resistance to what we feel and admit to be the pure, kind, saving will of God. Any man, therefore, who is now willing to submit, and even earnestly desirous of submitting to and obeying that Will, may be sure that he has not been "guilty of an eternal sin," or that he is no longer guilty of it; any man who now wants to be saved may be quite sure that he is not beyond the pale of salvation, let his sins have been what they will.

And perhaps what we all most need to lay to heart as we study this difficult theme is, that, by every inward act of resistance to the Spirit of all truth and goodness, we are tending toward the state in which forgiveness, and therefore salvation, become impossible to us. An unfaithful Christian, an untruthful, dishonest, worldly-minded, selfish, or sensual believer, is in a much more perilous condition than the man who, while he ignorantly rejects the Christian Faith, is true to conscience and duty—true, that is, to the voice of God, even though he does not recognize it as the voice of God. And I, for one, would rather be an agnostic, walking sorrowfully but faithfully under the burden of life, with no heaven above me to shed down strength and consolation, and no hope of immortality to allure me along the steep and difficult path of duty, than I would be a Christian learned in all the creeds, and for ever prating of my immortal hopes, yet living as though I had no Father on high, and no outlook beyond the narrow bounds of earth and time.

S. Cox.

STUDIES IN THE MINOR PROPHETS.

III.—AMOS.

LORD MACAULAY, in his celebrated essay on Milton, put forth the theory that the poetry of a nation belongs to its stages of incipient culture. He himself lived to retract that opinion, yet there was probably a truth at the root of it. It seems to us that poetry has indeed something to do with the beginning of things. It may be as perfect in an age of civilization as in an age of primitive culture, but, alike in the one case as in the other, it must find its stimulus in some new experience.

Poetry, we should say, is generally the child of reaction.

There are three phases of reaction in the life of every developed nation ; they may be described respectively as physical, intellectual, and moral. The physical reaction of a nation is the birth of its national freedom, the hour in which it first awakes to the sense of its own independence ; that hour is ever an outburst of song. The intellectual reaction of a nation is the period in which it begins to wrestle with antiquated forms of thought ; that hour is also vocal, though the song is naturally fraught with some strains of sadness incidental to the vanishing of old associations and cherished ideals. The moral reaction of a nation is the first breath of its national conscience, the waking of its sense of responsibility, the earliest conviction that it has a work to do ; and that hour is perhaps its period of highest poetic enthusiasm.

There have been times in the history of the world in which these three phases have been contemporaneous. Three such periods stand out very prominently—the age of the Lutheran Reformation, the age of the Buddhist Reformation, and the age of the Jewish Reformation. Separated as these are by long intervals of time, there is yet between them a common ground of unity ; they are all movements which concentrate in one focus the physical, intellectual, and moral aspirations of humanity. In all of them we see the tendency towards the emancipation of the individual life, in all of them we witness the struggle for the freedom of the human intellect, in all of them we behold the desire for the liberation of the moral consciousness. The rise of Luther, the rise of Buddha, and the rise of the prophets of Israel, widely different as were their internal aims, had yet their origin in a common external necessity. Each movement originated in the reaction of man's three-fold nature against the bondage of authority. Each took its rise in the dawning conviction that the individual had a life of his own, which refused to be regarded as a mere drop in the ocean of humanity ; that the intellect had a life

of its own, which could not accept truth on any basis but that of self-revelation; and that the conscience had a life of its own, which demanded the right of private judgment in performing the duties of the day and hour.

It is the third of these great periods that we are here specially called to consider. We have styled it the age of the Jewish Reformation to mark its features of similarity with the religious movement of the sixteenth Christian century. It was essentially an outburst of freedom. The facts are briefly these. Between seven and eight hundred years before Christ there appeared in the social firmament of Judea a galaxy of great souls. They appeared in reaction to the spirit of their age. The tendency of Judaism had all along been to suppress the instinct of individual independence. Man had been taught to think of himself, not so much in the light of his personality, as in the light of his membership. He had been trained to view himself as the part of a tribe, as the member of a family, as the citizen of a nation. He had not been suffered to have any individual interests; the only interests allowed to him were those he shared with the community. There was doubtless a moral good in this subordination of personal interests, but in Judaism it had been carried to an extreme which transformed the good into evil. Man had ceased to recognize himself in his individual attitude towards God. He worshipped the God of the nation, the God of the theocracy, the God of the Messianic kingdom, but not the God of the personal life; the man had been absorbed in the Jew. It was in reaction to this tendency that these great souls arose. They came to remind Judaism that she was neglecting one element, and that the most important element, of the religious life. They came to tell her that God had a mission, not only for her children collectively, but for her sons individually; that the Divine Voice was speaking to each man in the nation, not simply because he was a member of the

nation, but mainly because he was a man. They came to proclaim to her people the doctrine of an universal priesthood. They told every man in the State that he had a life independent of the State, and that, in virtue of that life, his individual soul exercised a priesthood of its own, enjoyed an immediate communion with the Father of spirits. In proclaiming that revelation they at once commended themselves to the popular ear. Their message had in it somewhat of a republican ring. It broke down the middle wall of partition between the rich and the poor, the king and the subject, the priest and the people; for, in making every man a medium of divine revelation, it elevated to an equal rank the lives of all. And if anything were wanted to complete the popular character of the movement, it was found in the fact that it expressed itself in the voice of the poet. The leaders of the Jewish Reformation, viewed from the divine side, were prophets; but, viewed from the human side, they were singers. Just as the Lutheran Reformation passed into the literary renaissance, so did the Jewish Reformation find expression in poetry. The difference between them lay in this, that, unlike the reformation of the sixteenth century, the prophetic movement did not become secular in becoming poetical; it was at one and the same moment a literary and a religious revival. The poetry of Judea is the utterance of a religious faith. The Greek was led to his religion by the inspiration of his poetry; the Jew was inspired to poetry by the breath of his religion. The symbols of the Jewish prophets have come down to us as poetic images, but they were to them sober realities. When they spoke of nature as alive, they did so, not by way of metaphor but, because they believed her to be alive. Nature was to them not only a veritable voice of God, but the sweetest of all his voices, because it was that in which He spoke to the heart of every man; that whose accents annulled the distinction between soul and soul, and lifted each individual

life into the participation and the privilege of divine communion.

Foremost amongst this group of early Jewish reformers stands the form of Amos. We say foremost, not because he was the greatest of them, but because his figure is the most characteristic type of the new movement. In Amos we see in its perfection the rising of the spirit of Jewish Protestantism; it is more pronouncedly marked in him than in either Jonah or Joel. His attitude towards his Church and nation is one of individual independence. He professes to bear the personal responsibility of everything he utters. Not only has he no connexion with any official priesthood; he has no connexion with any prophetic school. He declares in so many words that he is neither a prophet, nor the disciple of a prophet, that he has not received the education or training or apostolic succession supposed to be necessary to a master in Israel,—that on the contrary he has been called out of humble circumstances by a special voice addressed to his individual soul. He claims to speak in obedience to that voice alone. He boldly introduces himself in the meanness of his worldly surroundings. He tells the Jewish people that he is only a herdsman, and a “gatherer of sycamore fruit.” He tells them that he brings no credentials for his mission beyond those of the personal life,—that he has been associated neither with the court of kings nor with the guild of prophets,—that he has been called from the spade and from the goad to speak to the educated ranks of men. He lays claim to a call inaudible to human ears; he rests his authority on the mandate of the King of kings. On the strength of that authority he proceeds to rebuke the kings of the earth, and his rebuke is searching and terrible. There is no attempt to soften down, no effort to palliate or modify; Amos seems to grow personally bold in proportion to his consciousness of personal lowliness. This

herdsman of Tekoah, this prophet unordained by earthly episcopate, this teacher unsupported by social rank or influence, speaks with an authority which no previous teacher had ever wielded. He lashes the kingdoms all round with his scourge of ridicule and his rod of chastisement; he spares neither his own land nor the land of the stranger. The kings of the earth have violated that law of righteousness which is his standard of human dignity, and by that law of righteousness he judges and condemns them. He deprives them of their crowns, he blots out their dynasties, he fulminates the thunder-bolt of divine wrath against the empires that have served them. He sits upon the circle of the earth, and the sovereigns thereof are as grasshoppers; the herdsman of Tekoah is the autocrat of the world.

Yet we should greatly err, did we suppose that in all this, the spirit of Amos was revolutionary; it was, on the contrary, strictly constitutional. Let it not be forgotten that the king had been originally crowned by the prophet; that coronation itself expressed the subordination of the civil to the religious power. The prophet, and not the king, had been recognized from the outset as the true leader of the Theocracy; he stood as the representative of God, and as such he alone had the right to constitute earthly royalty. Yet in this coronation of the king by the prophet there was symbolized a thought deeper and more enduring still. The prophet was not only the representative of God, he was the representative of the idea of ministration; he embodied in his own person the sacrificial element of humanity. That the prophet should anoint the king was therefore a deeply significant circumstance; it said, in the plainest language, that all physical power existed only to be the instrument of divine and human ministration. Here, in the very heart of Judaism, we catch a premonition of the Christian day. The majestic power of the Theocracy

is made to flash before us, but we are told that the power exists not for its own sake; it lives, and moves, and has its being in the life of sacrifice. The king has received the crown in order that he may bear the cross, and the empire over humanity already begins to be prefigured as a power of universal service: "Whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister."

Amos, then, is no innovator; he speaks in the true spirit of the earlier Judaism. That spirit contains already the germ of Christianity. Moses, the representative of the prophetic office, was at once the meekest of men and the lawgiver of his people. The conjunction of attributes so dissimilar was no accident in the history of the Jewish nation; it expressed the very spirit which was to animate the life of her prophets. The meek were ever to be the lawgivers, the rulers of the people were to be the servants of all. The prophet was to anoint the king because he was to represent the Head of the Theocracy; and he was to represent the Head of the Theocracy because he was to embody, in its highest form, the divine life of ministration. If we look at the prophecy of Amos in this light, we shall see how true it is to the traditional Mosaic spirit. This herdsman, who lashes the kings of the earth with the scourge of divine judgment, has been roused into wrath purely by the departure of the nations from the sacrificial standpoint. He is angry because men will not see that the true road to personal greatness lies in ministration to the wants of others, that the lawgiver must be a man of meek and lowly spirit. He declares that the curse of the land is its self-sufficiency, its luxury, its self-appropriation of the superfluities of life (Amos vi. 4). He accuses the rich of trampling on the interests of the poor (*ibid.* v. 11), and says that in so doing they have forgotten the true character of the Being whom they worship (*ibid.* v. 8). Then he turns round upon them to point out a start-

ling inconsistency: "Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord! to what end is it for you? the day of the Lord is darkness and not light" (Amos v. 18). It is as if he had said: "You are looking forward with fond desire to the advent of a great day of national glory; you are anticipating with rapture the time when the Lord shall descend from heaven to give the final revelation to his people. You are not wrong in your anticipation; there is indeed coming such a day of divine glory and such an hour of revelation to the human soul. But if you knew what the divine glory is, if you had any conception of the character of this coming revelation, your feelings would be the reverse of joyful. Do you know what is meant by the day of the Lord, the light of the Lord, the revelation of the Lord? It means what the world calls darkness. The day of the Lord is the day of ministration, of sacrifice, of self-surrender. The light of the Lord is the light which is to reveal to the human soul its own poverty and its own nothingness; it is a revelation of pain. The glory which shall break upon the mind of the nation will be precisely that experience which the nation now deems the most inglorious of all things—the vision of a cross. The joy which awaits the people of God is just that surrender of self which to the worldly man is identical with misery. In desiring, therefore, the day of the Lord, you are desiring the woe of your sensuous nature; you are seeking the crucifixion of that animal life which is now the sum of your being; you are praying unconsciously for that power to lose yourself which seems to you to-day to be the power of suicide?"

Such we understand to be the meaning of Amos in this remarkable passage. The thought is indeed so remarkable and so interwoven with the whole texture of Jewish history, that it may not be altogether out of place to enquire a little more closely into its meaning and origin. First of

all, we have to face the fact that a nation which was essentially pervaded by a conservative spirit had yet the goal of its aspirations laid, not in the past, but in the future. The experience is one somewhat unique in history. There have been Eastern races as conservative as the Jews, and races which, like the Jews, have traced their origin from a garden of Eden ; but, unlike the Jews, they have for the most part refused to be driven out of the garden. China is the incarnation of Conservatism, but China has consistently clung to the past, and never deviated from her reverence for the changeless. Judæa, too, has incarnated the conservative spirit, but she has ever striven to leave her past behind her. She has refused to see any final glory in the lost garden of Eden. The Paradise on which her eye has rested is a Paradise to come. The goal on which her aspirations have centred is not the closed gates guarded by the cherubim and flaming sword, but the gates of an approaching morning which are yet to open and reveal the light of God. Judæa is ever travelling towards a golden era, which she calls the "day of the Lord." She expresses in that name her conviction that it is an age of light, an age of revelation, an age of purity. Throughout the long and intricate labyrinth of her history she holds by this hope as by a thread of gold, and when at times, like Abraham, she has lost country, and kindred, and father's house, the promise she has derived from Abraham keeps her heart alive, "In thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed."

All this is patent and indisputable ; but there is another, and in one sense a contrary, side of the question. The "day of the Lord" to the national mind is a day of cloudlessness, the realization of the national dreams of glory. But when we turn to the prophetic mind, we find a very different view of this Messianic future. The prophet too expects a "day of the Lord," but he commonly speaks of it as a source rather of fear than of hope, a day coming

with clouds. The language of Amos is not an isolated phenomenon ; it is in harmony with the whole tone of the Hebrew poetic literature. The future of the poet is commonly gilded with imaginary glories ; to the poets of the Bible it is draped in the most sombre shadows. To Amos, to Joel, to Jeremiah, to Zephaniah, the " day of the Lord " is a period of terror, and the identification of the Messianic age with an age of suffering and pain finds its climax and its completion in that chapter in which the evangelical prophet proclaims the " Son of man " to be the " Man of sorrows." The question is, how are we to account for this conception ? How are we to explain the seeming discrepancy between the national and the prophetic expectation of the Messianic day ? Above all, how are we to solve the problem of that dualistic conception which exists among the prophets themselves ? Why is it that at one time the coming Messiah is represented in an attitude of kingship, and at another in the garb of a servant ? Why is it that the advent of the Messianic day is described now as the approach of victory, and now as the herald of woe ? Why is it, in short, that one and the same Being, in one and the same act of his life, is represented as the ruler to whom every knee shall bow, and as the " Man of sorrows," " despised and rejected of men."

Behind all these questions there lies another on which the answer to them depends. If we would understand the seeming inconsistencies in the Jewish notion of the Messianic age, we must first ask what was the origin of the Jewish expectation. We find Joel, Amos, and Hosea, at so early a date as eight centuries before Christ, formulating a definite conception of the coming day of the Lord. Where did they get that conception ? Not manifestly from private or internal vision ; in that case they would have alluded to it as a new thing. They do not, however, so allude to it ; they speak of it as something which is already a current

thought of the national mind; nay, in the passage specially under consideration, we find Amos distinctly asserting that even the selfish men of his day were looking forward with longing to the day of the Lord. The conclusion is indisputable; the expectation must have been derived, not from private vision, but from national promise. Is there any evidence that such a promise was known to the prophets of the eighth century? It seems to us that there is. When we read the prophecies of Joel, of Amos, and of Hosea consecutively, we must be struck with the accumulation of references they contain to the past history of the Hebrew nation. In the view of these references we shall be forced to adopt one or other of three conclusions—either that the book of Genesis was in existence, or that there were in existence the documents out of which it was compiled, or that the leading facts now embodied in the book were even then embraced in the national tradition. It matters little for the present inquiry which of these views we follow; let us be content with the lowest ground. We find that Joel, who in all probability is earlier than Amos, was perfectly familiar with the tradition of a garden of Eden. We cannot say with certainty that he derived his tradition from the book of Genesis, but we can almost with certainty affirm that he had in his mind those incidents of the Paradise and the Fall which the book of Genesis now contains. Accordingly, when we find him and Amos, and the prophets in general, alluding to the advent of a “day of the Lord,” and alluding to it in terms which shew it to have been a general expectation, we are almost forced to conclude that the prophecy was based upon the promise which our present book of Genesis associates with the expulsion from Eden. If it be so, we are on lines which must lead us to light on this matter. If we want to know why the conception of the “day of the Lord” was so differently apprehended by different minds, the best way to reach our object is to find

the original terms in which the promise was given. If we concede that, in the mind of Amos, the expectation of a "day of the Lord" was grounded upon the traditional prophecy of the Garden of Eden, are we able by a reference to that prophecy to explain those clouds and shadows with which, to his inspired imagination, an epoch so glorious is invested, to account for this strange association of the trial of humanity with its triumph?

If we look at this primitive prophecy, we shall indeed find the secret of the seeming paradox. It must have struck every reader of Genesis that there is a double note in the promise of Eden. On one side, it is certainly a message of glory. It is a promise given not to a family, not to a tribe, not to a nation, but to man as man; a promise of ultimate, complete, and permanent victory, of final emancipation from slavery; the seed of the woman is to bruise the head of the serpent. Yet we cannot fail to perceive that this prophecy occurs in a very strange connexion; it is inserted amongst the denunciations of the Fall, it is placed in the very midst of the woes which are predicted as the result of man's disobedience. It is plainly intimated that the triumph of humanity shall only be achieved by its own sacrifice, that the seed of the woman must be bruised in the very act of bruising. But the idea of sacrifice lies even deeper than this; if we are not mistaken, it will be found in the triumph itself. What is that triumph? It is described as the bruising of the serpent. But was this promise at the time when it was spoken, descriptive of a joy? Was the serpent in the narrative of Genesis an object of loathing to humanity; on the contrary, was it not the very object which humanity had selected as its special gain? The serpent had been chosen by man as the source of a new life, a life which embodied the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of self-consciousness. It had suggested to him the thought

of his own greatness. It had opened up to him the hope of satisfaction through the pleasures of sense, of repletion through the liberty of self-indulgence. That hope no doubt was a delusion, but it was not yet seen to be a delusion, could only begin to be so seen in the light of future experience. Accordingly, to promise the bruising of the serpent was to promise misery to the natural man. It was to threaten him with the death of that which he had begun to call his life. It was to tell him that his pride must be crucified, that his lust of the flesh and his lust of the eye must be suppressed. It was to presage the coming of a time when he would require to give up his self-indulgence, to abandon his present standard of happiness, to confess that, in the sphere of sense, his search for pleasure had been a failure. This was the "day of the Lord" which had been promised to the primitive man; this was the "day of the Lord" which loomed in the imagination of the prophets.

And now, perhaps, we can understand the full and deep significance of the words in the fifth chapter of Amos. Let us try to throw ourselves into the position of the men to whom he was speaking. The Jewish world of that day was a world of self-indulgence; man was seeking to live unto himself alone. He had obtained much of the good things of life, but he was still conscious of something wanting; there was a Mordecai at the gate, who would not bow down before him. In these circumstances the man of Judæa was discontented, and it was out of this discontent that he conjured up his vision of the Messianic age. There were still things which were withheld from his possession in the present scene of life, but there was a future scene about to open in which he would receive even these. There was coming a great "day of the Lord" in which his possessions would be overflowing, in which his senses would be abundantly satisfied with the luxuries of land and

sea, in which his physical power would be recognized from shore to shore. For this "day of the Lord," he ardently longed; he looked forward to it as that which was to complete his possibilities of selfish enjoyment, to fill up the few wants of outward existence which the present state of things had left unsatisfied. It was on this popular and national delusion that the sword of Amos broke with crushing power. He told his countrymen that the "day of the Lord," when it came, so far from deadening their sense of want, would deepen and intensify that sense. He told them that, in running from the present into the future, they were like men who in seeking to escape the lion, are encountered by the bear, like men who are bitten by the serpent on the very wall on which they lean for support (Amos v. 19). They are coming to the day of the Lord in order that they may have fewer wants, and behold, they shall have more! They shall be given a divine sense of want, the infinite thirst of love. Unless men be awakened to this love of humanity, the "day of the Lord" when it comes will to them be darkness and not light; for the "day of the Lord" is the day of ministration, and can only be hailed by the unselfish heart. The serpent must be crucified, however painful be the crucifixion. The lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the pride of life must be rooted out, dear as they are to the natural soul; and in their room there must be planted that love which to the selfish man is pain, the love which "seeketh not her own."

Such was the message of Amos. It will be found concentrated in a single verse of his prophecy, which has become the popular text of many sermons: "Prepare to meet thy God, O Israel!" He was essentially the prophet of preparation. If it was the mission of Jonah to tell that the kingdom of God was a reign of pardon; if it was the mission of Joel to tell that the region outside the kingdom of God was a reign of locusts, a gnawing of constant care;

it was the mission of Amos to tell that men were not ready for this kingdom. His province was to reveal to the human soul its need of preparation. He had to proclaim that men could only get rid of the gnawing of worldly care by taking on another care which was not worldly. If they would be released from their personal burden, they must bow their heads to an impersonal one—the burden of humanity. God was about to reveal Himself in his deepest and essential nature; but that nature was love. No man could see the revelation unless he himself had love in his soul. Therefore to the world of selfishness, the prophet cried, Prepare! He called upon men to make themselves ready for the vision of a life which was a contrast to *their* lives. He told them that if the divine life came to them at that moment, it would come to them as darkness and not light, it would be an enigma which they could not solve. He bade them prepare for the vision by the destruction of their old ideal, by the bruising of the serpent, by the crucifixion of the flesh; and he told them that, in the abandonment of that which constituted their selfish joy, they would behold in its veritable glory, the “day of the Lord.”

GEORGE MATHESON.

THE FEAR OF FATHER ISAAC.

GENESIS xxxi. 53.

IN our Authorised Version the last clause of this Verse is rendered, “And Jacob sware by *the fear* of his father Isaac.” The rendering is accurate enough, and would convey the true sense of the passage were the word “fear” printed with a capital F. While Laban sware, at the Heap of Witness, to keep faith with Jacob by “the God of Abraham,” *i.e.*, Jehovah, and “the God of Nahor,” *i.e.*, the

idol worshipped by their common ancestor, Jacob swore to keep faith with Laban by "the *Fear* of Isaac," or, as in Verse 42, by "the Eloah of Abraham *and* the *Fear* of Isaac." That is to say, "the *Fear*," "the Dreadful One," "the Terror," was Isaac's name for the very God who was "the Friend," or "the Strength and Shield," of his father Abraham, and whom even his son Jacob worshipped as "the Shepherd," or "the Rock" of Israel.

Each of the patriarchs had his own name for the Divine Ruler of the universe; and Isaac's name for him was "the *Fear*." So habitual was this name to him that, not his children only, but his far-away cousins in their distant ancestral seat were familiar with it; so sacred was it that when Jacob would pledge himself to the suspicious Laban by his most binding oath, he swears to him by "the *Fear* of his father Isaac."

The conception of the Divine Character implied in that Name, repugnant as it may be to us, was quite in accordance with the idiosyncrasy of the man. For Isaac, although the son of one of the bravest and greatest of men, was himself of a quiet, meditative, and even timid temperament. For the first forty years of his life he seems to have remained in his mother's tent, ruled by the proud and resolute will of Sarah, "the Princess," if also cherished and protected by her love. And when, in after years, he had to choose his own course and was free to follow his own will, he seems to have had little will left. He drifts with circumstances. He is timid and yielding, so timid that again and again he gives up his most precious possessions—the deep costly wells which he had dug and built by the labour of years—rather than strive for them with any neighbouring herdsman who coveted them. Pensive and timorous, he had a keen eye for the dark and haunted shadows of life; and while Abraham walked with God as with a Friend, Isaac prostrated himself before "the *Fear*."

that sat on the throne of the universe, with an awe, if not with a terror, too deep for words. His name for God at once harmonizes with, and reveals, the character of the man.

To *us* it may seem as if this Name better befitted some grim and wicked idol than the gracious and benignant Lord, the Father of all mercies, the God of all comfort, to whom we owe every good gift and perfect boon, and in whom there is no darkness at all. We have seen his glory, full of grace and truth, in the Man Christ Jesus; seen Him come into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved; seen Him raise the fallen, quicken the dead, seek the lost until He found them; seen Him shew Himself the Friend of sinners and the Redeemer of them that were bound, even though He had to sink into the darkness of death, and descend into Hades itself, in order that He might save them from their sins and deliver them from their bondage. In Christ Jesus the Father of an infinite majesty has shewn us that He is never so happy as when He is forgiving our sins, bearing our infirmities, winning us to righteousness and charity. And hence it might reasonably be thought that the conception embodied in "the Fear of father Isaac" would be simply an impossible conception to us, that our only emotion toward God would be one of reverent and grateful love.

And yet is it so? I doubt it. I doubt whether after all, if things were but called by their proper names, the God and Father of *Christendom* would not be known as *the Fear* of Christendom. I doubt whether, under all the gracious names we lavish on Him, our deepest emotion toward Him is not one of awe, of terror, of fear only faintly touched with hope. Nay, I doubt whether even those of us who do really think of Him as Love, and maintain that in his love He is ever seeking, and must ever continue to seek, the salvation of men, do not *feel* that He is not even seeking our own salvation, and that there is very little hope

that even we, despite our larger creed, shall come to a good end. What assurance have most of us that we are really safe from sin and condemnation, death and hell? what rooted and ineradicable conviction that, under the guidance and influence of the Divine Teacher and Redeemer of the world, the world is growing wiser and better from age to age? what confident and triumphant expectation that, in the body or out of the body, we shall live to see all races and kindreds of men rejoicing in the pure and tender rule of Christ, serving Him with boundless devotion, serving one another with boundless love?

It is not only in Catholic Europe, where God the Father, where even Christ the Saviour, is deemed so awful and implacable to men that mother Mary must intercede with Him for the sinful and needy; nor is it only in Calvinistic America, where "the plan of salvation" includes only an elect minority of the race, that this awful "fear" of God lingers on. Neither is it only by our fathers of bygone generations that God has been conceived of as an Enemy who has been converted into a Friend—for the elect—by a sacrifice so stupendous as to out-run the reach of human thought. But here in England, and even among those who faintly trust the larger hope, the germ of this frightful misconception still lives and thrives, insomuch that, while we *think* of God as Love, our most habitual *feeling* toward Him is, in many cases, a nameless fear of his power or of his anger.

Now an emotion so general, and so persistent, must have some ground in reason. And, of course, so soon as we analyse and consider it, we perceive that this trembling fear of a Divine Terror—as degrading to God as it is to us—is but a bastard form of that wholesome reverence which we owe to Him. Because God is great, He *is* greatly to be feared. Conscious of our mortal limitations and our weakness, even we, who are his offspring, cannot but

reverence his power. Conscious of our guilt, even we, who are his redeemed and reconciled children, cannot but reverence his purity. And this due and becoming reverence, this wholesome fear of One so great and so good, easily degenerates into a paralysing or helpless dread which makes Him our Terror rather than our Hope and our Strength. For the simple fact is that for the most part we have not really, or have not fully and cordially, received the good news, the grace and truth, which came by Jesus Christ. We have not learned the great lesson He came to teach, that the very Power of God is our refuge and defence; that in his very Purity lies our only hope of redemption from impurity and guilt; that by his goodness we are to be made good. We forget that it is to the weak He offers the Divine Strength; that it is to the weary and the heavy-laden He offers a Divine rest: we forget that He came to call, not the righteous, but sinners, to Himself, and to draw them to Himself by offering them both pardon for and salvation from their sins. Familiar as the words are to us, they have not carried the truths and hopes with which they are fraught into the central fountains from which all our thoughts and passions well up. We have got them into our creed, but we have not got them into our hearts and lives: or why are we any longer oppressed by that fear of God which hath torment?

Yet that, despite our better knowledge, we *are* still oppressed by this tormenting and degrading fear, hardly needs proof, so conscious are we of it, so deeply and habitually and painfully conscious. But if any proof be needed, we may find it in the fact that our sense of weakness does not, instantly and invariably, lead us to take shelter in the Divine Strength, nor our sense of sin lead us, instantly and invariably, to put our trust in Him who is the Saviour from all sin. When, for example, we meet with any check—any loss, grief, bereavement—which feel-

ingly persuades us of our weakness amidst the great forces which drive us to and fro, with our will and against our will; when we are made to feel how slender is our control over our own health, our own prosperity, or even our own life, with which of us is any such check only an incentive to cast ourselves, without pause and without misgiving, on the care of Him who holds all the forces of life and death in the hollow of his hands? in which of us does it but quicken an instinctive and habitual conviction that He who compels all things to work for good, is working out good for us by the very grief, losses, pains which we are called to endure?

As a general theorem, as a dogma in our creed, we all hold that God is good, and that his kindly Providence covers every fact and incident of our life. But, practically, in the disappointment or trouble of the passing day—when we lose health of body or power of mind, when the value of our property lessens or our business declines, when, from any cause, the wheels of life run heavily and the outlook is dark—which of us recognizes the gracious hand of God in such facts and incidents as these, or hears his fatherly voice bidding us still trust in Him and assuring us that all is well? Instead of making the Almighty our Refuge and Strength in these hours of conscious weakness, do we not rather suffer the old grim dread of Him, and of his dealings with mankind, to revive in our hearts, and look up with terror to see a Divine Terror frowning upon us from heaven itself? And if we do, what is all this but a proof that, if we can trust in God while all things go smoothly with us and we have no great need, or no great sense of our need, of his help, no sooner do the currents of our life begin to run awry, and our need of Him become deep and great, than we lose trust in Him, and the Love which sits on the throne of heaven is transformed into the Fear of father Isaac? In other

words, we believe in the gracious providence of God so long as it is remote from our personal experience or veiled from our personal consciousness, but the very moment it touches and disturbs our lives—disturbing them, like the angel who troubled the waters of the Bethesda fountain, only to quicken in them new powers of health—we begin to distrust and dread that Providence, and lose our God just when we need Him most.

Or, again, when the sense of sin is awakened within us, and grows keen and poignant, does *that* instantly lead us to the Friend and Saviour of sinners? do we at once betake ourselves to Him who taketh away the sin of the world? Theoretically, no doubt, our sense of sin grows strong as we realize more and more fully the holiness of God, and the exceeding greatness of his love for us. And, practically, to a few rare and elect souls, it is true that they attain their profoundest consciousness of spiritual infirmity and guilt when they are wrapt in intimate communion with Him whose pure and awful eyes cannot look on iniquity; when, therefore, they can cast themselves without fear or hesitation on the Love which is more than all our sins and can cleanse us from every stain of guilt. But if I am to speak, as a common man, to common men, must I not say that *our* most painful and penetrating consciousness of guilt is roused by the penal consequences of our sins? Is it not when we are suffering for, and by, our transgressions that we feel our transgressions most keenly? Is it not then that the fire we have kindled by them begins to burn within and upon us? If, for example, although we sincerely believe in God, and worship Him as our reconciled Father in Christ Jesus, and take some delight in the study of his Word and will, we have long indulged a too worldly spirit, and have cared more for business and politics than for the interior economy and wealth of the soul, more for a good reputation among men

than for the honour which cometh from God, more for a faithful and generous observance of the rules and customs of the little world immediately around us than to lift our lives into accord with the Divine law and ideal: is it not when the world or our power of handling it begins to fail us, when success and the praise of men can no longer satisfy us, that we commonly find out our sin, and mourn over it, and wish that we could recall the past and mould it to a different and higher shape? Is it not, in plain words, when the punishment of our sin comes upon us that we grow profoundly and painfully conscious of our sin?

What wonder, then, if our sins breed fear and despair in us rather than contrition? What wonder if we take our punishments as signs of the Divine anger rather than as proofs of God's correcting and redeeming love, and are filled with dread of Him when most we need to trust Him in order that, strong in faith, we may break away from the chain of our sins? When a Christian man cries, "*My sin has found me out!*" instead of crying, "*God, who has long been seeking me, has found me at last, and is making me to know my sin, that He may save me from my sin!*" it is only too likely that God may become a Terror, and even *the* Terror, to him for a time, and that he may fall in fear before One to whom he ought to look up in penitence and faith.

What we want, if we are ever to break away from the cold and degrading restraints of mere fear is, of course, a simpler, a more sincere and vital, faith in the God, in the *Love*, Christ came to reveal; a more settled and active conviction that God is in very deed the Love which Christ declared Him to be, and not the Fear which Isaac dreaded Him to be. And surely it might help us to rise into this faith were we more habitually to dwell on two thoughts which are of the very stuff and substance of the Gospel; the one, that what seem to us the very failures of the

Divine Care for us are special illustrations of that Care ; and the other, that the very punishments which wait on sin are among the appointed and most efficient means of saving us from sin.

It is, as I have already said, when we meet with losses, pains, disappointments, griefs, bereavements, that we feel as though God's providence had failed and He had ceased to care for us. Yet, if we have sat at the feet of Christ, we ought to know that all these "misfortunes," as we call them, are really a special summons to put our trust in God, since they come to remind us of our dependence on Him, to prove us and put us to the test whether we *can* trust in Him when there is nothing else to sustain us, and to incite us to care for the best things most,—for the things of the soul more than for the things of the body, for the things which are unseen and eternal more than for the things which are seen and temporal. When all goes easily with us we are apt to forget God, whom we *must* remember if we are to truly live at all ; and therefore He suffers the smooth current of our lives to be ruffled with adverse winds that put us in mind of Him and of our need of Him. When we are rich in health, in possessions, in friends, we are apt to settle down comfortably in our place, to grow content with ourselves and our surroundings, and suffer our spiritual life and energy to decline till we compel God, for very love, to pull our cushions from under us, to take away the comforts which effeminate us, and to push us out into the cold but bracing air of adversity that our spirit may recover its tone ; that, instead of resting in present ease, we may press forward to the better things He has prepared for us. I need not cite texts to prove that this is the meaning of God's providential discipline for many of us ; we *know* that it is his meaning, that it is declared to be his meaning from one end of the Bible to the other. And therefore we know

that we should take every loss, every stroke of adversity, as a proof of God's goodwill for us, as at once a summons and an incentive to a more unworldly, a higher and better, life. And if we are men and have discourse of reason, if we are Christian men and have a Divine ideal before us, we shall and must come at last to feel that, just as "fifty years of Europe are better than a cycle of Cathay," so a life ever rising to meet a Divine call and to touch a Divine ideal is infinitely better than a life "cradled on its lees," rocking to and fro over its baser elements and familiar comforts, but making no progress, achieving no ascent. We must and shall learn to welcome the strokes and shocks of change from which we gather a Divine behest to go forward, and in that behest a promise of Divine help.

So, too, if once we feel that the punishments which wait on sin are among the most efficient means of saving us from our sins, we shall be reconciled, and more than reconciled, to the very afflictions which wound us most sharply and are most apt to induce fear and despair. And why should we not feel it? The New Testament is full of the promise that, here or hereafter, we shall receive the due reward, as of our good deeds, so also of every bad deed that we have done; and we know how, at this point at least, Science and Philosophy confirm the promise of Scripture, affirming, in many ways, that our future life must be a continuation and development of the life we now live in the flesh. I say *the promise* of Scripture, observe, not the threatening. For, if we have at all entered into the spirit of the Gospel, we know that every Divine law works for our good. We can even *see* that the law which binds punishment to sin must and does work for our good, by making us sensible of our sins and eager to renounce them. Thank God we cannot do evil without suffering from the evil we have done! Thank God the more we are bent on being good, and the more of goodness we have attained by his help, the

more keenly we suffer from any evil deed we do ! For how should we be cleansed from evil except by the pain which at once convinces us of its presence and purges it away ? We suffer that we may be strong. Bane and antidote go together. Sin, the poison, is checked and counteracted by the pain it excites. And this pain drives us to the great Physician, of whom we are apt to think but seldom in our hours of ease ; while, when we are oppressed and agonized with the punitive results of the evil we have done, we fly to Him who alone can save us from its taints, and who very commonly saves us from its infections by letting us taste the deadly misery it breeds.

So that just as every apparent failure of Providence is an illustration of the Providence which watches over us with unceasing care, and a summons to rely upon it, so also every fall from grace, every punishment that follows sin, is an invitation to us to betake ourselves afresh to the Saviour from all sin and uncleanness ; a proof that, by the very law which binds pain to sin, He is already at work for our salvation ; and a promise that He will never cease from that work until He has made us every whit whole, every whit clean.

What else, indeed, has God to do, the God whose glory we behold in the face of Jesus Christ, what else *can* be his aim for us, but to save us from the evil He hates, and to establish and perfect us in the goodness He loves ? Yet did we but believe this to be his aim, all our fears would be at an end ; every moment of conscious weakness would but drive us to the Almighty for strength, and every moment of conscious sin to the All-pure for pardon and salvation.

To many this life of unbroken faith may seem too high, if not for mortal man, at least for *them*, so long as they are beneath the sky. If that be so, yet even for those who forbode that their trust in the Providence of God and their

faith in the salvation of God must be clouded with many fears, there is this comfort: God will not refuse even *their* faith, broken and hesitating though it be, albeit He cannot save them, at least from their fear and the torments of their fear, while their faith is hesitating and broken. He did not turn away from Isaac, even though He was only the Fear of Isaac; and He will not turn away from us, even though our love for Him be blended with many fears.

But let no man conclude that he cannot be saved even from fear until he reaches the world to come. God is neither unwilling nor unable to save even the most timid and apprehensive from it even here and now, if only, trusting in Him, we seek to have fear cast out by love. And it is worth an effort—worth a patient and strenuous effort. For how noble and how tranquil is the life to which He invites us, and into which He will assuredly raise and deliver us, if only we permit! Think what it must be “not to hate anything but sin; to be full of love to every creature; to be frightened at nothing; to be sure that all things will turn to good; not to mind pain or loss, because it is our Father’s will: to know that nothing—no, not if the earth was to be burned up, or the waters come and drown us—nothing could part us from God who loves us, and who fills our souls with peace and joy, because we are sure that whatever He wills is holy, just, and good.”¹ To be saved from all fear, all care, all pain, all loss, all sin; to see our Father’s will in everything that befalls us, and therefore to find everything “very good,”—this is the reward, this the blessedness, of those who believe in the Love revealed in Christ Jesus, rather than in the Fear before whom father Isaac trembled all his days.

ALMONI PELONI.

¹ George Eliot.

THE SENSE IN WHICH ST. PAUL CALLS
HIMSELF AN ECTROMA.

1 CORINTHIANS xv. 8.

“And last of all, as if it were unto the *Ectroma*, he appeared also unto me.”

II.

IN a previous Number, an endeavour was made to investigate the exact import of the term *ectroma* taken literally. Reasons were alleged, which I venture to think an attentive reader will consider satisfactory, for believing that St. Paul in penning the word could allude only to one object;—namely, to that diminutive creature, still-born, which comes away from its mother in a miscarriage.

I crave leave now to resume the discussion of the passage for the purpose of stating, as I then could only very partially do, what it was in reference to himself that we may suppose him to have had in view in thus designating his own personality, and also to explain how it was that he was prompted to interrupt his argument respecting the Resurrection, by the introduction just then of this particular topic.

The remark has already been made,—a remark which, as I apprehend, no one who bears in mind St. Paul’s habitual manner in dealing with the subject will be disposed to dispute—that he cannot be supposed to have intended in this epithet to refer either to the dignity of *his* apostolical status as compared with that of other apostles, or to the manner in which, compared with them, he had himself discharged his apostolical office.

Next, I would add as a consideration of no small interest, that the strong feeling of personal moral insignificance which the Apostle here sums up in this burning word *ectroma*, was not merely in part, not merely even in very large proportion, founded upon the consciousness of what

he had been before his conversion: it was the result of this consciousness exclusively. He says as much in the words, "because I persecuted the church of God." This is the exact truth. We have reason on all hands to feel assured that the self-humiliation expressed was in no degree whatever the result of any sense of inconsistency or shortcoming in the spirit or the outward action of his life since he had been "in Christ."

This may seem at first sight a startling observation, and even a paradox. In the biographies of pious Christians, especially of those who have made a habit of recording their feelings and judgments relative to their own spiritual history, we have been accustomed to find even a considerable space occupied by penitent confessions of frequently occurring failure and inconsistency, and by acknowledgments of painful defects in the posture of their spirits towards God and the Redeemer, or towards their fellow-men. Particularly has this been the case when the saint was anticipating a speedy departure from this life. Moreover, both our private consciousness respecting ourselves, and the sense too often forced upon us of blots and deficiencies marking the characters of such pious men as we have known the most closely, point in the same direction: they prepare us to *expect* such penitent confessions as only too befitting even in the case of the most devoted workers for Christ. Nevertheless, any one who will be at the pains to look through the writings of St. Paul with an eye to this particular point, taking note also of such utterances of his as are recorded in the Acts, will find himself face to face with the remarkable phenomenon that, while the Apostle has very frequent occasion to refer to himself and to his manner of behaviour both as a Christian believer and as an Apostle, we never, not even once, meet with any such penitent acknowledgments of inconsistency or deficiency as have now been spoken of. Instead of reading any such

acknowledgments of a penitential character, we have to note the frequent occurrence of passages in which the writer confidently, without any reservation, and at times with great solemnity, asseverates his unfailing integrity, the stainless purity of his motives, the sanctity and charity of his behaviour in all the relations of life; and, in especial, the single-hearted, entire, wholly self-sacrificing devotion with which he served the Saviour of the World in promoting the well-being of men and especially of the Church;—passages, too, from time to time, in which he holds up his own tenor of conduct as a meet example for his fellow-believers to imitate.

One form of qualification alone is to be discerned, relieving what at first sight has the appearance of absolute self-commendation; a qualification which in effect transmutates and transfigures its entire character: there is evermore present a constant and palpably most genuine and single-minded reference to the grace of Christ, as the only source, but an unfailing and all-sufficient source, of whatever virtue or goodness or spiritual victory he claims to have himself achieved. Throughout, in one form or other, this refrain is to be heard: “By the grace of God I am what I am.”¹

The only instance which I have been able to find of the Apostle’s confessing an error in conduct is that related by

¹ In illustration of these remarks, I venture to refer the reader to the following passages arranged according to the order of time in which they were probably written.

1 Thess. i. 5, 6; ii. 3–11, 19, 20; iii. 8–12; 2 Thess. iii. 7–9; Gal. ii. 19, 20; vi. 14; 1 Cor. iv. 4, 9–17; ix. 15–27; x. 33; xi. 1; xv. 10, 31; 2 Cor. i. 12; ii. 15–17; iii. 5, 6; iv. 1, 2, 5, 7–11, 16; v. 9, 13–15, 18; vi. 3–10; x. 3; xi. 7, 23–29; xii. 9, 10, 14, 15; Rom. i. 5; v. 1–5, 11; vii. and viii. [so far as these two chapters may be regarded as founded on the Apostle’s own experience, previous and subsequent respectively to the time of his becoming a believer in Christ]; xiv. 7–9; xv. 14–21, 29; Eph. iii. 1, 2, 7–12; Col. i. 23–29; ii. 1, 5; Phil. i. 7, 8, 17–26, 30; ii. 20–22; iii. 3–14, 17, 20; iv. 9, 11–13; 1 Tim. i. 12–15; ii. 7; 2 Tim. i. 3, 7–12; ii. 8–13; iii. 10, 11; iv. 6–8, 16–18; Tit. iii. 3, 4. Also the following in the Acts: chap. xx. 18–35; xxii. 3–5, 19, 20; xxiii. 1; xxiv. 16; xxvi. 4–23; xxvii. 23–24.

St. Luke in Acts xxiii. 5, where we read that he apologized for the manner in which he had rebuked Ananias the High Priest. St. Paul frankly acknowledged that the tone of his rebuke was unbecoming;—unbecoming, however, he evidently considered, not absolutely in itself, but only upon the consideration of whom it was that he was addressing: "I knew not that he was High Priest; for it is written, Thou shalt not speak evil of a ruler of thy people." He acknowledged having fallen into an involuntary mistake. This he might do without being blameworthy if, immediately on becoming aware of his error, he retracted his foot.

The Apostle's confession in Philippians iii. 9-14, that he had not already obtained neither was already made perfect, even when taken with a purely ethical reference, cannot be considered an exception to the foregoing remarks; any more than the statement in Colossians i. 24, that he was eagerly filling up that which was lacking of the afflictions of Christ in his flesh for his Body's sake. A striving after yet higher spiritual achievement than has hitherto been reached, is one thing; a wailing consciousness of having allowed oneself to displease the Great Master is quite another. Nothing of this latter kind ever escapes the lips of St. Paul, not even when expecting very shortly to give in his account of the things that he had done. We do not, for example, find it when he discourses to his affectionately sympathizing friends at Philippi, "beloved and longed for," so freely concerning his past life and his presumedly approaching end. Neither again do we find it when, in his very last Epistle that we possess, he breathes forth his tenderest inmost emotions into the ear of Timothy, his very heart's "child."

We are bound, however, to take account of the description which in Galatians v. 17 St. Paul gives of the Christian's spiritual conflict: "The flesh lusteth against the

spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary [*ἀντίκειται*, stand in antagonism] the one to the other; that ye may not do the things that ye would." For we cannot suppose that the Apostle wrote this as a mere spectator of the spiritual experience of his brethren, as if he in his own person were exempt from the antagonism, more or less mutually disabling, between these two adverse principles. Rather, it seems certain from his words, that with him too, as with all his brethren, the besetment of the flesh did really hamper the action of the spirit; and that therefore in his case as in theirs, though certainly not in the same degree as is found in the melancholy experience of most, the thing from time to time *done* fell more or less short of the thing which the *will* had grasped after. Not even in *his* person had the moral malignity inherent in the flesh ceased to exist or been wholly consumed by the fire of the Divine Spirit, intensely as this fire burned within him. On the contrary it is manifest from all his teaching that he knew full well, that for no one human soul was any security to be found, to the very end of life, save in vigilant self-control, and in Divine help to be incessantly drawn down by prayer. Thus, for example, in Ephesians vi. 10-20, he plainly identifies himself as engaged in the like conflict against the evil one with the whole body of the faithful, and as depending upon the like spiritual resources with them for the attainment of victory.

But though it is true that in every Christian soul in which the Spirit of God has taken up its abode, the old inbred principle of the flesh still continues to subsist, acting in antagonism to the newly-imparted principle of grace, it yet does not follow, as we are perhaps but too ready to assume, that in the result this corrupt element will in each individual case infallibly from time to time so far make good its oppugnancy as to overmaster for awhile the

better principle and evidence its victory in concrete acts of sin. On the contrary, it is quite conceivable that there may be instances, though they are certainly only too rare, in which, from the hour in which the Spirit of God takes supreme possession of the soul, He successfully and without intermission asserts his right to reign, making the believer in very truth so "free from the law of sin and death, that in him the requirement of God's law is fulfilled,"—fulfilled, that is, unceasingly, constantly. Only, the clog of the flesh does no doubt here also so far hinder the perfection of the obedience, that the man after all will prove to have not quite done that which he fain would have done.

There is no reason, for example, for doubting that this magnificent achievement of the Divine grace was seen in the apostle Paul. There is no reason why we should discredit, or call in question, or in any way qualify, that representation of his personal character and life which in the large number of passages above referred to he has himself given or implied. Here, in his own character and life, he was conscious of there being a counterpart to that glowing description of a believer's state which we read in the eighth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. It is *not* necessary to take that description either as an ideal picture of a state which in actual fact is never realized, or as merely a hortatory exhibition of that which his readers are to aspire after, though they may not hope to attain it. Why not rather assume it to be the faithful presentment of that which in Christ the writer was conscious of actually being himself, and of that which *therefore* he knew that any other believer in Christ, through the same grace, both might be and therefore ought to be?

Does it seem hard to imagine such a persistent tension of vigilance and self-control maintained through such a length of years as this estimate of St. Paul's life pre-supposes; maintained amidst trials and conflicts assailing him both

in the Church itself and from the world without, trials so unceasing, so diverse in character, and at times well-nigh overwhelming? I apprehend that it will only appear not unimaginable, not incredible, if, with a steadfast belief in the reality of the Redeemer's unseen agency, we bring into our reckoning that one factor in the case which the Apostle himself recognized as of the supremest importance and necessity, the "*sufficing* grace" and *might* of Christ (2 Cor. xii. 9).

In fact St. Paul has taught us to account of himself as of one whose personality had been well-nigh, so to speak, *absorbed* in the agency upon him and in him of Christ; as of one who had come to be just a living willing organ for the revelation to the Church of what Christ the Redeemer is in Himself, and of what Christ the Redeemer can effect in those who implicitly resign themselves to his disposal. "I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." "To me to live is Christ." "For this cause I obtained mercy, that in me chief of all might Jesus Christ shew forth all his long-suffering, for an ensample of them who in the time to come should believe on him unto eternal life." In this last passage he intimates, that his case was to be an "ensample," not only in respect to the marvellous patience and forgivingness which had been evinced towards him up to the hour of his being brought into union with Christ, but also in respect to that gracious goodness (*χάρις*) of the Lord which thenceforward so "surpassingly overflowed" upon him, in conjunction with the faith and love which "in Christ Jesus" he was himself enabled to exercise. Through Him that strengthened him, he tells the Philippians, he knew by experience that he possessed the power for every moral success (Gal. ii. 20; Phil. i. 21; 1 Tim. i. 1-16; Phil. iv. 12).

We have, then, before us a psychological phenomenon of a very remarkable kind. The nobleness and grandeur of

St. Paul's character and his singular goodness are so patent in the history of the Acts, and transpire so vividly in his Epistles, as to be altogether beyond dispute. Answering to the moral image of the Lord Jesus presented to us in the Gospels, we have displayed to us in these other Scriptures the moral image of this particular disciple of Jesus,—an image, we may almost say, unique and alone in the refinement and splendour of its spiritual beauty. Nevertheless, the man whose spirit and whole course of life were such that we may without much exaggeration describe them as seraphic, amid all that he unceasingly thought and felt and did that was heavenly-minded and Christ-like, carried in his bosom unabated even to the very end a genuine persuasion that he was “unspeakably small and insignificant,” a mere “still-born abortion,” a “chief of sinners” (ελαχιστότερος πάντων ἁγίων, ἔκτρωμα, πρῶτος ἁμαρτωλῶν.)¹ How is this seeming inconsistency to be explained?

I venture to think it is to be explained thus:—St. Paul felt that the first of those two lives which he had led, before and after his conversion, was his very own, the outcome purely of the workings of his own mind; but that the other life was not his own, no product of thinkings, willings, strivings of his, but the result of the working within him of the teachings of Christ and of the actuating life of Christ. Viewed as he was in himself, he was (he considered) “*leaster* than all saints,” nay “first of sinners;” but viewed as he was in Christ, he was not a whit behind any Apostle; he had laboured more abundantly than any one of them all—yet not he “but the grace of God which was with him.” No occasion has he to disparage either the magnitude or the quality of his services.

¹ In 1 Tim. i. 15, we must not lose sight of the tense in the words ὡς πρῶτος εἰμι ἐγώ, not ἡμην ἐγώ. So also in 1 Cor. xv. that τῷ ἔκτρωματι is written with reference to the time when he was writing is evidenced by the following words, ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστόλων κ.τ.λ.

Why should he? In all of this, Christ was to be recognized, not Paul.

Therefore he can speak with the utmost possible frankness and unreserve of himself, of the spirit which animated him and of his achievements, almost as if he were not speaking of himself but of another person; "how holily and righteously and unblameably he behaved," "in holiness and sincerity of God;" that "he was a sweet savour of Christ unto God in them that were being saved and in them that were perishing;" that "as a wise master-builder (when founding the Church of Corinth) he had laid the foundation;" that "no longer he lived but Christ lived in him;" that through the cross of Christ "the world was crucified unto him and he unto the world;" that "to him to live was Christ;" that he "could do all things in Christ that strengthened him." And he can boldly say, "Be ye imitators of me, even as I am of Christ." In fact, when to the superficial, unspiritual, or cynical reader he the most seems to be beyond measure lauding *himself*, at those very times he is in reality the most empty of self-glorying: he is "glorying only in the Lord."

Further, we can easily understand how it might well come to pass that, with the growing perfection of his spiritual sensibility, there would come not a diminishing but an ever keener perception of the wickedness of his earlier life, and therewith also a deeper and more vivid consciousness of his own personal vileness. Granted that his labours in the cause of Christ transcended those of the rest of the Apostles; yet, for all that, he was in his own view meaner and more to be contemned than any of them could be; not one of *them* had proved himself so "foolish," so "disobedient," so far "gone astray" (Tit. iii. 3), as in the days when he lived under his own guidance and wrought out his own will he had proved himself to be: for "he had persecuted the Church of God!"

With such considerations on our mind, we shall probably be able to enter more fully than we otherwise could do into the general spirit and bearing of this particular passage of his writings. To this let us now apply ourselves.¹

The clause "as if it were unto the untimely birth," may be conjoined, either (1) with "Last of all," with no comma after "all"; or (2), with "he appeared also unto me," with a comma after "all," but none after "birth."

(1) According to the former construction, St. Paul marks a certain congruity or analogy as subsisting between his being an *ectroma*, and the fact that the appearance made to him was the last which the Risen Christ vouchsafed to any. But it is difficult to understand the point of congruity. (a) *Why* should the circumstance of being the last recipient of such a manifestation bespeak any kind of inferiority? There is no gradation of status observable in the cases of those who previously had been successively thus

¹ One or two observations of verbal criticism of the passage appear to be not superfluous.

"Ἐσχατον appears to be a form of adverb, like *πρῶτον, πρότερον, ὕστερον, δεύτερον, τρίτον*, comp. 1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Cor. i. 15; Matt. iv. 2; John iii. 4; Luke xxiii. 22.

The *πάντων* is added just as in Mark xii. 22, where according to the now generally accepted reading we have *ἔσχατον* (*Rev., ἐσχάτη*) *πάντων καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἀπέθανεν*. In this passage of St. Mark the *πάντων* seems added to mark the closing up of the statement of the circumstances in reference to which the subsequent question is raised. With much the same effect *πάντων* is added here; it marks the winding up of the enumeration which the Apostle is making of such of our Lord's appearances after his Resurrection as he is now concerned to adduce.

In neither passage does *πάντων* recite the group of *persons* that the writer has in his view. In grammatical analysis, the adverb *ἔσχατον* may be resolved back into a neuter adjective agreeing with the cognate verbal noun suggested by the principal verb of the sentence, *ἀπέθανεν* or *ὥφθη*. As if it were, "The last appearing of all, he appeared to me."

Ὡσπερ occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, though *ὥσει* does frequently (*e.g.*, Matt. iii. 16; Acts ii. 3; Luke i. 56; ix. 14; xxii. 41; etc.); neither is it found in the Septuagint. Canon Evans (*Speaker's Commentary* in *h. l.*) gives a probable analysis of the phrase in explaining it as = *ὥσπερ εἰ τῷ ἐκτρώματι ἐωρᾶτο* (or, *ἐμελλεν ὀφθῆναι*).

honoured. (β) The term *ectroma* does not of itself suggest any notion of *lateness* of birth; on the contrary, it would fit in rather with the opposite notion of being born *before* the due time. No commentary that I have seen gives any satisfactory or even tolerable explanation of the supposed analogy.¹

(2) If we adopt the second way of constructing the sentence, the clause, "as if it were to the untimely birth," suggests the difference, which is in fact most conspicuous in the history as given in the Gospels and Acts, between the manner of our Lord's appearance to Saul and the manner of his appearance on all the occasions which the Apostle has immediately before referred to. In these last, the Risen Christ had shewn Himself in the condescending guise of a fellow-man, with no external circumstance of personal awfulness, but conversing with his disciples as "his brethren," on very nearly the like terms of parity with them in outward corporeal condition as when He had formerly conversed with them before his Passion. To Saul the persecutor, He disclosed Himself in the aspect of the glorified Messiah whose Divine dignity was being outraged by this feeble creature's antagonism; and the awful splendour which from his suddenly manifested Presence blazed forth, not alone on Saul's bodily eye, but also, in all that it implied, upon his mental sight as well, sufficed in one moment to crush down into the dust the self-righteous, misconceiving, carnal blasphemer, and forced him through his inmost soul to feel that in relation to the

¹ Meyer observes: "er spricht das starke Gefühl seiner Unwürdigkeit aus indem er sagt, er sei gleichsam ($\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\iota$) τὸ ἐκτρώμα, der unzeitige Fœtus." According to this view, the sentence would run as follows: "Last of all, to one who was as it were the abortion, he appeared also to me." But surely this is inadmissible: the position of $\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\iota$ makes it clearly felt, that it is not inserted to qualify the term ἐκτρώματι, but to mark a congruity or correspondence between τὸ ἐκτρώματι and something else stated in the sentence. De Wette, again, cannot be justified in *combining* the two senses, as he does by his rendering, "als gleichsam der Fehlgeburt," "as to the abortion as it were."

true service of God he had up to that hour, when compared with those who had known and followed the Lord Jesus, but whom he had been persecuting, been no better than an unperfected fetus, cast forth from its mother's womb still-born might seem to be amongst grown men in the full activities of life.

This was the light in which Christ Himself regarded him,—as is indicated by the subjective tinge of meaning, attaching, as Canon Evans has observed, to ὥσπερὲι contrasted with ὥσπερ or ὥς; and the profound sense that his character hitherto had really been of this description, was not only borne in upon Saul's consciousness with overwhelming force, but also, as we have seen above, abode with him to the very end of his life. In fact, the more vividly he realized by blessed experience the soul's divine life in Christ, by so much would he the more vividly apprehend the darkness and miserable abjectness of that former condition of his when spiritually "dead through his trespasses" (Eph. ii. 5).

Assuming, then, the interpretation now given of the bearing upon the sentence of this intermediate clause, let us proceed to review the tenor and spirit of the whole passage.

While stating certain points of the historical evidence for the fact of Christ's resurrection, it comes in the Apostle's way, and is indeed unavoidable, that he should refer to himself too as able to bear valid testimony thereto. That he considered himself a competent witness, as truly so as any of the other Apostles, is shewn, as by other things, so in particular by the stress which he laid upon this experience of his in his speech before Festus and Agrippa as reported in Acts xxvi. For in reviewing the line of thought pursued in that address, we perceive that its one great topic is the Resurrection;—the hope, the Apostle says, of Israel; in itself not incredible; promised by God through Moses and the Prophets: the realization of this hope

depending, as he shews, on the Resurrection and consequent agency of the Messiah. In the course of his speech he introduces a full narrative of his own conversion ; and his motive for narrating it was this ;—because the circumstances attending it made it palpably evident that up to a certain hour he had himself been bitterly hostile to belief in Jesus as Messiah or as risen from the dead, but that at that hour he was overpoweringly convinced of these truths by himself beholding Jesus, not only living, but clothed with ineffable majesty, and by himself hearing words addressed to him as by one who was both Lord and Christ.

He cites no other eye-witnesses in arguing before Agrippa, as he does here in writing to the Corinthians, to prove that Christ was risen : so far as this branch of evidence is concerned, he is content in addressing the king to rest his proof upon what he had himself seen and heard. This shews how completely he felt assured, that he in his own person was both a competent and a fully sufficient witness to the fact. Further, he stated to Agrippa, that at the time of his conversion Christ expressly signified to him that his very purpose in appearing to him was thereby to constitute him a “witness,” able, as is plainly meant, to testify of Him to the world on the very ground of his having then *seen* Him (Acts xxvi. 16).

It was a further consideration, making it incumbent upon St. Paul when writing to the Corinthians on this subject to expressly adduce the fact of his having himself seen the Risen Christ, that the very reality of his own apostolical status, which some at Corinth were disposed to gainsay, depended upon it. He was no Apostle at all if he had not himself seen the Lord (1 Cor. ix. 1). If he had here refrained from citing this experience of his, he might have given occasion to those who were but too eager to find occasion for calling in question his parity with Cephas or even with James “the Lord’s brother.”

And yet in approaching this item of the historical proof substantiating Christ's resurrection, the close connection in which the particular manifestation of the Risen Lord now to be referred to stood with the foolish and impious course of conduct in the midst of which he was then arrested, comes upon his mind with a passionate access of shame and remorse. That Jesus should shew Himself alive after his Passion to the Eleven and to other believers who had previously loved and followed Him, and that they should receive from Him the ennobling commission which authorized them to bear witness to their Risen Lord, was one thing: *they* might boldly bear their testimony and feel no shame. But that a man who at the time when Christ disclosed Himself to him was fanatically blaspheming his name and persecuting those beloved followers of his whose names he has just before been reciting,—that *he* should put himself forward by *their* side to assume this supremely honourable function of witnessing as an Apostle of Christ to his Resurrection,—and this too on the precise ground of a manifestation of Himself made to rebuke and arrest that guilty career of his,—this the writer might well feel would be but too likely to strike some at least of his readers as no better than a piece of effrontery, bespeaking a most strange unmindfulness of the complexion of his own previous life. “It was proper enough” (such critics might say) “that he should marshal forth the testimony of those venerable men, Cephas, and the other Apostles, and James, and of the Five Hundred Brethren in Galilee; but for himself! just here surely it were meetest for him to maintain the attitude of a penitent self-conscious reticence.”

But this might not be! The function of bearing witness had been assigned him by Christ Himself. This was what he was set to do; and this he *must* do. He cannot at his peril forbear from proclaiming the glory of the Risen

Jesus, though in the same breath he must proclaim his own unspeakable worthlessness.

This inward conflict of emotion is discernible in the very manner in which he approaches the subject. He approaches it, as it were, with a delaying reluctant step, which, in a certain degree, reminds us of the manner, in which in the beginning of the eleventh chapter of his second Epistle to the Corinthians he seems with so much effort to constrain his visibly reluctating spirit to "become," as he phrases it afterwards, "a fool in glorying" of his apostolic greatness.

"*And last of all*"]—Thus he begins; making felt the lapse of a perhaps considerable interval of time since those former appearances of Christ previously mentioned:—possibly also suggesting not merely an interval in point of time, but even here, in this initial clause, a distinction in the manner of the Manifestation. If this last notion of the words be thought to be reading too much between the lines, at all events the next clause, if what has been advanced above respecting its bearing be just, indicates this thought.

"*As if he were appearing to one a still-born miscarriage and no man*"]—Here we have a direct, though no doubt veiled, reference to the difference of the manner of Christ's manifestation of Himself to him as compared with former manifestations of Himself to disciples.

Further, we observe that it is before he states the fact which he has to adduce that he introduces this characterisation of himself as being an *ectroma*,—certainly a term expressing the most intense feeling of self-inanition that can be imagined. The position in the sentence in which this clause is placed bespeaks an extreme eagerness to humble himself down to the very lowest level, which he quite genuinely feels to be his own proper level, before he declares the honour, which he has no option not to tell, had nevertheless been put upon him.

Shall we say that he inserts this self-emptying designation of himself for the purpose of disarming detractors, ready to charge him with unseemly self-obtrusion, by himself anticipating the utterance of the utmost that they could possibly say? It would admirably serve such a purpose, supposing it to have been a *purpose* consciously entertained. But is it necessary to assume that there was such a purpose? Instead of suspecting any such rhetorical artifice, should we not in all candour say that it is mainly, if not rather solely, the simple natural outcome of a deep-seated habitual feeling of remorseful shame which, at the definite recalling to view of *that* Appearance of the Risen Jesus, at once wells up in his bosom, and must find vent?

"*He appeared also to me.*" —He too can testify to Christ's being alive again after his death. Indeed, most poignant, most heart-piercing, however in another point of view exalting, must be for him the recollection of that fate-fraught hour. For had he not then had to feel how awful, nay, how *terrific*, Christ's revealed Presence *when displeased* can be? how effectual to instantaneously "scorch and shrivel" as with flaming fire a soul surprised by Him in a course of sin? Such had been St. Paul's experience then. He had found himself suddenly lying as it were dead before Christ, in that all-manifesting light which revealed himself to himself; all his self-praise, all his self-vaunted eminence in righteousness, all his superiority in religious knowledge, all his power to do great things for God, at once gone, annihilated, consumed; shewn to his own self to have been up to that hour no better spiritually than, so to speak, a mere half-formed creature unborn, and in this hour born in death.

It was an unspeakably bitter terrible experience; as nearly approaching to that of a soul actually passing out of life in its sins, to encounter face to face an avenging God and "be utterly consumed with terrors," as perhaps can possibly be imagined as having been ever gone through on

this side of the grave. "As to a still-born miscarriage he appeared to me;"—just such had been in that hour the sensation of St. Paul's own soul.

An experience like this was not only one whose occurrence could never have been forgotten by the Apostle, but must also have stamped the sensations attending it upon his memory with so sharply-cut a distinctness as could never be obliterated. I apprehend that this is what he means when he writes to the Corinthians, that he "*knew the terror of the Lord*;" for it is of the Lord Jesus that he there speaks (2 Cor. v. 11).

Thenceforward, through the new life which Christ's infinite loving-kindness imparted to him, and in the animating power of grateful love to Him as his Redeemer, it became (as he says in that same pathetic passage of personal history) his one eager aim so to comport himself in his service that, when that other hour should arrive in which he should find himself manifested before the judgment seat to receive his final award, he might be found well-pleasing unto Him;—not, again, and not *then*, to hear from the lips of that All-Holy One words of remonstrance and rebuke, but to receive back at his hands the good things which through his grace alone he should be found to have done in the body.

E. HUXTABLE.

THE REVISED VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

ON CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT PASSAGES.

IN my former papers I expressed a confident belief that the Revised Version is a much more correct reproduction in English of the sense intended by the writers of the New Testament than that given in the Authorised Version. In

spite, however, of greatly preponderant excellences, I could not forbear to point out what seemed to me to be defects in the new rendering of Greek words and grammatical forms. But nearly all these were only retentions, needless and unwise retentions I believe, of defects already existing in the Authorised Version. They were merely cases in which there was not a majority of two-thirds in favour of change. In this paper I shall discuss a few renderings of solitary passages, all of them specially interesting or specially difficult, which seem to me further removed than the old renderings from the sense of the Original.

In Romans viii. 16, 26, instead of *the Spirit itself* we have in the New Version *the Spirit himself*; without any alternative in the margin; a rendering which implies expressly, by the simple grammatical force of the words used, as a matter not open to question, that the Spirit of God is a person. That this is a correct inference from the New Testament as a whole, I firmly believe. But it is by no means implied in the Greek words found in Romans viii. 16 or 26. And translators have no right to compel their readers to learn from a single verse that which they would not themselves have known but for their study of other, and in this case far removed, portions of the Bible. They ought as far as possible so to put the Scriptures before their readers that the same passages shall proclaim the same truths to learned and unlearned alike. Even the ambiguities of Scripture should, if possible, be reproduced. That this is not always possible in the text, owing to the different compass of Greek and English forms of speech, I admit. In these cases, the translator is compelled, in spite of himself, to become an expositor. He ought, therefore, to put in the margin the rendering required by the exposition he rejects; so that his readers may know that an alternative is grammatically allowable, and therefore open to the expositor's choice.

The above is one of the very few passages in which the judgment of the Revisers seems to have been warped by something apparently akin to theological bias.

This incorrect rendering, like all such, is an injustice, not only to those who do not believe the doctrine involved in it, but to those who do. For, that the Greek name of the Spirit of God is a neuter substantive accompanied by neuter pronouns, is in my view very significant. It reminds us how constantly the third Person of the divine Trinity, although a distinct person sharing with the Father and the Son all divine attributes and working out by his own divine power all the operations of God, nevertheless withdraws for the more part his own personality from public view, that all eyes may be fixed on one object, viz. the Eternal Son, who is the Image of the invisible God. And just so far as the Spirit reigns in us shall we efface ourselves in order that Christ alone may be exalted.

Of the difficulty of using the words *it* and *itself* when speaking of one whom we believe to be both a person and divine, I am fully conscious. Even the Authorised Version uses a masculine pronoun in Romans viii. 27, *he maketh intercession*. Here the difficulty might be avoided by the use of italics: "according to *the will of God the Spirit* maketh intercession for saints." Or, if the words *he, himself*, are put in the text, there should be in the margin, "Gr. *it, itself*."

In the new version of 2 Corinthians iii. 18 are three clear gains; *unveiled* instead of *open*, *mirror* instead of *glass*, *transformed* instead of *changed*.¹ But the word *reflecting*, with *beholding* removed to the margin, seems to me a serious error and loss. The word thus rendered, *κατοπτρίζω*, derived from the common Greek word for *mirror*, is found in the active voice only, so far as I know, in p. 894d of the *Morals* of Plutarch; meaning to *shew*

¹ See Vol. ii., Second Series, pages 97, 100.

reflected in a mirror. In the middle voice, in the sense of *seeing oneself reflected in a mirror*, it is found in Artemidorus, *On Dreams*, ii. 7; Athenæus, v. 687e; Diogenes Laertius, ii. 33. (Cognate words in the same sense are found in one or two passages.) It is also found, in the sense of *to see an object in a mirror*, in Philo, *Allegories*, iii. 33: "let me not see thy form mirrored (μηδὲ κατοπτρῖσαιμην in anything else except in Thyself, even in God." This passage, like that before us, refers to Moses talking with God at Sinai. The middle voice denotes, according to a very frequent use, the effect which Moses hoped to receive from the vision he prayed for. The same use is also found in Philo's *Migration of Abraham*, ch. xvii., where to denote seeing oneself in a mirror the middle voice ἐνοπτριζόνται is followed by ἐαυτούς. Compare also Plutarch, *Morals*, pp. 696a and 143c.

Chrysostom, followed by Theodoret, expounds the word as meaning "reflect like a mirror." But it is not found in this sense, to my knowledge, in any independent passage. This meaning was suggested to Chrysostom probably only by this verse. The verb in question is never predicated of the reflecting mirror; but always, in the active voice of him who causes the reflection, and in the middle voice of him who sees reflected in a mirror either himself or some object beneficial (or hurtful) to himself. Of these two meanings of the middle voice, the latter is in the passage before us suggested at once by the accusative, τὴν δοξάν, governed by the verb. And that this is the sense designed by the Apostle is made clear by the context. For, if the unveiled ones are already reflecting the glory of Christ, it is needless and meaningless to say, as the Revisers make St. Paul say, that they *are being transformed into the same image*: for the change would be already effected, especially as the word *image* suggests outward form, not inward essence. The other rendering,

now pushed into the margin, states appropriately the means of the change, viz. contemplation of the reflected glory; and thus supplies the link connecting the *unveiled face* with the progressive transformation *into the same image*. It also keeps up the contrast, suggested by *we all*, of the unveiled Christians and the veiled Jews; while the word *transformed* reminds us of Moses returning unveiled into the presence of God, and thus rekindling his faded brightness. All this is obscured by the rendering adopted by the Revisers.

The Authorised rendering, *the Spirit of the Lord*, is properly abandoned. For it involves an inversion for which no reason can be conceived. But the Revisers have found no place, even in the margin, for the very simple, and I believe correct, rendering, *the Lord of the Spirit*. The words in question refer undoubtedly to Verse 17a. St. Paul has expressed a hope that the heart of Israel will turn to the Lord. And he remembers that to turn to *the Lord* is to turn to *the Spirit*. In other words, between the Son and the Spirit is a relation so intimate that to accept the one is to accept the other. This intimate relation, a practical identity of two distinct Persons, St. Paul embodies in the words *the Lord is the Spirit*. They are akin to the words of Christ in John x. 30, *I and my Father are one*; which give a reason and proof that no one can pluck the sheep of Christ from his hands, viz., because to do this is to pluck them from the hands of his Father. Each of these passages leads us up to the mysterious relation of the Persons of the Divine Trinity. And to this relation the concluding words of Verse 18 certainly refer. The only question is whether St. Paul designed the word *Πνεύματος* to be in apposition with, or governed by, *Κυρίου*. The latter seems to me the simpler mode of conceiving his thought. When two substantives, each in the genitive case, denote different persons or objects, objects not often

mentioned in apposition, it is most easy to understand the second genitive as subordinate to the first, implying that the objects are related, but leaving the relation, as the genitive of itself always does, quite indefinite. To take the second genitive in apposition to the first, is to assume that the relation of the two objects is that of identity. In virtue of the relation embodied in the strong words of Verse 17, *the Lord is the Spirit*, the Spirit is immediately afterwards appropriately called *the Spirit of the Lord*. And with equal right Christ may be called the *Lord of the Spirit*; inasmuch as from Him goes forth the Holy Spirit to reproduce his mind in his disciples. St. Paul teaches that the transformation *accords* with the mysterious relation to the Holy Spirit of Him whose *glory* the *unveiled* ones *behold reflected* in the Gospel mirror. The revised rendering is certainly better than the old one; for it suggests St. Paul's indisputable reference to Verse 17a. But it is obscure. The Revisers' marginal note, "Gr. *the Spirit* which is *the Lord*," is incorrect and almost meaningless.

Exceedingly wretched is the Revisers' rendering of their amended reading in 2 Corinthians iv. 6: *Light shall shine out of darkness*. A mere schoolboy, following the Greek order, might have given the more exact rendering of St. Paul's intensely graphic words, *Out of darkness light shall shine*. Similarly, Romans i. 14 should have been: *Both to Greeks and to Barbarians, both to wise men and to foolish, I am debtor*. These cases, which might be multiplied indefinitely, illustrate one of the most conspicuous defects of the New Version, viz., the almost total absence of poetic instinct. Whether in a large committee and in majorities of two-thirds it is reasonable to expect a poet's ear and eye, I cannot say. But, certainly, without these no first-rate literary work has ever been accomplished.

In 2 Corinthians v. 16, the Revisers retain the word *him* in italics, an insertion which in my view obscures com-

pletely the sense of the whole clause. In consequence of his judgment (Verse 15) that Christ died for all, etc., St. Paul's life has so altogether ceased that he no longer sees men as rich or poor, Jews or Gentiles, enemies or friends, but as those for whom Christ died. In former days it was otherwise. Of this he gives an extreme case. So accustomed was he to look upon men according to bodily appearance and surroundings, that even upon Christ he looked thus; he thought of Him as a mere Jew from Nazareth, a feeble man of flesh and blood, whose teaching he could easily crush out. Indeed, all the disciples knew Christ first as a man; till through the veil of flesh they saw his real dignity. But, in spite of having gone so far in knowing men *according to flesh* as even to know Christ thus, to St. Paul all knowing according to flesh is past. The object of *γινώσκωμεν* is quite unlimited. It cannot be limited to knowing Christ. Nor can this be St. Paul's reference. That he did not know Christ according to flesh was so evident that it could not need this emphatic and contrasted assertion. He mentions Christ only as an aggravated case, from his own past life, of knowing according to flesh; and now gives, in contrast, a repetition of the general assertion which is the chief matter of this verse: "If we have even known Christ according to flesh, yet now no longer do we know *men thus*."

In Galatians ii. 16,¹ instead of *knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ*, the New Version gives *save through faith*. This rendering suggests or implies that if a man have faith he may be justified by works of Law. But, that this is not implied in St. Paul's words, is evident from Matthew xii. 4, *which it was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them that were with him, but only for the priests*; Luke iv. 26,

¹ On this verse see an excellent paper by the Bishop of Llandaff, in *Public Opinion* for Sept. 17, 1881.

27, *there were many widows in Israel . . . and unto none of them was Elijah sent, but only to Zarephath . . . and none of them was cleansed, but only Naaman the Syrian*; Revelation xxi. 27, *there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean . . . but only they which are written in the Lamb's book of life*. In all these cases the particles $\epsilon\lambda$ $\mu\eta$ retain their exceptive force: but the exception is taken, not to $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\epsilon\acute{\xi}\omicron\nu$ $\eta\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$ $\phi\alpha\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, but only to $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\epsilon\acute{\xi}\omicron\nu$ $\eta\nu$ $\phi\alpha\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$: and similarly in the other passages. And these cases warn us not to extend in Galatians ii. 16 the exceptive force of the same particles beyond St. Paul's chief thought, *is not justified*. The Revisers have extended it to the whole phrase, *is not justified by the works of the law*; and have thus modified materially the sense of the verse. This is the more remarkable because in the passages quoted above they have adopted, without any marginal note, the very good rendering *but only*, which in the passage before us they have put in the margin as an alternative. But I think it claims a place in the text.

In Philippians ii. 6, instead of *thought it not robbery to be equal with God*, the New Version renders *counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God*. The word *prize*, which English readers will naturally understand to mean something received as a reward, the Revisers explain in a marginal note to mean *a thing to be grasped*. This last verb we use only of objects not already in our grasp, or at least not within our firm grasp. The meaning of the new rendering is put beyond doubt by the excellent commentaries of two of the Revisers, Bishops Ellicott and Lightfoot, of whom the latter gives as a paraphrase "a treasure to be clutched and retained at all hazards." This interpretation suggests that the equality with God which the Son did not regard as a treasure to be clutched and retained, He actually surrendered, *i.e.*, that He actually ceased to be equal with God. This is the only practical

significance of St. Paul's words thus expounded. For we have no hint that the *equality with God* was merely a human recognition of Christ's divine dignity.

This exposition supposes that, although wishing to convey the very common and grammatically correct sense of the very common word ἄρπαγμα, St. Paul went out of his way to find a very rare word which by its form suggests an altogether different sense. But a careful writer's rejection of a common word and choice of a rare one implies that the rare word chosen conveys, and the word rejected does not convey, his intended sense. And this intended sense we must seek in the difference between the words rejected and chosen. Now ἄρπαγμα is a passive form, denoting an object seized: ἄρπαγμός is an active form, a seizing. And Paul's choice of this latter word can be accounted for only by supposing that he wished to convey an active sense.

Again, ἀρπάζω and its cognates denote a strong-handed taking hold of something not already in our hands. Unfortunately I am not now able to verify the various passages quoted by Dr. Lightfoot in proof that ἀρπάζω and its cognates are sometimes used to denote a mere clutching of treasure already our own. But the quotations do not on their face convey this proof. On the contrary, one of them, Eusebius, *Church History*, viii. 12, τὸν θάνατον ἄρπαγμα θέμενοι, certainly does not refer to something already possessed and tenaciously held. For the persons in question did not hold fast to death as something they would not surrender, but by flinging themselves from high roofs they laid hold of death, as if by violence, and made it their own. And this is the exact ordinary sense of ἀρπάζω and of substantives in -μα. I also observe in Dr. Lightfoot's paraphrase something like contradiction. For he says that ἄρπαγμα "is employed like ἔρμαιον, εὕρημα, to denote 'a highly-prized possession, an unexpected gain.'" Are these last terms synonymous? The word "gain" implies

acquisition of that which before was not ours; and so do ἔρμαιον and εἴρημα. Are we to understand St. Paul to teach that the Eternal Son's equality with the Father is in any sense an acquisition?

All this proves that the obscure rendering given by the Revisers, and the exposition of it given by Drs. Ellicott and Lightfoot, involve a double difficulty, viz. St. Paul's inexplicable choice of a rare active form to convey a passive sense, when a common passive form was ready to his hand; and his use of a very common word in a sense of which I have not seen an example.

In view of the almost insuperable combination of difficulties besetting the rendering just discussed, I venture to suggest another. Let us accept the active sense of ἀρπαγμός, and the usual meaning of the verb from which it is derived. It denotes "taking hold with a strong hand," but not necessarily of other men's goods. It implies force, but not necessarily injustice. For want of a better word, I will paraphrase it *high-handed self-enriching*, or more accurately but less forcefully *high-handed taking to himself*. St. Paul refers, not to acquirement of wealth, i.e., capacity of self-indulgence, but to the taking and drinking of the cups of happiness held out to the Eternal Son. But the poverty of language compels me to use words not quite accurate. The Son did not look upon his equality with God, i.e., his possession of divine powers, as a self-enriching, or as we should say a means of self-enrichment. He was the very opposite of some whom St. Paul describes in 1 Timothy vi. 5, νομιζόντων πορισμὸν εἶναι τὴν εὐσέβειαν, which the Revisers render, *supposing that godliness is a way of gain*. This use of a simple substantive as predicate to denote coincidence, i.e., practical identity, where we should use a circumlocution, is very common in the New Testament. Compare 1 John v. 3, 4: *This is the love of God, that we may keep his commandments; this*

is the victory which hath conquered the world, our faith. And it is a correct and forceful expression of human thought. For instance, a Turkish Pasha might look upon governorship of a province as a self-enriching. In his mind, to be governor and to be constantly enriching himself were practically the same. For with him they always went together. And it seems to me that in the verse before us we have a similar mode of thought.

The words thus taken in their natural sense give a good meaning to the whole passage. Not as a means of self-gratification in the palace of the skies did Christ look upon his divine prerogatives. This was not their worth in his view. He did not use his strong hand to bring pleasure to Himself. But this is exactly what the gods of the Pantheon of Greek mythology did. They were only big men who used their superhuman powers for their own selfish enjoyment. The absolute opposite of this, Christ did. It is true that He used violence: but it was upon HIMSELF. The man who seizes with violence frequently empties those on whom he lays his hand. And so did the Son of God; BUT it was HIMSELF HE EMPTIED. Thus *ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* forms the most tremendous contrast conceivable to *ἀρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*. These last words suggest what Christ might have done (for He was armed with divine power), if He had been like the deities with whom the fancy of the Greeks had peopled their heavens. The words following tell us what He actually did.

It may be objected that, since all things belonged already to the Son, He could not conceivably enrich Himself. But *ἀρπάζω* does not necessarily involve taking what is not our own. An owner may lay hold of the grapes on his own vines. At the moment of his incarnation the continued joys of heaven were before the Son. But instead of taking and drinking the cups of celestial happiness, *He emptied*

Himself. He did this because from eternity He had not looked upon his own divine powers as a means of his own enjoyment. It will be noticed that whatever weight there is in the above objection bears with equal force, I believe greater force, against the exposition embodied in the Revised Version.

A really satisfactory rendering for the exposition given above, I cannot find. In lack of a better I suggest: NOT HIGH-HANDED SELF-INDULGING DID HE DEEM HIS EQUALITY WITH GOD. This rendering preserves well the order of the words, the active sense of the termination *-μος*, and the idea, ever present in *ἀρπάζω*, of a strong hand. The word *self-indulging* avoids the idea of acquisition which would be suggested by *self-enriching*. It limits, however, unduly the root-meaning of the word thus translated: but the limitation is suggested by the context.

The foregoing exposition I offer with diffidence. The serious objections to the exposition now common compel me to seek a better. And such, I believe, I have now proposed. It retains the root idea of *ἀρπαγμός*, and accounts for its rare termination; and makes the clause a real addition to the sense of the passage. And it avoids the suggestion that at his incarnation the Son surrendered his equality with God: for it tells us, not what He did, but the way in which He viewed, or rather did not view, his own divine prerogatives, viz. not as a means of self-gratification.

In his mode of viewing his own divine powers Christ is our pattern. The mind which was in Him must be in us. Men of the world look upon their various powers as legitimate means of self-enjoyment and self-exaltation; and consider this to be their real worth. But the example of Christ has taught us better. Our various powers were given us that we may lay them, as He did, on the altar of God. And when we have done this we feel that in a

real and very solemn sense we have emptied ourselves of our former fancied fulness. Whether we shall thus empty ourselves depends upon the estimate we have formed about the meaning and purpose of our various powers.

One more passage I cannot refrain from discussing. In Titus ii. 13 the New Version reads: *looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ*. In the margin, as an alternative, we find the old rendering: *of the great God and our Saviour*.

The reading in the text gives to Christ unmistakably the title, *our Great God and Saviour*. And a title practically the same is involved in, or is most easily suggested by, the reading in the margin. That, taken by themselves in their mere grammatical force, St. Paul's words admit this sense, I readily concede. But they do not demand it. For with equal grammatical accuracy they admit the rendering, *appearance of the glory of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ*. From the words as they stand we cannot be certain whether the term *great God* refers to the Father or to the Son. This, St. Paul left his readers to determine by their knowledge of his usual teaching. The grammatical latitude of the words in question is a matter so delicate and intricate that I shall not attempt to discuss it here. But I notice that both Winer and Ellicott, who take different views of the reference of these words, hold their opinions for exegetical reasons; and admit that each exposition is grammatically admissible. Dr. Ellicott, who gives in his commentary the rendering which the Revisers have put in their text, says: "it must be candidly avowed that it is *very* doubtful whether on the grammatical principle last alluded to (on which alone rests the application of the words *great God* to Christ) the interpretation of this passage can be fully settled. There is a *presumption* in favour of the adopted interpretation, but, on account of the defining genitive ἡμῶν, nothing more." He also adds: "It ought

not to be suppressed that some of the best Versions . . . and some Fathers of unquestioned orthodoxy adopted the other interpretation."¹ I find no fault with the Revisers for the rendering they have put in their text; although my own study of St. Paul's general teaching does not confirm its correctness. But certainly the alternative exposition, which Dr. Ellicott admits to be grammatically allowable, should have been put, clothed in unmistakable words, in the margin, instead of, or in addition to, the ambiguous rendering now found there. The readers of the New Version would then have judged for themselves, as students of the Original now judge, from St. Paul's teaching elsewhere whether he meant to speak of *the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ* or *the great God and our Saviour, Jesus Christ*; or, as I believe, *of the blessed hope, even the appearance of the glory of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ*.

This is one of the many passages in which the translator is compelled by the circumstances of the case to become also an expositor. In all such the rejected exposition, unless it be absolutely impossible, should have a place in the margin.

Firmly as I believe that the Son of God shares to the full with the Father all divine attributes and may therefore be correctly called *God* and is thus called in the Fourth Gospel, I do not think that He is ever so called in the Epistles of St. Paul. Certainly it is worthy of note that in all the passages, such as Romans i. 4, Philippians ii. 6, Colossians i. 15 ff., etc., in which St. Paul speaks expressly

¹ I cannot refrain from pointing out, in reply to Dr. Ellicott's first objection to the exposition ignored by the Revisers, viz. "that *ἐπιφάνεια* is a term specially and peculiarly applied to the Son, and never to the Father," that St. Paul does not here speak of the appearance of the great God but of *the appearance of the glory of the great God*, in full accord with Matthew xvi. 27, *the Son of Man will come in the glory of his Father*. The announcement of this coming is (1 Timothy i. 11) *the gospel of the glory of the blessed God*.

of the nature and glory of the Son, the explicit title *God* is not given to Him; that even as distinguished from the Son (*e.g.* 1 Corinthians iii. 23, viii. 6, xv. 28) the Father is called simply *God*; and that in all the passages in which St. Paul seems to speak of Christ explicitly as *God*, either the reading or rendering or exposition is open to doubt and is marked as doubtful in the New Version. This I venture to explain by suggesting that in St. Paul's day the theological education of the Church was not sufficiently advanced to make it safe, in view of surrounding polytheism, to use the word *God* as a common designation of Christ; but that the development of Christian thought justified the use of it by the last surviving Apostle, and that in the age following it became universal in the Church.

I cannot conclude this paper and series of papers without giving in a few words some estimate of the Revision as a whole. In the first place the Revision is thorough. With perfect candour and without concealment, and even without any presumption in favour of the Received Text and the Authorised Version, the Revisers have told us, in the best and plainest words they could find, the exact sense which they believe the Writers of the New Testament intended to convey. They might have acted, and many would have advised them to act, on other principles. They might have received into the New Version, or at least into the text of it, only those changes in reading and rendering which modern scholarship had placed beyond reasonable doubt. Had they done this, the New Version would have been merely an approach at a safe distance in the direction of the results attained by Biblical research. Instead of this, the Revisers have held the balance with steady hand and have given a place in the text to whichever reading or rendering seemed to them to have preponderant evidence, reserving for readings or renderings supported by evidence considerable but not preponderant a place in the margin.

Consequently, wherever there is no marginal note the English reader may accept the New Version with reasonable confidence as reproducing with tolerable accuracy the sense of the original. The Revisers have thus bridged over fairly and well the immense gulf formerly existing, and by many painfully felt, between the New Testament as read by scholars and as read by the millions who know it only through an English Version. Much more nearly than ever before can the whole Anglo-Saxon family of God now hear the same words from the lips of their heavenly Father. And this is an infinite gain.

The Revised Greek Text seems to me better than the Revised rendering of it. It is quite true, as Dr. Sanday has said, that the new Edition of the Greek Testament by Drs. Westcott and Hort, which with its Introduction and Appendix is now complete in our hands, has pointed out and opened up a new path of investigation in this grave study. It is also true that, although the principles of Textual Research propounded by these editors commend themselves to us at once, their application of these principles in detail can be fully and intelligently accepted only after careful sifting. But already Textual Criticism has given us abundant assured results; and has brought within narrow limits the readings still awaiting decision. And these assured results are embodied fairly and fully in the New Version.

The rendering of the Greek text affords greater scope for the subjectivity of the translator, and is therefore more open to criticism. But, after all reasonable objections, the New Version remains an immense improvement on the Old one. For many Greek words more accurate equivalents have been found; while of others the significance has been brought out with more fulness and force than before by the use of a constant, or more nearly constant English equivalent: grammatical forms very imperfectly understood

when the Authorised Version was made are now much better represented: and the emphasis of the original is in many cases more fully reproduced by a rearrangement of the words in the English translation. Against these indisputable gains the losses which can be set will be found, I firmly believe, to be few and small. The real blemishes will soon be detected and condemned by, we may hope, a tolerably unanimous consent of the best scholars; and enumerated. And, by enumeration, their effect will be lessened. The improvements will never be numbered.

While thus commending the New Version, I cannot forbear to express a hope that, after the Revised Old Testament has been published and has been estimated by those capable of judging its merits, the Revisers of the New Testament may be permitted to discuss again those readings and renderings against which there was a large adverse vote. The judgment of the Revisers would be matured by their own quiet thought and by their intercourse with others. And thus, I doubt not, we should have a Version still nearer to perfection than the noble work already in our hands. Such reconsideration would not involve very great time and cost. And it is demanded by the importance of having an English Version of the Bible as little as possible open to objection. In the meantime all lovers of the Bible may thank God that he has permitted this generation to see the great work which in these pages I have ventured to criticise.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

CRITICAL NOTE ON ST. JOHN xiv. 2.

DR. WESTCOTT in his Commentary on St. John's Gospel gives the following explanation of the words, "*In My Father's house are many mansions.*" "The rendering comes from the Vulgate *mansiones*, which were 'resting places,' and especially the 'stations' on a great road, where travellers found refreshment. This appears to be the true meaning of the Greek word here; so that the contrasted notions of repose and progress are combined in this vision of the future."

The interpretation here suggested of the word *μονή* will, I believe, come as a surprise to most students: it is found in none of the recent Commentaries on St. John, such as those of Olshausen, Meyer, De Wette, Tholuck, Luthardt, and Godet; and it introduces a thought alien to that ordinarily associated with this Verse. The questions, therefore, naturally arise, first, what is the evidence on which the proposed interpretation rests? and, secondly, does it suit the context in which the word is found?

In classical Greek *μονή* is used as signifying an abiding in a place, a delay (Thuc., i. 131, vii. 47, 59; Herod., i. 94; Eur., Tro., 1129); it is applied to what is fixed and stationary, as opposed to what is transient and in motion (Pl. Crat., 437 B.; Pol., iv. 41). The word does not occur in the LXX., but it is found once in the Apocrypha, viz., 1 Macc. vii. 38 *μὴ δῶς αὐτοῖς μονήν*; here Schleusner suggests that it means either "continuance" or else "a fixed abode," illustrating the latter meaning by a reference to St. John xiv. 2. In Josephus *μονή* signifies "an abode" (Ant., xiii. 2, 1); in another passage (Ant., viii. 13, 7) it appears at first sight as if he used the word in the sense adopted by Dr. Westcott in the note that I have quoted, for he applies it to the stay of Elijah in the cave of Mount Horeb, but the context and the construction alike seem to prove that here also the word signifies "an abode," for the sentence runs as follows: *καὶ διατέλει ποιούμενος ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν μονήν*.

So far, then, as the usage of the word goes, the evidence appears to be against the interpretation suggested by Dr. Westcott: none of the Greek Lexicons that I have been able to consult mention the meaning which he gives to *μονή*, except Schleusner who in his Lexicon of the New Testament writes as follows: "Apud Græcos scriptores *μονή* etiam haud raro *stationes σταθμούς* significat, in quibus milites, in itinere constituti, aut alii, itinera facientes quietem capere

solent. Conf. *Amelii*, Illustrationem difficilium N.T. locorum. T. ii. p. 404, qui ostendit, *diversoria* quoque *mansionum* nomine veteribus maxime *Suetonio* appellari consuevisse." I have been unable to find the work to which reference is made here, and so cannot verify Schleusner's statement. There is no question that *mansio* came to signify "a halting place;" but no authorities are quoted for this usage earlier than Pliny and Suetonius. Instances in which *μονή* has a similar meaning can also be produced (cf. Plut., De Profect. in Virt., 76 D.? text probably corrupt; Paus. x. 31; Athan. Apolog. cont. Arianos, 29); but in order to establish Dr. Westcott's interpretation it must be proved that this was its recognized and ordinary signification in the first century. That such was not the case appears to follow from the fact that the Greek Fathers do not connect that meaning of *μονή* with St. John xiv. 2. There was a difference of opinion amongst them as to whether this Verse implied that there would be various degrees of glory and happiness assigned to the Saints hereafter in proportion to their merits; most of the Fathers agree that the words "*many mansions*" do contain this thought: but it never seems to have occurred to any one of them that the *μοναί* were only resting places and not abiding homes (cf. Iren., Adv. Hær., v. 36, 2; Clem. Alex., Strom., ii. 6; vi. 14; Theodoret, In Cant. Canticorum, v. 7, 8; Interp. 1 Ep. ad Cor. xv. 40; Theod. Mops., In Evang. Joh., xiv. 2; Cyr. Alex., Comm. in Johannis Evang., Lib. ix.). Some uncertainty might be felt as to the sense in which Chrysostom understood the word, for he paraphrases it thus: ἀφθονία γὰρ ἐκεῖ πολλή καταγωγίων, were it not that the context shewed that he uses *καταγωγή* not as meaning "an inn" but "a place of reception," since the words immediately preceding those that I have quoted are, ὅτι καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐκείνος ὁ χώρος δέξεται ὁ καὶ τὸν Πέτρον. Moreover, in his Homily on 2 Corinthians v. 1, where he goes more fully into the explanation of the word, he points out that St. Paul uses *σκῆνος* to shew the temporary character of our earthly dwelling, as compared with the eternal homes of heaven; and Chrysostom illustrates the contrast by quoting St. John xiv. 2, thus making *μονή* the opposite of *σκῆνη*.

But the testimony of the Latin Fathers is even stronger, for *mansio* had the recognized signification of "a halting place," and yet it does not appear ever to have been regarded as having this meaning in St. John xiv. 2. Tertullian (Resurr. xli.) interprets

it as being synonymous with *domus*. Augustine (in Joh. Evang.) paraphrases it in the words "cum Christo esse mansuros." But perhaps more important than all is the testimony of Jerome; he uses the word *mansio* in the sense of "a halting place," for one of his letters (Ep. lxxviii.) is headed "De xlii. mansionibus Israelitarum in deserto;" but he does not connect that meaning with St. John xiv. 2: for, in combating with scorn the view that by the many mansions are meant the various Churches scattered through the world, he remarks (Adv. Jov. ii. 28) that Christ is speaking in this Verse "de caelorum mansionibus et eternis tabernaculis," and that each will receive a mansion for himself by the goodness of God, according to his deserts.

It is hard to understand, if "stations" or "halting places" be the true meaning of *μοναί* as used by St. John, how it happens that the Fathers are unanimous, so far as my investigation has gone, in giving another signification both to *μονή* and *mansio* in this Verse.

But the difficulties in the way of Dr. Westcott's interpretation, that present themselves in connexion with the context in which the word occurs here are still stronger. In the first place it introduces into the Verse a confusion of metaphor: "*In My Father's house are many halting-places:*" it needs but to translate this interpretation into plain language in order to see how unnatural the sequence of thought becomes. There seems no doubt but that in the words *ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ Πατρὸς μου* allusion is made to the Temple, and that the design which Christ had in view was to carry the thoughts of his Apostles from the material building to the heavenly archetype; but that, in immediate connection with this thought, reference should be made to the stations upon a great road, appears wholly unnatural. Nor is it conceivable that with the idea of the Temple before them the Apostles could have connected that signification with the word *μονή*, when there was another meaning both more suitable and apparently more familiar to them.

But, further, Dr. Westcott's interpretation seems to interrupt the harmony of the paragraph of which this Verse forms part. Christ had just spoken to his Apostles words which, apparently for the first time, shewed them that He was about to be taken not only from the Jews, but also from them (Chap. xiii. 33). The tidings of this separation, so soon to take place, shut out every other thought from their minds; the "*new commandment*" seems scarcely to have been heard by them; for as Christ paused, St. Peter at once leads

Him back to the subject that filled the hearts of them all. He receives an answer and a warning; and then, as the eye of Christ rests upon the mourning group around Him, He speaks words of comfort and hope, assuring them that the parting would be but for a little time, since, in the home of Him who was his Father and theirs, there was room for all his children, many abiding-places provided for them. *"If it were not so, I would have told you; for I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I come again, and will receive you unto myself; that where I am there ye may be also."* Surely it mars the harmony of these words with the circumstances that called them forth to read into this Verse an allusion to progress as an element of the life to come.

But, lastly, it must be borne in mind that the word *μονή* not only occurs here, but also in Verse 23; no one would think of interpreting the latter passage as meaning "we will come and make our halting-place with him," for the contrast appears to be between the temporary dwelling of Christ among men (Chap. i. 14 *καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν*) and the permanent abiding of the Trinity in man; but if *μονή* is used in this sense in Verse 23, does not this furnish a clue as to its meaning in Verse 2?

While, therefore, it is doubtless true that the life to come will be a constant rest, and yet a constant progress—an eternal abiding with God, and yet an eternal approaching unto God—still neither the history of the word *μονή* nor the context in which it stands here seems to justify the view, that these two contrasted notions "are combined in this vision of the future."

T. STERLING BERRY.

*DR. ABBOTT ON THE SECOND EPISTLE
OF ST. PETER.*

WHATEVER conclusions may be ultimately adopted respecting the authenticity of the "Second Epistle of St. Peter," there can be no question that the considerations laid before the readers of the EXPOSITOR by Dr. Abbott¹ must receive the closest attention. In his first paper he announces an important discovery which can never henceforth be entirely overlooked. In the two following papers, which, though full of interest, are much less important than the first, he criticises the Epistle with the utmost freedom, and passes upon it a verdict which can only be called contemptuous. The readers of the EXPOSITOR will naturally expect some remarks upon these papers. I anxiously looked for some learned and discriminating estimate of them, which may I hope yet be forthcoming. Meanwhile, and provisionally, I am requested by the Editor to add what I can, as a small contribution to the discussion of the subject.

The importance of the issue which has been raised by Dr. Abbott cannot be denied. If his views can be substantiated, they mean nothing less than this, that the Church has admitted into her Canon of holy and inspired Scripture a book deliberately pseudonymous. If any one desires to see the way in which the issue presents itself in the abstract to the minds of many learned Churchmen, let him turn to the introduction to this Epistle in the Bishop of Lincoln's Commentary. "Let us remember," says the Bishop, "that this Epistle claims to have been written by

¹ January, February, March, 1882.

St. Peter. *If this Epistle was not written by the Apostle, it is a shameless forgery.*" And again, "There is scarcely a single writing of all antiquity, sacred or profane, which must not be given up as spurious, if the Second Epistle of St. Peter be not received as a genuine writing of the Apostle, and as a part of Holy Writ." Many of the defenders of the Epistle have freely used such language. If the Epistle be not genuine, they say, "Christ's promise to his Church has failed, and the Holy Spirit has not been given to guide her into all truth;" and "the Church must then have been imposed upon by what must in that case be regarded as *a satanic device*." They talk of the author, if he were pseudonymous, as "an impostor" and "a forger"; of his motives as shewing "intentional fraud" and "cunning fabrication"; of his work as that of "a deceiver fathering his Epistle upon St. Peter with an evil intention."¹ Let me say at once that such language seems to me to be both erroneous and full of danger. It seriously imperils causes far more important than that which it is employed to defend. Critical questions can only be decided on grounds of serious criticism. Traditional dogmas, terrified deprecations, angry anathemas, cannot have, and ought not to have, any weight in deciding questions which can only be determined by quite other considerations. Mr. Plummer, in Bishop Ellicott's Commentary, has excellently said on this subject, that "it is inexpedient to encumber the discussion by an attempted *reductio ad horribile* of one of the alternatives. A court must not concern itself with the consequences of finding a prisoner guilty." Nothing would be more unwise for the Church of the nineteenth century than to abnegate the duty of fearless and independent enquiry, and to take its stand on the imperfect and undeveloped criticism of the fourth century. Nothing is less reverent than the notion that the

¹ See Fronmüller, Introd. Lange's Bibelwerk).

Holy Spirit was so much more present in "the Fathers" than in ourselves, that we must prejudge and condemn the accumulating masses of modern learning. It would be unfaithfulness on our part to give a blind deference to the very fallible conclusions of men neither abler nor wiser than the great scholars of to-day. The members of the Council of Laodicea were far less advantageously situated than we are as regards many of the means for arriving at a just conclusion in nice questions of authenticity and evidence. Nothing, again, is more full of danger than to stake the acceptance of the essential truths of Christianity on questions of very minor importance. In the examination of such questions it may at any time happen that the fresh evidence becomes too strong to be resisted. The belief of past centuries on some points of criticism may turn out to be an error which can no longer be held by any honest and unbiassed mind; but no such discoveries can ever touch a single fundamental article of the faith of Christ. I do not accept the conclusion of many critics, that a belief in the authenticity of this Epistle is a demonstrable error. Some strong arguments can still be urged in its favour. It must, however, be admitted that Dr. Abbott has adduced facts which are all but absolutely new, and of which he has been, so far as we know, the first scholar in nineteen centuries to observe the true importance.

I. What he has proved in his first paper beyond all shadow of doubt is that Josephus and the author of this Epistle *could not have written independently of each other*. I must confess that it would be impossible for me to feel respect for the judgment of any critic who asserted that the resemblances between the two writers were purely fortuitous.

I was one of those to whom Dr. Abbott was kind enough some months ago to submit a preliminary sketch of the

evidence so convincingly stated in his paper of last January. He has put on record some of the answers which he received from those to whom he wrote. Let us glance at them :

a. "One expressed a doubt *whether the method was safe.*" I cannot quite understand this way of meeting the evidence. I can only suppose that the scholar who returned this answer was in reality unable or unwilling to give his full attention to the enquiry. The method may be very unsafe indeed if it builds conclusions on one or two isolated words scattered up and down the voluminous works of different authors. But Dr. Abbott has adduced the very different evidence of groups of words—words in some instances not only unusual but startling—words which are in some instances *hapax legomena*—occurring together in much the same sequence and connexion in passages of brief compass. I venture to say that you might submit this evidence either to any twelve of the most eminent scholars and literary men in England, or again to any twelve men selected at haphazard who had enough general education to understand the question, and that both juries would, without any hesitation, give an unanimous verdict that such resemblances, however to be accounted for, *could not be accidental*. Were this question unconnected with theology, I am sure that no critic could set aside the facts adduced, without being charged with a total absence of the critical faculty.

β. "Another urged that the Epistle might be a translation from the Aramaic, and that it was the *translator* and not the *author* who borrowed from Josephus." As to this answer, I must confess that I look on the hypothesis of "Aramaic originals," where there is no trace of them, and not even a tradition that they ever existed, with a good deal of suspicion. The thesis has indeed been recently maintained by Mr. King, but to me it seems quite untenable,

and that on two grounds. The first is, that the Epistle is addressed quite as much to Gentiles as to Jews. Now the Jews of the Dispersion were very probably acquainted with Aramaic, but most certainly the Gentiles were not. The second is, that though the Greek of the Epistle is sufficiently strange, yet the main peculiarities belong essentially to the *thoughts* as well as to the style, and it would be not too much to say that, unless the "translator" tampered to an indefinite extent with the original before him, the resemblances of the original author to Josephus are as certain as those of his imaginary translator. Could the translator have introduced *de suo* the alliterations (*e.g.*, ii. 16) and the *autanaclises* (*e.g.* ii. 12, see *infra*), as well as the peculiar repetitions which mark the style?

γ. My own answer to Dr. Abbott, when he sent me a very brief lithographed sketch of his evidence was, that I regarded it as "decisively proved that either the author has borrowed from Josephus, *or Josephus from the author.*"

I fully admit that there are difficulties about the latter hypothesis. Those difficulties do not lie in the mere supposition that Josephus may have seen this Epistle. It may indeed be said that he shews (so far as I am aware) no decisive proofs of familiarity with any other book of the New Testament. Dr. Abbott, for instance, has found that the unquestionably genuine First Epistle of St. Peter does not contain any traces of similarity to the writings of Josephus. Still there is no impossibility in the supposition that an isolated Christian tract may have fallen under his notice, and that he may have availed himself of some of its thoughts and expressions. Books have strange destinies. There is no knowing where they may not penetrate; what strange results they may not produce; into what entirely unexpected hands they may not fall. Josephus, whom I regard as radically untrustworthy where he had any advantage to gain by suggesting a falsehood or by suppressing

a truth, must certainly have known a great deal more about Christians and Christianity than he has chosen to record. He was a friend of Aliturus, the Jewish pantomimist, who was one of the favourites in the court of Nero. In his youth he had hung about the boudoir of Poppæa, who in all probability was a Jewish proselytess. As one who, it is to be feared, may not have been without his share in calling unfavourable attention to the Christians in Rome, and so in the instigation of Nero to his horrible persecution of the Christians; as one who may not impossibly have crossed the mind of St. John as a person possessing some of the characteristics of his False Prophet in the Apocalypse; as one who in old age had attended in the antechambers of the persecutor Domitian; he was a person who may have read, and even have sought for, any Christian writing which any unhappy *traditor* may have been tempted to place at his disposal. Further than this, he has, in his *Antiquities* (xviii. 3, § 3), directly referred to Christ and Christians in a passage, which is indeed interpolated, but probably has a genuine basis; he has also recorded the preaching of John the Baptist, and the martyrdom of James, the Lord's brother. Josephus had much to do with Jerusalem, and as this Epistle must, if genuine, have found its way to Jerusalem, he may have met a copy there. Besides all this, he was a personal friend and intimate of Agrippa II., and Agrippa, as we know from the Acts of the Apostles, had heard the defence of St. Paul, and felt a strong interest in the controversy between Judaism and Christianity.

If this were all, I should see little or no difficulty in believing that the "plagiarist"—if such a word were applicable—was the Jewish historian, not the Christian writer. I feel it right, however, to say that this hypothesis involves a very serious difficulty of another kind. It is this. The expressions which are common to the two writers are

not specially remarkable in Josephus, but *are* specially remarkable in the Epistle. In some instances they are unique, having no parallel in a single other passage of the New Testament or the Septuagint. Further than this, when we are reading the passages in Josephus we can see why the words were used. There is nothing in them which we can regard as startling or abnormal. In the Epistle, on the other hand, the same thoughts and expressions sometimes cause us a shock of surprise.

I will give one remarkable instance of this. In 2 Peter i. 3, we read in our Authorised Version the expression, "through the knowledge of Him *that hath called us to glory and Virtue.*" Now the only thing remarkable about this clause would be the fact that it contains the word "Virtue" which is all but unknown to the New Testament. The plural *aretai* does indeed occur in 1 Peter ii. 9, "that ye should shew forth *the praises (aretas)* of Him that hath called you out of darkness into His marvellous light." Here the margin of the Authorised Version gives us "*virtues*" for "praises." It is doubtful whether *aretai* could ever mean "praises" in classical Greek, nor does it mean "virtues." But "praises" was chosen by our translators because *aretai* is used in the LXX. (Isa. xlii. 8, xliii. 21) as the representative of the Hebrew תְּהִלֹּת, and is interchangeable with *dóξα* "glory." Hence the "excellencies" of the Revised Version is a better word. But *arete* in the singular occurs three times in this Second Epistle (i. 3, 5) in the sense of "Virtue," and it is found only once in the rest of the New Testament, viz., in Philippians iv. 8, where it occurs in an appeal *a majori ad minus*. The reason of this exclusion of so remarkable a word from the New Testament is that "virtue" was the ideal of Paganism, whereas Christians set before themselves the much loftier ideal of "*holiness.*" How strange, then, is the true translation of 2 Peter i. 3, which cannot by any possibility be, as in the

Authorised Version, "who hath called us *to* glory and virtue," but as in the Revised—(one of the thousands of positive and indefensible errors which the Revised Version has silently corrected). "Who called us BY HIS OWN GLORY AND VIRTUE" (ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ). To attribute "virtue" to God may well have been startling to any transcriber and any reader, and that is probably the reason why in B and other MSS. the reading has been altered. But ἴδιος is a characteristic word of this author (in whom it occurs no less than seven times), and ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ is found in \aleph A C. Now it might have been said that the author is only influenced by a reminiscence of 1 Peter ii. 9, or that he uses *arete* as the LXX. use it in rendering Habakkuk iii. 3, where it is only an equivalent of the Hebrew הֵדָר or "glory." But when we find "virtue," in the strictest and most normal sense of the word *attributed to God in a passage of Josephus* (*Antt.*, *Proem.*) together with four or five other very peculiar expressions which (so far as the rest of the New Testament is concerned) are peculiar to this Epistle, it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that the writer is borrowing from Josephus, in whom the expression at once explains itself. For if Josephus attributes "virtue" to God, he only does so because he is contrasting the ideal of God as revealed by Moses with the flagrant *vices* attributed to their deities by the Pagan mythologists. In this Epistle the employment of so rare a word, in so startling a connexion, requires to be accounted for by giving to the word some unusual sense; in Josephus, where it occurs among other expressions common to both passages, it is found in a sense perfectly natural.

Nothing seems to come more easily to a modern theologian than a cautious reticence; nothing is easier than the common fashion of proving oneself a "safe man" by steering "through the channel of no meaning between the Scylla and Charybdis of Yes and No." But serious readers

have a right to claim an honest expression of opinion ; and if I am asked the final impression left on my mind by such facts as these, I say that Dr. Abbott's discoveries add very appreciably to the difficulty in accepting the genuineness of the Epistle. Every item of dubious or unexplained phenomena must tell with something of cumulative force against a writing which is, on the one hand, by far the most weakly-authenticated of all those which have been finally admitted into the Canon of the New Testament, and which, on the other hand, presents the maximum of internal difficulties and sources of perplexity. Considerations which I have not space in this paper to explain prevent me from regarding it as certain that the letter is spurious. I still think that St. Peter may have lent his name and the weight of his authority to thoughts expressed in the language of another. Suspension of judgment is called for by these counter-considerations. Meanwhile I await with anxiety the opinion of others. The Fathers of the first three centuries felt no certainty about the Epistle, and many of them do not allude to it. After the revival of learning, Erasmus, Luther, Cardinal Cajetan, Grotius, Scaliger, Salmasius, all doubted its genuineness. In modern times it has been rejected not only by Eichhorn, De Wette, Baur, Schwegler, Hilgenfeld, Mayerhoff, Bleek, Schott, Davidson, Meissner, Reuss, Renan, and many others, but even by Neander, Weiss, and Huther ; while Bunsen, Bertholdt, Ullmann, and even Lange, hold that, though genuine, it has been largely interpolated. Not one of these writers was aware of the new arguments adduced by Dr. Abbott. Those arguments must be thoroughly sifted and carefully examined before we can duly appreciate their significance. It is to be hoped that modern divines will not be tempted to a conspiracy of silence respecting them, and will not adopt the ostrich-policy of hiding their heads in the sands. It is possible that the new arguments may

be refuted, or that the edge of them may be turned by counter-considerations. If so, we shall listen to all that can be urged against them with earnest and respectful attention.

I agree, then, with Dr. Abbott in thinking that he has placed in a light never yet observed by any ancient or modern scholar the resemblances to Josephus which up to this time have only partially been noticed. But I do not agree with him in thinking that his arguments are absolutely decisive against the authenticity of the letter. I still think it *possible* that Josephus may have been the borrower, though I have furnished one reason among many why it is difficult to believe that he was not the originator of these particular sequences of thought and expression. It is as yet too early to come to any final conclusion on the new facts which have thus been brought to light.

II. But when Dr. Abbott proceeds to the direct criticism of the Epistle, I am compelled in great measure to part company from him. Without entering into any questions of canonicity and inspiration, even if we judge the Epistle as he judges it on its own intrinsic merits, apart from all associations of reverence, he seems to me to adopt a tone of unwarrantable disparagement. Let us briefly glance at one or two points in his two remaining papers.

1. He begins by endeavouring to prove that the writer "copied" the Epistle of St. Jude.

I entirely agree with him as to the *priority* of St. Jude's Epistle. Although the other view is still maintained, it is I think an easy matter so to state the evidence on the subject as to make it impossible for any student who approaches the question with a trained literary sense to feel any remaining doubt that the "plagiarist"—if that word be at all applicable—is the author of the "Second Epistle of St. Peter" and not St. Jude. I further agree with Dr. Abbott in thinking that they cannot both be modified from

some common original, because they are interwoven with an idiosyncrasy of tone and expression which could not have existed in any document that professes to be ancient. But I entirely dissent from the view that the Second Epistle contains "an unintelligent copy" of St. Jude's burning denunciation.

Let me pause to observe that such words as "forger," "plagiarist," and "copy" involve more or less of an anachronism. They connote conceptions which in the first and second centuries had little or no existence. The views of the ancients and of the moderns, the views of Semites and Aryans, differed very materially on the subject of literary methods. The term "forger" involves an accent of moral reprehension and indignant disdain which no Jew and no early Christian would dream of attaching to pseudonymous literature. If an Alexandrian Jew, or an early Christian, wished to attract attention to his views, he felt no hesitation in putting them forth under the authority of a distinguished name. Very frequently, indeed, this use of the name was not intended to deceive. If a writer thought that he was truly representing the views of some great predecessor, he felt no scruple in adopting his name. The author of "The Wisdom of Solomon," for instance, can never have dreamt of deceiving his readers into the notion that they were reading the words of the ancient Hebrew king. Writings attributed to St. Peter, St. John, and St. James were widely current in the early Church, and for the most part they deceived no one. We cannot even be sure that they were ever intended to do so. If we adopt the word *falsarius*, and strip it almost entirely of moral blame, we shall more nearly approach the facts of the case than when we use the word "forger" to describe the authors of the pseudonymous literature of Jewish and Jewish-Christian communities in the early days of the Christian Church. It is true that the writer of

this Epistle assumes the name of St. Peter and writes in the character of St. Peter; but, in doing this, he is only carrying out the pseudonymous method. That method of course required a certain amount of literary verisimilitude. It may be doubted whether any deception was intended in such cases.

Similarly with the words "copy" and "plagiarist." In the days when books were few in number and restricted in circulation, they often produced so deep an impression that readers who had passed the words and thoughts of others through the crucible of their own individuality never hesitated to adopt such words both consciously and unconsciously as their own. The remark applies with special force to early Christian literature. Even in the New Testament we can see that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews had been deeply influenced by the words, thoughts, and quotations of St. Paul; that St. James was familiar with the Book of Proverbs, with the sapiential literature of the Jews in general, and with the Books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus in particular; that St. Peter, in his first Epistle, had read and profited by the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians. The writings of Polycarp, Irenæus, and Hegesippus abound in current and common phraseology; the pages of Clemens Romanus are often little more than a cento of phrases from the New Testament. We see exactly the same phenomena in the later Hebrew Prophets. In many instances their language is not original. It abounds in reminiscences of the phrases and metaphors which had been first used by their most eminent predecessors. There is no affectation of originality; there is not the least attempt to gain literary credit by adopting the eloquent turns and profound thoughts of others. The motives which actuated these writers were wholly alien from such small considerations. The term "plagiarism" is inapplicable because its connotations are entirely modern.

2. The "copying" therefore of St. Jude by the Second Epistle does not involve a shadow of blame, and so far am I from regarding it as "unintelligent," that it seems to me to shew great calmness and wisdom. I doubt whether St. Peter would have thought it in the smallest degree derogatory to his position to make use of the words and thoughts of a brother Christian if they had made a very powerful impression on his imagination; and if he thus used the Epistle of St. Jude, it seems to me that he has used it in a manner entirely worthy of his Apostolic dignity.

Let us take the broadest features first, before we descend to details.

a. St. Jude speaks of the strange event known as the Fall of the Angels. Our notions respecting that event are derived to a very large extent from apocryphal fancies which have been glorified by the splendid imagination of Milton. They scarcely find the shadow of any sanction from Scripture. The Rabbis attributed the Fall of the Angels to sensual sins with mortal women. Various apocryphal books—and especially the Book of Enoch—dwell at length on this wild tradition. It was precariously derived from Genesis vi. 2, and it must be obvious to any reader that such a notion is surrounded with difficulties, and that the consideration of it tends to no practical edification. It has proved attractive to sensual poets like Moore and Byron, but lies outside the range of ordinary moral reflections. St. Peter—if it be he—shews his practical wisdom by removing it altogether.

β. St. Jude speaks of Sodom and Gomorrah as "undergoing a judgment of æonian fire." The expression was a peculiar one, and perhaps opened the way to misconception. "St. Peter" confines himself to the more intelligible remark, that God reduced those cities to ashes and condemned them with an overthrow.

γ. St. Jude in two passages (Verses 8, 23) alludes to a peculiar form of ceremonial pollution which would be familiar to readers of the Levitic law. "St. Peter," perhaps disliking a needless particularity, perhaps supposing that the allusions would not be obvious to his Gentile readers, shews his wisdom by the modification which omits them both.

δ. St. Jude makes a direct quotation from the apocryphal Book of Enoch—a book entirely without authority, and in many respects objectionable. Perhaps, to the readers whom he is addressing, it may have had the force of an *argument ad hominem*. "St. Peter" entirely omits a quotation of which Gentiles would not have understood the purely literary character, and which proved to be a stumbling-block to many readers in the early Church.

ε. St. Jude directly refers to a most extraordinary Jewish Hagadah about a dispute between the Archangel Michael and the devil respecting the body of Moses. We are told by an ancient Father that the allusion came out of an apocryphal book called the "Ascension of Moses." It was an allusion, which—unless it was understood to be purely literary and legendary—suggested endless difficulties, and was not only unauthorized by Scripture but seemed to conflict with it. "St. Peter" omits the allusion altogether. He does not even use the word "archangel"—a word of rare occurrence and uncertain significance in Holy Writ.

Now let it be admitted that St. Jude's Epistle is more passionate, more forcible, than the Second Chapter of the Second Epistle of St. Peter, that there is more lightning in it, and therefore more literary splendour—on the other hand "St. Peter" is more guarded, more dignified, more exclusively authoritative, less likely to excite offence and cavil. How can such a copy be called "unintelligent"?

III. Let us now glance more in detail at one or two

passages which Dr. Abbott suggests for special animadversion.

1. He contrasts 2 Peter ii. 10, 11 very unfavourably with Jude 8. 9. Undoubtedly the reference in St. Jude is unmistakeable, but since (as we have seen) "St. Peter" did not choose, even by way of literary allusion, to refer to the Rabbinic legend about the dispute between Michael and Satan, what does he say? "Daring, self-willed, they [these false teachers] tremble not to rail at glories [*i.e.*, at glorious beings], whereas angels, though greater in might and power, bring not a railing judgment against them before the Lord." No reasonable reader can doubt that "*them*" refers to the "*glories*" or "glorious beings." The supposed ambiguity of the passage has only been created, as in thousands of other instances, by exegetes who do not care to accept the simple sense. It means that the false teachers shewed neither dread nor hesitation in railing against Beings of high estate, whereas Angels do not bring a railing accusation against such beings even when they stand in God's sight. Who are the beings alluded to in the last clause? Clearly Fallen Angels, for good Angels, unlike the majority of Christians, do not seem to indulge in the constant practice of "bringing railing accusations" against each other. But, it will be objected, *Fallen* Angels cannot be called "*glories*." The answer is that, according to the idea of Satan in Job, he is not—

"Less than Archangel ruined, and *excess*
Of glory obscured";

and the obvious reference of the writer (as proved by the words "before the Lord") is to the calm words of the Angel of the Lord when (in Zech. iii.) he stood before the Lord with Satan to resist him. So far, then, from being "unintelligent," the "copy" in this instance shews consummate skill. It points the same great lesson, while, by

a skilful modification of the phrase, it diverts the reader's attention from the dubious Hagadah of an apocryphal treatise to one of the glorious visions in the widespread work of a genuine Prophet.

2. The next passage criticised is "Spots (*spiloi*) and blemishes, luxuriating in their own deceits (*apatais*) while they banquet with you." We will assume that this is the correct, as it is the most probable and on the whole best authenticated, reading. The corresponding passage in St. Jude is, "These are the sunken reefs (*spilades*) in your love-feasts (*agapais*), banqueting with you fearlessly." I have little doubt that St. Jude's *spilades* means "sunken reefs" (*αἱ ὑφαλοι πέτραι*, *Etym. Magn.*), for the sense of "stains," which it has in an Orphic poem of the fourth century, is hardly a sufficient authority. Why should it be said that "St. Peter's" words are absurd? The false teachers are "spots and blemishes" on the Christian community, and while they banquet with their brethren, whether at the *Agapæ* or elsewhere, they are really wantoning in their own hypocrisies. "St. Peter" may have wished to avoid the confusion of metaphors in St. Jude's "rocks"; and he may have purposely suppressed all reference to the *Agapæ* and Love-feasts of which the name and purport were, from very early ages, so grievously misunderstood. Where is the "chaos"? It is even possible that "St. Peter" was writing without St. Jude's Epistle before him, and that, only vaguely remembering the words, he shews the not unfamiliar phenomenon of an imagination influenced by the *Wortklang*—his memory has been magnetised by the sounds of the words rather than by the words themselves.

3. Then St. Peter says, "These are waterless springs, and mists driven by a hurricane, for whom the mirk of darkness has been reserved." St. Jude had written, "These are waterless clouds, swept hither and thither by winds . . .

wandering stars for which the mirk of darkness has been reserved for ever." Here the *reason* of St. Peter's modification is evident. There is no such thing as a "waterless cloud": even a cloud which is driven away without shedding its rain cannot be accurately called a waterless cloud. "St. Peter" substitutes a more scientific expression, while he keeps the fine metaphor of the gust-driven mist. Why he rejected the "wandering stars" is not so clear. He might have disliked the apparent reference to the Book of Enoch. He might have thought that the expression "wandering stars" was ambiguous. Or again, writing only from memory, he may not have recalled the exact expression, while our Lord's own metaphor (Matt. viii. 12, etc.) enabled him to say directly of the false teachers that for these "the mirk of darkness" has (without any metaphor) been reserved. Where is the "chaos"? where the "carelessness"? where the "confusion"?

4. I take a fourth instance. St. Jude (Verse 10) writes "These rail about such matters as they know not, and such things as they understand naturally, like the irrational animals, in these they corrupt (or destroy) themselves." "St. Peter" (ii. 12) writes, "But these as mere irrational animals, having been born for capture and destruction, railing in things which they know not, in their own corruption shall be utterly destroyed." I will say nothing here, though something might be said, of the reason why the writer partly changes St. Jude's presents into futures; but in other respects the two passages differ as follows. St. Jude says, "that these bad men talk blasphemously about things of which they know nothing, and corrupt such natural knowledge as they possess in common with the beasts." "St. Peter" expands the description of the irrational animals by saying, in accordance with the prevalent Jewish notion, that their destined end is to be caught and killed;—and describing the sin of the teachers

exactly as St. Jude does—"blasphemy about things of which they know nothing"—he says that "they shall perish in their own corruption." But he says something more than this, and makes a point which Dr. Abbott misses. The words which he uses (*φθορά*, *φθείρω*) have *two* meanings—namely "destruction" and "corruption"—the first physical, the second moral. The writer, availing himself of both meanings by a fine use of the figure known as *autanacsis*, indicates the deep truth that moral corruption and physical ruin are not only correlated, but are in their essence and in their issue identical things. St. Jude's language is the more keenly epigrammatic; but the writer who has adopted it infuses into his expressions a far deeper truth. Here I see *difference*; I do not see any trace of *inferiority*, but rather the reverse.

IV. It would take me too long to follow Dr. Abbott through all his strictures, but I part company from him still more decidedly in his third paper, able and interesting as it is. He complains of the writer's tautology; of his fondness for fine words; and of his misapprehensions as to the proper form and meaning of words. He compares him to a Hindoo trying to write fine language in English, and making most ludicrous blunders in the endeavour to do so. Now even if we admitted these charges, I do not see that they would tell against the wisdom and intellect of the writer. Every writer has his idiosyncrasy. There is scarcely a single great writer from Heraclitus to Carlyle, and from Æschylus to Mr. Browning, whose style has not been a subject for stinging remarks. Really great writers stand above these criticisms. They create the taste which is at last compelled to appreciate them. St. Peter's "tautologies" may be due to his Hebraic training. But they are not found in Semitic writers only. Many writers—Æschylus no less than St. Paul—sometimes shew that they are haunted by a particular word. It is true that this

writer shews a partiality for expressions of poetic and almost lyrical boldness. It is possible that he has used unauthorised forms. What does this matter if he has great and essential truths to tell us! Personally I am quite convinced that the actual *language* of this Epistle cannot have proceeded from the author of the First. But St. Peter may have used "different interpreters," as St. Jerome tells us that he did. The "interpreter" employed in the second Epistle was probably one who (like Dr. Abbott's Hindoo writer) had learned a foreign language from books rather than from daily usage. There is nothing discreditable to him in the fact that expressions of extraordinary force and words of remarkable picturesqueness cling to his memory. Such words are *ταρταρώσας, δελεάζουσιν, ροιζηδόν*. Kossuth had learnt English only from the Bible and from Shakspeare, and the language of his extremely eloquent speeches shewed much the same peculiarities. But I cannot see that they are in any way derogatory to the power and greatness of an author so circumstanced.

And as regards *this* part of his enquiry I venture to think that Dr. Abbott's method must yield uncertain results. The Greek language had boundless resources, and it is quite possible that *we* may regard a word as unclassical which really was current and was sanctioned by good authors no longer extant. It would be a great deal easier to condemn Shakspeare for the use of unauthorised, pedantic, and inadmissible expressions than it is to condemn the writer of this Epistle. Byron used English words ("ruth" for instance, and "kibe") in absolutely mistaken senses, though he was writing in his own language; and he was guilty of such solecisms as "there let him *lay*" or "and the idols are *broke*," and many more. If it would be unfair to hold up Byron to utter scorn for such slips, it is much more unfair to charge a Jew writing in Greek with ignorant pedantry, even if (which I cannot regard as certain) he has

used mistaken forms of words in *kulismos* (supposing that to be the right reading) and *paraphronia*, and given mistaken meanings (which is less demonstrable) to such words as *kausoumena* and *exerama*; and got hold of untenable phrases (which I must regard as still more doubtful) in *μνημὴν ποιεῖσθαι*. But even supposing that passage after passage exhibits “a cluster of solecisms,” and that, in addition to writing bad Greek, the author is guilty of a “fondness for out of the way words”—what then? The Apocalypse contains the worst Greek in the whole New Testament. Some of the solecisms in that book are perfectly startling. It also abounds in strange words and stranger conceptions:—and yet it is, in some respects, one of the grandest writings in the Sacred Volume.

I feel a strong conviction that a good case might be made out for some of the expressions which Dr. Abbott ridicules. If I do not attempt to make out such a case, it is because I do not see how an imperfect acquaintance with Greek is any discredit to the author, or any injury to the value of his essential message. I think that Dr. Abbott presses his point much too far by putting the worst construction on the phraseology. For instance, he offers the following as an adequate translation of phrases in i. 5, 9, 11, 15.

“Take care to introduce *as an appendage* all zeal. . . . He that lacketh these things is blind, (and in fact) *short sighted* . . . Wherefore *I shall be destined* to put you in remembrance of these things, that ye may be able to *make the recollection* of them.”

I submit that by adopting a certain style of rendering one might make almost any passage sound a little ridiculous. Why should Dr. Abbott use the words “*as an appendage*”? Why may we not render the phrase just as literally by “adding,”—literally, “introducing besides”? Then in i. 9, why must *μωπάζων* mean short-sighted? No writer

in his senses could ever write "*blind, short-sighted.*" Such an anticlimax would strike even a child as silly. Perhaps the writer intended to use the word in the sense of "wilfully closing his eyes;" and the derivation of the word may be held to justify such a sense, and for all we know usage may also have justified it. But if, with the Authorised Version and the margin of the Revised Version, we adopt the sense in which the word is used by Aristotle (Probl. xxxi. 16), there is nothing ridiculous in the rendering, "*blind, not seeing afar off;*" or "*blind, seeing only what is near.*" The feebleness of thought is only in the particular form adopted by Dr. Abbott in his rendering. There is no bathos, no feebleness of thought, but rather wisdom and insight in a phrase which suggests such a meaning as "*blind to the far off heavenly things, able only to see the near earthly things.*" Then in i. 12, if *μελλήσω* can only mean "I shall be destined" (which perhaps might be combated) is it by any means certain that it is the right reading? If it cannot mean, as in our Revised Version, "I shall be ready," can we be sure that the author did not write *οὐκ ἀμελήσω* "I will not be negligent." Lastly *μνημὴν ποιέεισθαι* normally means "to make mention," and there is no reason to alter that meaning here. If so, then instead of the grotesque rendering of Dr. Abbott, we have:

"Adding all zeal, furnish, etc. . . . For he in whom these things are lacking is blind, seeing only what is near. . . . Wherefore I shall not neglect to remind you always about these things . . . that ye may be able to *make mention* of them (to others)."

The phraseology may be stiff and unusual, but are there any adequate grounds for pouring scorn upon the essential thoughts?

Dr. Abbott is very severe on the form in which the writer quotes Proverbs xxvi. 11. He seems to interpret

everything *in deteriorem partem*. First he follows Drs. Westcott and Hort in accepting the reading *kulismos*, not *kulisma*; but since *kulisma* is found in \aleph A K L as well as in Theophylact and Œcumenias, it may be the true reading and gives a perfectly good sense—"wallowing place," *volutabrum*. But even if BC be correct in reading *kulismos*, why need it be rendered by the grotesque word "*wallowance*"? Certainly there is no valid excuse for rendering *exerama* "evacuation." Aquila used ἐξήρασεν for "vomited" in Leviticus xviii. 28. Both verb and substantive seem to have had this plain sense. No doubt such a rendering as, "A dog having returned to his own *evacuation*, and the sow, having bathed, to her *wallowance*" sounds very affected and absurd; but I see no proof at all that it should not be rendered, "A dog turning to his own vomit," and "the sow, that had washed, to a wallowing-place of mire."

In conclusion, does it not strike Dr. Abbott that he has proved a good deal *too much*? The Epistle was read, was honoured, was adopted into the canon, by men to whom Greek was still a living language, by men keenly alive to solecisms and absurdities, by men who, like Basil and Chrysostom were mighty masters and orators in the Greek language. Even those who, like Origen and Gregory of Nazianzus, were dubious about the Epistle never dream of treating its style, manner, and contents in the *de haut en bas* style. Dr. Abbott calls it "a pedantic and ignoble collection of plagiarisms". Pseudonymous it may possibly be; but its "pedantic" aspect is probably due to the fact that the writer had only a literary and imperfect acquaintance with Greek, and "ignoble" it most certainly is not. How can an Epistle be called "ignoble" which has the high twofold object of warning and exhortation; which urges Christians to the full knowledge of Christ; which introduces so striking an appeal to the "word of prophecy

as a surer proof than even the Transfiguration; which modifies so calmly and wisely the burning material presented by St. Jude; which throws so broad a light on the difficulty felt by the early Christians as to the delay of the Lord's coming; which frankly acknowledges the dangerous misuse of St. Paul's writings, while it vindicates their inspired greatness; which always seems unwilling to dwell on acts of judgment without furnishing simultaneous instances of mercy; and which founds so noble an appeal upon the longsuffering of God? What is there "ignoble" here? Would thousands of Christians have gained spiritual help and comfort from a treatise so despicable as Dr. Abbott's criticism presents to us? That it stands on an inferior level of grandeur and usefulness to the First Epistle, or to any of the Epistles of St. Paul or St. John, we may admit; but, on the other hand, can Dr. Abbott name any single writer of the second century who was capable of having written even one of the chapters? Can he seriously affirm that it is not far superior to anything in the remains of Clement of Rome, or Ignatius, or Polycarp, or Hermas, or Justin Martyr, or even of the author of the Epistle to Diognetus? To me it seems impossible to read it without recognizing in it an accent of inspiration, and without seeing a "grace of superintendence" at work in the decision by which, in the Councils in the fourth century, it was finally allowed to take its place among the Canonical Books of Holy Scripture.

F. W. FARRAR.

THE WITCH OF ENDOR.

OF the changes made in the late Revision of the New Testament none affects words in such constant use as that in the "Deliver us from evil" of the Lord's Prayer. The controversy as to the merits of that change is one into which there is no temptation to enter. It is not likely that the arguments can be more ably stated than they have been, on the one side, by Canon Cook in his letters to the Bishop of London, on the other by the Bishop of Durham in his letters to the *Guardian*, which we may now expect shortly to see republished. The discussion, however, of the sense which early Fathers attached to this petition in the Lord's Prayer is only part of a larger inquiry, viz. into the history of early Christian opinion as to the power of the evil one. This inquiry has many branches. It would include a discussion of the question of demoniacal possession; it would include an investigation of that theory of the atonement which represented our Lord's death as a ransom paid to Satan; and though it might not at once occur to a modern reader, it was difference of opinion as to the power possessed by Satan over righteous souls which was at the bottom of controversy on the question, Was it really the soul of Samuel which was called up by the Witch of Endor? The connexion of this last question with the larger inquiry constitutes my apology for venturing to lay before the readers of this Magazine an analysis¹ of patristic opinion about the Witch of Endor, or, as from the word used in the LXX. translation of the Book of Samuel she was commonly called, the *Ἐγγαστρίμυθος*.² It does not enter into

¹ A fuller account will be found in the "Syntagma de Engastrimytho" of Leo Allatius in the "Critici Sacri," where also are given at length the discussions of Origen and Eustathius of which I speak in the text.

² The Latin is Pythonissa, on the strength of which Voltaire has an amusing argument that, since the word Python could not have been known to the Hebrews in the days of Saul, this history cannot have been earlier than the time of Alexander, when the Greeks traded with the Hebrews.

my plan to speak of Jewish opinion about the history under discussion; but, for future reference, it is convenient to mention at once the three proofs given by Waterland (*"Works,"* V. 763) that the Jews understood the words of the Book of Samuel in their most obvious sense, as relating that the soul of Samuel really appeared to Saul. (1) The son of Sirach says concerning Samuel (*Eccclus.* xlv. 20): "And after his death he prophesied, and shewed the king his end, and lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy, to blot out the wickedness of the people." (2) In 1 Chronicles x. 13, where it is stated that Saul asked counsel of one that had a familiar spirit, the LXX. translator adds, without authority from the Hebrew, "And Samuel the prophet answered him." (3) Josephus, in telling the story, makes no doubt of the reality of Samuel's appearance.

The verse quoted from Ecclesiasticus will serve to illustrate the great revolution of opinion on the subject which took place in later times. It is the last verse of a chapter which, in the old Lectionary of the Church of England, was appointed to be read as the Lesson for Nov. 16; but with the omission of this one verse. There could not be a clearer indication of refusal to accept the doctrine which this verse contains. The omission here specified was first made in the liturgical revision of the reign of James I. The revisers of Charles II.'s reign, in addition to the verse with which we are concerned, marked for omission two other passages of the Book of Ecclesiasticus, one on account of its misogyny, the other apparently for reasons of delicacy. The reasons which induced the framers of the Lectionary to omit the verse about Samuel may be inferred from the notes in the Geneva Bible on the history in question; for I believe that these notes fairly represent the prevailing opinion of English divines at the time, as to the history under consideration. On 1 Samuel xxviii. 11: "And he answered, bring me up Samuel," the note is,

“He speaketh according to his gross ignorance, not considering the state of the saints after this life, and how Satan hath no power over them.” On Verse 14: “And Saul knew that it was Samuel,” the note is, “To his imagination: albeit it was Satan who, to blind his eyes, took upon him the form of Samuel, as he can do of an angel of light.” There was nothing new in these Geneva notes. In Mathew’s Bible the note had been, “St. Austen¹ affirmeth that it was the Devil in the likeness of Samuel.” The Bishops’ Bible, “To his imagination; albeit it was Sathan indeed.” On these notes I would remark that down to their date, though there was controversy in the Church as to whether the appearance was the work of God or of the devil, it was agreed on all hands that it was supernatural. I may set aside as modern solutions, altogether too late to come within the range of the present inquiry, the hypothesis that there was no real appearance at all, but that the woman had taken advantage of Saul’s excited superstitious feelings, had used jugglery, employed confederates, or so forth. Nor need I consider the hypothesis ingeniously maintained by the late Dr. Maitland, in his tract on Mesmerism, that the woman was a *clairvoyante*, though some of the ancient critics agreed with him in thinking that the story only tells of Saul’s hearing a voice, and that Samuel’s appearance was not seen by Saul, but only described to him by the woman. I have thought it well to set aside modern solutions, because I remember reading something on this subject in which the writer puts forward the view that Samuel really appeared, as one that ought to be held by way of protest against modern rationalism and dislike to believe in the supernatural. In the ancient Church, some of those who denied that Samuel really appeared were most remote from modern rationalism; for they ascribed the phenomenon to Satanic agency; and

¹ A reference is given to a work now known not to be Augustine’s.

the admission of this solution is at the present day repugnant to the belief of many whose rationalism does not extend to a denial of the possibility of a manifestation of divine miraculous power.

In the ancient Church, however, there was difference of opinion on two questions: Did Samuel really come up or not? Was what took place the work of God or of the devil? Combining the different answers to these two questions we get four different views. (a) Samuel really appeared, being compelled to do so by the woman's incantations. (b) There was no real appearance of Samuel, but the devil or one of his angels assumed the prophet's form. (c) God confounded the diviner's art by sending one of his angels to deliver a true prophecy in the form of Samuel. Or (d) by sending up Samuel himself.

Though the views (a) and (d) agree in asserting a real appearance of Samuel, they are evidently quite distinct, and those of modern times who hold the view (d), do not act fairly when they cite as favouring their opinion ancient authors who hold the view (a).¹

(a) In favour of this opinion may be urged that it is that which best accords with the words of the narrative in Samuel. If it is contended that the words, understood in their most obvious sense, assert a real appearance of Samuel, it is equally clear that they seem to assert that the appearance was effected by the woman's magical art. Saul says to her, "Bring me up Samuel." When Samuel appears, he says, "Why hast thou disquieted me, and brought me up." Now it was a matter of general belief in the early Church, that the souls of the righteous men of the old dispensation remained in Hades until liberated by our Lord on his descent into hell. It was only to

¹ I refer in particular to Bishop Wordsworth, for I own that it was dissatisfaction with the account of patristic opinion given in his commentary which led to my attempting to draw up the present account.

add to this doctrine a belief that Satan possessed some sovereignty or power over souls detained in these lower regions, and an explanation was given how Samuel might be made to ascend to earth against his will.

The earliest Christian reference to the story of Endor is in Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho (c. 105). Justin is expounding the Messianic Prayer (Ps. xxii.), "Deliver my soul from the sword, and my only begotten from the hand of the dog; save me from the lion's mouth." And he says that Christ here prays that no one should get possession of his soul, in order to teach us at the hour of death to make the same petition of God, who can keep off every wicked angel from seizing our soul. He remarks that the story of Endor shews that the soul of Samuel, as well as the souls of other holy men and prophets, were then under the authority of such powers. So Christ when giving up his Spirit on the cross said, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit": God teaching us by his Son that we should at our departure make like prayer that our souls should not fall under the dominion of evil angels. No controversialist can avoid being influenced to a certain extent by the opinions of those whose views he combats. In Justin's time the Church's great controversy was with Gnostic sects, almost all of which communicated, as their most precious secret, formulæ to preserve the departing soul from the dominion of hostile powers. With regard to the bearing of this passage on the controversy about the Lord's Prayer, the argument *ex silentio* is so precarious that I do not know whether stress can be laid on the remark, that Justin only speaks of prayer to be saved from the power of Satan as made at the hour of death, and says nothing about its being the subject of a Christian's daily prayer.

Substantially the same views as Justin's were entertained by Origen, of whom an interesting sermon on this narrative has been preserved. He begins by enumerating four dif-

ferent lessons read in Church on that day, and, as time would not permit all to be treated of, asks the Bishop to choose on which he shall speak. The Bishop chooses the story of Ender, and Origen proceeds to refute at length the arguments apparently of a previous writer who had not been able to believe that so great a man as Samuel could be detained in Hades and have come up from thence, and who therefore maintained that the assertion that it was Samuel who spoke was but a lie of the demon who spoke in his name. But Origen contends that this assertion is made by the sacred historian himself, and not merely put into the mouth of the woman. He points out that there is nothing disparaging to Samuel in believing him to have been beneath in Hades, since a greater than he, our Lord Himself, had gone there. It is for us so to live that we may not descend to that place where were all the patriarchs who died before his coming, but may pass uninjured through the flaming sword that guards the tree of life, which before Him none could pass. The fact that the shade delivered a true prophecy is another reason which convinces Origen that it was not a demon.

(b) Notwithstanding Justin's authority, the doctrine was very repugnant to the Christian mind, that the devil could have had power over the souls of righteous men even of the old dispensation. It was one of the old dispensation who said (Wisdom iii. 1), "The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them." We have no evidence as to whose arguments it is that Origen is replying to. It might possibly have been Hippolytus, who wrote a tract *De Engastrimytho*, but we have no means of knowing what view he took. But Tertullian (*De Anima*, 57) energetically repels the idea that the devil could have had power over the soul of any man, much less of so great a prophet. He who can transform himself into an angel of light might easily transform him-

self into a man of light; nay, he is to shew himself that he is God, to shew signs and wonders such as if it were possible would deceive the elect.

But the most elaborate refutation of Origen is in a treatise by the great Eustathius of Antioch, who, according to the opinion of some, presided over the Council of Nicæa, and who certainly played a leading part there. Eustathius, even more energetically than Tertullian, denied that the devil had power to bring up the soul not to say of a prophet like Samuel, or even of any man, but even of an ant or a flea. Against those who insisted that the narrative asserted a real coming up of the soul of Samuel, and not merely a deceptive appearance, he asks if they maintained that the body as well as the soul of Samuel was brought up. If the soul only, it would not have been an object of vision. And in any case, what about the mantle in which the prophet was clad; was that also real? Did they suppose that Samuel's mantle had been buried with him with a view to its use on this occasion? He concludes, then, that it was the devil who transformed himself into Samuel's shape and uttered a prophecy in his name. This is further proved by the fact that the supposed Samuel accepted the worship which Saul offered him, a countenance to idolatry which the real Samuel would have been incapable of giving. Nor are we to be disturbed by the fact that the prophecy uttered by the pseudo Samuel was tolerably correct. Caiaphas could prophesy; God might force an unwilling mouthpiece to utter a truth; or, again, devils might, by their own sagacity and by remembering true prophecies which they had heard, have some knowledge of near approaching events. And that this is the true account in the present case is proved by the fact that the prediction was a blundering one after all. It was not on the morrow that Saul and his sons died, but some days after. And, lastly, the prediction, "Thou and thy sons shall be with me," is incon-

sistent with what we know of the "great gulf" which in the other world separates the righteous and the wicked. Later critics, conceding to Eustathius that neither Saul nor even his sons could be imagined to be sharers of happiness with Samuel, maintained, no doubt correctly, that "with me" means no more than joined with me in the common lot of death. I am sorry to be obliged to agree with them, for I could have wished success to a different way of meeting the argument of Eustathius, suggested by Charles Wesley's lines:—

"What do those solemn words portend?
A ray of hope when life shall end?
Thou and thy sons, though slain, shall be
To-morrow in repose with me.

Not in a state of hellish pain,
If Saul with Samuel remain;
Not in a state of damned despair
If loving Jonathan be there."

The theory of Eustathius may be said to have become the generally accepted one. Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory Nyssen, are a few of the names that may be cited as adopting it. Philaster not only regards the appearance as a diabolical illusion, but counts as a heresy the opinion that Samuel really was brought up.

The opinions of Augustine deserve to be stated in a little more detail. He first discussed this subject in answer to a question put to him by Simplicianus, Bishop of Milan, and as far as I can perceive shews a knowledge only of solutions (*a*) and (*b*), either of which seems to him to be admissible. As for the first, he sees no difficulty in a righteous soul being brought up by an evil spirit, the soul not indeed being constrained by magical incantation, but coming voluntarily in accordance with God's will. In this life good men have perpetually to come at the call of bad men. Our Lord suffered Himself to be bound by wicked

men and led away by them to crucifixion; and, what is more to the point, He suffered the evil spirit to take Him to a high mountain, and to set Him on a pinnacle of the temple. Why should it be supposed an indignity for a departed saint to submit to what his Master submitted to? But it is perhaps simpler to suppose that what appeared was but a phantom created by diabolical art, and only called Samuel because images are always called by the name of what they represent. If we look at a picture, we say without hesitation, That is Cicero, or, That is Achilles; if we relate a dream, we say, I saw Augustine, though in all these cases what has been seen is not the man himself but only his likeness. In a later work, *De Cura Pro Mortuis*, Augustine retracts the preference he gives to solution (b) and returns to (a), being induced to do so by the distinct statement in the Book of Ecclesiasticus that it was Samuel who prophesied.

The view of Eustathius was very strongly taken by Luther, and by Calvin, whose homilies on this narrative contain much worth extracting if space permitted. Supported by such authority, it naturally became for a considerable time the prevalent opinion among the reformed, including the Church of England, as has been already mentioned.

(c) Theodoret, however, finds himself compelled to reject both the former solutions. Theory (a) is impious. Departed souls abide in a certain place, waiting for the resurrection of the body; and to imagine that sorcerers can have power over them is impious in the extreme. But those who in flying this impiety have devised theory (b), contradict the express statement of the Book of Chronicles already quoted. Theodoret concludes that God acted according to his rule (Ezek. xiv. 7), "Him that cometh to the false prophet I myself will answer him;" and as He put a true prophecy into the mouth of the false prophet Balaam, so

here too He gave to this seeker after a false prophet a true answer; for Theodoret contends, in opposition to Eustathius, that the answer given to Saul was entirely true. But he supposes that it was not Samuel who was raised up to give the answer, but that either an angel or a phantasm delivered the message; the sacred historian calling it Samuel because so it was thought to be; just as in the Book of Genesis the three who conversed with Abraham, though in reality angels, are called men, because to Abraham they seemed to be so.

(d) Though, as I have said, the view (b) is that which most prevailed for many years after the Reformation, it gradually died out; and at the present day most of those disinclined to give a rationalistic account of the story would adopt the solution that, in the same way as to the messengers sent to enquire of Baalzebub, the god of Ekron, God sent his prophet to deliver a true message, so on this occasion the woman who pretended to evoke the soul of Samuel was surprised by a success she had not anticipated; God having really sent up the prophet's soul to punish this necromancy by a prediction of coming evil. I do not think the arguments for this solution have been better stated or its difficulties better met than they have been by Farmer (*On Miracles*, p. 472). It seems to me strange that this solution should be so deficient in patristic support. I have not been able to find for it the patronage of any great ancient name, though Augustine's version of solution (a) and Theodoret's solution (c) seem to have prepared the way for it.

GEORGE SALMON.

DOCTRINAL EFFECTS OF THE REVISED VERSION.

WHATEVER may be the defects in the English of the Revised Version—and it is often stiff, pedantic, and unmusical to a quite unnecessary degree—no one, if at least a few unreasonable and intemperate fanatics be excepted, can fairly deny that, both in the text it follows and in the rendering of that text, it is much more exact and brings us much nearer to the Original Scriptures than any Version which has preceded it.

But though the New Version is a truer Version, and therefore a safer guide, than any we have had before, that is no reason why we should hide, either from ourselves or from others, the number and importance of the changes it has introduced. On the contrary, it is those very changes which are its most conclusive vindication; for, if many and important changes had not been imperative, why should we be required to exchange the Old Version, endeared to us by its noble phrasing and musical rhythms, as well as by its sacred associations and familiar use, for a New Version which, however exact it may be, must long offend us by its unfamiliar collocations, its lack of happy idioms and sweet stately music? To say or imply that there is no great difference between the New Version and the Old, while yet we are asked to give up the Old for the New, is to demand of us a most painful sacrifice for no worthy or sufficient end.

Yet, on all hands, there seems a disposition to minimize the changes that have been made, to say nothing about them or as little as possible, lest the English *fear* of change should be aroused; insomuch that many will be surprised, if not dismayed, to hear that, while there are nearly eight thousand verses in the New Testament, there are not eight

hundred of them into which the Revised Version has not introduced some alteration, though of course most of these alterations are very slight; that sixteen verses wholly disappear from the New Version, and that, besides these, a hundred and twenty-two sentences or parts of sentences are omitted from it; while only ten new passages, mostly very brief, are added to it.¹ And yet why should they be rendered uneasy, and much less be dismayed, by such statistics as these, if, as is undoubtedly the fact, all these changes, omissions, additions, or most of them, bring our New Testament into closer correspondence with the New Testament written by Apostles and Evangelists?

This is the true comfort for those who fear even the changes which lapse of time and the advance of scholarship have rendered imperative. They need no other, and least of all certain fallacious consolations which have been freely offered them. It has been very generally said, for example: "None of these changes in any way affect *the doctrines* taught in the New Testament. Numerous and important as they are, they will not compel us to revise or modify any of our conceptions of the truths most surely and commonly believed among us." That, however, is a very questionable statement; and, to some of us, it would be very questionable comfort, if it were true. Of course these changes will make no difference to scientific theologians familiar with the Greek Testament, and therefore not dependant on any Version, old or new. But the large majority of those who profess and call themselves Christians *are* dependant on the Translation they use; and many of them distrust the theologians, and draw their conceptions of doctrinal truth solely from the Version put into their hands, as explained by the leaders and teachers of the sect to which they are attached. And that being so, there can be little doubt that,

¹ I am indebted for these figures, as well as for some valuable hints, to a correspondent whose name has unfortunately escaped my memory.

should the Revised Version ever come into general use, the popular conceptions of Christian doctrine will be largely, and in some respects happily, changed. Let the Authorised Version once fall out of use and be forgotten by all but scholars—as half-a-dozen older translations have already done; for who now reads Wickliffe's Version, or Tyndale's, or the "Bishops' Bible," or the "Breeches Bible," or the "Treacle Bible"?—and the New Version be generally accepted, and the alterations in it will, I believe, inevitably induce grave changes at least in the *popular* theology.

Doctrines are but abstract statements of the truths taught in Scripture? How then can you touch the Scriptures without touching doctrine? The changes you make in the one must sooner or later be reflected in the other. And when our Version is largely and seriously modified, how can there fail to ensue a large and serious modification of our doctrinal conceptions? They must and will ensue, and that both in directions which will be very welcome to some of us, and in directions which will be no less unwelcome.

I propose, in the present essay, to indicate only two of these inevitable doctrinal modifications, one of which is likely to be welcome, and the other unwelcome, to many among us.

1. Whether we like it, or dislike it, there can be no doubt that the New Version gives greater prominence to *the devil* than the Old Version did, although of late it has become a fashion to ignore, if not to deny, his very existence. Of course we must all admit that, in any and every Version of it, the New Testament affirms his existence, and attributes to him a vast and sinister influence over the souls of men; for this is the teaching of St. John, St. Paul, St. Peter, St. James, and of our Lord Himself. In whatever else they differ, or are supposed to differ, they agree in this. And no one who has looked into the ques-

tion can for a moment doubt that the New Version gives a more decided prominence to this teaching, and a keener emphasis.

There are at least six passages in which it introduces the devil for the first time. Thus, in Matthew v. 37 it reads, "But let your speech be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: and whatsoever is more than these is of *the evil one*" (instead of "cometh of *evil*"). In Matthew vi. 13, and the final clause of the Lord's Prayer, we now read: "Deliver us from *the evil one*" (instead of "from *evil*"). In John xvii. 15 we read: "I pray not that Thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that Thou shouldest keep them from *the evil one*" (instead of "keep them from the evil"). In Ephesians vi. 16, the shield of faith is described as able to "quench all the fiery darts of *the evil one*" (instead of "the fiery darts of *the wicked*"). In 2 Thessalonians iii. 3, we are told that the Lord will "guard us from *the evil one*" (instead of "keep us from *evil*"). And in 1 John v. 18, 19, we are assured both that "the whole world lieth in *the evil one*" (instead of "in *wickedness*"), and that if we are begotten and kept of God "*the evil one*" shall not be able so much as to touch us.

Now the existence and ministry of the devil are not one whit more plainly taught in these passages than in a score of other passages which are common both to the Old Version and the New; but we should simply deceive ourselves were we to conclude that a Version which makes six additional references to his existence and ministry will not give him a greater prominence and stamp a deeper impression of him on the public mind.

Those of us who study the Greek Testament for ourselves, or who listen to the teaching of accomplished scholars, may doubt whether these references ought to have been made. We may say, as indeed Canon Cook has said with great force: "The Revisers were charged to make

none but necessary and inevitable changes, to correct only clear and plain errors. That this change of 'evil' into 'evil one' was not necessary is proved by the fact that, now it has been made, it is challenged and condemned by scholars as able and learned as those who made it." We may hold, many of us do hold that, though the balance of scholarship slightly dips in favour of those who maintain that the evil one is referred to in these passages, there is no such general consent, no such preponderance of competent opinion even, as to warrant the change that has been made. *We* may say this, and what we say may be quite unanswerable. But how many of the general public will hear what we say, or will pay much attention to it, especially when all we can say is, "*Perhaps* the change ought not to have been made, though very probably the word means what the Revisers take it to mean"? The impression on the public mind of the Church will be made by the Book itself, and not by our halting and dubious comments on the Book. And, therefore, as the New Version acquires authority, we must expect a more decided and general belief in the existence and power of the devil, on the part at least of those who bow to the authority of Scripture, than at present obtains among us. The *other* passages just cited might indeed be seldom read, and so might produce no very profound impression; but when, rightly or wrongly, the devil is brought into the Sermon on the Mount, and even into the Lord's Prayer, who can doubt that the belief in his existence, his enmity to all goodness, his strange and disastrous power over the minds of men, will become a well-defined article in the popular creed?

And why, after all, should we either fear or regret it? There is nothing irrational in such a belief; and, on the other hand, there is the gravest warrant for it. It is assumed by many, indeed, that the very existence of the evil one has been somehow disproved—disproved by science,

I suppose ; and Carlyle used humorously to complain that in this trivial and scoffing age it had become impossible to believe in so much as the devil : while many who know that science never has, and never can, either prove or disprove any spiritual fact, have persuaded themselves that, in speaking of the devil and his works, our Lord and his Apostles simply adopted the current Jewish terminology, and intended nothing more than a warning against the power of evil and its manifold sinister influences on the life and history of man. And I confess, so repugnant is this doctrine to my natural instincts, that, once and for long, I myself held the view they still hold, and quietly assumed that when the New Testament said " devil " I might cancel the first letter of the word, and understand that nothing more, or, rather, that nothing *less*, than " evil " was meant. It is only a larger experience of human life and a deeper study of the Word which has compelled me to abandon that view. It sounds terrible to say, yet why should I not say, since it is true, that I believe I have *seen* men and women who were possessed and torn by an evil spirit, and who were impelled on the downward course by an energy other than and beyond their own.

And quite apart from this tragic experience, which happily is not common, any one who will read the New Testament for himself cannot fail to be struck with the serious simplicity and earnestness with which our Lord and his Apostles speak of the presence and activity of an evil spirit who is very potent with men who walk in evil ways, or to observe in what grave connexions they thus speak,—often when they are teaching the highest truths we know, or inviting us to the most plain and binding duties of the Christian life. As we read, and ponder what we read, it becomes very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to hold that they are accommodating themselves to any current

superstition, or using language which we are at liberty to accommodate to our own fancies and doubts. The more gravely and thoughtfully we read it, the more likely are we to be convinced, however much against the grain, that the devil and his angels have a very real existence, and that we are urgently and solemnly summoned to pray and strive against them.

And why should we not believe it? What is any spiritual force—such as we know and feel evil to be—but a personal quality? An abstract beneficence has no existence save in our thoughts. Beneficence is a personal quality, and reveals itself in the action of a spirit, human or divine. But evil *is*. We *are* exposed to malignant influences. And just as there is no abstract beneficence, so also there is no abstract maleficence, except in our thoughts. This, too, is and must be a personal quality revealing itself in the action of some spirit, human or diabolic. And what comfort, at least to us men, can there be in the assumption that the human spirit is the sole source of evil, and that the most portentous criminals—a Nero, for example, or a Borgia, or a Buonaparte—have displayed none but human qualities? If there are other and more potent spirits than ours, may not some of these be evil too, and take that very delight in drawing men down to their own base level which we only too often see in the worst men and the worst women? Does not that hypothesis at least relieve the human story of some of its darkest stains, and approve itself to every lover of his kind?

Above all, when we find that men to whose authority we cannot but defer—if on no other ground, yet on this, that they possess a far deeper and wider insight into the spiritual world than their fellows—gravely assure us that there moves in that world a fallen and evil spirit, who tempts that he may destroy us; when they gravely and

earnestly beseech us to resist him and his temptations,—what are we to do? what is it reasonable for us to do? To turn from their teaching with a jest or a smile, as if we were somehow superior to them and knew more than they did? Or to argue: “These men have brought God, life, immortality to us. They have taught us to know ourselves, what we are and what we may and ought to be, as we never could have known ourselves but for them. They have *proved* that they know much more than we know both of the mysteries of our own spiritual being and of the mysteries of that vast spiritual empire to which we are related. And, therefore, confessing our own ignorance, acknowledging their superior insight and wisdom, we will believe what they teach, at least until we detect them in some affirmation or assumption plainly contrary to reason.” To those who have any tincture of modesty in their nature, the latter must seem unspeakably the more reasonable course of the two: and, hence, if the New Version should induce a more general belief in the activity and power of the devil, we should be so far from regretting it that we should rather welcome and rejoice in it as a proof that men are wise enough and humble enough to bow to the authority of teachers whose spiritual insight, or inspiration, they have tried and approved.

Curiously enough, however, while thus thrusting the devil into passages in which he had not otherwise appeared, the Revisers banish him from one very notable passage in which his presence has long been recognized,—a freak which has not yet, so far as I have seen, attracted the attention it undoubtedly deserves. In 2 Timothy ii. 25, 26, we read in our Old Version that, even to the opponents of his word and grace, “God is able to give repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, *who are taken captive by him at his will.*” But in the New Version

the last clause of Verse 26 becomes, "Having been taken captive *by the Lord's servant unto the will of God.*"

Now the passage is confessedly a difficult one, capable of at least three or four different interpretations. For in its final clause, which may be literally rendered, as in the margin of the Revised Version, "Having been taken captive *by him* unto *the will of him,*" two different pronouns are used in the Greek (*αὐτός* and *ἐκεῖνος*) for "him": and hence we naturally look for two different antecedents. It is not altogether impossible indeed that, in the Greek, *ἐκεῖνος* may have been employed, as some have contended that it was employed, instead of *αὐτός* on the second occasion, by way of *emphasis* simply; but it is so doubtful, common sense and the *usus loquendi* are so decisively against it, as to be to the last degree unlikely. Any scholar coming to the passage for the first time, with a mind neither perplexed nor prepossessed, would naturally conclude that one person was here represented as taking certain men captive, but that it was to subserve some other and higher will than his own—another person's will—that he was permitted to ensnare them. Any such scholar, too, would, it will be admitted, naturally and instinctively look for the antecedents to the personal *αὐτοῦ* and the demonstrative *ἐκεῖνου* in the substantives which most nearly precede these pronouns; which substantives are "the devil" and "God." So that, all theological difficulty or prejudice apart, the simple and natural way of reading the sentence, according to the plainest grammatical rule, would be to take it as affirming that, though *the devil* may be allowed to take a certain specified class captive, it is only in order that, by taking them captive, he may in some way subserve *the will of God*. And thus we should reach what seems to me the perfectly true and valuable sense, that the devil himself is but the servant, or slave, of God, whose real function, whatever his intention may be, is to get the pure,

large, saving will of God done in the end by the very men who once opposed themselves against it.

And I confess that when I first read the Verse in the New Version—happening to refer to it apart from its connexion—I too hastily concluded that our Revisers used “the Lord’s servant,” *i.e.*, bond-servant, or slave, as a synonym for the devil, and had adopted the simple and natural rendering of the passage. And I praised them in my heart for the courage they had shewn in inserting so many words into the text rather than suffer the sense of the passage to remain any longer dubious or obscure.

It only needed a second glance, however, to dispel the pleasant illusion. For, as is apparent from Verse 24, “the Lord’s servant,” or “bond-slave,” means, for them, the idealized Timothy, the Christian teacher or preacher in the abstract. They *have* shewn courage, indeed, but not precisely the kind of courage for which I gave them credit. What they have been bold enough to do is to insert *a gloss* into the text, one of the three or four interpretations which have been put upon this much-disputed passage; and that not, as we have seen, by any means the most simple, natural, and grammatical. Why they should have swept past the antecedent offered them for *αὐτοῦ* in Verse 26 (“the devil”) to the remote antecedent in Verse 24 (“the Lord’s servant”), it is for them to explain. To me it is inexplicable on any other ground than the feeling that there must be something wrong in the simplest and most obvious sense of the Apostle’s words, or the fear that there might be something so theologically unsound in it as that it could not possibly be true. For, as Huther has long since pointed out, the interpretation which they have lifted into the text is not only alien to St. Paul’s usual mode of expression, but is also grammatically defective. What they mean to convey is that it is the Lord’s servant, the preacher of the Word, who takes captive those who oppose

themselves to Christ, in order that the will of God may be fulfilled in their salvation. But the use of the perfect tense (ἐξωγρημένοι) in "*having been taken captive*," shews that the men in question had been taken captive *before* they had escaped out of the snare of the devil, and implies therefore that it was by him whose snare they had escaped that they had first been caught. So that, according to the interpretation adopted by the Revisers, the servant of the Lord had taken them captive before they escaped from the craft and power of the devil; or, in other words, they had broken the snare *before* they were ensnared! ¹

But where after all is the difficulty, theological or other, in the simple grammatical rendering of the words, that we should be driven to fall back on an interpretation of them so singular and open to such serious objection? Why should St. Paul scruple to say, or we scruple to believe, that the devil is God's slave, and can only do what He permits, and is compelled to subserve the high and gracious counsels of the Divine will, let his aim and intention be as malignant as it may? Surely *that* is the teaching of the whole Bible, or of the Gospel in the whole Bible, from the Book of Genesis to the Book of the Revelation, from the promise to Eve down to the Apocalyptic vision of the triumph of the Lamb; and never needed to be enforced with graver emphasis than now when the devil is being given a new prominence in the Scriptures of the New Testament.

Read thus, in the simplest plainest way, the Verse goes

¹ None of the readings of this perplexing passage are free from difficulty. But, so far as I can see, there is only one difficulty in the reading here proposed, and only one argument in favour of that preferred by the Revisers. And these two are one. The usage of ζῶρειν appears to demand that it should be rendered to take captive *alive*; and whether or not that sense may be sufficiently met by the implication that the devil attempts to take men captive *even while they are alive, before their time*, that is, before they die and fall fairly into his power, or whether, in its later usage, the verb dropped its qualification, and came to imply *capture* pure and simple, I am unable to determine.

far to render the new prominence given to the Tempter tolerable; for if he be but "the Lord's slave," *i.e.* the slave of Christ, and the very temptations and miseries which he inflicts are but means for carrying the saving will of God into effect on those who have opposed themselves to that high Will, we need not at all events lose our composure at finding him introduced into the Lord's prayer. Read thus, the Verse does but pack the whole magnificent argument of "Job" into a nutshell. It represents the great adversary of our souls as still claiming a place among the servants or slaves of God, if no longer among his sons; and as having men "delivered" to him for a time only that he may prove, search, and cleanse their spirits by the fiery trials to which he exposes them. And it invites and strengthens us to endure his "temptations" with fidelity and patience, in order that, like Job, we may rise, through suffering, into a wider truer knowledge of God, and a more entire and hearty devotion to his will.

Nay, more, it suggests that this is the ministry and function of the devil in the history of humanity at large, as well as in the growth and development of the individual soul; that even those who "oppose themselves" are delivered into his hand only that, finding his very mercies to be cruel, they may be quickened to repentance and brought to a saving knowledge of the truth: and that when we can review the human story as a whole, and shall have "seen *the end* of the Lord," we shall discover that all the pains and wrongs and sorrows of time have been permitted and overruled by God for the greater good of his creatures, and in order that they, like Job, like One greater than Job, might be made "perfect" by the things which they suffered.

2. The other inevitable modification of doctrine of which I spoke will probably be most welcome to precisely those to whom the prospect of a deepened popular belief in the existence and activity of the devil will be most un-

welcome: and to no man can this second modification be more welcome than to myself.

For thirty years now I have been preaching what is called "the larger hope," through good and ill report. And only seven years ago when I delivered the series of Lectures, afterwards published in *Salvator Mundi*, and had to affirm that the words "hell" and "damnation" ought to be banished from our New Testament, and that *αἰώνιος* should never be rendered "everlasting," I had to admit that that was "a very grave assertion to make," and might well seem "almost incredible." Most of my hearers, I know, felt its gravity very deeply, and waited with keen anxiety for the proofs by which it was to be sustained. And yet, had the New Version then been in our hands, I should not have felt any special gravity in the assertion, nor would my hearers have waited with any anxiety for proofs: for, actually or virtually, all these words *have* now been banished from our New Testament. The word "everlasting" is not once applied either to the future life or the future punishment of men, in the New Version, though in the Old Version it occurred again and again. The words "damn," "damnation," "damnable," "damned," have all disappeared, and have been replaced by such words as "judge," "judgment," "condemn," "condemnation," "condemned." And though the word "hell" is still retained by our Revisers for "Tartarus" and "Gehenna," or even aggravated into that grotesque pleonasm "hell of fire," it is given up for "Hades"; while even where it is still retained, the Margin confesses that it has no right to its place by recalling the original word. And can any reasonable man suppose that these tremendous changes will have no appreciable effect on the popular eschatological belief?

Hades, a new word, a Greek word, the very word used by the Apostles and Evangelists, is boldly and bodily trans-

ferred into our New Version in every case—and there are ten of them—in which it occurs in the original. Consider what the effect of that will be on the popular mind. We now read (Acts ii. 31), for instance, that our Lord descended from the Cross *into Hades*, while yet, on the Cross, He had promised the penitent robber (Luke xxiii. 43), “To-day shalt thou be with Me *in Paradise!*” Paradise must be in Hades then, though it could not be in “hell.” But in the famous Parable recorded by St. Luke (chap. xvi. 23), we read that “*in Hades*,” the rich man, “lifted up his eyes, being in torments.” In Hades, yet not in Paradise! Then there must be another Hadean province, a place of torment and punishment, the place elsewhere named “Gehenna,” because Gehenna was the public place of punishment and torment for the criminals of Jerusalem. And yet, once more, in the Apocalypse (Rev. xx. 14), it is predicted that, when the Great Assize is held, and the dead both small and great shall be judged according to their works, the whole Hadean world, including both its provinces, will be “cast into the lake of fire,” *i.e.* will be destroyed, as having fulfilled the function for which it was created and made. The states of being shadowed forth by the words, Gehenna, Paradise, Hades cannot, therefore, be final or everlasting; they are only intermediate conditions, states of discipline in which the souls of men await, and may be prepared for, their final award.¹

Yet two of these words, *Hades* and *Gehenna*, are the words which in our Old Version were translated “hell,” and were popularly held to denote the *everlasting* punishment and torment to which the wicked were damned! Only one other word, indeed, has ever been so translated,

¹ I am not now justifying these inferences, be it remembered—though that would be far from a hopeless task; and still less am I dealing with the question which has much exercised some thoughtful minds, whether these words and phrases are more than an accommodation to the current eschatological beliefs; I am simply pointing out what the popular mind is likely to make of them

the word "Tartarus," which only occurs in a single passage in a dubious Epistle; where St. Peter, or a *falsarius*, affirms that the angels who sinned were "sent into *Tartarus*, to be held in custody" till they too were judged. Here (2 Pet. ii. 4) our Revisers retain the word "hell" in the text, without, as it seems to me, a shadow of reason, though they give "Tartarus" in the margin; for if they might transfer the Greek word *Hades* into our English version, why might they not also transfer the Greek word *Tartarus*, with which every schoolboy is familiar and which is frequently used by many of our best writers? As however this word occurs only once, and then has no bearing on the future estate of man, we may henceforth drop it out of account. But their great fault in my judgment—and I hold it to be by far the greatest blemish in their whole work—is that they did not also transfer into their version the Hebrew word "Gehenna," since we have no English word which would convey its meaning and implications. This, to my thinking, is a fault wholly inexcusable. For it is of no use to plead, as more than one learned friend on the New Testament Committee have pleaded, that the word "hell" was once a comparatively innocent word, and that it still conveys innocent meanings in certain obscure provincial dialects. Whatever it has been, whatever it may still be in fading provincial usages, the word in its common and popular use is charged and surcharged with horrible meanings and connotations which have no counterparts in the name of the darker province of Hades. To use "hell" for "Gehenna" is only to mislead as many as do not study the margin of the New Version as well as the text.

Nor do I see what reasonable objection there is to retaining the original word. *Gehenna* is already familiar to many, and might just as easily be explained to those who are unfamiliar with it, as "Hades," or "baptize." No child

who has passed through our Sunday Schools ought to be ignorant of the fact that, taken literally, Gehenna is the name of a valley outside Jerusalem where criminals were executed, and their dead bodies were consumed by fire or left as a prey to the worm; and that, taken figuratively, it denotes the darker province of the Hadean world, in which impenitent sinners receive the due reward of their deeds, await their final award, and are, as some believe, purged from their sins "so as by fire." But it never denotes the final and endless estate of man; and still less does it imply an everlasting torment and degradation; for Gehenna itself is to perish one day, as soon as its work is done.

It is on all grounds to be regretted, therefore, that this word was not inserted in the text; while yet it is something—much—to be thankful for that, in every case but one,¹ it is inserted in the margin of our New Version, so that every *careful* reader can now see for himself what the word ought to be.

Now that we may estimate the effect of these changes on the popular mind, let us suppose that the New Version has become the Authorised Version, and that a man of good natural intelligence, but simple and unlettered, comes to his New Testament to learn what it has to teach him of the future doom of the wicked. What does he find? He finds (1) no such word as "damn" or "damnation." (2) He finds the word *Hades* in ten passages in which we now read "hell." And (3) wherever this word "hell" is retained in the text, he is warned by the margin that the original word is *Gehenna*. He sets himself to ascertain by a careful comparison of passages, what these two words mean and imply; and he discerns that *Gehenna* is one of the provinces of Hades, that *Hades* is the name of an

¹ The exception is James iii. 6, where the tongue is said to be "set on fire of hell." Here there is no *Gehenna* in the margin. It is omitted, I suppose, by mere accident or misadventure, and not of set purpose or intention.

intermediate state in which the souls of both righteous and unrighteous await the final judgment, and that when the throne is set and the books are opened *Hades* is to pass away.

Is it possible that *he* should form the doctrinal conception of the future estate of the impenitent that we, many of us at least, have derived from our Authorised Version? Can he possibly believe that, when they die, the wicked pass at once into a place of torment, a hell, from which they will never be released? I do not say that he will be led to "trust the larger hope," to believe in the ultimate restoration of all souls to the love and service of Righteousness. I am sure that, if he read his New Version carefully, he must still believe that a long and terrible retribution awaits those who have loved evil and done it greedily, and that at the lowest a severe and searching discipline must await those who have habitually lived in the baser part of their nature, "cradling themselves on their lees." But can he possibly believe in the dogma represented by the words *Hell* and *Damnation* when once he has learned that neither of these words, that nothing answering to these words, is to be found in the Original Scriptures, or should be retained in our English Version?

It is quite incredible that he should; and if he proceed to study the use of the words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*, it will become well nigh impossible. I argued in *Salvator Mundi* that the latter of these two words should never be rendered "everlasting" and gave reasons for believing that it should either be transferred into our English Version, and that we should read "*æonial* life" and "*æonial* punishment"; or, if this should be thought too technical and pedantic, that we should keep our word "eternal" for it, since many of us already used the word *eternal* in the same double sense in which *αἰώνιος* is used in the Greek, and all of us might easily learn to do so, now meaning by it

“spiritual,” now “agelong.” But all that I ventured to propose has been done in our Revised Version. The word “everlasting,” implying endless duration, is never once applied whether to the future life or to the future punishment of man: wherever this word once stood, we now read “eternal,” and even where we still read “for ever” or “for ever and ever,” we are fairly warned in the margin that in the Original we have “through the ages” or “for the ages of the ages.”¹

Nor is it possible, even where the word “eternal” occurs, that any careful student of the English Testament can take it as an equivalent for “everlasting.” And that as for other reasons, so also for this. St. Paul thrice speaks (Rom. xvi. 25; Titus i. 2; 2 Tim. i. 9) in our New Version of “times eternal.” Now a time may be æonial or agelong; but how can *time* be everlasting? and how, above all, can there be *many* everlasting times?

If our supposed student, intelligent but unlettered, with nothing but the New Version of our English Testament before him, should make this discovery also—as in time he must,—could it fail to confirm the conclusion he had already drawn from the other changes of which he had taken note? With all three words gone—“hell,” “damnation,” “everlasting,”—is it credible that he should hold that doctrinal conception of the future fate of the wicked which, in the popular mind at least, has been mainly founded on these very words?

Nor is it of any use, as he will soon detect for himself, for those of us who have rejected this dogma, or for those who still hold to it, to pretend that, after all, we differ only on a single point, and that not of the first importance.

¹ And here I may remark, in passing, that in such marginal readings as “this age” and “the coming age” which abound in our New Version, there lie the germs, latent for the present, of far larger doctrinal changes than either of those which I am now suggesting.

It is of the first importance, and it runs far beyond a single point—so far as to give form and colour to our whole system, not of theology alone, but of ruling principles and practical beliefs. It radically affects our conception of God, of his character, of his rule. We can hardly take up the biography of any great writer of our own time without seeing that the dogma of endless torment and punishment has much of the growing scepticism and unbelief of the age to answer for. Many of them have rejected it, and with it, alas, the whole creed of which it has hitherto formed part. When we are admitted to their most secret thoughts, we find them asking such questions as these: “To what end do men tell us God is just, when they attribute to Him deeds from which our natural sense of justice revolts? To what purpose do they assure us that God is love, when they ascribe to Him deeds from which even the fellest Hate would shrink?” And so it has come to pass that we have long made our very God the scourge by which we have driven some of the noblest minds among us from all faith in Him, from all communion with Him, and have then consigned them to an interminable torment for lack of the very faith which we ourselves have made impossible to them!

It will, I hope, be some consolation to those who still cling to this dogma for themselves, in prospect of the inevitable change at hand, to remember that the change they dread will at least remove the rock of offence which has long lain at the threshold of the Church, and over which so many noble souls, “naturally Christian,” have stumbled and fell. While to those of us who have long held Christ to be the Saviour of *the Lost*, the change they dread cannot but be most welcome. It is indeed a very small thing that we who have long been denounced as dangerously in the wrong should at last be pronounced, and that by the New Testament itself, to be, in some

large measure at all events, in the right: but it is a very great thing that any candid and intelligent man who will patiently study the English New Testament for himself may now find in it a God whom he can honour and love as the very Incarnation and Ideal of all justice and all charity; a God who will by no means spare the guilty indeed, but who will punish them justly and not unjustly, and who will at the same time temper judgment with mercy, nay, cause mercy to rejoice over judgment.

If the New Version had no other claim upon us, it has this supreme claim; that, with all its defects, it brings us, on all grave doctrinal questions, nearer to "the mind of the Spirit."

S. Cox.

SOME CRITICISMS ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE REVISED VERSION.

THE more closely we look into the Revised Version, the more apparent is the lack, in numerous instances, of fine scholarship. Certainly, no fixed principles seem to have guided the learned translators in their dealings with ὡστε, as was shewn in the first Article. The three Participial Tenses also have bitterly complained, apparently with justice, of unworkmanlike treatment. This was discussed in Article II., wherein a certain law or rule was formulated, bearing upon the distinct uses of the three participial tenses. It may now be added that this law, which I then framed, I have tested for many years; and (unless I am mistaken) have verified it by instances so numerous, that it seems to be a *rule* with few exceptions. It was shewn in that Article that, if the rule therein formulated be

correct, some grave errors have been committed in constructions of participial tenses with verbs of *seeing*; errors always impairing, sometimes destroying, the true idea which the Greek writer intended to place before the reader. It is to be regretted that a similar inattention to close scholarship appears now and then in the method of dealing with other verbs of perception in the like construction. It is true that in the text 2 Peter i. 18, τὴν φωνὴν ἠκούσαμεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθεῖσαν the learned Revisers have duly respected the participial aorist in the rendering "this voice we heard *come* out of heaven:" where the variant in the margin for *come* is *brought*: this alternative rendering also is good as being aoristic: nevertheless, it seems to me that better than either *come* or *brought* would have been "*borne* out of heaven." But if the *aorist* was here recognised in ἐνεχθείσης, why was the *imperfect* ignored in λαλοῦντος, John i. 37? Why was ἤκουσαν αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος rendered, just as if λαλοῦντος were identical with λέξαντος or εἰπόντος, "they heard him *speak*?" Surely the rendering "they heard him speaking" or "talking," or "they heard him as he spake" or "talked," would have been not only more correct in itself, but probably more in keeping with the context. For the preceding context presents to us a picture of John *standing still* and of Jesus *walking about*. The Baptist, we read, εἰστήκει—"was standing;" the coming Teacher, as was the way with the teachers of those days, περιεπάτει—"was pacing about." As the latter slowly paced to and fro, the former would more than once utter in tones audible to the bystanders "Behold the Lamb of God!" But be this as it may, it would have been better and more true to the Greek to recognise the imperfect in λαλοῦντος by some such rendering as "heard him talking" or "heard him as he spake." Out of very many parallel passages in Greek tending to verify the above propounded theory of participial tenses constructed with verbs of *seeing*

and of *hearing* let two suffice as samples. Cassandra says (Agamemnon 1258),

εἶδον Ἰλίου πόλιν
πράξασαν ὡς ἔπραξεν,

i.e. "I saw Ilium's city *fare* as it did fare," "treated in what way it was treated," from first to last. Again in *Œdipus Colon*. 1645 we find

τοσαῦτα φωνήσαντος εἰς ἡκούσαμεν,

"all this we heard him *speak* aloud."

We now proceed to discuss the treatment of *ἵνα* in the Revised Version. Upon the uses of *ἵνα* much has been written, but little hitherto that presents a distinct view of them. *Grimm* has done good service in classifying parallel texts, but he does not seem to have evolved any clear theory. *Winer's* views on this particle are perplexing in the extreme, a labyrinth without a clue. The inexorable *Meyer* clings with a strange pertinacity to the *telic* or *final* use of *ἵνα*: to this one use he makes all contexts bend alike. Nevertheless *Meyer's* scrupulous and rigorous scholarship seems to have found *large* favour with some eminent commentators among ourselves. For instance, *Alford* and *Ellicott* have drafted into their notes much of what he has written about *ἵνα*. No doubt, *Meyer* has made a mark on English exegesis. He seems to have bewitched some of our ablest expositors. Who can tell how far the learned Revisers themselves may have been *bemeyered*? Was it his potent spell of the *telic* use that charmed them away from their better judgment, when they changed "*should* fall" into "*might* fall" (Rom. xi. 11)? or when they changed "be" into "*may* be" (1 Cor. vii. 29)? or "that they be with me" into "that they *may* be with me" (John xvii. 24)? or when they failed to change "that I *may*" into "that I *should*" (1 Cor. ix. 18)? But no wonder if they were now and then beguiled; for *ἵνα* is a difficult particle. And yet

if we glance through all that Grimm and Winer and Meyer and some others have written about it, we shall find that what is difficult in itself has been made more difficult still by a lack of simplicity in their method of analysis. The above named scholars, whenever they meditated upon the particle in question, seemed utterly unable to get out of their heads the haunting notion, that the idea of *design* or *purpose* is an inalienable attribute of *iva*; that, be the surroundings what they may, let the context frown or protest never so much, nevertheless some little measure of purpose, an ounce of intent, or a dram of design is a necessary ingredient in the composition of *iva*'s use.

From this rooted opinion, coming often into contact with a context that contradicted it flat, was engendered that hybrid curiosity in modern scholarship, that veritable minotaur of philology, which is called sometimes "a combination of *purpose* and *consequence*," and sometimes "a combination of *purpose* and *purport*." In these two appellations, frequently used, it is evident that the idea of *purpose* is a constant quantity, that it belongs to the fixed opinion about *iva*'s essential sense or use; while the ideas of *consequence* and of *purport* as clearly belong to the contexts which may happen to surround *iva*. Alford seems to have felt this strongly when he wrote on 1 Corinthians xiv. 13 "the idea of *purpose* is inseparably bound up with this particle, and can be traced wherever it is used." He then goes on to say that in the phrase *to pray that* "the *purport* and *purpose* become compounded in the expression." To shew further how stereotyped in thoughtful minds this opinion is, or was some years ago, I well remember once asking a distinguished scholar "How do you explain the *iva* in the text 'command *that* these stones be made bread'" (Matt. iv. 3)? He answered me promptly and without a moment's hesitation, "Simple enough the principle: it is a combination of two ideas—thus, Command

these stones to become loaves in order that they may become so." This explanation, not being simple, was not convincing: for it is obvious that grammatical duplicity is as unsatisfactory in its way as moral duplicity is. The truth is, language is simple: one idea is quite enough for one clause to carry at a time, whether it be an *iva* clause or any other. If therefore we would try and solve the riddle of *iva*, we must first clear the course by removing the obstacle that has so long beset the path, even by exterminating this modern monster of two heads, this double-walking amphisbæna which guards the approach, I mean the so-called combination of two ideas in one clause, the combination whether of purpose and result or of purpose and purport. But, this obstruction being swept away, it is not easy to propound a lucid theory, that shall explain all the difficulties. Nevertheless I venture to lay before the reader one that was formulated by me some twenty years ago; one that I have found useful, and in most instances satisfactory to myself. It is a theory that receives support from its being flexible alike to *iva* in Greek, and to *ut* in Latin, and to *that* in English.

There are, it appears, three uses of *iva*: the first may be called the *definitive* use, when *iva* ushers in a clause simply explanatory of something, whether that something be the subject of the verb, as in English *It is a pity that he should go so soon*, or the object of the verb as in the clause *I advise that he go at once*. The second use is the well-known *telic* or *final* use, the admiration of Meyer, implying intention or design or purpose, as in English, "I will order the carriage *that we may start*." But besides these two uses, the *definitive* and the *final* or *telic*, which are not difficult, there is a third, which is difficult. I have accustomed myself to call it, for lack of a better term, the *subjectively ecclastic* use, or the use of *contemplated result*: in which the *iva* clause denotes a result not *actual* (this is the province of an ὥστε

clause with the *indicative* mood), but contemplated or viewed by some person or other as an effect possible or probable or reasonable. One instance of this use in English is, "Have they stumbled *that* they *should* fall?" (Rom. xi. 11) where the Greek *ἵνα πέσωσιν* is admirably rendered in the Vulgate *sic ut caderent*, less admirably rendered "that they *might* fall" by the learned Revisers, who in this instance preferred the *telic* to the *ecbatic*, and the view of Meyer and Alford to that of Origen and Chrysostom.

But if we would be clear upon this point, we must first banish clean from our thoughts this modern theory of "purpose and purport," or two distinct ideas embodied in one clause; and in order that we may destroy and deracinate this irrepressible double-headed monster, *ἵνα τήνδ' ἀμφίκρανον καὶ παλιμβλαστῇ κύνα πρόριζον ἐκτρίψωμεν* as Euripides would say, it is necessary that we discharge many missiles—*ἵνα πολλὰ τοξεύσωμεν*. These missiles will be passages illustrating the *definitive* use of *that* or *ut* or *ἵνα*, the definitive use pure and simple, without any admixture or alloy of *intent* or *design*. First we will quote a few passages in English, where the *that* clause simply defines the subject to the verb.

It is impossible that I should die.

It seems to me most strange that men should fear.

And 'tis great pity *that* the noble Moor

Should hazard such a place.

Is *it* meet *that* we *should* be an' ass?

The above lines from Shakespeare may be matched by such texts as "*It is expedient for you that* one man *should die* for the people;" or (with the *should* omitted), "*It is expedient for you that* I go away" (*συμφέρει ἵνα ἀπέλθω*). What is expedient? *It is expedient*. What does *it* mean? The explanation of *it* is a thought or idea or proposition contained in the *definitive clause* "*that* I go away," or

“that one should die for the people.” In other words “it,” namely, “that I go away” or “that one should die for the people,” is the subject of the sentence, of which “expedient” is the predicate. So in Latin: *Proximum est ut doceam*, “the next step is that I teach,” or “should teach;” where *ut doceam* simply defines the subject in a sentence in which *proximum* is the predicate. Again, Cicero has *Accidit ut in urbe essem*. Twins apparently in construction, are *Mos est hominum ut nolint eundem pluribus rebus excellere* (Cic. Brut., 21), and ἔστιν συνήθεια ὑμῶν ἵνα ἀπολύσω (John xviii. 39), well rendered in both the Versions, “Ye have a custom that I *should* release,” not “that I release,” but “that I *should* release”; and yet the two passages above cited are not twins really, but really dissimilar; for *ut nolint* is a *definitive* clause, and ἵνα ἀπολύσω a *subjectively ecclastic*, for the meaning clearly is, “There is a custom among you (requiring) that I should release”; albeit in the very next sentence, “Will ye therefore that I release,” curiously enough the same ἵνα ἀπολύσω is a *definitive* clause. But we may rightly compare, “Whence is *this that* the mother of my Lord *should come* unto me,” where “whence” is the predicate (τοῦτο ἵνα ἔλθῃ, Luke i. 43) with Horace’s

Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus, inter amicos
Ut nunquam inducant animum cantare rogati;

where the demonstratives *this* and τοῦτο and *hoc* are simply defined by the clauses ushered in by *that* and ἵνα and *ut*. It may be noted that in John iv. 34, “My meat is *to do* the will of him that sent me,” the construction is, “that I should do the will” (ἵνα ποιήσω) defines the subject, and “my meat” (ἐμὸν βρῶμα) is the predicate.

Furthermore, it should be well noted that the particles *ἵνα* and *ut* and *that*, are used to usher in clauses that define the *object* of the verb, as well as the subject of the verb.

After verbs of *willing, commanding, praying, desiring, exhorting, asking, expecting*, the object clause appears to be (with few exceptions) purely definitive, without any alloy or admixture of intent or design or purpose. In Shakespeare we find,—

All do *expect* that you *should* rouse yourself.

Admonishing,

That we *should* dress us fairly for our end.

He *wills* that you *divest* yourself.

Go *bid* thy mistress when my drink is ready

She *strike* upon the bell.

In this last cited passage, if any one supposes the construction to be “bid thy mistress to strike upon the bell, that she *may* strike thereupon,” let him also suppose the construction of Matthew iv. 3 to be, “command these stones to become bread, that they *may* become such.” At all events, this double dealing theory will hardly fit the following line from Henry V., Act 4, Sc. 1,—

I do not *desire* he *should* answer for me.

A thousand modern instances of this use might be quoted: let one suffice: “I had no *desire* that the contents of that telegram *should* be communicated to M. Le Fevre” (*St. James's Gazette*, March 29, 1882).

How often in Latin also does an objective *ut* clause define and specify the contents of the verb's general idea. For example, *suadeam tibi ut hoc agas*, sine te *exorem ut adsis*, *velitis jubeatis* Quirites *uti* prætor rem ad senatum *referat*. And precisely as is the construction of an objective definitive *that* clause in English, and of a similar *ut* clause in Latin, such is the construction of a like *iva* clause in Greek; not only in Hellenistic, but in *Attic* Greek also, albeit this last statement is questioned or denied by Winer and Meyer and others. It is true that in these instances from classical Greek the *iva* is generally omitted,

just as *that* is omitted in the passage of Macbeth, "Go bid thy mistress (that) she strike upon the bell"; but the principle is in no wise affected thereby. Let two instances suffice: *βοῦλει φράσω* (Aristoph., Equit., 36) and *θέλετε θηρασώμεθα* (Eur., Bacchæ, 719).

The principle above formulated being true, it is not easy to see upon what grounds the learned Revisers in John xvii. 24 inserted *may* in their new rendering "I will that, where I am, they also *may* be with me." This *may*, which is significantly and properly omitted in the Authorised Version, is neither more nor less than an impertinent intrusion; after the words *I will that* it is precisely not wanted; for, in an alien construction, it is a word savouring of *intent*: its very presence banishes simplicity and encourages duplicity, making room for the reappearance of that monstrous construction, the combination of purport and purpose, namely "I wish them *to be* with me *that* they *may be* with me." Besides, what makes the false rendering more strange, is the fact that it contradicts the true renderings given by the Revisers themselves in numerous other texts, in which *to will that* occurs; for instance John xviii. 39, "*Will ye that I release* unto you?" not "that I *may release*" but that I *release*." Moreover this inaccuracy tends to create ambiguity and to breed confusion in the whole sentence, which now runs thus: "I will *that they may be* with me, *that they may behold* my glory": for who can tell from this sentence, as it is, whether the second *that they may* clause is or is not intended to be an added improvement or corrective explanation of the first *that they may* clause? On the other hand, nothing can be clearer than the meaning of the old rendering "I will that they be with me, that (being with me) they may behold my glory;" the first clause *that they be* being *definitive* and specifying the contents of the Lord's will, the second *that they may behold* being *final*

or *telic* and denoting the objective end of the specified contents.

Again this modern amphisbæna seems to erect its double crest in the new rendering "Let us therefore give diligence to enter that rest, that no man fall" (Heb. iv. 11). This ambiguous rendering appears to postulate the following construction, "give diligence to enter into that rest—give diligence that no one fall;" for the omission of *may* before *fall* declares the *that* clause to be a definitive clause specifying the contents of the verb *give diligence*, and that too when the contents of this verb have already been specified in the words *to enter into that rest*. Probably this text in the Greek is a sentence in which the second clause contains the final cause of the first, and should be rendered "that no one may fall"; which indeed seems to be the meaning of the A. V. rendering "lest any man fall." It is a pity that in John viii. 56, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day" the obviously correct rendering *that he should see* was not transferred from the margin into the text: *to see* is a rendering not true to the true idea; for the phrase "I was delighted to see you" is very different in meaning to the phrase "I was delighted that I should see you," i.e. delighted at the idea or prospect of seeing you.

As the second use of *iva*, called the *telic* or *final*, is well known, we now proceed to the third, which I have termed the *subjectively ecclastic* use or use of *contemplated result*. This last, as compared with the other two, is difficult. The learned Revisers seem to have erred still more in the ecclastic than in the definitive, apparently drawn away from their finer judgment by the powerful magnet of the inexorable Meyer. The difficulty in this use lies mainly in the context of the *iva* clause. The character of the context determines the particular line of the subjectivity, and sometimes this particular line is not easy to trace;

even as it sometimes happens in the case of ὥστε with the infinitive; for example in ὥστε ἀκοῦσαι (Acts xix. 10), "And they continued for the space of two years, *for* all them which dwelt in Asia *to hear* the word," who can tell whether "for them to hear" was intended by the writer to mean "allowing them to hear" or "time enough for them to hear" or "with a view to their hearing"? Certainly the sacred historian never intended to state as a fact, what the Revised Version has made him state, namely "that *all they* which dwelt in Asia *heard* the word." And precisely as with ὥστε and the infinitive, so with ἵνα and its subjectively ecbatic use; the difficulty is to determine the direction of the subjectivity and its whereabouts, in *what mind* the conception resides; whether, for instance, the contemplated result is contemplated as such by one who is moving in the action or by others outside the action. This ambiguity may be removed to the reader by the translator supplying a link of connexion in the form of a brief phrase inserted between the context and the ἵνα clause; such a link as *a fact requiring or giving occasion or making it possible or desirable or reasonable* that. But in a rigorous translation like that of a Version such ellipses can hardly be inserted. To be sure, in the Latin Vulgate we find a clever instance of a curt *sic* inserted in Romans xi. 11, where ἵνα πέσωσιν is lucidly rendered *sic ut caderent*, "that they should fall" or "in such wise as to fall."

The above rule, examples of which may be found (in spite of what Winer and Meyer and others have said) in classical Greek, may aid us in testing some dubious renderings in the Revised Version. The last cited text shall come first in order. The question here is whether the ἵνα πέσωσιν comes under the *telic* use and means "in order that they might fall." If this view be correct, the idea of design or purpose must reside in some mind or

other. Does it reside in the mind of the Jew who stumbled? Clearly not: for as he did not stumble of choice, neither did he stumble on purpose that he might fall. Was then his future fall a final cause of his stumbling in the *divine mind*? Incredible; for how could St. Paul moot the idea of a divine purpose in one sentence, and pray for the thwarting of that purpose in the next? How could he append to such an idea, *God forbid* or *far be it*? We must therefore recall and reinstate the A. V. rendering "Did they stumble (so) that they should fall?" in other words, Did the Jew when he stumbled overhang the perpendicular so many degrees as to make it probable that he should finally fall flat? Let us rather believe that, arrested halfway and stereotyped aslant, he is to remain suspended between the vertical and the horizontal, say at an angle of 30 or 45 degrees, until in the lapse of centuries he regain his original upright position.

Neither is the rendering correct of *ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ* (1 Cor. i. 15) "lest any man should say," i.e. if this English means "in order that no man may say." The modern interpretation of this text seems to be, "I am thankful to God who, in order to prevent any one from asserting that in my name ye had been baptized, designedly brought about the fact of my having baptized very few in Corinth." This view, held by many moderns, cannot be right; it is out of all keeping with the line of argument. The truth is, this Verse 15 is in a serious *reductio ad absurdum* argument intended to refute an inference drawn from an inference. This might be shewn at length, did space permit. It is quite clear from the preceding context that the whole paragraph means *I am thankful to God* for the fact that no one did I baptize save Crispus and Gaius (a fact requiring) that no one should say that in my own name ye were baptized." The *ἵνα* or *that* here denotes, not purpose or design on the part of God, but a result contemplated as

necessary or possible by St. Paul. This is a clear instance of the *subjectively cebativ* use of *ἵνα*. On the other hand, the Revised Version rendering "lest any man should say" seems to me an instance of the *telic* use, which precisely breaks the logic here. It may be remarked that in the rendering "so that no one should say" the *should* has much the sense of *must*; and this *must* serves well enough to render the subjunctive sometimes, *e.g.*, in *τί εἶπω* "what must I say." If this be true, the Authorised Version rendering "how that he *must* suffer many things" (Mark ix. 12) might well have been allowed to remain. It may be asked, by the way, why in 1 Corinthians i. 15 was "any one" of the Authorised Version exchanged into "any man?" Surely "one" is truer to the Greek, and a term more comprehensive; who knows but St. Paul alluded to other creatures besides human?

Neither is the rendering correct "that ye *may* marvel" (John v. 20): for it is quite clear that "their marvelling" was not viewed as the final cause of the "greater works," but rather a contemplated result, the sense of the *ἵνα θαυμάσητε* being obviously, "enough to make you wonder," precisely the *ὥστε θαυμάσαι* of Attic Greek. Neither is the alteration an improvement but rather the reverse in 1 Corinthians i. 27, "God chose the foolish things *that* he *might* put to shame them that are wise" (rather feeble and verbose "them that are wise"; why not "wise men," or if "the" must be retained before "foolish things" "the wise men"?): for nothing can be clearer than this, that *ἵνα* here does not denote *design* on God's part in putting to shame the wise men, but a contemplated necessary and negative result of the design itself, which design was the selection of the fittest for the kingdom, and the fittest would be mostly found among such as were not pre-occupied by the world's wisdom. We must therefore recall and reinstate the Authorised Version's "to confound" or

rather "to put to shame," unless we substitute "so as to put to shame."

Neither in 1 Corinthians iv. 21, is the rendering to be admired of *τί θέλετε; ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἔλθω ἢ ἐν ἀγάπῃ*; "What will ye? shall I come with a rod or in love?" Manifestly a more correct translation would be "*Which* do ye choose? With a rod must I come or in love?" or "with a rod that I come:" where *ἵνα* must be supplied before *ἔλθω*, just as *that* must be before *she strike* in "Go bid thy mistress she strike upon the bell." Compare also Luke ix. 54, *θέλεις εἰπωμεν* well rendered in the Revised Version "wilt thou that we bid." It is obvious that in 1 Corinthians iv. 21 *τί=πότερον*, just as in verse 7 of the same chapter *τίς=πότερος*, "which" of us two.

Neither is the strange rendering in 1 Corinthians vii. 29, "that henceforth *those* that have wives may be as though they had none," one that can stand the test. In the first place, why has the demonstrative *those* been allowed to displace the correct *they* of the Authorised Version? There is no *οὗτοι* in the Greek text. Why the final *may* has been permitted to usurp the seat of the consequential *should*, is easily explained; for it is clear that the learned Revisers have again preferred the *telic* use to the *ecbatic*, steering steadily in the wake of the indomitable Meyer and of other equally rigorous expositors. Nearly all recent commentators seem to see the "divine counsel" in this *ἵνα* clause, which in fact has nothing at all to do with the divine counsel—quite the other way—but simply denotes a natural result or effect of an antecedent cause, contemplated as such by St. Paul and intended by him to be contemplated as such by his Corinthian readers,—an *inference*, in fact, that may be fairly deduced from the *premiss* "the time is straitened." It matters little with which clause we take *τὸ λοιπόν*, which means "in what remains" or "in what is left"; for whether we take it with the

protatic clause and render "that *henceforth*," or with the apodotic and render "the time is straitened in what remains" of it, in neither case can *iva* possibly signify, as so many expositors insist, *in order that*, denoting (to quote from one of them) "the divine counsel in shortening the time." For is it probable that a state of sitting loose to worldly interests should be described as the aim or purpose of God in curtailing the season of the great tribulation? This might be a divine motive for the terrors and portents of the last time being lengthened, hardly for the last time itself being shortened. Again is it probable that St. Paul should assign such a motive for the curtailment, when evidently he is here giving merely *an opinion of his own*, not recording a divine inspiration? That he does state merely a view of his own, is clear from the first words of this text, "but this I affirm, brethren." No doubt in this clause *iva* has precisely the same use as in 1 Corinthians i. 15, and the ellipse or missing link to be supplied is "(a fact requiring) that": this ellipse (to take a leaf from the Latin Vulgate) may be condensed into *so*, and the sentence rendered "the time is straitened in what is left, so that they who have wives should be as men having none."

"Once more and yet once more" the *telic* is permitted to eclipse the *ecbatic* in 1 Corinthians ix. 18, "What then is my reward? That, when I preach the gospel, I *may* make the gospel without charge." What is the meaning of the expression "my reward is that I *may* make the gospel without charge"? Is *reward* identical with *object* or *design*? This central text is an important one; it may be termed the eye of the chapter, the pivot on which the whole argument turns; but it seems to have been simply misunderstood and mistranslated in both Versions. It would take too much space now to state in full what appears to me the only right rendering of this curious text, involving a construction easy enough to unlock, if we apply

the key of the subjectively ecbatic use. A new translation, one that shall not identify *reward* with *object*, will be set before the reader in another Article ; in which the treatment in the Revised Version of nouns in $\mu\alpha$ and of the middle voice and of some hard texts will come under review.

T. S. EVANS.

THE SELF-STANDARD DECEPTIVE.

2 CORINTHIANS x. 12.

THE Jewish members of the primitive Church, even though they were sincerely converted to Christ, could not throw off the habits of a lifetime or the hereditary tendencies of their race. At no time indeed, no, not even when a new life had been quickened within them, do Pharisees find it easy to shed either their ecclesiastical habits or their theological opinions. Could they have had their way, Christianity would have been but a reformed or fulfilled Judaism, looking back on a Messiah who had come instead of looking forward to a Messiah who was to come, and provided with an additional rite—Baptism, and an additional feast—the Lord's Supper. Naturally, therefore, the broad and catholic spirit of St. Paul was an offence to them. *They* still plumed themselves on the superiority of the Jew over the Gentile, while *he* refused to see any vital difference between Gentile and Jew, but counted all "one in Christ Jesus." To them Religion was still mainly a thing of rites and precepts, while to him circumcision was nothing and the law was dead, and charity, or love, was at once the end and the fulfilling of the commandments. The gulf between them and him was as deep, the opposition as sharp, as that which obtains between the modern Sacerdotalist and

Sacramentarian, who holds the substance of religion to be submission to the priest and the due observance of ritual, and the Free Churchman who believes in a Divine Charity at work for the redemption of the whole race, and holds that to love God and his neighbour is the whole duty of man.

Once embarked in the controversy with St. Paul, these proud and self-satisfied Pharisees—the Judaists, as they are called—grew more and more bitter, and descended to the use of weapons more and more unworthy of good or reasonable men. At first, no doubt, they honestly shrank from the new and unwelcome development which it was his mission to give to the faith and the church of Christ. But, soon, pride of race and pride of caste came in to vitiate the honesty of their opposition to him; and, ere long, they were flinging at him any aspersion, however unworthy or untrue, that came ready to their hands and was likely to lower his authority. *He* had never seen the Lord, they said, or heard his words, and held no commission direct from Him. His personal appearance was mean, his oratory contemptible, his courage questionable; however bold he might be when writing letters from a distance, he did not dare to meet them face to face and set his claims beside theirs.

St. Paul is answering these and similar aspersions when we meet him here. His authority, he contends, is as good as theirs. He *had* seen the Lord, and that in the most wonderful way, and received his commission straight from Him. If they are such eloquent and impressive orators, why do they not at least make converts of their own instead of trying to snatch his converts from him? And as for courage, though he has never yet feared the face of man, at one point he may be lacking in the courage for which they are conspicuous; he dare not praise and commend himself as they do. He leaves his works to speak for him.

They, having no works to shew, naturally fall back on great swelling words and loud autocratic assumptions.

But he is not content with argument and satire. He wants to get at the root of the matter. He wants to understand, and to make them understand, what it is that lies behind their opposition to him, and which prompts them to oppose him instead of doing good and quiet work of their own. And he finds this hidden but potent motive in their ignorance and self-conceit,—in what we might term their provincialism, or even their parochialism. Their minds have not travelled, if their bodies have. They do not know how many forms the truth may take; nay, of the higher and larger forms of truth they have not as yet so much as caught sight. Only the forms familiar in their own province, in their own parish, in their own circle, among their own set, carry any authority with them. When they come out into the great open world of thought they are bewildered, lost. To encounter the wider modes of thinking, the nobler ways of action, which lie outside their rustic purview, only renders them uncomfortable, distrustful, suspicious, sharpens their bigotry, intensifies and crystallises their narrowness. They have been wont to measure themselves *by themselves*; and, judging themselves by that poor standard, they have been content with themselves, with their modes of thought, their ways of action. And even now that their native world of Judaism has come toppling about their ears, and a whole new world, “a new creation,” has been called forth by Christ, they still go on comparing themselves with one another, and judging all men outside their little circle by their petty provincial standard; and so they still continue to rate themselves as the wisest and best, and look down on men to whom they ought to look up.

Three follies are rebuked by the Apostle in this brief passage which, egregious as they are, are nevertheless

always at work in the world, and were never more conspicuous, never more ludicrous, than they are at the present day.

1. The first is the folly of *measuring ourselves by our immediate neighbours*, by the standard of our sect, our set, our coterie, instead of by the loftiest standard and the noblest examples we can find,—and of being content with ourselves if we come up to that poor parochial standard. “With all your pretensions to superior wisdom you are *not* wise,” said St. Paul to his Judaic opponents and detractors; “and you shew your lack of wisdom in this: instead of trying yourselves by the largest and finest standard of human thought and conduct, or even by the noblest standard of *Jewish* thought and conduct, you are for ever measuring and comparing yourselves with one another. You do not want to know any truth that lies beyond your present limited reach, or to copy any nobler example than you can find in your own little ‘set.’ To be as wise as they are is enough for you. To be as good as they are is enough for you. You know, you want to know, of nothing wiser, nothing better. You do not believe that the wide world holds anything wiser or better. And hence, in your infatuation and self-conceit, you despise men to whom, because they are of a larger and more open mind, God has revealed his will more fully than to you, and given a larger measure of his wise and holy Spirit.”

To give the thought a modern turn which will sufficiently expose its folly, we may say that these men were each of them setting his private watch, not by the true mean time, nor even by the parish clock, but by one another’s watches; and when they had got the hands of their several dials to touch the same point, they determined that *that* was the true time for them, and for all the world, let the sun say what it would.

A folly so antique and so egregious can scarcely, we might

think, have survived to these modern days. But though you should bray men in a mortar, you would hardly get all the folly out of them. Men travel so much, communication with all parts of the world is now so constant and so rapid, that it seems almost impossible for a little knot of neighbours to isolate themselves from the rest of the world, to cherish a handful of narrow prejudices in common, and to give themselves all the airs of superior wisdom because they are so ignorant and so foolish. And yet these wiseacres, these "superior persons," are by no means uncommon; nor are they to be found only among the uncultivated vulgar. Cliques of poets, cliques of painters, cliques of literary and even of scientific men, cliques of politicians and metaphysicians, flourish among us who can see no wisdom or virtue beyond the limits of their own school, who pity or condemn the world at every point on which it ventures to differ from them, and who doubt the wisdom of Providence itself if it does not favour their cause. What is the parish clock, or Greenwich mean time, or even the sun itself, to them, if it does not tally with their pocket dial?

Even in the common walks of life this folly is as rife as ever. Which of us does not know men who *will* play "Sir Oracle" somewhere—in the club, the town council, the market place, the Church, if they can, and if they cannot, in their own office, on committees, among their own dependents, or at least by their several hearths? Which of us does not know some one man, of no extraordinary culture or gifts, who is perfectly ready to lay down the law even on subjects which he has never attempted to bottom, and to shew an architect how to build, a lawyer how he ought to have conducted his case, to teach a statesman politics, or a minister theology, or a musician music? Nay, if we are honest and know ourselves at all, must we not confess that we ourselves are constantly tempted to mount the tripod, utter oracular verdicts which have no inspiration,

hide our ignorance under airs of wisdom and authority, and, in playing the critic and censor, play the fool?

And yet we, who are so ready to think ourselves wiser than our neighbours, are quite content with ourselves if we are, or can decently assume that we are, as good as the general run of our neighbours; quite content if, when we measure and compare ourselves with them, we come up to the standard of conduct current among them. When we sit in judgment on them, our verdict may not be a favourable one; we may not rate them very high: but when we sit in judgment on ourselves, if we can only persuade ourselves that we do not fall beneath them, we see little necessity for rising above them. How many a man of business is content with himself, or sufficiently content to make no earnest effort at amendment if, in the conduct of his business, he takes no advantage which his neighbours and rivals would not take, launches into no speculation into which they would not launch, sanctions no adulteration, no deception, no overcharge which they would not sanction! How many religious persons are quite content with themselves if they know as much of the Bible as their fellow-worshippers know, or do as much for the Church! nay, how many take what their neighbours think and do and give as their main standard, and are at some little pains *not* to go beyond the general and customary limits!

And so, in innumerable ways, we go on measuring ourselves by ourselves and comparing ourselves with ourselves,—not looking out into the great world, or even into the great Church, beyond our narrow sectional or sectarian barriers; not trying ourselves by the only perfect standard, the will of God as manifested in the life of Christ; our standard sinking because it is so seldom rectified, until, if God do not correct us, our religion becomes little more than a name or a habit, and our life grows to be as worldly and self-regarding as public opinion will suffer it to be.

We need to be on our guard, then, and to set our watches by the sun, not by our neighbours' watches, nor even by the parish clock, lest we lose the true time altogether.

2. The second folly rebuked by St. Paul grows out of the first. For when men have satisfied themselves that they have reached the standard in vogue among their neighbours, and need strain no higher, they commonly *make themselves the standard by which other men are to be tried*. Having first made their immediate neighbours—mostly people who agree with them and feel with them—their standard, the standard by which they have tried themselves, they go on to make themselves the standard by which they try neighbours outside their immediate circle, if not also those who are within it; condemning all who differ from them, whatever the cause of the difference; condemning us if we believe less than they do, but also condemning us if we believe more; condemning us if we stand still when they advance, but condemning us none the less if we advance when they stand still; fitting bad motives to our good deeds if our good works take a form which they have not sanctioned, or even refusing to admit that there can be anything good outside the field which they have blessed.

It was thus with the Judaic opponents of St. Paul, though they were not what we should call bad men, unless a narrow and rigid sectarianism makes men bad, as perhaps it does. Whatever he taught, whatever he did, they suspected him, or even condemned him, until at last they formed a habit of attributing the worst motive to his best deeds, and even condescended to ridicule his personal appearance, as if there were some argument in that! Did he remain unmarried that he might be more free to encounter perils in the service of the Church? *That* was to reflect on St. Peter and the other Apostles who had taken a wife. Did he preach the Gospel without charge that his

disinterestedness might appear unto all men? That was because he *wanted* to be seen of men, and to imply that they, his opponents, had no right to live by the Gospel they preached. Did he refuse to impose circumcision on the Gentiles? That was both to insult the Jews and to make void the law. Did he collect alms from his Gentile converts for the poor Jews of Jerusalem? Let him be watched, or he might appropriate them to a private or a sinister use.

Now this was surely a terrible depth of baseness in men who professed to be animated, and in some measure were animated, by love for Christ. But may not we sink as low if once we make self the standard by which other men are to be judged? Who can have forgotten how the Church of our own day once treated those whom it dubbed "heretics" simply because they were before their time—such men as Maurice, Robertson, Lynch—though it now regards them as among its wisest and most devoted ministers; or how it treated Robertson Smith but the other day? It is but a little while since everything these men said was suspected, and everything they did misrepresented; and even good men could find no good thing in them.

Or if we turn to the political world, are similar instances lacking? Must we not confess that the temper which can see no good in a statesman of the opposite party, especially if he be either an avowedly religious man or a man a little before his day, is growing more common, and his very wisdom is denounced as folly, his very goodness derided as hypocrisy, and a selfish, or factious, or sinister motive is attributed to him even when his public conduct is most just, most patriotic, most loyal or generous?

It might well scare us from this ugly suspicious mood, so unworthy of reasonable, so doubly unworthy of Christian men, did we but remember the elementary rule, that we find the motives we attribute to others in our own hearts; that what we suspect in others is what we ourselves might

be guilty of in their place; that the man who can see no good, nothing but base and sinister motives, whether in statesmen or in teachers of the Church who differ from him, is a man who would himself prove a rogue, devoid of patriotism, were he in power, or a fomentor of error and unbelief were he an advocate and defender of the faith. The one man whom it is wise of us to suspect is he who is for ever suspecting others—betraying his own character in the character of his suspicions; the one man whom we may lawfully condemn is he who is for ever condemning others.

The only power that can raise men out of this depth of baseness, or guarantee them against it, is the power, or the “secret of Christ,” who has taught us to love men and not to judge them. When we make Him our standard instead of ourselves, and learn of Him to live for others instead of for ourselves, the meek, gentle, generous temper we derive from Him will lead us to find the good there is in every man, and to foster in him that which is good rather than to condemn in him an evil which we may only too easily find in ourselves. The temper which suspects and censures its neighbours is at the farthest remove from the mind that was in Christ Jesus; and if his mind be in us, that base and evil temper can have no lasting dominion over us.

3. St. Paul rebukes a third folly, proceeding from the previous two. Trying themselves by the standard of their neighbours, and finding that they met that easy standard fairly well; and then trying their neighbours by their own standard, and finding that *they* met it by no means well, the Judaists were so puffed up by the overweening self-estimate thus induced as to conclude that it was they, and not St. Paul, who were the real Apostles of Christ: that while he was utterly unfit for the prominent position he had usurped, and utterly incompetent for the great work he had taken in hand, they, on the contrary, were eminently qualified to adorn the most distinguished posts and to undertake the

most honourable and heroic enterprises. Had the Church but been wise, it would have turned with one consent, from him, to them.

As we look back and weigh the rival claims of the Apostle and his opponents, we are tempted to smile at their pretensions, so utterly baseless and absurd do they seem to us, until we remember how bitter they made his life to him, how hard his work. But before we give way to our natural scorn or indignation, it will be well for us to ask if no touch of their folly taints our wisdom. Surely there are men, in the Church as well as in the world of to-day, who would enter with a light heart on the very gravest responsibilities, and who, without counting the cost and considering whether they are able to meet it, are willing to engage in enterprises which might task the highest wisdom and courage. Surely we must all have met with men who have somehow persuaded themselves that, in almost every department of human activity, they know more and could do better than most of their neighbours. Yes, there are many even to-day who cherish a comfortable conviction that they could have filled a much more dignified position than any they have attained, and could have worthily expended a much larger wealth than they have ever possessed. There are still many among us who think that the Church would have shewn a truer wisdom had it elected them, in lieu of some of their neighbours, to posts of honour or of difficult and dangerous service. And we must all know *one* man—any glass will shew him to us—who finds it hard to convince himself that either God, or the Church, or the world, has given him quite as much honour, or trusted him with quite as much wealth or responsibility, as he could have wisely used, quite as much therefore as it is good for him to have.

Measuring ourselves by ourselves, and comparing ourselves with ourselves, we are not wise. No, it is our ignorance and our folly, not our wisdom, which prompts

that overweening estimate of ourselves and our own powers to which we are all prone, and which leads us indirectly to criticise, if not to censure, the Providence in which we profess to trust. And the one true remedy for it is to measure ourselves, not by ourselves, but by the standard of Christ; and to compare ourselves, not with one another, but with Him who was so great and yet so humble, so rich and yet so poor in spirit, so wise and yet so meek, who did so much for God and man and was yet so lowly of heart.

ALMONI PELONI.

ST. LUKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

IN the article by Dr. Sanday, on the Revised New Testament (Vol. II. pp. 401 *et seq.*), he adverts to the four parallel accounts of the Institution of the Lord's Supper, and notices a difficulty in the longer reading of St. Luke's account "arising from the apparent division of the Institution of the Cup into two parts, separated from each other by the Institution of the Bread." Dr. Sanday appears to hesitate as to whether the latter clause of the passage is to be accepted as genuine or not.

It appears to me that a comparison of St. Luke's account with the ceremonies observed by the Jews at the Passover supper in our Saviour's time presents at once a natural and reasonable explanation of the difficulty. I take the account of the Passover supper from Lightfoot's Temple service. There were four cups of wine drank at the supper, but only two of these were preceded by a blessing or thanksgiving: viz. the first and the third. Thus, according to the Talmudical schoolmen, "He gave thanks most especially over the first cup and over the cup of blessing, over the first cup and over the third."

Now let us compare the account of the Passover supper there given with St. Luke's account of this Institution of the Lord's Supper.

(1) The first cup was brought to the master of the family, who gave thanks over the wine, and then they drank it off. Now St. Luke does not say, as he does of the Bread, that our Saviour took the cup, but "He received a cup." He does not say to the disciples, "Drink ye all of it," but "Divide it among yourselves"; and He gives as the reason for this command, not, "For this is the new covenant in my blood," but "For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine," etc. This was evidently not the Sacramental Cup, but the first cup, which our Saviour Himself did not drink for the reason there given.

(2) After the first cup the Jews supped upon the food placed on the table, the master of the household explained to the children the origin and meaning of the supper, the first part of the Hallel was sung, and the second cup, over which no thanksgiving had been pronounced, was drunk. This part of the supper is expressed by the first two Evangelists by the words, "And as they were eating."

(3) The master of the household then took two cakes of unleavened bread, broke one of them in two, and, laying the broken cake upon the whole, he gave thanks to God. One half of the broken cake was given to one in the company, and the rest he retained to be reserved till they had eaten the Paschal lamb, when the reserved bread was eaten: after which "they tasted nothing at all," that is, the eating of the bread terminated the supper. This is exactly followed by St. Luke: "And He took bread, and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and gave to them, saying, This is my body," etc.

(4) Then the master of the household took the third cup, and gave thanks over it, and this cup was called "the cup of blessing."

St. Luke says, "And the cup in like manner"—that is, taking it and giving thanks—"after supper, saying, This is the new covenant in my blood," etc.

(5) Then they sang the rest of the Hallel, that is, from the 115th to the 118th Psalm, and drank the fourth cup, which was called the Cup of the Hallel. This is alluded to by the first two Evangelists: "And when they had sung a hymn, they went out," etc. The fourth cup was optional, and was not drunk by them.

This comparison shews, I think, the contrast between the two cups mentioned by St. Luke. The first was received, not taken; it was given to the disciples to be divided among themselves,

because our Saviour would not drink of the fruit of the vine any more on earth: and they were not told to drink all of it as representing his blood. What were instituted and consecrated, as the memorials of his passion and the symbols of his body and blood, were the cake of unleavened bread which terminated the supper, and the third or cup of blessing, which immediately followed it.

If this view is correct, the first cup mentioned by St. Luke was the first cup of the Passover supper; and it follows that St. Luke could not have copied St. Paul's report in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, but that they are independent reports.

I am inclined to account for the identity of many of the expressions in this way. In the Passover supper the master of the household gave an account of its institution before partaking of the Bread which closed the supper, and of the cup of blessing. When the disciples met together to break bread, they probably repeated the account of the Institution. By the words of which, repeated over the Bread and Wine, they consecrated them as the Body and Blood of our Lord. The account given by St. Paul was probably that which was repeated at the celebration of the Sacrament; and the expression "which also I delivered to you" refers to its having been delivered to them when partaking of the Lord's Supper.

WILLIAM F. SKENE.

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